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Abstract
SPEECH ACT THEORETIC SEMANTICS
by
Daniel W. Harris
Adviser: Professor Stephen Neale
Abstract:
I defend the view that linguistic meaning is a relation borne by an expression to a type of speech 
act, and that this relation holds in virtue of our overlapping communicative dispositions, and not 
in virtue of linguistic conventions. I argue that this theory gives the right account of the seman-
tics–pragmatics interface and the best-available semantics for non-declarative clauses, and show 
that it allows for the construction of a rigorous compositional semantic theory with greater ex-
planatory power than both truth-conditional and dynamic semantics.
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PREFACE & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The ideas of Paul Grice have come up often during the recent boom of work on the seman-
tics–pragmatics interface. In experiencing this boom, ﬁrst as an undergraduate at Simon Fraser 
University in , then in graduate seminars at the City University of New York, New York Uni-
versity, and Rutgers, as well as in summer schools at the Central European University in  and 
the University of Riga in , I have often thought that if we really want to understand the se-
mantics–pragmatics interface, it is not enough to be Griceans when it comes to pragmatics; we 
must also work out the details of a properly Gricean semantics.
Part of Grice’s ambition in introducing the program of intention-based semantics, initially in 
his  paper, ‘Meaning,’ and later in his  William James Lectures (: chs.–), was to 
give a theory of the timeless meanings of utterance-types, and this category includes (but is not 
exhausted by) the meanings of linguistic expressions. The most worked-out version of Grice’s take 
on linguistic meaning can be found in his  paper, ‘Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence Meaning, and 
Word Meaning’ (: ch.). This paper is a diﬃcult read, and it languished, unanthologized until 
the publication of Studies in the Way of Words in , in the pages of the short-lived and rela-
tively obscure journal, Foundations of Language (–). I suspect that the essay’s relative 
obscurity partly explains the fact that Grice has had little inﬂuence on contemporary theorizing 
about linguistic meaning.1  Grice’s  article has inﬂuenced the present work immensely. Grice 
v
1  Of course, Grice’s theory of conversational implicature has had a massive inﬂuence on seman-
tics, but this inﬂuence has been from outside, via its inﬂuence on pragmatics, by placing limits on 
what is generally taken to be the scope of semantic explanation. On occasion, Gricean reasoning 
has had a more direct inﬂuence on semantics—for example, via Schiﬀer’s () objections to 
hidden-indexical theories of propositional-attitude reports. Another example is Potts’ () use 
of Grice’s deﬁnition of conventional implicature in the course of bringing that notion into main-
stream semantics. (Ironically, of course, although Potts attributes all four of the clauses of his 
deﬁnition to Grice, he argues that none of Grice’s own examples are genuine cases of conventional 
implicature.)
does the following things in the paper: (a) he lays the foundations for a theory of the nature of 
sentence meaning and semantic underspeciﬁcation that I develop and defend in Chapter Two, (b) 
he builds on his intentionalist theory of illocutionary force, and hints at how it can be used to give 
a semantics of grammatical mood that inﬂuences the theory I build in Chapter Three;2  (c) he 
sketches a metasemantic theory that is the main inspiration for the theory I give in Chapter Four; 
and, ﬁnally, (d) he outlines a proto-speech-act-theoretic account of the composition of complex 
utterance-type meanings, which is one of the main inﬂuences on the account of the composition-
ality that I give in Chapter Five. To be sure, the sketches, outlines, and hints in Grice’s  article 
are incomplete and confused in various respects. I have had to extrapolate from, build on, and, in 
places, heavily revise Grice’s ideas in order to arrive at the theory spelled out here. And, of course, 
my own views have also beneﬁtted from a wide variety of other inﬂuences, some of which I’ll 
mention here. But it is unlikely that I would have thought up most of the components of what fol-
lows if I had not read, and re-read, Grice’s  paper.
The crucial thing about the ideas in that paper, as well as the ideas in this dissertation, is that 
their appeal is best seen from a perspective on the nature of language, communication, and the 
mind–language interface that is thoroughly Gricean. This is a perspective that I have inherited not 
only from Grice, but also from a succession of Gricean mentors. I bought my copy of Studies in 
the Way of Words for Mike Harnish’s undergraduate seminar at Simon Fraser University in .3  
In my term paper for that course, which anticipates some of Chapter Two of this dissertation, I 
vi
2  The initial formulation of Grice’s theory of illocutionary force can be found in his  essay, 
‘Utterer’s Meaning and Intention’ (: ch.). It builds on some ideas in Strawson ().
3  I ﬁrst read Martinich’s (/) anthologized versions of ‘Meaning’ and ‘Logic and Conver-
sation’ a year earlier, in Martin Hahn’s Philosophy of Language course at SFU, which was where I 
became interested in the philosophy of language in the ﬁrst place. The following autumn, Martin 
agreed to supervise a directed reading on Frege with me, and, in return, got to read a convoluted 
term paper in which I attempted to solve every problem in the philosophy of language all at once.
defended the view that the reference of a demonstrative is ﬁxed by the speaker’s communicative 
intentions. 
The reading list for Mike’s seminar also included Stephen Neale’s epic review of Studies, ‘Paul 
Grice and the Philosophy of Language’ (), which I have re-read several times since. It took a 
couple of years after I came to the Graduate Center to study with Stephen before he was able to 
convince me of the Gricean program in all of its nuance. By the middle of , I had become 
convinced of the fruitfulness of the methodological framework that Stephen calls linguistic prag-
matism, and I had decided to work out the implications of that framework for linguistic meaning. 
In the fall of , I met with Stephen nearly every week, and we took turns discussing the early 
bits of this dissertation as well as some articles that I was helping him to prepare for publication in 
a volume of collected papers. In several of those articles (, , a), Stephen outlines 
what he calls the blueprint theory of meaning, and in ‘Term Limits Revisited’ (), he sketches 
an “act-syntactic” approach to the meanings of noun phrases—both ideas that he presented in 
greater detail in his seminar on linguistic pragmatism in the spring of . I was convinced that 
these ideas pointed in the direction of the right sort of approach to semantics—one that also ﬁt 
nicely with Grice’s () approach. I had also been confused about how Stephen’s more conven-
tional work on semantics—such as what he says in Descriptions () and Facing Facts ()—
could possibly be compatible with his radically Gricean views about the semantics–pragmatics 
interface. So, with Stephen’s encouragement, I decided to work out a pragmatist approach to the 
foundations and methodology of natural-language semantics that could incorporate both the 
rigor of contemporary truth-conditional and dynamic semantics and the foundational depth of 
Griceanism. I am ﬁlled with gratitude for Stephen’s guidance and enthusiasm, without which this 
dissertation would not have been possible.
Others—Gricean or otherwise—who, in their roles as professors and mentors, and through 
their seminars, questions, comments, and encouragement, have helped to shape the views pre-
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sented here include Kent Bach, Liz Camp, Michael Devitt, Peter Hanks, Kirstie Laird, Sandra La-
pointe, Ernie Lepore, Peter Ludlow, Jeﬀ Pelletier, Craige Roberts, David Rosenthal, Stephen Schif-
fer, Dan Sperber, Jason Stanley, Zoltán Szabó, and Deirdre Wilson.
I would particularly like to single out Michael Devitt, Ernie Lepore, Gary Ostertag, and David 
Rosenthal, both for agreeing to be members of my dissertation committee and for being suppor-
tive and persistent forces for good in my intellectual life while I’ve been a graduate student.
I took several of Michael’s seminars early in my career at the Graduate Center, and the subtle 
pattern of ways in which we agree and disagree has forced me to attend to many details of my 
views that might otherwise have gone unarticulated. Michael has also been an invaluable model 
for how to stay focused on what is important, both philosophically and professionally, and I am 
grateful for this.
Ernie’s recent and ongoing work—much of it jointly thought up with Matthew Stone and Una 
Stojnic—conceives of the overall goals of semantics and pragmatics in communication-centric 
terms that I ﬁnd largely congenial, but our projects diverge on the details at nearly every choice 
point. Our resulting debates have been as enjoyable as they have been productive, and I look for-
ward to continuing them. I’ve also learned from Ernie that a crucial part of doing philosophy is 
working to create the social conditions for philosophy, that healthy and productive philosophical 
communities are fueled by a constant supply diverse viewpoints, contrasting personalities, and 
mutual fascination, and that the right kinds of attitude and eﬀort can reveal that philosophy is not 
a zero-sum game. I am fortunate to have learned these lessons at the start of my career.
My debates with David have tended to center around the most theoretically basic commit-
ments that underlie my project—the idea that intentional mental states ground the properties of 
speech acts, for example, and the idea that we must explain linguistic meaning compositionally at 
all. I like to think that I have come some way toward internalizing David’s foundational concerns, 
so that I will continue to worry about and make progress on them in the years to come. I am 
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grateful for this, and I feel lucky to have had David as a mentor and a friend for the past several 
years.
Gary has been a patient, careful, and energetic interlocutor since I ﬁrst met him in my second 
year at the Graduate Center. He read many early versions of my work, and has always been adept 
at pointing out large and small problems in my arguments while at the same time keeping my 
own explanatory goals charitably in focus. Gary’s home base at the Kripke Center is a place where 
I can reliably go to upgrade both my philosophical acumen and my musical taste in the most en-
joyable ways possible.
I am also greatful to all of the following people for their inﬂuence on the ideas contained in 
this dissertation, either through philosophical conversation, via their excellent questions at talks, 
or by commenting on drafts of chapters: Josh Armstrong, Endre Begby, Ray Buchanan, Alexis 
Burgess, Nate Charlow, Lars Dänzer, Imogen Dickie, Daniel Fogal, Peter Hanks, Megan Henricks 
Stotts, Thomas Hodgson, Zoe Jenkin, Marilynn Johnson, Jessica Keiser, Phil Kremer, Oliver Mar-
shall, Rachel McKinney, Eliot Michaelson, Lisa Miracchi, Friderike Moltmann, Adam Morton, 
Matt Moss, Sarah Murray, Myrto Mylopolous, David Pereplyotchik, Ariadna Pop, Jesse Rappa-
port, Gurpreet Rattan, Indrek Reiland, Mark Schroeder, Will Starr, Matthew Stone, and Elmar 
Unnsteinsson.
I presented earlier versions of some of the work contained here at the Atlantic Canadian 
Philosophical Association’s Annual Meeting at Kings College in Halifax in October of , at the 
UCLA/USC Graduate Philosophy Conference at UCLA in February of , at the conference on 
Meaning, Context, and Implicit Content in Cérisy, France in June of , at the New York Phi-
losophy of Language Workshop in September of , March of , and January of , at 
APA Paciﬁc Division Meetings in Seattle in April of  and in San Francisco in March of , 
at the CUNY Cognitive Science Speaker Series in March of , at the Society for the Study of 
the History of Analytical Philosophy’s annual meeting at McMaster University in May of , at 
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thanks to the audiences at each of these venues for their thought-provoking feedback.
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CHAPTER ONE: MEANING, SPEECH ACTS, & METHODOLOGY
What is linguistic meaning? In the context of contemporary philosophy of language and linguis-
tics, to answer this question would be to articulate and explicate a concept of meaning that can 
play the various explanatory roles demanded of it by pragmatics, semantics (lexical and composi-
tional), and metasemantics—a concept that can play nicely with our best theories of the workings 
of the human mind, the nature of representation, and the intricacies of communication and social 
interaction. The articulation and explication of such a concept is the task of this dissertation.
This chapter will serve as an introduction to the project, its place in the dialectical landscape 
of current thinking about meaning and communication, and its methodological background. In 
§., I give a brief introduction to my own theory of linguistic meaning, which I call speech-act-
theoretic semantics. In §., I introduce the Gricean theory of speech acts that I favor. The main 
purpose of this dissertation is not to defend Griceanism, but to articulate and defend an approach 
to semantics that can interface with a Gricean approach to pragmatics. Nevertheless, because the 
Gricean approach to speech acts is an important component of speech-act-theoretic semantics as 
I conceive of it, it is important that I say something about why I favor the approach. In §., I out-
line my overall methodological approach to the study of linguistic meaning, situating it within 
Gricean speech-act theory.
1.1  Speech-Act-Theoretic Semantics: The Basic Picture
Speech-act-theoretic semantics identiﬁes the meaning of an expression with the type of speech act 
that the members of a community are disposed to perform with the expression and interpret oth-
ers as performing with it. This approach encompasses approaches to several broad components of 
the study of linguistic meaning, each of which breaks away from contemporary orthodoxy.
1
Metasemantics addresses the question: In virtue of what do expressions have meaning for a 
group of speakers? The dominant answer to this question is that expressions have meaning in vir-
tue of the linguistic conventions in which language-users participate. In Chapter Four, I will oﬀer 
a series of objections to this view and defend the alternative view that an expression has meaning 
for a group of speakers in virtue of their overlapping dispositions to perform speech acts of a cer-
tain type with the expression, and to interpret utterances of the expression as performances of the 
same type of speech act. We can think of the type of speech act thus related to an expression as its 
meaning for the relevant community.
Compositional Semantics addresses the questions: What are the meanings of complex expres-
sions—such as sentences—and how are complex expressions’ meanings determined by their struc-
tures and the meanings of their parts? The two mainstream answers to this question are truth–con-
ditional semantics, on which sentences’ meanings are properties that ﬁx their truth conditions 
relative to contexts, and dynamic semantics, on which sentence meanings are context-change po-
tentials. I will raise objections to both of these genres of semantics in Chapters Two and Three, 
and argue that sentence meanings are types of illocutionary acts. On the most inﬂuential versions 
of both truth-conditional and dynamic semantics, simpler meanings combine via functional ap-
plication to yield complex meanings. In Chapter Five, I’ll defend the alternative view that seman-
tic composition is a matter of the way in which our dispositions to perform word-sized speech 
acts add up to our dispositions to perform sentence-sized speech acts, and that facts about this 
adding-up are intimately connected to combinatory speech acts such as predication.
Lexical Semantics addresses the question: What are the meanings of semantically primitive ex-
pressions? Semanticists answer this question in a variety of ways; most inﬂuentially, they say that a 
word’s meaning is its character—a function from possible contexts to the word’s contents at those 
contexts. In Chapter Two, I argue that this answer can’t account for the ways in which words can 
be used to do diﬀerent things on diﬀerent occasions, and defend the alternative answer that the 
2
meanings of semantically primitive expressions are types of acts of referring to objects, properties, 
and relations.
Speech-act-theoretic semantics incorporates the advantages of use-theoretic approaches to 
meaning by making the meaning of an expression a matter of what people are disposed to do with 
it, rather than merely a matter of what the expression stands for. In performing speech acts with 
particular expressions, we don’t just represent the world and what’s in it; we also ask questions, 
issue directives, signal presuppositions, imply things beyond what we say, express non-cognitive 
mental states, and signal socially signiﬁcant facts about ourselves. Since these are all aspects of the 
speech acts that we are disposed to perform with particular expressions, speech-act-theoretic se-
mantics can ﬁnd a place for each in its account of those expressions’ linguistic meanings. This 
gives speech-act-theoretic semantics signiﬁcantly more explanatory power than mainstream se-
mantics when it comes to dealing with the aspects of natural languages that set them apart them 
from the artiﬁcial languages of logic and mathematics.
Speech-act-theoretic semantics retains the chief explanatory advantage of truth conditional 
semantics and dynamic semantics by accounting systematically for the compositionality of lin-
guistic meaning in terms of the compositionality of speech acts. Just as the meaning of a sentence 
depends systematically on the meanings of its parts, the properties of sentence-sized speech acts 
(like the act of asserting that Ludwig is a philosopher) depend systematically on the properties of 
the word-sized speech acts which are involved in their performance (like the act of referring to 
Ludwig and the act of predicating the property of being a philosopher of him). 
The idea of explicating linguistic meaning in terms of speech acts is not new.1  Other proposals 
for speech-act-theoretic approaches to semantics include those of Alston (), Barker (), 
Searle (). Given particular approaches to speech-act theory, it is also possible to understand 
3
1  Unless I indicate otherwise, I will reserve the phrase ‘speech-act-theoretic semantics’ exclu-
sively for my own view.
some versions of expressivism and dynamic semantics as speech-act-theoretic approaches to se-
mantics.
My own approach to semantics diﬀers from each of these views in a variety of ways, but one of 
the most crucial points of disagreement revolves around their diﬀerent accounts of the nature of 
speech acts. Searle and Alston defend variations on the Austinian view that illocutionary acts are 
constituted, at least in part, by linguistic convention. Expressivism revolves around the idea of 
identifying speech acts in terms of the kinds of mental states they express. Dynamic semantics is 
based on the Stalnakerian idea of identifying speech acts by their eﬀects on discourse context. I’ll 
brieﬂy critique each of these conceptions of speech-act theory in §..
Precursors of the kind of theory I’ll defend here can be found in the work of Paul Grice 
(), Stephen Neale (, forthcoming), and Stephen Schiﬀer (). What ties their ideas 
together with mine is a Gricean approach to communication and speech-act theory, according to 
which performing a speech act is a matter of producing an utterance with addressee-directed 
communicative intentions. The idea that the speech-act types with which I identify expressions’ 
meanings are individuated in terms of the kinds of communicative intentions underlying them 
will be a crucial component of the semantic accounts that I develop in Chapters Two and Three. 
But although this idea has been defended by Grice, Neale, Schiﬀer, and others, nobody until now 
has attempted to fully articulate speech-act-theoretic semantics, systematically show why it is bet-
ter than the contemporary alternatives, defend it against objections, or work out the details of 
how it can help us to understand the meanings of a range of particular linguistic phenomena. 
These my the goals.
4
1.2  A Gricean Theory of Speech Acts
Speech-act-theoretic semantics draws on the explanatory resources of a Gricean approach to the 
mind–language interface, human communication, and—in particular—speech acts.2  A Gricean 
theory of communication includes two interwoven components: the theory of speaker meaning, 
which spells out speakers’ contributions to communication, and the theory of interpretation, 
which spells out addressees’ contributions. Both of these components are psychologistic, in that 
they explicate the concepts involved in theorizing about meaning and communication in terms of 
the mental states of speakers and hearers, respectively. To mean something, Grice tells us, is to 
produce an utterance with some communicative intention. Roughly: a communicative intention 
is an intention to produce a certain response in an addressee, in part by means of the recognition 
of that intention.3   An addressee successfully interprets the speaker if she recognizes their inten-
tion to produce that response. The job of a theory of interpretation is to explain the non-
demonstrative inferential process by which audience members come to recognize communicative 
intentions. 
The two halves of the Gricean theory of communication are psychologically intertwined and 
constitutively cooperative. Utterers can intend to aﬀect their addressees only in ways that they 
believe are possible, and, because communicative intentions are reﬂexive, in the sense that they 
involve intending that one’s addressee recognize that one intends to produce a certain response, 
5
2  The canonical texts of the Gricean tradition include Bach (), Bach and Harnish (), 
Bennett (), Grice (, , , , ), Loar (), Neale (, , , 
forthcoming a), Schiﬀer (, , ), Sperber and Wilson (/), Strawson (, 
), Wilson and Sperber (). The version of Gricean speech-act theory I will construct here 
diﬀers from the accounts given by all of these authors in greater or lesser ways, but it comes clos-
est to the ideas of Grice (, ), Strawson (), and Schiﬀer (: ch.). I mostly agree 
with the version of Griceanism that can be found in Neale () and Neale (forthcoming a), and 
much of the present chapter is inﬂuenced by those articles and by conversations with Neale.
3 The precise formulation of communicative intentions is a matter of considerable debate among 
Griceans; see Bach and Harnish (), Bennett (), Grice (, ), Neale (), Schiﬀer 
(), Sperber and Wilson (/), and Strawson () for some of the most inﬂuential ar-
guments and proposals.
an utterer can have a communicative intention only if she believes that it is possible for her ad-
dressee to recognize that she intends to produce the relevant response. These doxastic constraints 
on intentions will depend on an utterer’s beliefs about how her addressees will interpret her; ad-
dressees’ interpretations, which proceed via nondemonstrative inference, must be based on their 
beliefs about utterers’ larger plans and other psychological states. One of Grice’s great insights was 
to posit a shared stock of norms that govern both sides of this communicative equation, and in-
deed all cooperative behavior, by guiding the processes behind both intention-formation and 
intention-recognition. According to Grice, the overarching norm is the Cooperative Principle: 
“Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the 
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (: ). Grice 
goes on to formulate a collection of maxims of conversation that govern some forms of commu-
nicative cooperation speciﬁcally.4  Although Grice’s best-known application of the maxims of con-
versation was to his theory of conversational implicature, the cooperative principle and the max-
ims should be understood as guiding all aspects of the psychological processes underlying com-
munication of the sort that Grice was interested in.
A useful and equivalent way of describing communication is in terms of the performance and 
interpretation of communicative illocutionary acts. Following Austin (), I’ll say that an illocu-
tionary act is an act that one performs in producing an utterance, such as an act of asserting a 
proposition, asking someone a question, directing someone to do something, marrying someone, 
voting in an election, and so on. The central idea of Gricean speech act theory is that there is a 
theoretically signiﬁcant category of communicative illocutionary acts whose performance is con-
stituted solely by the production of an utterance with certain communicative intentions. Within 
6
4  The status and formulation of the maxims is another matter of controversy among Griceans 
and other theorists. For some inﬂuential revisionary proposals, see Bach and Harnish () and 
Sperber and Wilson (/). One clear limitation of Grice’s formulation of the maxims that I 
will discuss in Chapter Three is that his maxims of quality and quantity don’t apply to non-
assertive speech acts. 
this genre of speech act theory, there is much disagreement about details, but the theory I’ll pre-
sent here draws on, adjusts, and elaborates ideas that can be found in Grice (, ), Schiﬀer 
(), and Strawson (). To perform a communicative illocutionary act, on this view, re-
quires meeting the following schematic condition:
(GI) Gricean Illocution
 S performs an illocutionary act α in uttering u only if S utters u intending:
 () to produce thereby a certain response Δ in a certain addressee A;
 () A to recognize S’s intention ();
() A’s response Δ to be at least partly based on of her recognition of () and (in some 
cases) partly on the basis of some further reason ρ.
(GI) is not suﬃcient for the performance of an illocutionary act by anyone’s lights. Strawson 
() adds a fourth clause requiring A to also recognize S’s intention (). Schiﬀer, after arguing 
that this is still not suﬃcient, argues that the deﬁnition must be infused with the notion of mutual 
knowledge (: chs.–). Grice also adds further conditions to block counterexamples (). I 
propose that we take (GI) as a necessary condition on the performance of an illocutionary act, 
and stipulate that a theory of illocution counts as Gricean only if it builds on (GI) by the addition 
of further conditions or elaborations.
(GI) provides framework within which to give a constitutive account of the content and force 
of communicative illocutionary acts. Given that S exempliﬁes (GI) and thereby performs an illo-
cutionary act α, the content p and force F of α will be constituted by features of the response Δ 
that S intends to produce in her addressee, as well as (in some cases) the further reasons ρ on the 
basis of which she intends to produce Δ in A. Speciﬁcally: p will be determined wholly by some 
feature of Δ, and F will be determined by some combination of features of Δ and ρ. This is all 
rather abstract; here are some examples that would ﬁt into the framework:
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(GI) Asserting that p
 S asserts that p in uttering u iﬀ S utters u intending:
 () to produce thereby in A a belief that (A believes) p (Δ);5
 () A to recognize S’s intention ();
() A’s response Δ to be at least partly on the basis of her recognition of () and A’s be-
lief that S knows that p (ρ).
(GI) Suggesting that p
 S suggests that p in uttering u iﬀ S utters u intending:
 () to produce thereby in A an act of considering whether p (Δ); 
 () A to recognize S’s intention ();
() A’s response Δ to be at least partly on the basis of her recognition of () and A’s be-
lief that S has a non-negligible credence in p (ρ).
8
5 The question of whether asserting p requires intending to produce in one’s addressee (a) a be-
lief that p or (b) a belief that one believes that p is a matter of contention among Griceans. Grice 
originally went with (a) () but changed his mind to (b) in later work () in order to deal 
with putative counterexamples wherein a speaker apparently asserts p despite the fact that her be-
liefs rule out the possibility of convincing her addressee to believe p. But there are other ways to 
handle such cases. For example, it is plausible that we sometimes perform speech acts involving 
intentions of type (a) and sometimes perform speech acts involving intentions of type (b). 
Moreover, it seems plausible that colloquial usage papers over this theoretically interesting dis-
tinction by allowing us to call both types of speech act ‘assertions’. These considerations illustrate 
the broader point, seemingly not fully appreciated by Grice, Strawson, and Schiﬀer (whose work, 
after all, grew out of ordinary language philosophy) that we should not expect the theoretically 
interesting distinctions between types of illocutionary act to be reﬂected in the colloquial vocabu-
lary that we use to talk about speech acts. Folk speech-act theory may be a confused mess, and a 
theoretically useful taxonomy of types of communicative illocutionary act and the intentions that 
underpin them should ultimately be based on the description and explanation of variation in the 
ways that we communicate rather than our everyday ways of talking about talking.
(GI) Ordering that p
 S performs an orders A to p in uttering u iﬀ S utters u intending:
 () to produce thereby in A an intention that p6 (Δ);
 () A to recognize S’s intention ();
() A’s response Δ to be at least partly on the basis of her recognition of () and A’s be-
lief in S’s authority to require S to p (ρ).
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6 The careful reader might balk at my way of formulating ascriptions of intentions and directive 
speech acts using that-clauses, and might prefer Schiﬀer’s () way of schematically represent-
ing intentions and directive acts: ‘A intends to ψ’ and ‘S directs A to ψ’, where ψ ranges over prop-
erties rather than propositions. This reader may be correct, and nothing about my broader theory 
would stop me from going along with the suggestion, but the issue is complicated, and requires a 
brief digression about the LFs of propositional attitude reports with inﬁnitive complements and 
ﬁrst-personal thought contents.
The LF of a standard intention ascription ‘A intended to dance’ can be represented as [Ai in-
tended [PROi to dance]], where the matching subscripts on ‘A’ and ‘PRO’ represent that the two 
expressions bear a semantically special relationship to one another which could be thought of as a 
kind of de jure coreference or perhaps binding. The result of this special relationship is that inten-
tion reports seem to have an essentially indexical or ﬁrst-personal quality, which can be seen from 
the fact that ‘S intends to Dance’ has diﬀerent truth conditions than ‘S intends that S dances’ 
(since the latter could be true even if S doesn’t realize that he himself is S). It seems to follow that 
we need a special treatment of intention reports (and, similarly, for desire reports, and so on). 
One response to this explanandum is to posit a special kind of ﬁrst-personal proposition and say 
that intending sometimes relates a speaker to this kind of proposition (cf. Stanley : ch.). 
Another option is to say that essentially ﬁrst-personal contents are self-locating properties (cf. 
Lewis b). If we take the former view—that the contents of intentions are propositions, albeit 
sometimes propositions of a special kind—then I maintain that my use of that-clauses is ﬁne, so 
long as it is understood as technical, and so long as we keep in mind that not just any proposition 
can be slotted in for ‘that p’. If the contents of intentions are self-locating properties, on the other 
hand, then my locutions are quite misleading, and usage more like Schiﬀer’s should be preferred. I 
will stick to the awkward-sounding locution in what follows, with the proviso that I could easily 
change things around if need be. (A slightly modiﬁed version of all of this goes for directive act 
reports as well.)
This issue will turn out to be intimately connected to the issue of whether the mood-free cores 
of imperative sentences are sentence radicals that can be used to express propositions or predi-
cates that can be used to refer to properties. As it turns out, this is a matter of some controversy in 
semantics at the moment (see footnote  in Chapter Three). One reason that I provisionally adopt 
the assumption that the contents of intentions and directive acts are propositions, together with 
my awkward-sounding technical usage in reports of intentions and directive speech acts, then, is 
that these simplifying assumptions go well with my simplifying assumption in Chapter Three that 
imperatives contain mood-free sentence radicals. But again: little will hang on that assumption, 
which I will adopt mainly because it allows me to compare my theory to others more easily.
(GI) Advising that p
 S suggests that A p in uttering u iﬀ S utters u intending:
 () to produce thereby in A an intention that p (Δ);
 () A to recognize S’s intention ();
() A’s response Δ to be at least partly on the basis of her recognition of () and A’s rec-
ognition of S’s belief that p is in S’s interest (ρ).
(GI) Asking whether
 S asks whether p in uttering u iﬀ S utters u intending:
 () to produce thereby in A an intention to inform S whether p (Δ);
 () A to recognize S’s intention ();
() A’s response Δ to be at least partly on the basis of her recognition of () and A’s rec-
ognition of S’s desire to know whether p (ρ).
(GI) Asking wh-
 S asks wh- is F in uttering u iﬀ S utters u intending:
 () to produce thereby in A an intention to inform S that x is F (Δ);7
 () A to recognize S’s intention ();
() A’s response Δ to be at least partly on the basis of her recognition of () and A’s rec-
ognition of S’s desire to know wh- is F (ρ).
These examples are loosely based on the ideas of Grice (), Schiﬀer (: ch.), and Strawson 
(), but mix together and deviate from all of their accounts in some respects. There are many 
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7 Even more than the (GI–), (GI) must be treated as particular provisional, both because dif-
ferent kinds of wh-questions place diﬀerent constraints on good answers and because of the dif-
ference between mention some and mention all readings of wh-questions (see, e.g., Groenendijk 
and Stokof ). (GI) is at best a ﬁrst shot at an explication for mention-some questions. It’s 
likely that diﬀerent explications will have to be given for mention-all and mention-some ques-
tions relative to each type of wh- question.
details over which we could (and probably should) continue to debate. (GI–) should be treated 
as a rough ﬁrst shot at explicating a few types of illocutionary acts, articulated for the purposes of 
illustrating the overall Gricean approach.
(GI–) illustrate several signiﬁcant points about the Gricean theory of force. First, (GI–) 
are all (partial speciﬁcations of) kinds of Gricean communicative intention. Performing an illocu-
tionary act is, for a Gricean, a way that a speaker can mean something. 
Second, illocutionary acts can be divided into the mutually exclusive categories of assertive 
acts (assertives) and directive acts (directives) on the basis of whether the response Δ that a speaker 
intends to produce in an has a mind-to-world (cognitive) direction of ﬁt or a world-to-mind 
(connative or action-guiding) direction of ﬁt, respectively (cf. Grice ; Schiﬀer : ). The 
term ‘assertive act’ is somewhat misleading: although assertion is one kind of assertive act, there 
are other assertive acts that aren’t assertions—such as (if these are all genuinely distinct kinds of 
illocutionary act): acts of supposing, suggesting (that p), assuring, reporting, estimating, hypothe-
sizing, and so on. What unites all of these assertive acts is that their characteristic communica-
tively intended response Δ is a cognitive mental state of some kind. Performing them, that is, re-
quires communicatively intending to produce a cognitive response, such as a belief, an act of sup-
posing or considering-whether, or a change in credence. In the above explications, for example, 
asserting involves intending to bring about a belief and suggesting requires intending to bring 
about a mental act of considering whether. Assertives stand in contrast with directives, whose 
performance requires intending to bring about a non-cognitive, connotative, or action-guiding 
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psychological state of some kind.8  I have followed Grice (, ) in taking these action-
guiding mental states to be intentions.9  To command, request, advise, instruct, and so on, are all, 
in part, to communicatively intend to produce an intention in one’s addressee; the content of this 
communicative intention is the content of one’s directive speech act. 
Third, we can draw more ﬁnely grained distinctions within each of the broad categories of as-
sertoric and directive illocutionary acts based on features of both the type of response Δ that the 
speaker communicatively intends to produce and the reasons ρ on the basis of which she intends 
to produce Δ.10 Within the broad category of assertive speech acts, for example, asserting p is dis-
tinguished from suggesting that p on the basis of both Δ (‘belief that (...) p’ versus ‘consideration 
whether p’) and ρ (‘belief that the speaker knows p’ versus ‘belief that the speaker has non-
negligible credence that p’). Within the broad category of directives, commanding A to p is dis-
tinguished from advising A to p solely on the basis of ρ (‘recognition of the speaker’s authority...’ 
versus ‘belief that the speaker believes that p is in A’s best interest’).
Fourth, questions are a sub-genre of directives: to ask a question is to direct an addressee to 
supply one with information. Whereas performing a non-question directive whose content is p 
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8  This way of drawing the distinction between assertoric and directive illocutionary acts is not 
universal to all Gricean accounts. For example: Bach and Harnish distinguish the similar (but not 
quite coextensive) categories of constative and directive illocutionary acts on the basis of whether 
they are intended to express the speaker’s belief or his “attitude toward some prospective action by 
the hearer” (: ). Although I am doubtful of the utility of Bach and Harnish’s notion of ex-
pressing a mental state, I have no special reason to think that their version of Gricean speech act 
theory is incompatible with the kind of speech-act-theoretic semantics that I will defend in later 
chapters. One reason for adopting the Grice–Strawson–Schiﬀer approach rather than the Bach–
Harnish approach is that the former makes comparing Gricean and dynamic theories of mood 
and force particularly straightforward, and this comparison will be at the heart of Chapter Three.
9  Schiﬀer adopts an alternative approach on which performing a directive speech act requires 
intending to bring about one’s addressee’s action itself (: ch.). Other possibile intended re-
sponses that would ﬁt within the same general framework are desires or obligations of some kind, 
although I don’t regard either of these two options as particularly attractive.
10 Here I follow Schiﬀer quite closely (: ch., §). My ‘Δ’ corresponds to Schiﬀer’s ‘p’ (in the 
case of assertorics) and ‘ψ’ (in the case of directives), and my ‘ρ’ corresponds to Schiﬀer’s ‘ρ(t)’. 
requires communicatively intending to produce an intention to being about p in one’s addressee, 
and particular types of illocutionary act within this genre are distinguished on the basis of the 
value of ρ, questioning requires communicatively intending to produce an intention to inform 
one whether p (or wh- is F) in one’s addressee. Diﬀerent types of questioning, including the dis-
tinctions between asking whether and asking wh- as well as the distinctions between various 
kinds of asking wh-, can be distinguished on the basis of the nuances of Δ. There may also be dif-
ferent types of questioning that are distinguished on the basis of ρ; for example, whereas asking 
involves intending that the addressee answer because of the speaker’s desire for information 
(making asking akin to requesting information), it is plausible that the act of interrogating also 
involves intending that the addressee answer because of the speaker’s authority, or in order to 
avoid unpleasant consequences of not answering (making interrogating akin to commanding that 
one’s addressee provide information) (cf. Schiﬀer : ).
All of the illocutionary acts I have discussed so far are either assertive or directive acts, and I 
have claimed that these two kinds of acts are mutually exclusive. Do they also mutually exhaust 
the category of illocutionary acts? This is a matter of controversy. Clearly, there are speech acts 
that have traditionally been thought of as illocutionary acts but that don’t ﬁt into the framework 
I’ve outlined so far. One kind of example ivolves some purported illocutionary acts, such as the 
act of greeting someone by saying ‘Hi!’ or the act of insulting someone by saying ‘Screw you!’, that 
don’t seem to have contents in the same way that the illocutionary acts I’ve discussed have con-
tent. (Of course, wh-questions don’t have propositional contents, but they seem to have contents 
of some kind—perhaps types or sets of propositions). In at least some cases, these contentless 
speech acts also don’t seem to involve intending to produce either a cognitive or action-guiding 
attitude in an addressee. It might make sense to follow Searle in holding that greeting involves 
intending to produce the knowledge in the addressee that she is being greeted (: )—
thereby making greeting an assertive speech act by the criteria I’ve outlined. And we might be 
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tempted to extend this account to insults, taking them to be (in part) a matter of communicatively 
intending to produce in an addressee the recognition of being insulted. But greeting, insulting, 
and some other speech acts seem aimed more at producing responses that are neither cognitive 
nor action-guiding—such as, perhaps, the feeling of being welcome or oﬀended. If this is right, 
then the range of values for Δ in the above schema may have to be expanded to include aﬀective 
or phenomenological responses. This would mean that assertives and directives do not mutually 
exhaust the illocutionary acts, but it poses no threat to the framework as a whole.
Some illocutionary acts—including many of Austin’s favorite examples, such as the act of 
marrying someone by uttering ‘I do’—can be performed only if the right social or institutional 
background conditions obtain. Following Bach and Harnish (), I will call these conventional 
illocutionary acts, to be distinguished from communicative illocutionary acts like asserting, ask-
ing, and requesting. The existence and purported extent of conventional illocutionary acts has 
often featured in objections to Gricean speech act theory, in part because they seem to conﬂict 
with the Gricean idea that what we do with language is a matter of our intentions, and in part be-
cause many speech act theorists—most prominently Austin () and Searle ()—have 
claimed that all, or nearly all illocutionary acts should be thought of as conventional because they 
are constituted by linguistic conventions. This is a claim that I wish to wholeheartedly deny.
Austin’s focus on paradigm cases of conventional illocutionary acts, such as marrying some-
one and christening a ship, is seemingly what led him to think of illocutionary acts in general as 
deeply conventional phenomena. This is also what has led most Griceans to bracket oﬀ conven-
tional acts as a special case that is not of particular interest to the study of human communica-
tion. Indeed, Schiﬀer ﬁnds it tempting to deny that convention-constituted speech acts are genu-
ine illocutionary acts at all (: ch.), presumably because he is not convinced that they form a 
uniﬁed explanatory category together with the communicative illocutionary acts that are his pri-
mary focus. I see the distinction between this view and Bach & Harnish’s as a verbal one. On the 
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latter view, conventional illocutionary acts are seen as a distinct sub-genre of illocution, distin-
guished speciﬁcally by the fact that their performance requires that background conditions be-
yond the speaker’s intentions obtain. Convetional illocutionary acts do not lack theoretical inter-
est. Indeed, I believe that understanding the nature of conventional illocution will be key to solv-
ing a wide variety of philosophical problems about speech that is native to institutional contexts, 
including special problems about the nature of legislative speech and legal interpretation, confes-
sion, and legal testimony.11  The reason for bracketing conventional illocutionary acts in the study 
of human communication, then, is not that they are theoretically uninteresting. Rather, conven-
tional acts should be bracketed because they introduce theoretical elements that may be distract-
ing and misleading when it comes to human communication in its paradigmatic form. 
An illustration of how conﬂating conventional acts with communicative acts can make a mess 
of one’s understanding of speech acts is one of Thomason’s () arguments that performing a 
speech act involves intending to produce an eﬀect, not in an addressee, but instead in a conversa-
tional record—a common stock of mutual presuppositions shared by the participants in a conver-
sation (cf. Stalnaker’s () common ground).12  Thomason argues for this dynamic account of 
assertion rests on the basis of an analogy between normal assertion and formal testiﬁmony in 
court. When testifying, a witness’s goal usually isn’t to aﬀect the beliefs of whomever we’re ad-
dressing. A witness who’s been well-prepared by the lawyer who is asking the questions won’t be 
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11  These issues are illuminated in the dissertation of my colleague, Rachel McKinney, which is 
still in progress. In forthcoming work, McKinney and I draw out the implications of the commu-
nicative–conventional distinction for the understanding of police interrogation, false confession, 
and other forms of apparently unintended illocutionary acts.
12  The idea that speech acts can be individuated in terms of their eﬀects—intended or other-
wise—on the shared context of conversation is one of the foundational ideas of the dynamic the-
ory of speech acts, which has recently come to dominate pragmatic theory, particularly among 
linguists. I will discuss dynamic pragmatics in detail in Chapter Three (§.), where I’ll argue that 
dynamic accounts collapse into Gricean accounts precisely because performing a speech act in-
volves intending to change the mental states of an addressee rather than the mutually represented 
context of conversation.
saying anything that the lawyer doesn’t expect, for example. Instead, the goal of a witness should 
be to place certain information onto the oﬃcial court record. Thomason argues that something 
similar is going on in normal assertion—that our primary aim to update the public, mutally rep-
resented conversational record rather than any particular addressee’s mental states. But this anal-
ogy between testimony and assertion is misleading precisely because testimony, unlike assertion, 
is a conventional illocutionary act—an act whose performance is possible only in an elaborate set 
of institutional circumstances, and whose purpose is deﬁned in part by the goals of the institu-
tions that give rise to those circumstances. We should therefore expect that to testify in court is to 
do something very diﬀerent than to assert. This explains why the intentions behind one would be 
so diﬀerent than the intentions behind the other.
Of course, there is plenty of room to disagree about the exact placement of the boundary be-
tween purely intention-constituted speech acts and those that are partly constituted by social or 
institutional conditions. One of the broadest and best-known disputes about the nature of both 
illocutionary acts and speaker meaning is best understood as a dispute over this boundary. Al-
though some of the core ideas of the Gricean, intention-based theory of communicative illocu-
tionary acts are at least suggested by Grice (), the ﬁrst explicit articulation of the theory is 
Strawson’s (). In a well-known response to Strawson, Searle protests that the Gricean picture 
vastly underestimates the role of convention in the performance of illocutionary acts, and also in 
the nature of speaker meaning itself:
[Grice’s theory of speaker meaning] fails to account for the extent to which meaning can be a 
matter of rules or conventions. This account of meaning does not show the connection be-
tween one’s meaning something by what one says, and what that which one says actually 
means in the language. [...]
Suppose that I am an American soldier in the Second World War and that I am captured by 
Italian troops. And suppose also that I wish to get these troops to believe that I am a German 
soldier in order to get them to release me. What I would like to do is to tell them in German 
or Italian that I am a German soldier. But let us suppose that I don’t know enough German or 
Italian to do that. So I, as it were, attempt to put on a show of telling them that I am a German 
soldier by reciting those few bits of German I know, trusting that they don’t know enough 
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German to see my plan. Let us suppose that I know only one line of German which I remem-
ber from a poem I had to memorize in a high school German course. Therefore I, a captured 
American, address my Italian captors with the following sentence: Kennst du das Land wo die 
Zitronen blühen? [fn. If it seems implausible that one could intend to produce the desired ef-
fects with such an utterance in these circumstances, a few imaginative additions to the exam-
ple should make the case more plausible, e.g., I know that my captors know that there are 
German soldiers in the area wearing Italian uniforms, I know that they have been instructed 
to be on the lookout for these Germans and to release them as soon as they identify them-
selves. I know that they have lied to their commander by telling him that they can speak Ger-
man when in fact they cannot, etc.] Now, let us describe the situation in Gricean terms. I in-
tend to produce this eﬀect of believing that I am a German soldier, and I intend to produce 
this eﬀect by means of their recognition of my intention. I intend that they should think that 
what I am trying to tell them is that I am a German soldier. But does it follow from this ac-
count that when I say, Kennst du das Land…etc., what I mean is, “I am a German soldier”? 
Not only does it not follow, but in this case I ﬁnd myself disinclined to say that when I utter 
the German sentence what I mean is “I am a German soldier”, or even “Ich bin ein deutcher 
Soldat”, because what the words mean and what I remember that they mean is “Knowest thou 
the land where the lemon trees bloom?” Of course, I want my captors to be deceived into 
thinking that what I mean is: “I am a German soldier”, but part of what is involved in that is 
getting them to think that that is what the words I utter mean in German. In the Philosophical 
Investigations, Wittgenstein (discussing a diﬀerent problem) writes “Say ‘it’s cold here’ and 
mean ‘it’s warm here”’ [§]. The reason we are unable to do this without further stage set-
ting is that what we can mean is at least sometimes a function of what we are saying. Meaning 
is more than a matter of intention, it is also at least sometimes a matter of convention. (: 
–)
Searle admits that illocutionary acts aren’t necessarily convention-based, since “some very simple 
sorts of illocutionary acts can indeed be performed apart from any use of any conventional device 
at all, simply by getting the audience to recognize certain of one’s intentions in behaving a certain 
way” (: ). But he takes such cases to be both rare and marginal, and so outlines a theory of 
illocutionary acts according to which they are typically constituted by linguistic rules, much as 
the act of playing chess is constituted by the rules governing the movement of chess pieces. The 
best summation the Gricean response to this argument that I know of comes, ironically, from 
Searle himself, who apparently intends it as the linchpin in his reductio ad absurdum of the Gri-
cean view:
One might say that on Grice’s account it would seem that any sentence can be uttered with 
any meaning whatever, given that the circumstances make possible the appropriate intentions. 
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But that has the consequence that the meaning of the sentence then becomes just another 
circumstance. (: )13
But for the Gricean, the meaning of one’s utterance-type really is “just another circumstance” in 
the relevant sense. The role of utterance-type meaning, much like the roles played in communica-
tion by other circumstances external to the performance of a speech act itself, is to enable the ad-
dressee to infer the speaker’s intentions, and thereby to enable the speaker to have those inten-
tions (given her estimate of what the addresse is capable of working out). The meanings of the ex-
pressions we utter needn’t be constitutive of what we say or otherwise do in uttering them in or-
der to play this dual role. And, as I will argue in Chapter Two, there are excellent reasons to think 
that expressions’ meanings aren’t even partly constitutive of what we say or otherwise do with 
them.14
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13 As Neale (forthcoming a: fn.) points out, it can be seen from the two quoted passages that 
Searle’s objection to Griceanism is based, at least in part, on the conﬂation of several importantly 
distinct notions of meaning. For his objection to an intention-based account to hold any weight, it 
must be intended as an objection to Grice’s notion of utterer’s occasion meaning (a.k.a. ‘speaker 
meaning’). But some of what Searle says suggests that what he is really objecting to is the idea that 
a speaker’s intentions can override what Grice would call the timeless meanings of utterance types 
or the applied timeless meanings of utterance types relative to particular occasions of use (on the 
distinction between these three notions, see Grice ). One clue is that Searle attributes mean-
ing using direct quotation. Another is the locution that Searle employs in summing up his point 
(emphasis added): “on Grice’s account it would seem that any sentence can be uttered with any 
meaning whatever”. This phrasing suggests that what Searle is really interested in is whether a 
speaker’s intentions can determine what a sentence means, either in general or relative to a par-
ticular occasion. But the distinction between utterer’s meaning and (applied) timeless meaning is 
absolutely central to the Gricean project, and, I think, Searle’s argument becomes less intuitive if 
we attempt to rephrase his point to make it squarely about speaker meaning.
14 For a nice historical discussion of Grice’s aversion to both convention and the terminology of 
speech-act theory, see Chapman (: ). I think of speech acts (and communicative acts more 
generally) as a topic in pragmatics and the philosophy of language that admits of competing ap-
proaches, including the convention-based tradition of Austin () and Searle (), the 
intention-based, Gricean approach outlined here, the expressivist approach of (e.g.) Davis () 
and Green (), the dynamic approach of (e.g.) Portner (), Roberts (/), and Stal-
naker (), and the conceptual-role approach of (e.g.) Brandom (), Sellars (), and 
Vendler (), and others. Chapman suggests that Grice avoided the terminology of speech-act 
theory because he took it to be native to Austin’s own, convention-laden approach to the topic.
I want now to draw out some interesting consequences of the the fully intentionalist, Gricean 
account of communicative illocutionary acts that I’ve sketched. One is that the theory, as stated so 
far, has nothing to do with either language or utterance-type meaning, and therefore nothing to 
do with linguistic meaning. At least in principle, on my view, it is possible to perform any com-
municative illocutionary act with an utterance type that is neither linguistic nor meaningful. All 
that’s required is that one have the right communicative intentions, and all this requires is that the 
speaker takes her addressee’s present psychological state to be such that she can produce the right 
sort of response. As I’ll argue in §., the roles of language and linguistic meaning lie in their ca-
pacity to explain how certain utterance types—the linguistically meaningful ones—make it rou-
tine for communicators to eﬃciently perform and interpret extremely information-rich speech 
acts in a way that is less wedded to their particular circumstances.
A second interesting consequence of intentionalism about speech acts is that the individua-
tion conditions of utterances and illocutionary acts diﬀer in such a way that it is possible to per-
form more than one illocutionary act with a single utterance. An utterance, on this view, can be 
thought of as any piece of behavior that is designed and intended for the interpretation of one or 
more addressees.15  But illocutionary acts are individuated in terms of the more ﬁne-grained 
communicative intentions with which an utterance is produced, and it is possible to produce a 
single utterance with more than one communicative intention, thereby performing more than one 
communicative act. These distinct communicative acts may both be addressed to the same per-
19
15 An addressee may be a particular person or group of people about which the utterer has a de 
re communicative intention, or it may be one of many people who meet a condition speciﬁed in 
the utterer’s de dicto communicative intention, as when I record my answering machine message 
intending to produce an intention to leave me a message in whomever calls my phone and gets the 
voicemail.
son—as when one both says something and implies something else—or they may be aimed at dis-
tinct addressees. Consider the following example:16
Party Yawn
Dan is at a party with Smith and Jones. Dan and Jones have discussed the fact that they aren’t 
tired, but are getting bored, would like to go to another party, but don’t want Smith to come. 
Smith is oblivious to all of this. In full sight of both of both Smith and Jones, Dan produce an 
utterance consisting of an exaggerated and obviously fake yawn and glance at his watch. In do-
ing so, Dan have two distinct communicative intentions: (i) Dan communicatively intends to 
produce a belief in Jones that he believes it’s time to go to the next party, and (ii) Dan commu-
nicatively intends to produce a belief in Smith that he (Dan) believes it’s time to go home and 
sleep.
In this case, Dan performs two communicative acts by producing a single, nonlinguistic, utter-
ance: he addresses to Jones a nonlinguistic assertion that it’s time to go to the next party, and he 
addresses to Smith a nonlinguistic assertion that that it’s time for him to go to bed.17  That Dan is 
able to do this results from the fact that he takes Jones and Smith to have very diﬀerent back-
ground information on the basis of which they’ll interpret him.
The Party Yawn case illustrates two other signiﬁcant points about communicative acts. First, 
communicative acts needn’t have anything to do with either language or utterance-type meaning. 
The point about language is obvious enough. The point about utterance-type meaning is less ob-
20
16  Stephen Neale has presented a similar example in talks and seminars in order to make the 
point that the saying–implicating distinction does not depend on language. Some aspects of this 
example were suggested to me by my colleague, Marilynn Johnson.
17 It might be better to describe what’s going on in Party Yawn by saying that Dan indirectly as-
serts to Smith that it’s time to go home by directly asserting to Smith that he’s tired, and that he 
indirectly asserts to Jones that he wants to go to the next party by making as if to indirectly assert 
to Jones that it’s time to go home, which he in turn does by making as if to directly assert to Jones 
that he’s tired. I ignore some of this complexity in the text.
vious, but it plausibly follows from the fact that both of Dan’s speech acts might have led to suc-
cessful communication in the Party Yawn case even if Dan, Jones, and Smith belonged to a com-
munity whose members had developed no special conventions or dispositions for communicating 
anything in particular by yawning or looking at their watch. Dan’s intentions, in that case, could 
still be worked out merely by recognizing that people are tired when they yawn, and that they 
look at their watch when they’re worried about how late it’s getting.18  The other point that Party 
Yawn illustrates is that communicative acts can be either direct or indirect: Dan informs Jones 
that it’s time to go to the next party by making as if to address to her a nonlinguistic assertion that 
it’s time to go home and sleep. He indirectly performs one communicative act by making as if to 
perform another one. But Dan’s act of nonlinguistically asserting to Smith that it’s time for him to 
go home and sleep is not indirect in this way.
Taken together, the two points in the last paragraph illustrate two other interesting aspects of 
Gricean speech-act theory. First, Party Yawn illustrates the fact that communicative illocutionary 
acts have their force and content only relative to some addressee(s). In the vocabulary of Wilfrid 
Sellars ()—but contrary to his theory of speech acts—every communicative illocutionary act 
is a talking-to, and not a mere expression of thought. If this weren’t the case, then we would be 
forced to say that Dan both asserts and makes as if to assert that it’s time to go home and go to 
bed in the Party Yawn case. Griceanism easily handles the addressee-relativity of communicative 
acts by relativizing the communicative intentions that constitute communicative acts to address-
ees. In addition to Sellars, many alternative approaches to speech-act theory lack the resources to 
explain this kind of addressee-relativity.19
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18  Roughly the same point—that the notion of speaker meaning is prior to both language and 
utterance-type meaning—is made by Grice () and Schiﬀer (: ch.; : §.). 
19  For example, Bar-On (), Davis (), Green (), and Pagin () all defend ver-
sions of speech-act theory in which the content and force of a speech act are constituted by fea-
tures of the psychological states that are thereby expressed or indicated, where these are not taken 
to be addressee-relative notions.
Party Yawn also entails that the distinction between direct and indirect communicative acts is 
explanatorily prior to linguistic and semantic notions. It is typical, even among Griceans, to expli-
cate the distinction between direct and indirect speech acts, and, in particular, the distinction be-
tween what a speaker says and what she implicates (which I view as a special case of the direct/
indirect distinction), partly in terms of either linguistic or semantic notions. For example, Schiﬀer 
holds that what a speaker says in uttering a sentence is the part of what she means that (unlike 
what she implicates) “ﬁts” the sentence’s meaning (). In a similar vein, Sperber and Wilson 
argue that the explicit portion of what a speaker means in uttering a sentence should be distin-
guished from the implicit portion by virtue of the fact that the former, but not the latter, is a “de-
velopment” of the sentence’s logical form (/).20  But accounts like this suﬀer from serious 
problems, not the least of which is the diﬃculty of giving an account of what it means for a 
proposition to ‘ﬁt’ a sentence’s meaning or ‘be a development of ’ its logical form. Further tension 
for these views arises from malapropisms and slips of the tongue, as when a speaker utters, ‘I 
hissed my mystery lecture’, with the intention of asserting that she missed her history lecture. As 
Neale has argued, we have good reason for thinking that what the speaker says in this case is just 
what she intended to say, rather than some proposition that ﬁts or develops the meaning of the 
sentence she utters (, , forthcoming a). This full-blown intentionalism follows from 
Grice’s view that one says something only if one means it (: ch.). Moreover, as Neale points 
out, there are good reasons to go along with Grice on this issue, since the most theoretically use-
ful notion of what a speaker says will make it the object that a hearer must identify in order for 
communication to succeed. If I utter, ‘I hissed my mystery lecture’, intending to say that I missed 
my history lecture, I will succeed in communicating only if my addressee charitably treats me as 
saying what I intended to say, rather than what I may superﬁcially appear to have said. Moreover, 
22
20 See also Bach (, ) and Devitt (forthcoming) for the view that what a speaker says in 
uttering a sentence is partly constituted by the sentence’s meaning. I will discuss their views in 
greater detail in Chapter Two.
this case shouldn’t be treated as one in which I made as if to say that I hissed my mystery lecture 
in order to implicate that I missed my history lecture. After all: I might have intended merely to 
make as if to say that I missed my history lecture, in order to implicate something further—for 
example, that I don’t remember the dates of the French Revolution. But I didn’t make as if to say 
that I hissed my mystery lecture in order to make as if to say (or make as if to implicate) that I 
missed my history lecture in order, in turn, to implicate that I don’t remember the dates of the 
French Revolution. And, if I really did say that I missed my history lecture, then views like Schif-
fer’s and Sperber and Wilson’s have a serious problem. Unless one adopts the view that the mean-
ing or logical form of the sentence a speaker utters can itself be sensitive to her intentions (thus, 
seemingly, commiting oneself to an unattractive form of grammatical Humpty Dumptyism), it is 
hard to see how what I said can be a development of the logical form of the sentence I actually 
uttered.21  Finally, if agents can perform both direct and indirect communicative acts without us-
ing language or meaningful utterance-types at all, then there is reason to think that the saying/
implicating distinction, as well as the distinction between direct and indirect speech acts, are just 
special cases of the broader distinction between direct and indiect communicative acts, and that, 
therefore, all of these distinctions can be made without appealing to linguistic or semantic no-
tions.
If all of this is right, then how should we draw these distinctions? My answer is that perform-
ing an indirect communicative act requires having diﬀerent kinds of intentions than performing a 
direct communicative act. Roughly, to perform an indirect communicative act with the content p 
requires, in addition to the usual communicative intentions, that one’s addressee recognize one’s 
intention to bring about a mental state whose content is p, that one intend them to recognize this 
23
21 Intentionalism about saying is often attacked on the grounds that it is just too darn unintui-
tive that I could say something that doesn’t ﬁt with the meaning of the sentence I utter. Where 
does the strength of this intuition come from?
partly on the basis of their recognizing a second communication intention with which one per-
forms the speech act, and in virtue of which one performs a direct speech act.22
(MAI) Making As If
S performs an illocutionary act α by making as if to perform an illocutionary act β in utter-
ing u iﬀ:
(i) β is an illocutionary act of the type that can be performed by communicatively in-
tending to produce a response γ in an addressee, in part on the basis of the recogni-
tion of this intention and in part on the basis of some further reason σ; and 
S utters u intending:
(a) to produce thereby in an addressee A an act of entertaining, and rejecting, the pos-
sibility that S intends to produce γ in A partly on the basis of σ.
 () to produce a certain response Δ in A;
 () A to recognize S’s intentions (a) and ();
() A’s response Δ to be at least partly on the basis of her recognition of (a) and () and 
(in some cases) partly on the basis of some further reason ρ.
An indirect speech act is a speech act that one performs by either performing or making as if to 
perform some other speech act. (We can say that S performs an illocutionary act α by performing 
another illocutionary act β just in case () S performs both α and β, and () S meets a modiﬁed 
version of (MAI) such that condition (a) is replaced by whatever S would have to intend in order 
to perform β. 
Grice’s notions of saying and implicating are special cases of direct and indirect illocutionary 
acts, respectively. There are several ways of specifying how these special cases are delimited that 
would ﬁt with Grice’s usage, but here is one: to say is to perform a direct act of asserting by means 
24
22 The formulation of (MAI) is inﬂuenced by unpublished work by Jessica Keiser.
an utterance of some meaningful, linguistic type, and to implicate is to perform an indirect act of 
asserting. Ultimately, I don’t think that it matters very much how saying and implicating are ex-
plicated, because the notions of direct and indirect communicative illocutionary acts that I have 
explicated are more general and more theoretically interesting.23  What makes an utterance type 
linguistic, on my view, is that it bears a special relation to either the speaker’s language faculty 
(Chomsky ) or to a productive system of other utterance-types (Devitt ; Lewis a). 
(Although I am tempted toward the Chomskian half of this disjunction, I can oﬃcially remain 
neutral between Chomsky’s psychologism, Devitt’s nominalism account, and Lewis’s platonism 
about the metaphysics of language.) All of the concepts involved in explaining communication 
that I have outlined so far, including the distinction between direct and indirect speech acts, are 
explanatorily prior to the notion of utterance-type meaning. Semantic concepts and linguistic 
concepts, are, moreover, explanatorily independent: neither is needed to explain the other, and 
each is needed to explain concepts for which the other is not needed. The two collections of con-
cepts come together in the notion of linguistic meaning, which is explanatorily posterior to both.
What do I mean by saying that some concept or collection of concepts is explanatorily prior to 
or explanatorily independent of another one? I have in mind the following deﬁnitions:
Weak Explanatory Priority (≤)
c is weakly prior to c (c ≤ c) iﬀ c is to be explicated, in part, in terms of c. 
(Strong) Explanatory Priority (<)
c is strongly prior to c (c < c) iﬀ c ≤ c but c ≰ c.
25
23 It is plausible that the notion of saying still has an important role to play in the methodology 
of semantic theory, since speakers seem to have robust intuitions about what a speaker said, as 
opposed to what she merely implied. For doubts about the usefulness of these intuitions, see Cap-
pelen and Lepore ().
Explanatory Connectedness (≈)
c is explanatorily connected to c (c ≈ c) iﬀ c ≤ c and c ≤ c.
Explanatory Independence (≹)
c is explanatorily independent of c (c ≹ c) iﬀ c ≰ c and c ≰ c.
In saying that psychological concepts are explanatorily prior to semantic ones, for example, I 
mean that they are stongly explanatorily prior, in the sense outlined here. Griceanism thus posits 
an explanatory hierarchy of the key concepts in the philosophy of language and mind, starting 
from a collection of psychological concepts that are more basic than the rest, and explicating new 
concepts from there on up as new explanatory roles arise for them.24  Although I won’t attempt to 
argue for each priority claim here, I see this Gricean hierarchy mapped out as follows:
(C) Intentionality, mental content, mental attitude (belief, intention, etc.).
(C) Higher-order intentionality.
(C) Communicative intentions, inferential communication, speaker meaning, interpretation, 
communicative illocutionary acts, illocutionary act content, illocutionary force, referring, 
predicating.
(C) Direct communicative acts, indirect communicative acts, saying*, implicating
    C < C < C < C < C 
  < CB
 CA
}≹
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24  Of course, Griceans are free to think that psychological concepts should themselves be ex-
plained in terms of still other concepts. All that Griceans are committed to vis-a-vis these con-
cepts is that the best accounts of them won’t appeal to linguistic or semantic notions.
(C) Communicative dispositions, utterance-type meaning, speech communities.
(CA) Language, syntactic structure, sentence, word, linguistic expression, etc.
(CB) Linguistic meaning, (word meaning, sentence meaning, phrase meaning)
So far, I have said nothing about how utterance-type meaning and linguistic meaning ﬁt into the 
Gricean hierarchy, except to say that they are explanatorily posterior to the concepts involved in 
explaining folk psychology and communication, and that they play no role in explicating those 
concepts or the distinctions between them. I will spell out these connections in §..
1.3  The Explanatory Role of Meaning in Communication
In order to elucidate the nature of utterance-type meaning, and linguistic meaning in particular, 
we must ﬁrst identify the explanatory roles of these concepts as they occur in some broader theo-
retical enterprise. This methodological outlook is nicely summed up in what I’ll call Lewis’s dic-
tum:
In order to say what a meaning is, we may ﬁrst ask what a meaning does, and then ﬁnd some-
thing that does that. (: )
Lewis’s dictum recommends a broad methodological policy: we should investigate the nature of 
meaning by ﬁrst investigating its explanatory role. This policy is a sound one because meaning is a 
theoretical posit. Like other posits, our best and only way of ﬁnding out about meaning is by giv-
ing it a role to play in a theory that explains something else. Lewis’s dictum, and the methodologi-
cal policy it sums up, is a methodological cornerstone in much of what follows.
What is the explanatory role of meaning? In Lewis’s terms: what does meaning do? Lewis at-
tempts to answer this question by saying that meaning “is something that determines the condi-
tions under which a sentence is true or false” (: ). One serious problem with this answer 
is that it apparently does not apply to nondeclarative sentences, which don’t seem to have truth 
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conditions. Lewis attempted to address this worry by reducing the semantic properties of nonde-
claratives to those of declaratives, but, as I’ll argue in Chapter Three, Lewis’s solution does not 
work. Even if we restrict our attention to declarative sentences, however, Lewis’s answer is still 
problematic. Truth deﬂationists, for example, might accept that (some) sentences’ meanings de-
termine their truth conditions, but would deny that this fact has any explanatory signiﬁcance. 
Moreover, as I’ll argue in Chapter Two, and as others have previously argued,25  the meanings of 
declarative sentences typically underspecify the propositions that they’re used to express, and this 
underspeciﬁcation cannot be papered over by relativizing a sentence–content relation to contexts 
or indices, as Lewis and other truth-conditional semanticists have attempted to do.
I will therefore posit a diﬀerent explanatory role for meaning—one that even Lewis is com-
mitted to. This is the role of facilitating communication. Whatever other reasons we have for pos-
iting meaning, we certainly need it in order to explain how speakers are able to communicate so 
much more eﬃciently with some types of utterances (i.e., the meaningful ones) than with others.
For example, I can walk into any room full of English-speaking strangers and, apropos of 
nothing, utter the sentence, ‘Have any of you ever fantasized about high-ﬁving a Scientologist?’, 
and there is a good chance that many of the strangers would correctly understand me to be asking 
whether any of them has ever fantasized about high-ﬁving a Scientologist. If I were to ﬁnd myself 
in a room full of monolingual Japanese speakers, on the other hand, my attempt to ask the same 
question would go much less smoothly. Even if I were to somehow succeed (which seems un-
likely), asking my question in the second room would take enormously more time and eﬀort than 
it would have in the ﬁrst. When I refer to the eﬃciency of linguistic communication, this is the 
kind of datum that I have in mind: any instance of smooth and successful communication when 
these qualities clearly depend on the fact that the sentence (or other utterance-type) involved is 
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25 E.g., Bach (: chs.–), Carston (), Neale (: –), Schiﬀer (: ch.–), Sper-
ber and Wilson (/), Wilson and Sperber (: ch.).
meaningful for a group that includes the speaker and the addressee. At least part of why we need 
a concept of meaning is to explain the eﬃciency of linguistic communication in this sense. 26
One consequence of this methodological outlook is that meaning is a public property of utter-
ance types, including linguistic utterance types, such as words, phrases, and sentences.27  Meaning 
is public in the sense that utterance types have meaning for the speech community in which ut-
terances of that type are likely to lead to eﬃcient communication.28  I won’t posit any notion of 
meaning that is possessed by particular utterances, expression tokens, expression tokenings, 
expressions-in-contexts, or expression–context pairs. In these respects, I diﬀer from most conte-
morary semanticists. 
A further consequence of my line of thought so far is that sentence meaning is not a kind of 
intentional or propositional content. There is no such thing, that is, as semantic content, if we take 
that to be any property of sentences, sentence tokens, or utterances of sentences that determines 
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26 This way of framing the explanatory role of meaning is well-articulated and defended by Neale 
(forthcoming a: §), where he argues that all theorizing about language and linguistic communi-
cation must be done in the service of a Master Question:
We produce various noises, marks, and gestures, and in so-doing we manage to express or 
sharpen our thoughts, to communicate information about the external world or about our own 
beliefs, desires, plans, commitments, hopes, fears, feelings etc. eﬃciently (i.e. quickly, systemati-
cally and consistently). What facts about the noises, marks, and gestures we produce, what facts 
about our cognitive apparatus, and what facts about our physical circumstances and social rela-
tions explain this extraordinary capacity?
27  For the view that the bearers of meaning are utterance types, see also Grice (), Kaplan 
(a,b), Lewis (), Neale (, ), Schiﬀer (, , , ), Stalnaker (). I 
won’t attempt to give identity conditions for linguistic expressions or other utterance types. I take 
this to be a matter to be settled by phonology and psycholinguistics. My only signiﬁcant com-
mitment in this regard, which I share with the philosophers just mentioned, is that linguistic ex-
pressions and other utterance types can be individuated independently of their semantic proper-
ties.
28  Does this mean that there is no sense to be made of the idea that an expression could have 
meaning for a single speaker? Not necessarily, since we might this notion of meaning to make 
sense of the idea that a speaker can communicate with a later time slice of herself, for example, by 
writing herself a note. But this isn’t what philosophers usually have in mind when they speak of 
the meaning of an expression in a speaker’s idiolect.
their truth conditions. This follows from the fact that the bearers of semantic properties are lin-
guistic expressions, together with the fact—well documented in recent literature on the seman-
tics–pragmatics interface—that the semantic properties of linguistic expressions massively un-
derdetermine the contents they are used to directly and literally express on particular occasions. I 
will return to this point in greater detail in Chapter Two.
The confused idea that linguistic expressions possess a kind of intentional content has per-
vaded the study of language for the last one hundred and twenty-ﬁve years. One source of this 
idea is an equally confused and pervasive account of the role of meaning in linguistic communi-
cation. This is what Sperber and Wilson (/) call the code model, according to which the 
role of meaning is to encode propositional contents in linguistic vehicles, which are then passed 
from speakers to hearers, who decode them. Variants of this model show up in most of the prag-
matic theories that truth-conditional semanticists like best. Lewis holds that hearers interpret 
speakers’ utterances by relying on the assumption that members of their speech community utter 
a sentence only if the proposition that the sentence expresses in the language that they share is 
true (, a). Dynamic theorists take communication to succeed when a speaker adds some 
new content to the shared context of conversation, and dynamic semanticists hold that sentence 
meanings accomplish this because they are functions that map one state of the context into an-
other. I will criticize these implementations of the code model in Chapters Four and Three, re-
spectively. For devastating criticisms of the code model in general, see Sperber and Wilson (/
: ch.).
The correct conception of the role of meaning in communication must be built on top of the 
right theory of communication. On the Gricean model I put forward in §., communication 
succeeds when a speaker performs a communicative illocutionary act and her addressee recog-
nizes the ﬁrst component of her communicative intention, thereby fulﬁlling the second compo-
nent. If I address an assertion that the dog ate my homework to you, for example, we will thereby 
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successfully communicate if you recognize that I intend to produce in you the belief that (I be-
lieve that) the dog ate my homework. How are we able to recognize one another’s intentions in 
this way? The details are fuzzy, but we can be sure that the psychological process involves infer-
ence to the best explanation (a.k.a. abductive or nondemonstrative inference). In essence: to inter-
pret a speaker is to rationalize their utterance by inferring the best explanation of why they pro-
duced it. We do this by positing an intention with which the utterance was produced. This sort of 
mindreading is one of the most discussed topics in cognitive science,29 and the nondemonstrative 
inference that fuels it has proven to be among the mind’s most opaque black boxes.30  Neverthe-
less, I feel conﬁdent in the following principle of speculative psychology: whatever psychological 
processes underlie our ability to infer the best explanation of some observed phenomena, those 
processes are more likely to succeed, and to do so eﬃciently, when the search-space of possible 
explanations is narrower than when it is wider. It follows that anything that cuts down the size of 
the search space will make nondemonstrative inference more eﬃcient. I maintain that this princi-
ple provides the key to understanding the role of meaning in communication.
Returning to an example from earlier, suppose that I want to ask a room full of speakers 
whether they’ve ever fantasized about high-ﬁving a scientologist. What makes the process of real-
izing this desire so much more eﬃcient if the room is full of English speakers than if the room is 
full of monolingual Japanese speakers (given that I don’t speak Japanese)? The answer is that the 
sentence, ‘Have you every fantasized about high-ﬁving a scientologist?’ is meaningful for me and 
the English speakers, and the meaningfulness of this sentence (call it X) is the sort of fact that 
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29  For an excellent review of the literature on psychological and philosophical approaches to 
mindreading, see Goldman ().
30 For pessimism about the very possibility of a cognitive-scientiﬁc approach to the nondemon-
strative inference underlying interpretation, see Chomsky (), Davidson (), and Fodor 
(, , ). For optimism about such a cognitive-scientiﬁc approach, and for a detailed 
defense of the idea that the role of linguistic meaning is to narrow the search space of the non-
demonstrative inferences involved in interpretation, see Sperber and Wilson (/).
makes the following two counterfactuals true: (a) if an English speaker were to have the commu-
nicative intentions involved in asking the question I want to ask, they would be likely utter X, and 
(b) if an English speaker were to observe an utterance of X, they would be likely to take the 
speaker to have the kind of intentions involved in asking the question I want to ask. The truth of 
these counterfactuals accomplishes two things. First, my English-speaking addressees will have a 
much easier time recognizing the intentions behind my utterance because they have a much nar-
rower search space of possible explanations to look through. Barring very peculiar circumstances, 
they can ignore the possibility that I am trying to tell them that Seinfeld is on TV, for example. 
The absence of an utterance type that is similarly meaningful for me and my Japanese addressees 
means that I have no comparable method for narrowing their interpretive search spaces, and so 
they have a much wider and more varied space of possible explanations for my utterance. The 
kinds of evidence of my intentions with which I can provide them is radically impoverished vis-a-
vis my English-speaking addressees, and so we would have to work much harder to overcome that 
lack. The truth of the two counterfactuals also make it the case that I can reasonably believe that 
my attempt to communicate will succeed, and, given that intentions are doxastically constrained, 
this might unlock the possibility of having those intentions in the ﬁrst place. 
So the meaning of an utterance type plays a dual role, corresponding to the two halves of a 
Gricean theory of interpretation. It allows tokens of the utterance type to serve as a rich sort of 
evidence of the speaker’s intentions, thereby narrowing the space of interpretive options for an 
addressee and making interpretation more eﬃcient. In playing this role in interpretation, it also 
unlocks makes it rational for speakers to have a range of communicative intentions that it would 
otherwise have been irrational or impossible for them to possess. This is how utterance-type 
meaning makes communication more eﬃcient, on my view. My goal in the following chapters is 
to give a theory of meaning that allows it to play this role.
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CHAPTER TWO: SEMANTICS WITHOUT SEMANTIC CONTENT
Introduction
Contemporary semantics is built around the idea that the meaning of a sentence is a property that 
determines its truth condition in a context, and that a word’s meaning is a property whose role is 
to partly determine the truth conditions of the sentences in which the word appears. By focusing 
on the meanings of expressions that can be used to say diﬀerent things on diﬀerent occasions, I 
will argue in this chapter that words and sentences don’t have truth-condition-determining prop-
erties of these kinds. 
In §., I will introduce the basic ideas and motivations behind truth-conditional semantics, 
as well as some of the foundational problems raised by the fact that sentences’ meanings under-
specify truth conditions. In §., I’ll focus in on the case of demonstratives in order to argue that 
sentence meaning must play the role of constraining speakers’ communicative intentions rather 
than determining truth conditions. In §., I will introduce the basic moving parts of speech-act-
theoretic semantics and show how to account for semantic underspeciﬁcation within this kind of 
semantic theory.
2.1  Truth-Conditional Semantics and Underspecification
The dominant research paradigm in semantics has, for about half a century, centered around the 
idea that a sentence’s meaning is a property that ﬁxes the sentence’s truth condition. Diﬀerent 
genres of semantic theory spell out the nature of these truth-condition-determining properties in 
diﬀerent ways. According to the approach of Donald Davidson (, , ), a sentence has 
meaning just in case there is an extensional truth theory whose theorems include a T-sentence for 
33
the sentence and that truth theory meets further conditions that make it interpretive.1  Within a 
school of approaches favored by most working semanticists now, the job of a semantic theory is to 
assign to sentences model-theoretic objects, such as functions from worlds to truth values (inten-
sions) (Lewis ; Montague ; Stalnaker ; von Fintel and Heim ), sets of centered 
worlds (Lewis b; Stalnaker ), pairs of intensions (Chalmers ), or situations or sets of 
situations (Barwise and Perry ). These model-theoretic objects in turn determine the sen-
tences’ truth conditions. An alternative approach originally due to Gottlob Frege () and Ber-
trand Russell (), but more recently defended and developed by David Kaplan (a) and 
Scott Soames (), takes the job of a semantic theory to be that of assigning to sentences struc-
tured propositions—abstract entities composed of either objects, properties, and relations or 
modes of presentation of them; these structured entities in turn determine sentences’ truth condi-
tions.
I will group all of these approaches together under the covering term, truth-conditional se-
mantics. Although they go about the business of semantics in diﬀerent ways, and explicate an ex-
pression’s meaningfulness in terms of diﬀerent kinds of properties that it might have, the ap-
proaches I’ve alluded to all share an overall conception of the explanatory role that linguistic 
meaning is supposed to play. They confront the question that is raised by Lewis’s dictum—what 
does meaning do?—with Lewis’s own answer: “A meaning for a sentence is something that deter-
mines the conditions under which the sentence is true or false” (: –). This overarching 
genre of semantic theory has dominated thought about linguistic meaning among linguists and 
analytic philosophers. Individual strands within the genre are distinguished by disagreements 
over how best to understand the properties in virtue of which sentences have their truth condi-
tions.
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1  The question of what makes a truth theory interpretive turns out to be a diﬃcult one for 
Davidsonians to answer. See Davidson (, ), Lepore & Ludwig (: chs.–), and 
Neale (: §.) for discussion. 
In order to achieve some generality in the following discussion, I deﬁne a notion of semantic 
content as follows:
(SC) Semantic contents are properties of linguistic entities, such as expressions, expressions in 
contexts, utterances of expressions, or expression tokens. More speciﬁcally: a linguistic 
entity’s semantic content is its semantic value—i.e., the property that a compositional se-
mantic theory aims to ascribe to it.2
(SC) The semantic content of a sentence determines its truth condition, and the semantic con-
tent of a sub-sentential expression determines its contribution to the truth conditions of 
sentences in which it appears.
By explicating semantic content via its role in (SC–), I am construing the notion more broadly 
than is usual. Typically, an expression’s semantic content is taken to be its propositional content (in 
the case of a sentence) or, in some sense that would have to be spelled out further, its contribution 
to sentences’ propositional contents (in the case of sub-sentential expressions). But not every no-
tion that ﬁts (SC–) is best thought of as picking out a kind of propositional content. Some se-
manticists posit properties that satisfy (SC–), but deny that these properties ought to be cashed 
out as relations to propositions or their components. The best-known example is Davidson, who 
argued that meanings, construed as entities, “do not seem to…oil the wheels of a theory of mean-
ing” (: ). Nonetheless, Davidson did think that expressions have properties that satisfy 
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2  An expression’s semantic value, as I use the term, can be thought of as the meaning of an 
expression in the technical sense that is relevant to semantic theory. Schiﬀer (: ch.) points 
out that most linguistic expressions are such that there is no entity that we can felicitously say, of 
the entity, that it is the expression’s meaning, and concludes that talk of the meanings of words 
and sentences is confused. This may be a correct characterization of ordinary usage or folk-
semantic theory, but at least many technical semantic theories deviate from ordinary usage in this 
way, and I see no problem with saying that some entity is an expression’s meanings in at least a 
technical sense. Still, I will sometimes rely on Lewis’s () notion of a semantic value, which he 
introduced speciﬁcally so as to remain neutral about what kind of entity or property semantic 
theories should ascribe to expressions.
(SC–). According to a Davidsonian, the sentence ‘snow is white’ has the property of being the 
subject of a T-theorem of an interpretive truth theory for a language, for example. My extended 
usage of ‘semantic content’ to cover properties like these is unorthodox—and would probably 
have irked Davidson—but the usage is justiﬁed because it allows me to discuss aspects that 
Davidsonian semantic theories have in common with other forms of truth-conditional semantics 
that do trade in semantic entities.3
My main goals in this chapter can be summed up as follows: I will show that there is no such 
thing as semantic content (§.), and that semantics can (and must) get along just ﬁne without it 
(§.). Because my argument contra semantic content will revolve around semantic underspeciﬁ-
cation, I will spend the remainder of this section exploring that notion and some of the debates 
about the relationships between descriptive semantics, foundational semantics, and pragmatics 
that have arisen from it.
With my unusually broad concept of semantic content in hand, we can sum up the central 
tenet of truth-conditional semantics by saying that the job of a semantic theory is to systemati-
cally and ﬁnitely ascribe to each meaningful expression its semantic content. Once we pay a bit of 
attention to actual natural language expressions, however, a pair of obvious problems with this 
view quickly emerge. One is that sentences in non-declarative moods—including interrogatives 
(‘Who are you?’) and imperatives (‘Buy me a drink!’)—apparently aren’t truth-apt, and so don’t 
have truth conditions or semantic contents. I will consider this worry, and the semantics of non-
declaratives more generally, in Chapter Three. The second problem is that most declarative sen-
tences, conceived of as expression types, can’t be said to possess semantic contents either, because 
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3  Nonetheless, Davidson is not my main target in what follows, and some of my arguments 
might have to be reformulated in order to apply cleanly to his version of semantics.
they exhibit semantic underspeciﬁcation.4  Underspeciﬁed sentences’ meanings don’t fully specify 
truth conditions, so that knowing everything there is to know about an underspeciﬁed sentence’s 
meaning would not, by itself, allow one to identify any truth condition associated with any utter-
ance produced with it or speech act performed with it. It follows that at least many linguistic ex-
pressions don’t—at least by themselves—possess semantic contents.
In order to illustrate semantic underspeciﬁcation and the strategies that truth-conditional se-
manticists have used to address it, I will consider a range of examples.
Indexicals
() a. I am Canadian.
 b. Donald Trump lives here.
 c. It is now the twenty-ﬁrst century.
Each of these three sentences expresses determinate truth conditions in particular contexts (or 
can be used to literally and directly express propositions with determinate truth conditions on 
particular occasions),  but none of them has truth conditions on its own.5  The semantic under-
speciﬁcation of each of (a–c) can be traced (at least in part) to the underspeciﬁcation of the in-
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4  Two more common terms for this phenomenon are context sensitivity and semantic underde-
termination, but, as Neale (forthcoming a: §.) has pointed out, both of these expressions are mis-
leading. The latter term presupposes that the role of linguistic meaning is to determine the truth 
conditions of a sentence (perhaps relative to context), and the former presupposes that underspe-
ciﬁed expressions’ semantic contents are determined by something that can be called ‘context’. 
Both of these points are precisely what is at issue in this chapter.
For helpful discussions of semantic underspeciﬁcation, see Carston () and Neale (: 
pp.–).
5  The parenthetical qualiﬁcation is necessary because I’ll argue in §. that only speakers can 
express propositions, and that linguistic objects, such as expressions or utterances of them, can-
not. In order to avoid sounding as though I am begging the question agains the idea of semantic 
content, I will resort either to parenthetical disjunctive statements (as here), or to the locution, 
‘the truth conditions (content) associated with an utterance’, which should be understood as neu-
tral between ‘the truth conditions (content) of an utterance’ and ‘the truth conditions (content) of 
the proposition expressed by a speaker with an utterance’.
dexical constituent that I have highlighted in bold. Expressions like ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’ are indexi-
cal in the sense that what they refer to (or what speakers refer to with them) vary from one con-
text of utterance to another. Clearly, this is incompatible with the most naïve form of truth-
conditional semantics, on which the job of a compositional semantic theory is to assign semantic 
contents directly to sentence types.
The most inﬂuential strategy for dealing with semantic underspeciﬁcation within the frame-
work of truth-conditional semantics was developed in order to account for indexicals like these. 
According to this strategy, which was developed by Kaplan (a), the process by which a se-
mantic theory assigns truth conditions to sentences takes two steps: each of the sentence’s con-
stituents is assigned a semantic content relative to a context of utterance, and then the semantic 
contents of the sentence’s constituents are composed to determine the sentence’s semantic content 
in that context.6  On this view, it is expressions-in-contexts (or utterances of expressions), rather 
than expression types, that possess semantic contents. Kaplan (a) models the contexts rela-
tive to which expressions are assigned semantic contents as ordered quadruples (e.g., c = ⟨cA, cT, 
cP, cW⟩), whose coordinates represent the speaker, time, position, and world of a context, respec-
tively. Kaplan’s compositional semantics associates each indexical expression with a character—a 
function from contexts to semantic values. The character of ‘I’, for example, maps each context c 
to the agent cA of the context. This captures the intuitive idea that the referent of an utterance of ‘I’ 
is its speaker. 
As Neale (, , forthcoming a) has repeatedly pointed out, it is important to distinguish 
the metaphysical question of what ﬁxes or constitutes the properties of a given expression, utter-
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6  Kaplan is inconsistent about what sentences’ semantic contents are. Informally, he represents 
them as Russellian structured propositions, so that, for example, ‘Kaplan is funny’ would be rep-
resented by Russellian proposition, ⟨Kaplan, FUNNY⟩, in which the ﬁrst coordinate is Kaplan 
himself and the second coordinate is the property of being funny. In his model theory, however, 
Kaplan identiﬁes sentences’ contents with intensions, which he models as sets of world/time pairs 
(a: §XVIII).
ance of an expression, or speech act performed with an expression, from the epistemic question of 
how a hearer identiﬁes those properties. Although we could conceivably construe Kaplan’s theory 
of indexicality, or something similar, as part of an answer to a question of the latter, epistemic 
sort, this is not how Kaplan or his followers have understood it. Kaplan (a) intends his theory 
of indexicality to be an answer to the metaphysical question: what ﬁxes the referent of an indexi-
cal in a given context of utterance? In the same vein, Lewis holds that sentences’ meanings “de-
termine” their truth conditions “in various possible states of aﬀairs, at various times, at various 
places, for various speakers, and so on” (: –). The Kaplanian–Lewisian strategy for deal-
ing with semantic underspeciﬁcation is to build a notion of the objective context of utterance into 
the models underlying one’s compositional semantic theory, such that some fact about that con-
text, together with the characters of each sentence’s constituents and the principles governing se-
mantic composition, ﬁxes the semantic value (and so the truth conditions) of every meaningful 
sentence. Although Kaplan’s contexts are simple and well-behaved ordered tuples that represent 
apparently objective facts about the situation in which someone produces an utterance, the same 
basic idea lies behind a wide variety of other proposals about the nature, structure, and basis of 
utterance contexts. Philosophers and linguists have argued that a wide variety of further elements 
of context must be posited, including the mutual presuppositions of a conversation’s participants 
(Stalnaker ), a collection of assignment functions or discourse referents to keep track of enti-
ties about which the participants in a conversation are talking (Heim , ; Kamp ; 
Karttunen ), a salience ranking on the domain of disourse of on the discourse referents 
(Lewis a), representations of the questions under discussion at a given time in a conversation 
(Roberts /), and representations of the norms (Gibbard ; Lewis b, a), 
plans (Gibbard ; Charlow ), preferences (Starr ms), To-Do lists (Portner ), or other 
action-guiding states that the participants in a conversation have agreed upon for the purposes of 
a conversation. Although the contexts thus posited diﬀer in composition and complexity, the ba-
39
sic idea is always that the meanings of expressions and the context of utterance come together to 
jointly ﬁx the semantic values of expressions in contexts. This strategy is most plausible if we re-
strict our attention to the word ‘I’, which is sometimes called a pure or automatic indexical, on the 
grounds that its character and the context in which it is uttered seem to automatically ﬁx its refer-
ent in that context (see, e.g., Braun : §.). It is often claimed that ‘yesterday’, ‘today’, ‘tomor-
row’, ‘here’, and ‘now’ are pure indexicals in this sense.
I doubt that there are really any pure indexicals in this sense, but it can easily be seen that 
‘here’ and ‘now’ are impure. Even if we assume that ‘here’ can only refer to a place that the speaker 
is in (or that a speaker must use it to refer to a place she is in), this does not fully settle which 
place a given utterance of ‘here’ refers to (or what a speaker refers to with it). This is because a 
speaker’s location is not any single thing. I am in my apartment, in my building, in Fort Greene, 
in Brooklyn, in New York, and so on, and any one of these locations could be the referent of ‘here’ 
that’s relevant to the truth conditions of (b) in a given context (or of what I might say with (b) 
on a given occasion). Moreover, nothing about the meaning of ‘here’ together with the speaker’s 
physical location could determine which of these locations is the one that features in the truth 
conditions of (b) (or what a speaker says with it).
What does ﬁx the location that ﬁgures in the truth conditions associated with an utterance of 
(b)? On the view that I will defend using other examples in §., the relevant location is deter-
mined by the communicative intention with which a speaker utters (b) (cf. Neale ; Schiﬀer 
; Sperber and Wilson /). One consequence of this view, I’ll argue, is that we can make 
no sense of the idea that the expression ‘here’, or an utterance of it, refers. Instead, only people re-
fer, and they may do so by uttering expressions like ‘here’ (cf. Bach ; Neale , , forth-
coming a; Schiﬀer , ; Strawson ). And a consequence of this is that ‘here’ has no 
property that deserves to be called ‘semantic content’. Before turning to that argument, I’ll con-
sider a a few other examples of semantic underspeﬁciation.
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DP Restriction
() a. The book is over one-hundred pages long.
 b. Every beer is in the bucket.
The bold-faced constituents of (a–b) are DPs (‘Determiner Phrases’). Each consists of a deter-
miner (‘the’ and ‘every’) and an NP nominal (‘book’ and ‘beer’). A much-discussed fact about DPs 
is that the truth conditions associated with sentences containing them must be understood as if 
the things to which the DPs’ nominals applied were somehow restricted. Normally, the truth con-
dition associated with a direct and literal utterance of (a) will not be about the one and only 
book, for example, but will be about the one-and-only book-with-some-further-property. A 
speaker might use (a) to express the proposition that the book they are writing is over one hun-
dred pages long, for example, or that the book their nephew is reading is over one-hundred pages 
long, and so on. Similarly, the truth conditions associated with a direct and literal utterance of 
(b) would normally not concern every book in the world, but instead every book that meets 
some further condition. The problem of saying what ﬁxes these implicit restrictions is the prob-
lem of DP restriction.7  As it applies to quantiﬁer phrases like ‘every beer’ in (b), this problem is 
usually called the problem of quantiﬁer domain restriction (e.g., Stanley and Szabó ); as it ap-
plies to deﬁnite descriptions like ‘the book’ in (a), it is usually called the problem of incomplete 
descriptions (e.g., Neale : §.).
Two traditional solutions to the problem are what Neale calls the implicit and explicit ap-
proaches (: §.; : §§–), which he characterizes as follows:
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7  Stanley () uses the term ‘nominal restriction’ because he (following Stanley and Szabó 
) locates the restriction syntactically inside the DP’s nominal. Westerståhl () instead ar-
gues that the restrictor is contributed by the DP’s determiner. In calling the phenomenon ‘DP re-
striction’, I wish to remain neutral between these two options, as well as the possibility that the 
restriction is contributed by a property of the DP as a whole.
How are we to explain the incontrovertible fact that A can use a description ‘the φ’ in an ut-
terance of the simple form ‘the φ is ψ’ and thereby perform a perfectly felicitous speech act, 
indeed say something true, even though A and B (the hearer) both know that φ(x) is true of 
more than one thing? The question generalizes: How are we to explain the fact that (roughly) 
for a range of determiners, D, A can use ‘D φ’ in an utterance of the simple form ‘D φ is ψ’ and 
thereby perform a perfectly felicitous speech act, indeed say something true, even though A 
and B both know that φ(x) is true of some things that are not relevant to the truth or falsity of 
what A said?
Many philosophers appear to think the answer to the question…is obvious. ‘There’s always 
an implicit background restriction on the domain over which a quantiﬁer expression ranges,’ is 
one old reply. Another is, ‘An utterance of ‘the φ is ψ’ is sometimes elliptical for an utterance of 
‘the φ that ζ is ψ’, where ζ is something the speaker could have made explicit but didn’t.’ Call 
these the implicit reply and explicit reply, respectively, based only on the appearance of the 
words ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ in the quoted remarks. (Neale : –)
For my purposes, the details of who endorses each of these approaches, why, and who is right, are 
somewhat irrelevant. On either approach, some precisiﬁcation of this question arises: in virtue of 
what is a DP’s nominal restricted in the particular way that it is? 8 
Assuming the implicit approach, this question can be rephrased as the question of what ﬁxes 
the particular implicit background restriction over which a DP ranges on a particular occasion. 
One possibility is that a continually evolving domain of discourse is somehow built into the con-
text against the background of which expressions are assigned their semantic contents (e.g., Bar-
wise and Perry ). But then the question arises: in virtue of what does any particular object get 
into the contextually relevant domain of objects? Even this question turns out to be ill-posed, 
however, because no single contextually relevant domain will be enough. As several authors have 
pointed out, it is possible to utter ‘The Russian voted for the Russian’ in order to say that one spe-
ciﬁc Russian voted for a diﬀerent speciﬁc Russian, and, so, if the implicit approach is to work, 
then the two instances of ‘the Russian’ in this sentence must get their semantic contents from dis-
tinct contextually relevant domains, each of which contains a diﬀerent unique Russian (Neale 
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8  Of course, this is not to say that there won’t be any indeterminacy about how a nominal gets 
restricted in a particular case. See, e.g., Buchanan () and Buchanan and Ostertag () for 
helpful discussions of this sort of indeterminacy. Still: insofar as there is a fact about how a nomi-
nal is indeterminately restricted, we can ask what constitutes this fact. 
: ; Soames b; Westerstahl ). Simply adding more background domains to the 
context isn’t enough to solve this problem, moreover, since we still have to answer the question: in 
virtue of what is each distinct instance of ‘the Russian’ matched up with the contextually restricted 
domain relevant to its semantic value, as opposed to whatever other domains might be hanging 
around in the context? It is diﬃcult to imagine how one could answer this question with respect 
to the truth conditions associated with a given utterance without appealing to the communicative 
intentions of the speaker.
Assuming the explicit approach, on the other hand, the question of what constitutes the rele-
vant restriction can be rephrased as the question of what makes it the case that some more fully 
articulated DP counts as the one for which an actual utterance of some DP was elliptical. Neale 
argues that this fact could be determined only by the speaker’s communicative intentions. 
Roughly: taking Dφζ to be a DP whose nominal φζ is a restriction of the nominal φ of Dφ, what 
makes φζ the restriction of φ that is relevant to an utterance of ‘Dφ is ψ’ on a particular occasion 
is that the speaker could have uttered ‘Dφζ is ψ’ in order to give more precise evidence of the 
communicative intentions that she actually had in uttering ‘Dφ is ψ’ on that occasion. Other than 
the speaker’s intentions, it is hard to see what could do this work.
An added complication arises from Stanley and Szabó’s () and Stanley’s () arguments 
that DPs’ nominals contain aphonic, but syntactially-realized context-sensitive variables that 
function to restrict DPs’ domains. On this view, the LF of (a–b) can be roughly approximated by 
(*a–b):
(*) a. [DP [Det the] [NP book f(i)]] [VP is over one-hundred pages long]
 b. [DP [Det every] [NP beer f(i)]] [VP is in the bucket]
Stanley and Szabó explain the properties of the aphonic domain restrictor as follows (with ad-
justments to accommodate the present example and numbering):
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The value of “i” is an object provided by the context, and the value of “f ” is a function pro-
vided by context that maps objects onto quantiﬁer domains. The restriction on the quantiﬁed 
expression [“every beer”] in [(*b)] would then be provided by the result of applying the func-
tion that the context supplies to “f ” to the object that the context supplies to “i”. (Stanley and 
Szabó : ).
Stanley and Szabó posit the variable i in their LFs in order to explain the fact that some type-e 
variable hidden in DPs’ nominals can be bound by DPs higher up in an LF. They posit the aphonic 
indexical f in order to explain how the semantic content of a type-e variable like i can be trans-
formed into something of a semantic type that can restrict a DP’s domain by combining with its 
nominal.
If Stanley and Szabó are right that nominals contain aphonic domain-restricting variables, we 
still need to ask the question: in virtue of what do those variables have the contents that they do 
on particular occasions (cf. Neale : §; a)? For example: what is it about two diﬀerent 
occasions of use that makes it the case that the values of f and i are saturated in two diﬀerent ways 
on those occasions, so that (for example) ‘the book’ picks out the book on the table at Jason’s house 
on the ﬁrst occasion and the book on the shelf at Zoltán’s house on the second occasion? Stanley 
and Szabó’s answer is that the values of these variables are “provided by context”, but this just 
raises the further question: what fact about the context makes it the case that one value is “pro-
vided” rather than another? For roughly the same reasons mentioned in connection to the explicit 
and implicit approaches, it is diﬃcult to see what could do this work other than some fact about 
the speaker’s communicative intentions.
Some Other Examples of Underspeciﬁcation
The bold-faced expressions in (–) exhibit some other heavily discussed kinds of semantic un-
derspeciﬁcation. We can see this by noting that each sentence (n) could express a range of con-
tents in diﬀerent contexts (or could be used to literally and directly express a range of diﬀerent 
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contents on diﬀerent occasions), two of which could be more explicitly paraphrased by (na) and 
(nb).
()  It’s raining.
 a. It’s raining in New York.
 b. It’s raining in San Francisco.
() Elmar’s shark is more than six feet long.
 a. The shark that Elmar is eating is more than six feet long.
 b. The shark that Elmar rides is more than six feet long.
() The coﬀee in Rome is expensive.
 a. The coﬀee in Rome is expensive by the standards of food in Rome.
 b. The coﬀee in Rome is expensive by the standards of coﬀee elsewhere.
(6)  Rachel must be here.
 a. Rachel must, for all we know, be here.
 b. Rachel must, legally, be here.
Debates about these and other semantically underspeciﬁed expressions parallel the debate about 
DP restriction. 
In line with Stanley and Szabó’s syntactic approach to DP restriction, it is commonly argued 
that the expressions in (–) contain one or more aphonic variables, and that the context-
sensitivity of these variables is responsible for the underpeciﬁcation of the (–). The following 
examples are representative. Stanley argues that the LF of () contains a hidden variable that is 
saturated by “the contextually salient location” in the context of utterance (: ). Peters and 
Westerstahl argue that possessives like ‘Elmar’s shark’ in () contain implicit quantiﬁers which are 
themselves implicitly restricted (: ). Kennedy argues that gradable adjectives like ‘expen-
sive’ in () inherit their underspeciﬁcation from implicit variables saturated by “the contextually 
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appropriate standard of comparison, whatever that is” (: ). Kratzer argues that modals like 
‘should’ in () have semantic contents only relative to a conversational background (a.k.a. modal 
base) and ordering source, that the values of these variables determine whether a modal should be 
read epistemically (as in (a)), deontically (as in (b)) in some other way, and that the conversa-
tional background and ordering source are elements of context ().9  Similar claims have been 
made about a range of other semantically-underspeciﬁed expressions.10
As in the cases of indexicals and DP restriction, however, positing hidden variables and saying 
that they are saturated by context does not answer the question of what ﬁxes those expressions’ 
semantic contents. What, speciﬁcally, about the context makes it the case that the truth conditions 
associated with a given utterance of each sentence (n) above are such that they could be better 
captured by (na) than by (nb), for example? Again, it is diﬃcult to imagine what could do this 
work other than some fact about the communicative intentions of the speaker (Neale : §, 
a,b, forthcoming a; Dowell , ). 
The question of what ﬁxes the content of a given expression (or what ﬁxes the content that a 
speaker expresses with it) is typically thought of as a question about founational semantics or me-
tasemantics, as opposed to a question in descriptive or compositional semantics, which is the study 
of how sentences’ meanings are determined by their structures and the meanings of their parts. 
One reason that semanticists are typically vague or noncommital on the question of what ﬁxes the 
contents of semantically underspeciﬁed expressions is that they take descriptive semantics and 
foundational semantics to be distinct projects that can be successfully pursued in relative isolation 
46
9  Kratzer remains neutral about whether the conversational background and ordering source 
are the values of aphonic variables, or whether they get into the truth conditions of a modal claim 
in some other way. Hacquard () develops Kratzer’s account of modals into an elaborate 
aphonic-variable theory.
10 Since tense gives rise to a form of semantic underspeciﬁcation in much the same way as pro-
nouns (see, e.g., Partee ) and every natural language sentence involves tense, it follows that 
every natural language sentence exhibits at least some underspeciﬁcation.
from one another, so that how one answers questions in foundational semantics will have little 
impact on how one answers questions in descriptive semantics. The task of descriptive semantics, 
on this view, is to lay bare the semantically relevant structure of each meaninful sentence, assume 
that each underspeciﬁed expression is saturated by a semantic content of the right type, and com-
pute the semantic content of the sentences from their structures and the semantic contents of 
their parts. This approach is typiﬁed by Heim and Kratzer’s brief discussion of foundational se-
mantics and context sensitivity (: ):
If you utter a sentence like
[A]  She is taller than she
then your utterance is felicitous only if the utterance situation provides values for the two oc-
currences of the pronoun “she”. Given that referring pronouns bear indices at LF, [A] has 
some representation such as [B],
[B]  She is taller than she
and we can think of an utterance situation as ﬁxing a certain partial function from indices to 
individuals. An appropriate utterance situation for LF [B] is one that ﬁxes values for the indi-
ces  and . That is, it is appropriate for [B] only if the variable assignment it determines in-
cludes  and  in its domain.
Let “c” stand for an utterance situation or “(utterance) context” (we use these terms inter-
changably), and let “gc” stand for the variable assignment determined by c (if any). We can 
thus formulate the following appropriateness and truth-conditions for LFs with free pro-
nouns.
[C]  Appropriateness Condition
A context c is appropriate for an LF φ only if c determines a variable assignment gc 
whose domain includes every index which has a fee occurrence in φ.
[D] Truth and Falsity Conditions for Utterances
If φ is uttered in c and c is appropriate for φ, then the utterance of φ in c is true if ⟦φ⟧gc = 
 and false if ⟦φ⟧gc = .
Because they are writing a book about descriptive semantics rather than foundational semantics, 
Heim and Kratzer make no attempt, either in this passage or elsewhere, to say what a context is or 
how it determines a variable assignment. The implication is that this isn’t relevant to the task at 
hand. Stanley and Szabó () are even more explicit in their defense of the independence of 
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descriptive and foundatinal semantics. They begin by considering two claims that someone might 
make about the semantics of the demonstrative, ‘that’ (: ):
() Relative to c, “that” denotes o.
() o is what is demonstrated in context c.
Stanley and Szabó say that () is an answer to the “descriptive problem of context depend-
ence”—the problem of “deriving”, for an expression e relative to a context c, “the interpretation of 
e relative to c, given a prior characterization of what features of the context c have a bearing on the 
interpretation. (), on the other hand, addresses the “foundational problem of context depend-
ence for an expression e relative to a context c”, which is the problem of “specifying what it is 
about the context in virtue of which certain entities (be they objects, properties, or propositions) 
play the role they do in the interpretation of an occurrence of e” (: ). Stanley and Szabó go 
on to argue that it is crucial that we distinguish problems in descriptive semantics from problems 
in foundational semantics. They suggest, citing Braun () and Reimer () in agreement, 
that it is legitimate for those pursuing descriptive semantics to take “as given” the semantic con-
tents of context-sensitive expressions (: ), and argue that mixing up discussions of descrip-
tive and foundational semantics should be avoided:
In general, discussions of descriptive and foundational problems should be clearly distin-
guished from one another. To use an example discussed at length in Stalnaker (), in the 
case of proper names, an example of a foundational semantic debate concerns the viability of 
the causal theory of names, according to which the denotation of a name is due to the exis-
tence of a causal relation of the appropriate sort between it and its bearer. However, the causal 
chains are no part of the descriptive semantics of names. The descriptive semantics of names 
only involve linking them up with their bearers. Causal chains are rather part of a foundational 
semantic account of why names have the descriptive semantical interpretation they do. An ex-
ample of a descriptive semantical debate is whether names are rigid designators, or are rather 
shorthand for non-rigid deﬁnite descriptions. Only confusion results from running such dis-
tinct questions together. (: )
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Although I agree with Stanley and Szabó that descriptive and foundational semantics can be 
thought of as distinct projects (or at least as distinct parts of a single project), I disagree with sev-
eral of their other assumptions about the nature of the boundary between descriptive and founda-
tional semantics. One of these assumptions is that the semantic value of an expression—its mean-
ing from the point of view of descriptive semantics—should be thought of as a kind of semantic 
content. On the view I will defend later in this chapter, the semantic value of an expression is the 
type of speech act that a speaker can perform with it, and the type of act of referring that is the 
semantic value of ‘that’ is individuated broadly, so that it can be tokened by referring to diﬀerent 
objects on diﬀerent occasions. 
If I am right about this, then the proper foundational question about ‘that’ is: in virtue of what 
is a certain broadly-individuated type of referential speech act the semantic value of ‘that’? Stanley 
and Szabó’s version of the foundational question about ‘that’—in virtue of what does ‘that’ refer to 
an object o in a context c?—is, by contrast, ill-posed, since demonstratives don’t refer (only speak-
ers do). In §., I will argue that Stanley and Szabó’s version of the foundational question about 
‘that’ is illegitimate in this way by demonstrating that our best attempt to answer it collapses into 
an answer to an analogous question about what speakers refer to in uttering ‘that’. This strategy 
reveals a second kind of disagreement with Stanley and Szabó: it shows that how we pose and an-
swer questions in foundational semantics can have major consequences for the nature and meth-
odology of descriptive semantics. Foundational and descriptive semantics must, then, be pursued 
in close connection with one another.
2.2  The Case Against Semantic Content
In order to avoid unnecessary complexity in what follows, I will assume that if sentences and their 
parts have semantic contents, these contents are Russellian propositions and their parts, respec-
tively. On this view, for example, the semantic content of (a) is the Russellian structured proposi-
49
tion (b), whose parts—Bertrand Russell and the property of being British—are the semantic val-
ues of the sentence’s parts, ‘Bertrand’ and ‘is British’, respectively.
()  a. Bertrand is British.
 b. ⟨Bertrand Russell, BRITISH⟩
Nothing of dialectical importance hangs on this Russelian assumption. It will simplify my discus-
sion by allowing me to phrase Stanley and Szabó’s foundational question in the way they do—as a 
question about a semantic relation borne by expressions to familiar objects and properties, rather 
than as a question about a relation borne by expressions to modes of presentation or various sorts 
of model-theoretic objects. But the same problems for understanding those relations would arise 
as arise for the Russellian semantic relation I’ll discuss.
I will focus my attention in this section on the demonstrative pronouns ‘this’ and ‘that’ as they 
are used in () and ():
() This stinks.
() That stinks.
Although any of the semantically underspeciﬁed expressions that I discussed in §. would serve 
my purposes in this section, demonstrative pronouns are particularly useful for several reasons. 
One is that there is already a large literature discussing the question of what grounds demonstra-
tive reference, and the authors of that literature have already done much of my work for me. A 
second advantage of focusing on demonstrative pronouns depends on a further simplifying as-
sumption, which is already implicit in the fact that I refer to them as ‘demonstrative pronouns’ 
rather than as ‘demonstrative determiners’. Following nearly everyone who has contributed to the 
literature to which I’ve just alluded (and, most inﬂuentially, Kaplan a,b), I will take demon-
stratives like ‘this’ and ‘that’ as they appear in () and () to be syntactically unstructured, di-
rectly referential singular terms. This assumption is controversial, as various authors have enter-
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tained the view that seemingly syntactically unstructured demonstratives are actually complex 
DPs with aphonic or deleted nominals (Neale : §; Elbourne : ch.; Hawthorne and 
Manley : , fn.). I am conﬁdent that bracketing these views will do no dialectical harm 
to this chapter because all such views reduce demonstratives to other kinds of semantically un-
derspeciﬁed expressions of the kinds I discussed in §., and I am conﬁdent that I could give par-
allel arguments for each of those kinds of expressions (indeed, I sketched the most important 
steps of these arguments in §.).
The upside of the simplifying assumption that simple demonstratives are syntactically un-
structured and directly referential is that it allows me to move back and forth between talk of the 
semantic contents and the semantic referents of demonstratives. This is because a term is directly 
referential just in case its referent  in a context is identical to its semantic content in that context 
(Kaplan a). (Semantic reference can be deﬁned by restricting the scope of (SC) to directly 
referring expressions and replacing each instance of ‘semantic content’ with an instance of ‘se-
mantic reference’.)
My aim in this section, then, is to argue that there there do not exist entities that satisfy both 
of (SC–), and to do so by way of arguing that there is no coherent and explanatory notion of 
semantic reference. I am not the ﬁrst to make these claims. Perhaps the best-known semantic-
reference denier is P. F. Strawson, who famously summed up the position by saying that referring 
“is not something an expression does; it is something that someone can use an expression to do” 
(: ). Various philosophers of language have since adopted weaker approximations of this 
view. Kent Bach maintains, for example, that “referring is ultimately not something that words do 
but something that speakers use words to do” (: , emphasis added). Although Bach does 
ﬁnd room in his theory for a notion of semantic reference, he maintains that “speaker reference is 
a more fundamental notion than semantic reference” (ibid). This weakened version of the Straw-
son’s slogan is as close as most philosophers of language are willing to get to the kind of full-
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blown denial of semantic content that I am interested in here, but I will try to show that Bach’s 
watered-down view does not go far enough.
Neale has at least ﬂirted with Strawsonian semantic-content denial, in that he has periodically 
voiced skepticism that any notions of semantic reference and semantic content are needed for 
semantic theorizing.11  In support of this skepticism, Neale oﬀers the following argument for the 
dispensability of any non-speaker-based notion of reference.12
...we should separate (i) who or what A intended to refer to by an expression X on a given oc-
casion, and (ii) who or what a rational, reasonably well-informed interpreter in B’s shoes 
thinks A intended to refer to by X on that occasion. In cases where (i) = (ii), we can talk freely 
about what the speaker referred to. In cases where (i) ≠ (ii), we could argue about which of (i) 
or (ii) or some third thing has the ‘right’ to be called the person or thing referred to, but what 
would be the point? First, what third thing distinct from (i) and (ii) could be of any signiﬁ-
cance to a theory of interpretation? There is simply no rôle for a transcendent notion of what 
was referred to upon which (i) and (ii) converge when all goes well. [...] Second, why is a 
choice between (i) and (ii) needed in cases where (i) ≠ (ii)? Conceptually they are distinct, and 
they are both needed in a theory of interpretation. When all goes well, they coincide, and it’s 
just too bad they don’t always do so. There is no philosophical payoﬀ in bestowing the honor-
iﬁc ‘what was referred to’ on one rather than the other, or on some third thing, when they di-
verge. (Neale : –).
In eﬀect, Neale’s argument takes the form of a challenge. In order to understand the nature of 
communication, we already need an intention-based notion of speaker reference, as well as the 
notion of what an (idealized) interpreter would understand a speaker as referring to. Neale chal-
lenges anyone who wishes to theorize about any further notion of reference (such as the notion of 
semantic reference) to articulate some explanatory role for that notion to play. Without such a 
well-articulated explanatory role, the notion of semantic reference is mere theoretical clutter with 
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11 For Neale’s skepticism regarding the notion of semantic reference, see (: ; forthcoming 
a: , fn.). Neale’s skepticism about the notion of semantic content is more explicit, and comes 
out in his denial that there is any useful or coherent notion of what a sentence says, as opposed to 
the Gricean, speaker-based notion of what a speaker says (see Neale , , forthcoming b).
12  For an almost identical argument against semantic content (in Neale’s terminology: any no-
tion of what is said that isn’t an intention-based notion of what a speaker says), see Neale (: 
; : .).
no explanatory work to do. Neale gives almost identical arguments against any notion of what is 
said that isn’t an intention-based notion of what the speaker said (: ; see also : ). I 
will refer to these objections as the dispensability argument.
The most interesting kind of response to the dispensability argument would address Neale’s 
challenge directly by arguing that we need some notion of semantic content in order to construct 
an explanatory semantic theory. This response takes seriously the idea that we should counte-
nance semantic content only if we have a role for it to play, but contends that we need semantic 
conent to play the role of the semantic values that a semantic theory assigns to expressions. Ac-
cording to half a century of accumulated wisdom, compositional semantics works by showing 
how expressions’ semantic contents (relative to contexts) add up to sentences’ semantic contents. 
So one conceivable response to Neale’s dispensability argument would be that semantics can’t be 
done without semantic content.
One of the broad purposes of this dissertation is to counter this objection to the dispensability 
argument—to produce a proof-of-concept for a kind of semantic theory that doesn’t traﬃc in se-
mantic content. On the Gricean view that I sketched in Chapter One, the role of linguistic mean-
ing is not to determine truth conditions, but to enable eﬃcient communication. The explanatory 
role I assign to linguistic meaning is twofold: ﬁrst, linguistic meaning must provide evidence to 
interpreters of speakers’ communicative intentions, and, second, linguistic meaning must thereby 
constrain the communicative intentions that a rational speaker can have in uttering expressions. 
Based, in part, on a similar line of thought, Neale has proposed that compositional semantics 
should be in the business of showing how the constraints on what we can communicatively intend 
in uttering a sentence are built up from the constraints on what we can communicatively intend 
in uttering words (and, in particular, from the referential intentions we can have in uttering refer-
ring expressions). Neale uses the term ‘blueprints’ to describe meanings, construed as constraints 
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on intentions (, ).13  Neale is perhaps clearest about this point as it applies to the seman-
tic properties of quantiﬁers and referring expressions:
I prefer to watch those [varietals of noun phrase] that are useful emerge from act-syntactic re-
ﬂections, by which I mean reﬂections on the most fundamental features of speech acts as they 
are regulated by (or projected through the lens of) syntax. … That may sound mysterious, but 
the basic idea is quite simple. We might put forward a preliminary act-syntactic, speciﬁcation 
of the class of referring expressions that declares an expression E a referring expression if and 
only if (a) E is used regularly or systematically to perform such-and-such types of intentional 
acts—or at least could be so-used in a sense of ‘could’ that would require some explica-
tion—and (b) E has such-and-such syntactic distribution. (Neale : )
Although others have made similar programmatic remarks about the idea that semantics should 
be a theory of constraints on intentions, nobody has shown how this idea can be ﬂeshed out into a 
detailed and systematic compositional semantics.14  It is therefore open to the defender of seman-
tic content to protest that the proof is in the pudding—that until the details of this alternative 
kind of semantics are worked out, we should assume that the only workable conception of seman-
tics is one that employs a notion of semantic content. Part of my goal in the remainder of this dis-
sertation will be to show how to construct a semantic theory that builds on Neale’s programmatic 
remarks, and thereby refutes the idea that semantics without semantic content is impossible.
Before I reach that positive proposal, I want ﬁrst to oﬀer a more direct objection to the no-
tions of semantic reference and semantic content. Whereas Neale’s argument from dispensability 
makes the claim that we can do without semantic content, my argument aims to show that we 
can’t have semantic content even if we want it. I will demonstrate this by showing that any attempt 
to undestand the notion of semantic content for a variety of expressions will inevitably lead us to 
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13 “A semantic theory speciﬁes the constraints that word meanings and syntax place on what A 
can say by uttering X, a blueprint for X” (Neale : ).
14 Schiﬀer has likewise proposed in various places that the meaning of a sentence is a constraint 
on either the communicative intentions a speaker can have in uttering the sentence or on the type 
of speech act that a speaker can perform with the sentence (e.g., , , ). But, unlike 
Neale, Schiﬀer does not attempt to generalize this point to the meanings of sub-sentential expres-
sions.
some speaker-based notion instead, and that we should extend this result to all other expressions 
for methodological reasons. Call this the argument from collapse. 
The argument begins with the following two questions:
(Q) In virtue of what does an utterance of a simple demonstrative d refer to a given individual 
x in a context c?
(Q) In virtue of what does a speaker refer to a given individual y by uttering a simple demon-
strative d on a particular occasion?
If semantic reference and speaker reference (as applied to demonstratives) are really distinct no-
tions with diﬀerent explanatory roles, then the answers to these two questions must diﬀer. I con-
tend that our best answer to (Q) will collapse into our best answer to (Q).
The main reason I’ve chosen to focus on simple demonstratives is that the existing literature 
on demonstrative reference has already done much of the work of establishing my conclusion. At 
one point, it was commonly held that the reference of a demonstrative was ﬁxed by an accompa-
nying demonstration (e.g., Kaplan a). The paradigmatic example of such a demonstration is 
the act of pointing at one’s referent, and some philosophers have even argued that it is some 
physical fact about this accompanying act of pointing that ﬁxes the referent of a demonstrative 
(Quine ). As many philosophers have pointed out, however, demonstratives needn’t be ac-
companied by an act of pointing, or by any other overt demonstration. Moreover, demonstration-
theoretic accounts of demonstrative reference fail to explain the fact that even utterances of de-
monstratives that are accompanied by demonstrations sometimes refer to objects other than the 
object(s) at which the speaker points. One relevant kind of case involves deferred reference, as, for 
example, when a speaker points at a token object in order to refer to an associated type, or when a 
speaker points to a member of a group in order to refer to the group. It seems clear that any ac-
count of demonstrating capable of doing justice to these cases would have to ground the notion in 
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intention-recognition. Other philosophers and many linguists have attempted to answer (Q) by 
arguing that the reference of a demonstrative in a context is whichever object is most salient in 
the context (Heim and Kratzer ; Mount ; Larson and Segal ; Wettstein ). If the 
notion of salience is taken intuitively, however, then it seems that salience is neither necessary nor 
suﬃcient for demonstrative reference, since it is possible for the intuitive referent of a demonstra-
tive to be less salient than some other object (Michaelson ; Sperber and Wilson /). 
Moreover, salience-theoretic accounts of demonstrative reference have roughly the same prob-
lems with deferred reference as demonstration-theoretic accounts, since an utterance of a demon-
strative may refer to a type whose token is salient, or to a group one of whose members is salient. 
Just like the notion of demonstrating, then, it seems clear that the notion of salience is a place-
holder for something about the speaker’s intentions.
The literature has now mostly converged on the view that demonstrative reference is ﬁxed by 
the speaker’s directing or referential intentions.15  The fact that the best accounts of demonstrative 
reference ground reference in intentions is a key step in my argument, since, as I’ll argue below, 
the best accounts of speaker reference likewise ground referring in intending. But this still leaves 
open the possibility that demonstrative semantic reference and demonstrative speaker reference 
are grounded in two diﬀerent kinds of intentions. In the seminal paper in which he ﬁrst distin-
guished the notions of semantic reference and speaker reference, Kripke () defends this sort 
of view, though not with respect to demonstratives.
In a given idiolect, the semantic referent of a designator (without indexicals) is given by a gen-
eral intention of the speaker to refer to a certain object whenever the designator is used. The 
speaker’s referent is given by a speciﬁc intention, on a given occasion, to refer to a certain ob-
ject. If the speaker believes that the object he wants to talk about, on a given occasion, fulﬁlls 
the conditions for being the semantic referent, then he believes that there is no clash between 
his general intentions and his speciﬁc intentions. (Kripke : )
56
15 E.g., Bach (, ); Kaplan (b); King (, ); King and Stanley (); Kripke 
();  Michaelson (); Siegel (); Soames (b).
Kripke applies his distinction between general and speciﬁc intentions to puzzles about both deﬁ-
nite descriptions and proper names. For example, he argues that Donnellan’s () referential 
uses of deﬁnite descriptions are best understood as cases in which a speaker has an object-
dependent speciﬁc intention about a referent that is not the same object that is picked out by the 
speaker’s general intention to refer to whichever object satisﬁes the description. But Kripke’s way 
of explicating the intentions underlying speaker reference and semantic reference can’t help us to 
draw a distinction between speaker reference and semantic reference when it comes to demon-
stratives. This is because his account of the facts in virtue of which an expression e semantically 
refers to an object x take for granted that there is some fact about the speaker’s language—some 
linguistic convention, say—that connects e to o in a way that is independent of the speaker’s spe-
ciﬁc intentions, such that the speaker can intend to refer to o with e with the help of this fact. But 
it is precisely this sort of fact about demonstratives that I’ve been searching for in order to answer 
(Q), and coming up empty.16
King () and Michaelson () both argue that demonstrative semantic reference is dis-
tinguished from demonstrative speaker reference by virtue of the fact that the intentions underly-
ing semantic reference are somehow constrained in a way that the intentions underlying speaker 
reference are not. Here is King, for example:
I think of the fact that a speaker intends an object to be the value of an occurrence of a de-
monstrative and the fact that a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer who knows the com-
mon ground of the conversation would take the speaker to intend that a certain object be its 
value to be objective features of a context of utterance. Call the former the speaker fact and the 
latter the hearer fact. A context is appropriate for a sentence containing demonstratives if each 
occurrence of a demonstrative in it is associated with a speaker fact and a hearer fact and 
these facts “involve” the same object (i.e. the intended object in the speaker fact is the object 
that would be taken to be intended in the hearer fact). For a given occurrence of a demonstra-
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16 To be clear: Kripke makes no attempt to apply his distinction between speaker reference and 
semantic reference to demonstratives, and there is no reason to think that he took the distinction 
to so apply. It follows from what I’ll say later that Kripke’s notion of semantic reference is without 
theoretical utility in the case of deﬁnite descriptions, proper names, or any other expression, as 
well. But I needn’t oﬀer speciﬁc arguments in favor of those points here.
tive in an appropriate context, call this latter object the coordinated object. Then I view the 
meaning of a demonstrative as a function that maps an appropriate context to the coordinated 
object. I take the latter to be the semantic value of the occurrence of the demonstrative in the 
context. Finally, I take the lexical meanings of demonstratives to require that a use of a de-
monstrative be supplemented by a speaker’s intention that is recognizble by an ideal hearer in 
just the way that the demonstration account held that the lexical meanings of demonsatratives 
require that a use be supplemented by a demonstration. (King : )
In eﬀect, then, King thinks that the semantic referent of a demonstrative d in a context c is which-
ever object x the speaker intends to be the value of d in c, provided that his his intentions meet 
certain recognizability constraints. I see two serious problems with this view. First, King’s referen-
tial intentions are meant to ground the notion of semantic reference, but the content of each of his 
referential intentions is that some object x be the value of some expression e. But what is it for x to 
be the value of e if not for e to refer to x. This kind of circularity—grounding the notion of refer-
ence in an intention to refer—is a general problem with most intention-based accounts of refer-
ence, and I will return to it below. The second problem with King’s account is that it cannot dis-
tinguish semantic reference from speaker reference. In personal correspondence, King has sug-
gested that semantic reference diﬀers from speaker reference because the intentions underlying 
the former, but not the intentions underlying the latter, are constrained by what a competent 
hearer could understand. But, as Griceans have long argued, communicative intentions (and, so, 
the referential intentions underlying speaker reference) are constrained in this way as well, and so 
it’s not clear to me how King’s proposal could help him to draw the distinction he needs.17
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17 My two worries about King’s proposal are related. Below, I’ll follow Bach (), Neale (forth-
coming a), Schiﬀer (), and Stine () in arguing that the referential intentions underlying 
speaker reference are best understood a kind of communicative intention, and that all other ac-
counts that have been oﬀered wind up construing referential intentions as intentions to refer (or 
something similar). But communicative intentions are reﬂexive; they are intentions to produce 
some response in an addressee in part via their recognition of the intention to produce this re-
sponse. And so, one cannot rationally have a communicative intention to produce a response r 
unless one’s beliefs leave open the possibility that one’s addressee, if rational, will recognize this 
intention. So, the only non-circular way of spelling out the contents of referential intentions (that 
I know of) gives rise to the recognizability constraints on speaker reference that collapse it into 
King’s notion of semantic reference.
The ﬁrst of my two worries about King’s view is quite general: most accounts of referential in-
tentions are articulated by saying that a given utterance u of a demonstrative refers to an object x 
in virtue of the fact that the speaker intended that u refer to x.18  This sort of formulation, which 
attempts to ground the notion of demonstrative semantic reference in the notion of a speaker’s 
intention to refer, is inadequate as stated. If the concept of reference involved in the speaker’s in-
tention to refer is the concept of speaker reference, then the collapse of demonstrative semantic 
reference into demonstrative speaker reference is trivial, since for a demonstrative to semantically 
refer to x is just for its speaker to intend to refer to x with it. If the appealed-to concept of refer-
ence is the notion of semantic reference, on the other hand, then explications of this form are cir-
cular. Any account of referential intentions must articulate their contents in a way that does not 
include any notion of reference or referring.
To my knowledge, the only plausible attempts to non-circularly spell out the contents of refer-
ential intentions in this way are those of Bach (), Neale (forthcoming a), Schiﬀer (), and 
Stine () all of whom understand referential intentions as kinds of, parts of, or aspects of Gri-
cean communicative intentions. Here, for example, is Bach’s explication:
To refer to something is to use a singular term with the intention (part of one’s communicative 
intention) of indicating to one’s audience the object of the attitude one is expressing. (Bach 
: )
Schiﬀer () oﬀers a more detailed and elaborate account of referring in the same, intention-
based spirit. He also distinguishes between a generic notion of referring to an object in producing 
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18  This is how Michaelson () describes what he calls the ‘standard account’. As he points 
out, the view is often attributed to Kaplan (b), as in the following passage from Siegel: “[A]c-
cording to [Kaplan’s (b) view] what he calls a “directing intention” ﬁxes reference (p. ). 
This view diﬀers from the one Kaplan held in [a], according to which intentions do not ﬁx 
reference. A directing intention to refer to something is an intention to refer to a thing on which 
one has focused one’s attention” (Siegel : , fn.). As Michaelson points out, however, Kaplan 
explicitly restricts his discussion to cases involving “perceptual demonstratives”, and so he may 
not have held the more general view (b: ).
an utterance and a notion of referring to an object with a particular token expression that one ut-
ters. Neale (forthcoming a: §) reconstructs Schiﬀer’s () account as follows:
Referring-In
In (the course of) uttering x, S refers to A if, and only if, in uttering x, S means an A-dependent 
proposition.
Referring-With
In uttering x, S refers to A with e if, and only if, () e is properly contained in x, and () (∃H)
(∃R) s.t. in uttering x, S intends H to recognize that S was referring to A in uttering x, at least 
partly on the basis of their mutual knowledge that R(e, A).
I think that some theory of referring along these lines—one that grounds speaker reference in 
communicative intentions—has to be right. I will provisionally adopt the following proposal as a 
necessary condition on the posession of a referential intention, leaving the possibility of some fur-
ther conditions open.19
(RI) Referential Intention
S has a referential intention to refer to an object, property, or relation x with an utterance type e 
in producing an utterance u only if e is a proper part of an expression of which u is a token and 
there exists an x-dependent proposition p, addressee A, and binary relation R such that S pro-
duces u, thereby intending:
() to produce a state of entertaining p in A;
() A to recognize S’s intention ();
() A’s act of entertaing p to be at least partly on the basis of her recognition of (); 
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19 This account is watered down from Schiﬀer’s in that it does not make use of the notion of mu-
tual knowledge. I will argue in Chapter Four that linguistic meaning is not grounded in mutual 
knowledge, and I think that one could adjust this argument to support the conclusion that mutual 
knowledge is not required for referring to an object with a token expression. Much like (GI) from 
§.—my speciﬁcation of the intentions required for performing a comunicative illocutionary 
act—(RI) might have to be augmented with further conditions before it would count as suﬃcient.
() A’s act of entertaing p to be at least partly on the basis of A’s sensitivity to the fact that 
R(e,x).
Bach’s, Neale’s, Schiﬀer’s, Stine’s, and my own explications of referring are interesting because of 
what they have in common. First, they are the only non-circular theories of referential intentions 
in the literature, and the only theories to satisfyingly spell out the contents of referential 
intentions.20  Second, by making referential intentions a kind of communicative intention, they 
allow for a satisfying account of why the notion of referring should be posited in order to explain 
communication. Although these account make speakers’ communicative intentions explanatorily 
prior than her referential intentions (since the latter are explicated in terms of the former), refer-
ential intentions might be epistemically prior to full-blown communicative intentions from the 
point of view of an interpreter. You might come to recognize the communicative intentions be-
hind my utterance of ‘Kent is right’ in part by ﬁrst coming to recognize the referential intentions 
that I have in uttering ‘Kent’, for example. By uttering ‘Kent’ as part of my utterance of ‘Kent is 
right’, then, I can give you evidence that the content of my overall communicative intention is a 
Kent-dependent proposition, which takes you some of the way toward identifying the whole 
proposition. This is a notion of referring that is tailor-made to play a role in explaining the eﬃ-
ciency of linguistic communication in the way that I advocated in §., and that relies on the 
same Gricean resources that I drew on there.
Third, communicative-intention-based accounts of referring are all clearly attempts to expli-
cate speaker reference rather than anything in the neighborhood of semantic reference. Indeed, 
they are the best and most plausible explications of speaker reference available. In other words, 
these explications are the best-available answers to (Q). But, as I have attempted to show, at-
tempting to answer (Q) inevitably leads to these same accounts. This narrative, which is borne 
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20 Schiﬀer’s/Neale’s explication of referring-with is stated in terms of refering-in, but this is per-
fectly ﬁne, since referring-in is not explicated in terms of any other notion of referring.
out by the literature on demonstrative reference, is the basis for my claim that the notion of de-
monstrative semantic reference collapses into the notion of demonstrative speaker reference.21
Suppose that the preceding argument is sound, and that—to echo Strawson—referring is not 
something that demonstratives do; it is something that speakers can do with demonstratives. In 
that case, how should we conceive of the linguistic meanings of simple demonstratives? In par-
ticular, how can we account for the fact that the simple demonstratives ‘this’ and ‘that’, and there-
fore the sentences () and (), have diﬀerent meanings? In keeping with the constraint-
theoretic proposals of Neale and Schiﬀer, we can explicate the meaning of a demonstrative in 
terms of the constraints it puts on the referential intentions of a speaker who utters it. As a very 
rough ﬁrst pass, we might say that the communicative intentions of a speaker who utters ‘this’ 
may do so only with communicative intentions about relatively proximal non-persons (in some 
perhaps metaphorical sense of ‘proximal’), whereas a speaker who utters ‘that’ may do so only 
with communicative intentions about relatively distal non-persons (in some perhaps metaphori-
cal sense of ‘distal’).22  I will spell this out in my preferred, speech act-theoretic way in §.. (I will 
also replace the modal-sounding notion of constraint with a disposition-theoretic account of the 
connection between words and their meanings in Chapter Four.)
Although the argument from collapse is easy to run on demonstratives because the existing 
literature has already pushed toward the conclusion that demonstrative reference is grounded in 
referential intentions, I am conﬁdent that similar arguments could be run on other semantically 
underspeciﬁed expressions. I sketched how some of those arguments would go in §.. These ar-
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21 See also Bach (: chs.+, , , ms), Burton-Roberts (: –), Fodor and Le-
pore (), and Schiﬀer (: ), who argue that speakers’ intentions can’t be considered 
part of the context of utterance in any sense of context that could be relevant to semantics. I am 
sympathetic to these arguments, but it is important to distinguish them from the argument from 
collapse, which is instead based on the conclusion that there is no explanatory role for a notion of 
semantic reference that is distinct from the notion of speaker reference.
22 Cf. Evans () and Neale (b).
guments would have to show, for some underspeciﬁed expression e, that there is no way to distin-
guish the facts that ﬁx e’s content in a context from the facts that determine what a speaker di-
rectly and literally means in uttering e in the same context. The key step would be to show that if 
there is a fact about e’s content in a given context, this fact must be grounded in the speaker’s 
communicative intentions. I sketched arguments of this sort for a few semantically underspeciﬁed 
expressions in §..
If I am right about everything I’ve said so far, one possibility that still remains is that we 
should adopt a mixed content/constraint semantics. This is roughly the position of Kent Bach 
() and Michael Devitt (forthcoming), both of whom hold that the semantic content of a sen-
tence containing a demonstrative is a gappy proposition or propositional radical. The sentence (), 
on this view, would express the propositional radical ():
() That stinks.
() < ____distal , STINK>
The idea here is that the VP ‘stinks’ in (), which is not semantically underspeciﬁed, contributes 
its semantic content to the proposition (), whereas the demonstrative ‘that’ contributes merely a 
constraint on how the speaker can intend to ﬁll in the corresponding gap. We can think of the 
subscripted ‘distal ’ as a kind of propositional metadata—not as a component of the proposition 
itself, but as a limitation on what can be a component in the subscripted position.
We should prefer a pure constraint semantics over this kind of mixed content/constraint the-
ory on methodological grounds. As I argued in §., we should spell out the nature of linguistic 
meaning by ﬁrst spelling out its explanatory role. Mixed content/constraint accounts ﬁnd linguis-
tic meaning playing two distinct roles: the meanings of context-insensitive expressions play the 
role of ﬁxing the expressions’ semantic contents, whereas the meanings of semantically underspe-
ciﬁed expressions play the diﬀerent role of constraining the intentions a speaker can have in utter-
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ing the expressions. Whereas we cannot adopt a semantic theory on which meaning plays a 
wholly content-determining role for the reasons I’ve spelled out here, we can easily adopt a wholly 
constraint-based semantics by saying that the meanings of context-insensitive expressions also 
function by constraining speakers’ intentions, but simply do so to a greater degree. The meaning 
of ‘stinks’ is so strict that, in uttering it, I can only have the intentions involved in referring to the 
property of stinking. Assuming that it is better to have meaning play a uniﬁed explanatory role 
than a mixed explanatory role, and that a wholly constraint-based account of linguiatic meaning 
is possible, I submit that these considerations give us a reason to adopt such a fully-general ac-
count.
On this view, to say that an expression e is semantically underspeciﬁed is to say that it the that 
e’s meaning places relatively loose constraints on the communicative intentions of someone who 
utters e. This is a powerful way to think of underspeciﬁcation because speech-act types can be 
broadly individuated in a variety of ways, and so expressions’ meanings can give rise to their se-
mantic underspeciﬁcation in a variety of ways. I will try to precisify this point in the next section 
in the course of spelling out the basics of the speech-act-theoretic approach to lexical and com-
positonal semantics.
2.3  Speech-Act-Theoretic Semantics
What would a constraint-based semantic theory look like? I want now to take an initial step to-
ward answering this question by articulating the basic framework of speech-act-theoretic seman-
tics, according to which semantic values are types of speech acts.
Speech-act-theoretic semantics is inspired by Grice’s () theory of utterance-type mean-
ing. According to Grice, a sentence S is meaningful for a group G just in case the members of G 
have “a procedure in their repertoires” for uttering S if they have communicative intentions of a 
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certain kind (: –).23  Because Grice also takes the performance of a speech act to be a 
matter of producing an utterance with these same sorts of intentions,24  we can interpret him as 
holding that linguistic meaning is a relation borne by expressions to types of speech acts. For ex-
ample, it follows from Grice’s view that the meaningfulness of ‘Paul philosophizes’ boils down to 
the fact that speakers have a procedure in their repertoires for uttering the sentence if they overtly 
intend to bring about the belief (in some addressee) that they believe that Paul philosophizes. This 
explication is equivalent, by Gricean lights, to the idea that the sentence’s meaning is constituted 
by speakers’ shared procedure for uttering it in order to assert that Paul philosophizes. Along 
similar lines, we can say that Grice takes the meaningfulness of ‘does John philosophize?’ to be 
constituted by speakers’ shared procedure for uttering the sentence in order to ask whether John 
philosophizes. Given this theory of linguistic meaning, it makes sense to think of a sentence’s se-
mantic value as a certain type of illocutionary act—the type that speakers have a procedure to 
perform by uttering the sentence. Moreover, Grice argues that the procedure we have for per-
forming illocutionary acts using sentences are constituted by our procedures for referring and 
predicating with the sentence’s simple parts (: –). Given this view, it is natural to say 
that a Gricean compositional semantic theory would be one that showed how the types of acts of 
referring and predicating that are the semantic values of words add up to the types of illocution-
ary acts that are the semantic values of sentences.25
In order for Grice’s theory to count as a constraint semantics, we need only interpret his talk 
of having a procedure in one’s repertoire in the right way. In particular, we need to say that for a 
speaker to have a procedure in her repertoire that links an expression E to a type of communica-
tive intention CI entails that the speaker can have an intention of type CI only if she utters E or 
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23 I will discuss this part of Grice’s theory of meaning in greater detail in §..
24 Grice (: –). For more explicit statements of this Gricean theory of speech acts, see 
§. and the works cited there.
25 This is just a ﬁrst pass. I will have much more to say in Chapters Four and Five. 
some other expression similarly linked to CI. The nature of the modal, ‘can’, in this statement is an 
issue that a full-ﬂedged metasemantic theory would have to resolve. I will replace this statement 
with a more satisfactory account of linguistic metasemantics in Chapter Four.
I won’t try to give a speech-act-theoretic semantics for a large fragment of English here, but I 
can give a simple sketch, elaborate enough to precisify the discussion of underspeciﬁcation that I 
have outlined so far. For now, I won’t attempt to show how the meanings of sentences and other 
clauses are composed, as that will be my goal in Chapter Two. Instead, I will assume that every 
clause #(φ) consists of a sentence radical φ embedded within a mood-marker #. My goal here will 
be to give a simple account of the compositional semantics of moodless sentence radicals, and I 
will assume that the semantic value of a sentence radical is a force-free speech-act type of express-
ing some proposition. I don’t thereby intend to commit myself to the idea that speakers can per-
form force-free acts of expressing propositions in isolation; rather it is compatible with everything 
I’ll say here that expressing a proposition is always part of, or an abstraction away from, an illocu-
tionary act of some kind, just as it is compatible with what I say here that acts of referring and 
predicating are only ever performed as parts of, or abstractions away from, illocutionary acts. (I’ll 
have much more to say about what I mean by this in Chapter Five.) 
 On my preferred formulation, an actic semantics consists of two parts: ﬁrst, an assignment of 
types of acts to semantically primitive expressions, and, second, a collection of compositional 
priniciples assigning diﬀerent kinds of acts of predicating to diﬀerent types of binary-branching 
syntactic constructions. (Again, I will spend a good deal of Chapter Five justifying this formula-
tion and comparing it to other options.) Here are the rules for a very small fragment of English:
‘stinks’ ? a type that may be tokened only by referring to the property of being stinky.26
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26 ‘?’ symbolizes whatever relation holds between an expression and the type of act that serves 
as its semantic value.
‘Fido’ ? a type that may be tokened by referring to Fido.
‘everyone’ ? a type that may be tokened by referring to the property of applying to everyone
Sentence Radical Composition [S [NP][VP]]
S’s semantic value is a type that can be tokened by expressing a proposition by referring to an 
object x in a way that tokens NP’s semantic value, referring to a property F in a way that tokens 
VP’s semantic value, and predicating F of x.
Sentence Radical Composition [S [DP][VP]]
S’s semantic value is a type that can be tokened by expressing a proposition by referring to a 
property F in a way that tokens DP’s semantic value, referring to a property G in a way that to-
kens VP’s semantic value, and predicating F of G.
The resulting theory-fragment allows us to show how the types of acts of expressing propositions 
that are performable with the sentences ‘Fido stinks’ and ‘Everyone stinks’ are constituted by the 
types of speech acts performable with their parts. I will consider a theory capable of dealing with 
a larger fragment in Chapter Five.
The key to understanding semantic underspeciﬁcation is that the semantic value of an under-
speciﬁed sentence radical will be a broadly-individuated speech-act type—one that can be to-
kened by expressing a variety of propositions. In cases of lexical underspeciﬁcation, this will be 
because the semantic value of a semantically primitive constituent of the sentence radical is a type 
that can be tokened by referring to diﬀerent objects on diﬀerent occasions. For example:
‘that’ ? a type that may be tokened only by acts of referring to non-persons that are relatively 
distal from the speaker’s perspective (in a perhaps metaphorical sense).
‘he’ ? a type that may be tokened only by acts of referring to males.
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‘I’ ? a type that may be tokened only by acts of referring to oneself.
The basic idea is straightforward: an expression’s meaning plays the role of narrowing down the 
kind of speech act that someone might be performing in uttering the expression, but not neces-
sarily to the point of uniqueness. The interpreter’s task—which is to non-demonstratively infer 
which speech act the speaker is performing—is made easier because her sensitivity to the expres-
sion’s meaning cuts down the space of possibilities about what the speaker might mean. Because 
each speech-act type X—whether a communicative illocutionary act or an act of referring—can 
be individuated in terms of the kinds of communicative intentions a speaker must have in order 
to perform a token of X, we could equivalently formulate the semantic values of words and sen-
tences in terms of the kinds of communicative intentions a speaker might have in uttering them. 
(This point will be crucial to the account of mood that I will defend in Chapter Three.) On this 
account, each expression’s semantic value plays the role for which I posited meaning in §1.3. The 
semantic values of semantically underspeciﬁed expressions play the same role, but do so in a 
more loosely-constraining way.
To account for DP restriction, we can formulate principles that deliver results like the follow-
ing for DPs of the form ‘Every NP’:
‘Every NP’ ? a type that may be tokened only by acts of referring to the property of applying to 
every ψ (where ψ may be any restriction of the property that a speaker can refer to in tokening 
NP’s semantic value).27
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27  This treatment of quantiﬁer phrases is a rough ﬁrst pass. A proper treatment would have to 
take a stand on whether implicit restriction is triggered only in cases of determiners which are 
downward monotonic with respect to their nominals (see Barwise and Cooper ; Neale ), 
and would have to be more precise about what it means to say that a property ψ is a restriction of 
a property φ.
If Stanley and Szabó () are right that nominals contain aphonic restrictor variables, then our 
compositional principles will have to be more complex in order to take into account the complex 
acts of predicating involved in referring to a restricted property with a DP’s nominal. (I will have 
more to say about these complex acts of predicating in Chapter Five.)
The meanings of several of the other underspeciﬁed expressions that I discussed in §. could 
be captured by compositional principles that assign them the following semantic values. Again, 
each of these is a rough ﬁrst shot, and ﬁnal versions would have to be sensitive to whatever hid-
den syntactic structure is present in the expressions’ underlying syntax.
‘It’s raining’ ? a type that may be tokened only by acts of expressing a proposition that it’s rain-
ing at l at t, where l is a particular location and t is a particular time.
‘Elmar’s shark’ ? a type that may be tokened only by acts of referring to a shark that bears R to 
Elmar, where R is a particular relation.28
‘[Adj expensive [NP F(x)]]’ ? a type that may be tokened only by acts of referring to the property 
of having a cost that is higher than some degree relevant to the cost of F’s, where F may be any 
property.29
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28 If Peters and Westerståhl () are right, then it may be better to give a more complex, quan-
tiﬁcational account of the possessive. Nothing about the framework I am defending here would 
conﬂict with such an account, although the quantiﬁcational approach would require showing how 
‘Elmar’s shark’ can be used to performa a complex act of referring to a property of properties.
29  This is a simpliﬁed account based on Kennedy’s () defense of the idea that comparative 
adjectives contain hidden variables that determine a contextually salient standard on the basis of 
some contextually salient comparison class. I
Following Kratzer (), we can represent a modal claim ‘must φ’ as including variables for a 
conversational background f and an ordering source g, where each of these is taken as a sentential 
variable.30 We can then give a preliminary account of modals as follows:
mustf,g φ ? a type that can be tokened by expressing a proposition that some proposition p is 
true in the q-best worlds at which r is true, where p, q, and r are propositions that one could ex-
press by tokening φ, f, and g, respectively.
These could all be elaborated and improved, but they successfully illustrate my general strategy 
for understanding the semantics of any given underspeciﬁed expression, which is to specify the 
limits on the kinds of speech acts that a speaker can perform in uttering the expression. As the 
examples illustrate, these limits may be speciﬁed in a variety of ways, in keeping with the varieties 
of semantic underspeciﬁcation that we encounter in natural language. 
Conclusion and Mile-Marking
In Chapter One, I sketched my overall pragmatic and methodological framework for understand-
ing communication and language use, and argued that linguistic meaning must play a speciﬁc 
kind of role in order to ﬁt into that framework. In this chapter, I have argued not only that 
speech-act-theoretic semantics allows meaning to play that role, but also that truth-conditional 
semantics is internally unstable in a way that causes it to collapse into the speech-act-theoretic 
approach.
The argument can be summed up straightforwardly: if truth-conditional semantics is work-
able, then there must be some property of sentences, sentences-in-contexts, or utterances of sen-
tences that ﬁxes their truth conditions. But if this is so, then there must be some fact in virtue of 
which sentences (etc.) have these properties that can be distinguished from the facts in virtue of 
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30 Like Kratzer, I’ll remain neutral about where, if any, these variables are located in modal sen-
tences’ syntactic structures.
which speakers express propositions with sentences. But, given scrutiny to semantically under-
speciﬁed expressions, it becomes clear that semantic content collapses into a speaker-based, 
intention-constituted notion, and so semantics must be the study of constraints on speakers’ in-
tentions.
I have also begun to sketch the basic components of speech-act-theoretic semantics as I un-
derstand it. Over the course of the next several chapters, I will ﬂesh out this sketch considerably. 
In Chapter Three, I will expand the theory to cover sentences and embedded clauses, with a par-
ticular emphasis on mood. In Chapter Four, I will replace the notion of constraint on intentions, 
as well as the modal force implicit in my many statements here that an expression’s semantic value 
is the type of speech act that a speaker can perform with it, with a more fully-articulated 
disposition-based metasemantics. In Chapter Five, I will explain in greater detail what it is for 
word-sized speech-act types to add up to sentence-sized speech-act types, and give a fuller treat-
ment of the syntax–semantics interface and the nature of compositionality.
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CHAPTER TWO: SEMANTICS WITHOUT SEMANTIC CONTENT
Introduction
Contemporary semantics is built around the idea that the meaning of a sentence is a property that 
determines its truth condition in a context, and that a word’s meaning is a property whose role is 
to partly determine the truth conditions of the sentences in which the word appears. By focusing 
on the meanings of expressions that can be used to say diﬀerent things on diﬀerent occasions, I 
will argue in this chapter that words and sentences don’t have truth-condition-determining prop-
erties of these kinds. 
In §., I will introduce the basic ideas and motivations behind truth-conditional semantics, 
as well as some of the foundational problems raised by the fact that sentences’ meanings under-
specify truth conditions. In §., I’ll focus in on the case of demonstratives in order to argue that 
sentence meaning must play the role of constraining speakers’ communicative intentions rather 
than determining truth conditions. In §., I will introduce the basic moving parts of speech-act-
theoretic semantics and show how to account for semantic underspeciﬁcation within this kind of 
semantic theory.
2.1  Truth-Conditional Semantics and Underspecification
The dominant research paradigm in semantics has, for about half a century, centered around the 
idea that a sentence’s meaning is a property that ﬁxes the sentence’s truth condition. Diﬀerent 
genres of semantic theory spell out the nature of these truth-condition-determining properties in 
diﬀerent ways. According to the approach of Donald Davidson (, , ), a sentence has 
meaning just in case there is an extensional truth theory whose theorems include a T-sentence for 
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the sentence and that truth theory meets further conditions that make it interpretive.1  Within a 
school of approaches favored by most working semanticists now, the job of a semantic theory is to 
assign to sentences model-theoretic objects, such as functions from worlds to truth values (inten-
sions) (Lewis ; Montague ; Stalnaker ; von Fintel and Heim ), sets of centered 
worlds (Lewis b; Stalnaker ), pairs of intensions (Chalmers ), or situations or sets of 
situations (Barwise and Perry ). These model-theoretic objects in turn determine the sen-
tences’ truth conditions. An alternative approach originally due to Gottlob Frege () and Ber-
trand Russell (), but more recently defended and developed by David Kaplan (a) and 
Scott Soames (), takes the job of a semantic theory to be that of assigning to sentences struc-
tured propositions—abstract entities composed of either objects, properties, and relations or 
modes of presentation of them; these structured entities in turn determine sentences’ truth condi-
tions.
I will group all of these approaches together under the covering term, truth-conditional se-
mantics. Although they go about the business of semantics in diﬀerent ways, and explicate an ex-
pression’s meaningfulness in terms of diﬀerent kinds of properties that it might have, the ap-
proaches I’ve alluded to all share an overall conception of the explanatory role that linguistic 
meaning is supposed to play. They confront the question that is raised by Lewis’s dictum—what 
does meaning do?—with Lewis’s own answer: “A meaning for a sentence is something that deter-
mines the conditions under which the sentence is true or false” (: –). This overarching 
genre of semantic theory has dominated thought about linguistic meaning among linguists and 
analytic philosophers. Individual strands within the genre are distinguished by disagreements 
over how best to understand the properties in virtue of which sentences have their truth condi-
tions.
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1  The question of what makes a truth theory interpretive turns out to be a diﬃcult one for 
Davidsonians to answer. See Davidson (, ), Lepore & Ludwig (: chs.–), and 
Neale (: §.) for discussion. 
In order to achieve some generality in the following discussion, I deﬁne a notion of semantic 
content as follows:
(SC) Semantic contents are properties of linguistic entities, such as expressions, expressions in 
contexts, utterances of expressions, or expression tokens. More speciﬁcally: a linguistic 
entity’s semantic content is its semantic value—i.e., the property that a compositional se-
mantic theory aims to ascribe to it.2
(SC) The semantic content of a sentence determines its truth condition, and the semantic con-
tent of a sub-sentential expression determines its contribution to the truth conditions of 
sentences in which it appears.
By explicating semantic content via its role in (SC–), I am construing the notion more broadly 
than is usual. Typically, an expression’s semantic content is taken to be its propositional content (in 
the case of a sentence) or, in some sense that would have to be spelled out further, its contribution 
to sentences’ propositional contents (in the case of sub-sentential expressions). But not every no-
tion that ﬁts (SC–) is best thought of as picking out a kind of propositional content. Some se-
manticists posit properties that satisfy (SC–), but deny that these properties ought to be cashed 
out as relations to propositions or their components. The best-known example is Davidson, who 
argued that meanings, construed as entities, “do not seem to…oil the wheels of a theory of mean-
ing” (: ). Nonetheless, Davidson did think that expressions have properties that satisfy 
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2  An expression’s semantic value, as I use the term, can be thought of as the meaning of an 
expression in the technical sense that is relevant to semantic theory. Schiﬀer (: ch.) points 
out that most linguistic expressions are such that there is no entity that we can felicitously say, of 
the entity, that it is the expression’s meaning, and concludes that talk of the meanings of words 
and sentences is confused. This may be a correct characterization of ordinary usage or folk-
semantic theory, but at least many technical semantic theories deviate from ordinary usage in this 
way, and I see no problem with saying that some entity is an expression’s meanings in at least a 
technical sense. Still, I will sometimes rely on Lewis’s () notion of a semantic value, which he 
introduced speciﬁcally so as to remain neutral about what kind of entity or property semantic 
theories should ascribe to expressions.
(SC–). According to a Davidsonian, the sentence ‘snow is white’ has the property of being the 
subject of a T-theorem of an interpretive truth theory for a language, for example. My extended 
usage of ‘semantic content’ to cover properties like these is unorthodox—and would probably 
have irked Davidson—but the usage is justiﬁed because it allows me to discuss aspects that 
Davidsonian semantic theories have in common with other forms of truth-conditional semantics 
that do trade in semantic entities.3
My main goals in this chapter can be summed up as follows: I will show that there is no such 
thing as semantic content (§.), and that semantics can (and must) get along just ﬁne without it 
(§.). Because my argument contra semantic content will revolve around semantic underspeciﬁ-
cation, I will spend the remainder of this section exploring that notion and some of the debates 
about the relationships between descriptive semantics, foundational semantics, and pragmatics 
that have arisen from it.
With my unusually broad concept of semantic content in hand, we can sum up the central 
tenet of truth-conditional semantics by saying that the job of a semantic theory is to systemati-
cally and ﬁnitely ascribe to each meaningful expression its semantic content. Once we pay a bit of 
attention to actual natural language expressions, however, a pair of obvious problems with this 
view quickly emerge. One is that sentences in non-declarative moods—including interrogatives 
(‘Who are you?’) and imperatives (‘Buy me a drink!’)—apparently aren’t truth-apt, and so don’t 
have truth conditions or semantic contents. I will consider this worry, and the semantics of non-
declaratives more generally, in Chapter Three. The second problem is that most declarative sen-
tences, conceived of as expression types, can’t be said to possess semantic contents either, because 
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3  Nonetheless, Davidson is not my main target in what follows, and some of my arguments 
might have to be reformulated in order to apply cleanly to his version of semantics.
they exhibit semantic underspeciﬁcation.4  Underspeciﬁed sentences’ meanings don’t fully specify 
truth conditions, so that knowing everything there is to know about an underspeciﬁed sentence’s 
meaning would not, by itself, allow one to identify any truth condition associated with any utter-
ance produced with it or speech act performed with it. It follows that at least many linguistic ex-
pressions don’t—at least by themselves—possess semantic contents.
In order to illustrate semantic underspeciﬁcation and the strategies that truth-conditional se-
manticists have used to address it, I will consider a range of examples.
Indexicals
() a. I am Canadian.
 b. Donald Trump lives here.
 c. It is now the twenty-ﬁrst century.
Each of these three sentences expresses determinate truth conditions in particular contexts (or 
can be used to literally and directly express propositions with determinate truth conditions on 
particular occasions),  but none of them has truth conditions on its own.5  The semantic under-
speciﬁcation of each of (a–c) can be traced (at least in part) to the underspeciﬁcation of the in-
dexical constituent that I have highlighted in bold. Expressions like ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’ are indexi-
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4  Two more common terms for this phenomenon are context sensitivity and semantic underde-
termination, but, as Neale (forthcoming a: §.) has pointed out, both of these expressions are mis-
leading. The latter term presupposes that the role of linguistic meaning is to determine the truth 
conditions of a sentence (perhaps relative to context), and the former presupposes that underspe-
ciﬁed expressions’ semantic contents are determined by something that can be called ‘context’. 
Both of these points are precisely what is at issue in this chapter.
For helpful discussions of semantic underspeciﬁcation, see Carston () and Neale (: 
pp.–).
5  The parenthetical qualiﬁcation is necessary because I’ll argue in §. that only speakers can 
express propositions, and that linguistic objects, such as expressions or utterances of them, can-
not. In order to avoid sounding as though I am begging the question agains the idea of semantic 
content, I will resort either to parenthetical disjunctive statements (as here), or to the locution, 
‘the truth conditions (content) associated with an utterance’, which should be understood as neu-
tral between ‘the truth conditions (content) of an utterance’ and ‘the truth conditions (content) of 
the proposition expressed by a speaker with an utterance’.
cal in the sense that what they refer to (or what speakers refer to with them) vary from one con-
text of utterance to another. Clearly, this is incompatible with the most naïve form of truth-
conditional semantics, on which the job of a compositional semantic theory is to assign semantic 
contents directly to sentence types.
The most inﬂuential strategy for dealing with semantic underspeciﬁcation within the frame-
work of truth-conditional semantics was developed in order to account for indexicals like these. 
According to this strategy, which was developed by Kaplan (a), the process by which a se-
mantic theory assigns truth conditions to sentences takes two steps: each of the sentence’s con-
stituents is assigned a semantic content relative to a context of utterance, and then the semantic 
contents of the sentence’s constituents are composed to determine the sentence’s semantic content 
in that context.6  On this view, it is expressions-in-contexts (or utterances of expressions), rather 
than expression types, that possess semantic contents. Kaplan (a) models the contexts rela-
tive to which expressions are assigned semantic contents as ordered quadruples (e.g., c = ⟨cA, cT, 
cP, cW⟩), whose coordinates represent the speaker, time, position, and world of a context, respec-
tively. Kaplan’s compositional semantics associates each indexical expression with a character—a 
function from contexts to semantic values. The character of ‘I’, for example, maps each context c 
to the agent cA of the context. This captures the intuitive idea that the referent of an utterance of ‘I’ 
is its speaker. 
As Neale (, , forthcoming a) has repeatedly pointed out, it is important to distinguish 
the metaphysical question of what ﬁxes or constitutes the properties of a given expression, utter-
ance of an expression, or speech act performed with an expression, from the epistemic question of 
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6  Kaplan is inconsistent about what sentences’ semantic contents are. Informally, he represents 
them as Russellian structured propositions, so that, for example, ‘Kaplan is funny’ would be rep-
resented by Russellian proposition, ⟨Kaplan, FUNNY⟩, in which the ﬁrst coordinate is Kaplan 
himself and the second coordinate is the property of being funny. In his model theory, however, 
Kaplan identiﬁes sentences’ contents with intensions, which he models as sets of world/time pairs 
(a: §XVIII).
how a hearer identiﬁes those properties. Although we could conceivably construe Kaplan’s theory 
of indexicality, or something similar, as part of an answer to a question of the latter, epistemic 
sort, this is not how Kaplan or his followers have understood it. Kaplan (a) intends his theory 
of indexicality to be an answer to the metaphysical question: what ﬁxes the referent of an indexi-
cal in a given context of utterance? In the same vein, Lewis holds that sentences’ meanings “de-
termine” their truth conditions “in various possible states of aﬀairs, at various times, at various 
places, for various speakers, and so on” (: –). The Kaplanian–Lewisian strategy for deal-
ing with semantic underspeciﬁcation is to build a notion of the objective context of utterance into 
the models underlying one’s compositional semantic theory, such that some fact about that con-
text, together with the characters of each sentence’s constituents and the principles governing se-
mantic composition, ﬁxes the semantic value (and so the truth conditions) of every meaningful 
sentence. Although Kaplan’s contexts are simple and well-behaved ordered tuples that represent 
apparently objective facts about the situation in which someone produces an utterance, the same 
basic idea lies behind a wide variety of other proposals about the nature, structure, and basis of 
utterance contexts. Philosophers and linguists have argued that a wide variety of further elements 
of context must be posited, including the mutual presuppositions of a conversation’s participants 
(Stalnaker ), a collection of assignment functions or discourse referents to keep track of enti-
ties about which the participants in a conversation are talking (Heim , ; Kamp ; 
Karttunen ), a salience ranking on the domain of disourse of on the discourse referents 
(Lewis a), representations of the questions under discussion at a given time in a conversation 
(Roberts /), and representations of the norms (Gibbard ; Lewis b, a), 
plans (Gibbard ; Charlow ), preferences (Starr ms), To-Do lists (Portner ), or other 
action-guiding states that the participants in a conversation have agreed upon for the purposes of 
a conversation. Although the contexts thus posited diﬀer in composition and complexity, the ba-
sic idea is always that the meanings of expressions and the context of utterance come together to 
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jointly ﬁx the semantic values of expressions in contexts. This strategy is most plausible if we re-
strict our attention to the word ‘I’, which is sometimes called a pure or automatic indexical, on the 
grounds that its character and the context in which it is uttered seem to automatically ﬁx its refer-
ent in that context (see, e.g., Braun : §.). It is often claimed that ‘yesterday’, ‘today’, ‘tomor-
row’, ‘here’, and ‘now’ are pure indexicals in this sense.
I doubt that there are really any pure indexicals in this sense, but it can easily be seen that 
‘here’ and ‘now’ are impure. Even if we assume that ‘here’ can only refer to a place that the speaker 
is in (or that a speaker must use it to refer to a place she is in), this does not fully settle which 
place a given utterance of ‘here’ refers to (or what a speaker refers to with it). This is because a 
speaker’s location is not any single thing. I am in my apartment, in my building, in Fort Greene, 
in Brooklyn, in New York, and so on, and any one of these locations could be the referent of ‘here’ 
that’s relevant to the truth conditions of (b) in a given context (or of what I might say with (b) 
on a given occasion). Moreover, nothing about the meaning of ‘here’ together with the speaker’s 
physical location could determine which of these locations is the one that features in the truth 
conditions of (b) (or what a speaker says with it).
What does ﬁx the location that ﬁgures in the truth conditions associated with an utterance of 
(b)? On the view that I will defend using other examples in §., the relevant location is deter-
mined by the communicative intention with which a speaker utters (b) (cf. Neale ; Schiﬀer 
; Sperber and Wilson /). One consequence of this view, I’ll argue, is that we can make 
no sense of the idea that the expression ‘here’, or an utterance of it, refers. Instead, only people re-
fer, and they may do so by uttering expressions like ‘here’ (cf. Bach ; Neale , , forth-
coming a; Schiﬀer , ; Strawson ). And a consequence of this is that ‘here’ has no 
property that deserves to be called ‘semantic content’. Before turning to that argument, I’ll con-
sider a a few other examples of semantic underspeﬁciation.
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DP Restriction
() a. The book is over one-hundred pages long.
 b. Every beer is in the bucket.
The bold-faced constituents of (a–b) are DPs (‘Determiner Phrases’). Each consists of a deter-
miner (‘the’ and ‘every’) and an NP nominal (‘book’ and ‘beer’). A much-discussed fact about DPs 
is that the truth conditions associated with sentences containing them must be understood as if 
the things to which the DPs’ nominals applied were somehow restricted. Normally, the truth con-
dition associated with a direct and literal utterance of (a) will not be about the one and only 
book, for example, but will be about the one-and-only book-with-some-further-property. A 
speaker might use (a) to express the proposition that the book they are writing is over one hun-
dred pages long, for example, or that the book their nephew is reading is over one-hundred pages 
long, and so on. Similarly, the truth conditions associated with a direct and literal utterance of 
(b) would normally not concern every book in the world, but instead every book that meets 
some further condition. The problem of saying what ﬁxes these implicit restrictions is the prob-
lem of DP restriction.7  As it applies to quantiﬁer phrases like ‘every beer’ in (b), this problem is 
usually called the problem of quantiﬁer domain restriction (e.g., Stanley and Szabó ); as it ap-
plies to deﬁnite descriptions like ‘the book’ in (a), it is usually called the problem of incomplete 
descriptions (e.g., Neale : §.).
Two traditional solutions to the problem are what Neale calls the implicit and explicit ap-
proaches (: §.; : §§–), which he characterizes as follows:
How are we to explain the incontrovertible fact that A can use a description ‘the φ’ in an ut-
terance of the simple form ‘the φ is ψ’ and thereby perform a perfectly felicitous speech act, 
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7  Stanley () uses the term ‘nominal restriction’ because he (following Stanley and Szabó 
) locates the restriction syntactically inside the DP’s nominal. Westerståhl () instead ar-
gues that the restrictor is contributed by the DP’s determiner. In calling the phenomenon ‘DP re-
striction’, I wish to remain neutral between these two options, as well as the possibility that the 
restriction is contributed by a property of the DP as a whole.
indeed say something true, even though A and B (the hearer) both know that φ(x) is true of 
more than one thing? The question generalizes: How are we to explain the fact that (roughly) 
for a range of determiners, D, A can use ‘D φ’ in an utterance of the simple form ‘D φ is ψ’ and 
thereby perform a perfectly felicitous speech act, indeed say something true, even though A 
and B both know that φ(x) is true of some things that are not relevant to the truth or falsity of 
what A said?
Many philosophers appear to think the answer to the question…is obvious. ‘There’s always 
an implicit background restriction on the domain over which a quantiﬁer expression ranges,’ is 
one old reply. Another is, ‘An utterance of ‘the φ is ψ’ is sometimes elliptical for an utterance of 
‘the φ that ζ is ψ’, where ζ is something the speaker could have made explicit but didn’t.’ Call 
these the implicit reply and explicit reply, respectively, based only on the appearance of the 
words ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ in the quoted remarks. (Neale : –)
For my purposes, the details of who endorses each of these approaches, why, and who is right, are 
somewhat irrelevant. On either approach, some precisiﬁcation of this question arises: in virtue of 
what is a DP’s nominal restricted in the particular way that it is? 8 
Assuming the implicit approach, this question can be rephrased as the question of what ﬁxes 
the particular implicit background restriction over which a DP ranges on a particular occasion. 
One possibility is that a continually evolving domain of discourse is somehow built into the con-
text against the background of which expressions are assigned their semantic contents (e.g., Bar-
wise and Perry ). But then the question arises: in virtue of what does any particular object get 
into the contextually relevant domain of objects? Even this question turns out to be ill-posed, 
however, because no single contextually relevant domain will be enough. As several authors have 
pointed out, it is possible to utter ‘The Russian voted for the Russian’ in order to say that one spe-
ciﬁc Russian voted for a diﬀerent speciﬁc Russian, and, so, if the implicit approach is to work, 
then the two instances of ‘the Russian’ in this sentence must get their semantic contents from dis-
tinct contextually relevant domains, each of which contains a diﬀerent unique Russian (Neale 
: ; Soames b; Westerstahl ). Simply adding more background domains to the 
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8  Of course, this is not to say that there won’t be any indeterminacy about how a nominal gets 
restricted in a particular case. See, e.g., Buchanan () and Buchanan and Ostertag () for 
helpful discussions of this sort of indeterminacy. Still: insofar as there is a fact about how a nomi-
nal is indeterminately restricted, we can ask what constitutes this fact. 
context isn’t enough to solve this problem, moreover, since we still have to answer the question: in 
virtue of what is each distinct instance of ‘the Russian’ matched up with the contextually restricted 
domain relevant to its semantic value, as opposed to whatever other domains might be hanging 
around in the context? It is diﬃcult to imagine how one could answer this question with respect 
to the truth conditions associated with a given utterance without appealing to the communicative 
intentions of the speaker.
Assuming the explicit approach, on the other hand, the question of what constitutes the rele-
vant restriction can be rephrased as the question of what makes it the case that some more fully 
articulated DP counts as the one for which an actual utterance of some DP was elliptical. Neale 
argues that this fact could be determined only by the speaker’s communicative intentions. 
Roughly: taking Dφζ to be a DP whose nominal φζ is a restriction of the nominal φ of Dφ, what 
makes φζ the restriction of φ that is relevant to an utterance of ‘Dφ is ψ’ on a particular occasion 
is that the speaker could have uttered ‘Dφζ is ψ’ in order to give more precise evidence of the 
communicative intentions that she actually had in uttering ‘Dφ is ψ’ on that occasion. Other than 
the speaker’s intentions, it is hard to see what could do this work.
An added complication arises from Stanley and Szabó’s () and Stanley’s () arguments 
that DPs’ nominals contain aphonic, but syntactially-realized context-sensitive variables that 
function to restrict DPs’ domains. On this view, the LF of (a–b) can be roughly approximated by 
(*a–b):
(*) a. [DP [Det the] [NP book f(i)]] [VP is over one-hundred pages long]
 b. [DP [Det every] [NP beer f(i)]] [VP is in the bucket]
Stanley and Szabó explain the properties of the aphonic domain restrictor as follows (with ad-
justments to accommodate the present example and numbering):
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The value of “i” is an object provided by the context, and the value of “f ” is a function pro-
vided by context that maps objects onto quantiﬁer domains. The restriction on the quantiﬁed 
expression [“every beer”] in [(*b)] would then be provided by the result of applying the func-
tion that the context supplies to “f ” to the object that the context supplies to “i”. (Stanley and 
Szabó : ).
Stanley and Szabó posit the variable i in their LFs in order to explain the fact that some type-e 
variable hidden in DPs’ nominals can be bound by DPs higher up in an LF. They posit the aphonic 
indexical f in order to explain how the semantic content of a type-e variable like i can be trans-
formed into something of a semantic type that can restrict a DP’s domain by combining with its 
nominal.
If Stanley and Szabó are right that nominals contain aphonic domain-restricting variables, we 
still need to ask the question: in virtue of what do those variables have the contents that they do 
on particular occasions (cf. Neale : §; a)? For example: what is it about two diﬀerent 
occasions of use that makes it the case that the values of f and i are saturated in two diﬀerent ways 
on those occasions, so that (for example) ‘the book’ picks out the book on the table at Jason’s house 
on the ﬁrst occasion and the book on the shelf at Zoltán’s house on the second occasion? Stanley 
and Szabó’s answer is that the values of these variables are “provided by context”, but this just 
raises the further question: what fact about the context makes it the case that one value is “pro-
vided” rather than another? For roughly the same reasons mentioned in connection to the explicit 
and implicit approaches, it is diﬃcult to see what could do this work other than some fact about 
the speaker’s communicative intentions.
Some Other Examples of Underspeciﬁcation
The bold-faced expressions in (–) exhibit some other heavily discussed kinds of semantic un-
derspeciﬁcation. We can see this by noting that each sentence (n) could express a range of con-
tents in diﬀerent contexts (or could be used to literally and directly express a range of diﬀerent 
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contents on diﬀerent occasions), two of which could be more explicitly paraphrased by (na) and 
(nb).
()  It’s raining.
 a. It’s raining in New York.
 b. It’s raining in San Francisco.
() Elmar’s shark is more than six feet long.
 a. The shark that Elmar is eating is more than six feet long.
 b. The shark that Elmar rides is more than six feet long.
() The coﬀee in Rome is expensive.
 a. The coﬀee in Rome is expensive by the standards of food in Rome.
 b. The coﬀee in Rome is expensive by the standards of coﬀee elsewhere.
(6)  Rachel must be here.
 a. Rachel must, for all we know, be here.
 b. Rachel must, legally, be here.
Debates about these and other semantically underspeciﬁed expressions parallel the debate about 
DP restriction. 
In line with Stanley and Szabó’s syntactic approach to DP restriction, it is commonly argued 
that the expressions in (–) contain one or more aphonic variables, and that the context-
sensitivity of these variables is responsible for the underpeciﬁcation of the (–). The following 
examples are representative. Stanley argues that the LF of () contains a hidden variable that is 
saturated by “the contextually salient location” in the context of utterance (: ). Peters and 
Westerstahl argue that possessives like ‘Elmar’s shark’ in () contain implicit quantiﬁers which are 
themselves implicitly restricted (: ). Kennedy argues that gradable adjectives like ‘expen-
sive’ in () inherit their underspeciﬁcation from implicit variables saturated by “the contextually 
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appropriate standard of comparison, whatever that is” (: ). Kratzer argues that modals like 
‘should’ in () have semantic contents only relative to a conversational background (a.k.a. modal 
base) and ordering source, that the values of these variables determine whether a modal should be 
read epistemically (as in (a)), deontically (as in (b)) in some other way, and that the conversa-
tional background and ordering source are elements of context ().9  Similar claims have been 
made about a range of other semantically-underspeciﬁed expressions.10
As in the cases of indexicals and DP restriction, however, positing hidden variables and saying 
that they are saturated by context does not answer the question of what ﬁxes those expressions’ 
semantic contents. What, speciﬁcally, about the context makes it the case that the truth conditions 
associated with a given utterance of each sentence (n) above are such that they could be better 
captured by (na) than by (nb), for example? Again, it is diﬃcult to imagine what could do this 
work other than some fact about the communicative intentions of the speaker (Neale : §, 
a,b, forthcoming a; Dowell , ). 
The question of what ﬁxes the content of a given expression (or what ﬁxes the content that a 
speaker expresses with it) is typically thought of as a question about founational semantics or me-
tasemantics, as opposed to a question in descriptive or compositional semantics, which is the study 
of how sentences’ meanings are determined by their structures and the meanings of their parts. 
One reason that semanticists are typically vague or noncommital on the question of what ﬁxes the 
contents of semantically underspeciﬁed expressions is that they take descriptive semantics and 
foundational semantics to be distinct projects that can be successfully pursued in relative isolation 
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9  Kratzer remains neutral about whether the conversational background and ordering source 
are the values of aphonic variables, or whether they get into the truth conditions of a modal claim 
in some other way. Hacquard () develops Kratzer’s account of modals into an elaborate 
aphonic-variable theory.
10 Since tense gives rise to a form of semantic underspeciﬁcation in much the same way as pro-
nouns (see, e.g., Partee ) and every natural language sentence involves tense, it follows that 
every natural language sentence exhibits at least some underspeciﬁcation.
from one another, so that how one answers questions in foundational semantics will have little 
impact on how one answers questions in descriptive semantics. The task of descriptive semantics, 
on this view, is to lay bare the semantically relevant structure of each meaninful sentence, assume 
that each underspeciﬁed expression is saturated by a semantic content of the right type, and com-
pute the semantic content of the sentences from their structures and the semantic contents of 
their parts. This approach is typiﬁed by Heim and Kratzer’s brief discussion of foundational se-
mantics and context sensitivity (: ):
If you utter a sentence like
[A]  She is taller than she
then your utterance is felicitous only if the utterance situation provides values for the two oc-
currences of the pronoun “she”. Given that referring pronouns bear indices at LF, [A] has 
some representation such as [B],
[B]  She is taller than she
and we can think of an utterance situation as ﬁxing a certain partial function from indices to 
individuals. An appropriate utterance situation for LF [B] is one that ﬁxes values for the indi-
ces  and . That is, it is appropriate for [B] only if the variable assignment it determines in-
cludes  and  in its domain.
Let “c” stand for an utterance situation or “(utterance) context” (we use these terms inter-
changably), and let “gc” stand for the variable assignment determined by c (if any). We can 
thus formulate the following appropriateness and truth-conditions for LFs with free pro-
nouns.
[C]  Appropriateness Condition
A context c is appropriate for an LF φ only if c determines a variable assignment gc 
whose domain includes every index which has a fee occurrence in φ.
[D] Truth and Falsity Conditions for Utterances
If φ is uttered in c and c is appropriate for φ, then the utterance of φ in c is true if ⟦φ⟧gc = 
 and false if ⟦φ⟧gc = .
Because they are writing a book about descriptive semantics rather than foundational semantics, 
Heim and Kratzer make no attempt, either in this passage or elsewhere, to say what a context is or 
how it determines a variable assignment. The implication is that this isn’t relevant to the task at 
hand. Stanley and Szabó () are even more explicit in their defense of the independence of 
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descriptive and foundatinal semantics. They begin by considering two claims that someone might 
make about the semantics of the demonstrative, ‘that’ (: ):
() Relative to c, “that” denotes o.
() o is what is demonstrated in context c.
Stanley and Szabó say that () is an answer to the “descriptive problem of context depend-
ence”—the problem of “deriving”, for an expression e relative to a context c, “the interpretation of 
e relative to c, given a prior characterization of what features of the context c have a bearing on the 
interpretation. (), on the other hand, addresses the “foundational problem of context depend-
ence for an expression e relative to a context c”, which is the problem of “specifying what it is 
about the context in virtue of which certain entities (be they objects, properties, or propositions) 
play the role they do in the interpretation of an occurrence of e” (: ). Stanley and Szabó go 
on to argue that it is crucial that we distinguish problems in descriptive semantics from problems 
in foundational semantics. They suggest, citing Braun () and Reimer () in agreement, 
that it is legitimate for those pursuing descriptive semantics to take “as given” the semantic con-
tents of context-sensitive expressions (: ), and argue that mixing up discussions of descrip-
tive and foundational semantics should be avoided:
In general, discussions of descriptive and foundational problems should be clearly distin-
guished from one another. To use an example discussed at length in Stalnaker (), in the 
case of proper names, an example of a foundational semantic debate concerns the viability of 
the causal theory of names, according to which the denotation of a name is due to the exis-
tence of a causal relation of the appropriate sort between it and its bearer. However, the causal 
chains are no part of the descriptive semantics of names. The descriptive semantics of names 
only involve linking them up with their bearers. Causal chains are rather part of a foundational 
semantic account of why names have the descriptive semantical interpretation they do. An ex-
ample of a descriptive semantical debate is whether names are rigid designators, or are rather 
shorthand for non-rigid deﬁnite descriptions. Only confusion results from running such dis-
tinct questions together. (: )
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Although I agree with Stanley and Szabó that descriptive and foundational semantics can be 
thought of as distinct projects (or at least as distinct parts of a single project), I disagree with sev-
eral of their other assumptions about the nature of the boundary between descriptive and founda-
tional semantics. One of these assumptions is that the semantic value of an expression—its mean-
ing from the point of view of descriptive semantics—should be thought of as a kind of semantic 
content. On the view I will defend later in this chapter, the semantic value of an expression is the 
type of speech act that a speaker can perform with it, and the type of act of referring that is the 
semantic value of ‘that’ is individuated broadly, so that it can be tokened by referring to diﬀerent 
objects on diﬀerent occasions. 
If I am right about this, then the proper foundational question about ‘that’ is: in virtue of what 
is a certain broadly-individuated type of referential speech act the semantic value of ‘that’? Stanley 
and Szabó’s version of the foundational question about ‘that’—in virtue of what does ‘that’ refer to 
an object o in a context c?—is, by contrast, ill-posed, since demonstratives don’t refer (only speak-
ers do). In §., I will argue that Stanley and Szabó’s version of the foundational question about 
‘that’ is illegitimate in this way by demonstrating that our best attempt to answer it collapses into 
an answer to an analogous question about what speakers refer to in uttering ‘that’. This strategy 
reveals a second kind of disagreement with Stanley and Szabó: it shows that how we pose and an-
swer questions in foundational semantics can have major consequences for the nature and meth-
odology of descriptive semantics. Foundational and descriptive semantics must, then, be pursued 
in close connection with one another.
2.2  The Case Against Semantic Content
In order to avoid unnecessary complexity in what follows, I will assume that if sentences and their 
parts have semantic contents, these contents are Russellian propositions and their parts, respec-
tively. On this view, for example, the semantic content of (a) is the Russellian structured proposi-
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tion (b), whose parts—Bertrand Russell and the property of being British—are the semantic val-
ues of the sentence’s parts, ‘Bertrand’ and ‘is British’, respectively.
()  a. Bertrand is British.
 b. ⟨Bertrand Russell, BRITISH⟩
Nothing of dialectical importance hangs on this Russelian assumption. It will simplify my discus-
sion by allowing me to phrase Stanley and Szabó’s foundational question in the way they do—as a 
question about a semantic relation borne by expressions to familiar objects and properties, rather 
than as a question about a relation borne by expressions to modes of presentation or various sorts 
of model-theoretic objects. But the same problems for understanding those relations would arise 
as arise for the Russellian semantic relation I’ll discuss.
I will focus my attention in this section on the demonstrative pronouns ‘this’ and ‘that’ as they 
are used in () and ():
() This stinks.
() That stinks.
Although any of the semantically underspeciﬁed expressions that I discussed in §. would serve 
my purposes in this section, demonstrative pronouns are particularly useful for several reasons. 
One is that there is already a large literature discussing the question of what grounds demonstra-
tive reference, and the authors of that literature have already done much of my work for me. A 
second advantage of focusing on demonstrative pronouns depends on a further simplifying as-
sumption, which is already implicit in the fact that I refer to them as ‘demonstrative pronouns’ 
rather than as ‘demonstrative determiners’. Following nearly everyone who has contributed to the 
literature to which I’ve just alluded (and, most inﬂuentially, Kaplan a,b), I will take demon-
stratives like ‘this’ and ‘that’ as they appear in () and () to be syntactically unstructured, di-
rectly referential singular terms. This assumption is controversial, as various authors have enter-
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tained the view that seemingly syntactically unstructured demonstratives are actually complex 
DPs with aphonic or deleted nominals (Neale : §; Elbourne : ch.; Hawthorne and 
Manley : , fn.). I am conﬁdent that bracketing these views will do no dialectical harm 
to this chapter because all such views reduce demonstratives to other kinds of semantically un-
derspeciﬁed expressions of the kinds I discussed in §., and I am conﬁdent that I could give par-
allel arguments for each of those kinds of expressions (indeed, I sketched the most important 
steps of these arguments in §.).
The upside of the simplifying assumption that simple demonstratives are syntactically un-
structured and directly referential is that it allows me to move back and forth between talk of the 
semantic contents and the semantic referents of demonstratives. This is because a term is directly 
referential just in case its referent  in a context is identical to its semantic content in that context 
(Kaplan a). (Semantic reference can be deﬁned by restricting the scope of (SC) to directly 
referring expressions and replacing each instance of ‘semantic content’ with an instance of ‘se-
mantic reference’.)
My aim in this section, then, is to argue that there there do not exist entities that satisfy both 
of (SC–), and to do so by way of arguing that there is no coherent and explanatory notion of 
semantic reference. I am not the ﬁrst to make these claims. Perhaps the best-known semantic-
reference denier is P. F. Strawson, who famously summed up the position by saying that referring 
“is not something an expression does; it is something that someone can use an expression to do” 
(: ). Various philosophers of language have since adopted weaker approximations of this 
view. Kent Bach maintains, for example, that “referring is ultimately not something that words do 
but something that speakers use words to do” (: , emphasis added). Although Bach does 
ﬁnd room in his theory for a notion of semantic reference, he maintains that “speaker reference is 
a more fundamental notion than semantic reference” (ibid). This weakened version of the Straw-
son’s slogan is as close as most philosophers of language are willing to get to the kind of full-
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blown denial of semantic content that I am interested in here, but I will try to show that Bach’s 
watered-down view does not go far enough.
Neale has at least ﬂirted with Strawsonian semantic-content denial, in that he has periodically 
voiced skepticism that any notions of semantic reference and semantic content are needed for 
semantic theorizing.11  In support of this skepticism, Neale oﬀers the following argument for the 
dispensability of any non-speaker-based notion of reference.12
...we should separate (i) who or what A intended to refer to by an expression X on a given oc-
casion, and (ii) who or what a rational, reasonably well-informed interpreter in B’s shoes 
thinks A intended to refer to by X on that occasion. In cases where (i) = (ii), we can talk freely 
about what the speaker referred to. In cases where (i) ≠ (ii), we could argue about which of (i) 
or (ii) or some third thing has the ‘right’ to be called the person or thing referred to, but what 
would be the point? First, what third thing distinct from (i) and (ii) could be of any signiﬁ-
cance to a theory of interpretation? There is simply no rôle for a transcendent notion of what 
was referred to upon which (i) and (ii) converge when all goes well. [...] Second, why is a 
choice between (i) and (ii) needed in cases where (i) ≠ (ii)? Conceptually they are distinct, and 
they are both needed in a theory of interpretation. When all goes well, they coincide, and it’s 
just too bad they don’t always do so. There is no philosophical payoﬀ in bestowing the honor-
iﬁc ‘what was referred to’ on one rather than the other, or on some third thing, when they di-
verge. (Neale : –).
In eﬀect, Neale’s argument takes the form of a challenge. In order to understand the nature of 
communication, we already need an intention-based notion of speaker reference, as well as the 
notion of what an (idealized) interpreter would understand a speaker as referring to. Neale chal-
lenges anyone who wishes to theorize about any further notion of reference (such as the notion of 
semantic reference) to articulate some explanatory role for that notion to play. Without such a 
well-articulated explanatory role, the notion of semantic reference is mere theoretical clutter with 
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11 For Neale’s skepticism regarding the notion of semantic reference, see (: ; forthcoming 
a: , fn.). Neale’s skepticism about the notion of semantic content is more explicit, and comes 
out in his denial that there is any useful or coherent notion of what a sentence says, as opposed to 
the Gricean, speaker-based notion of what a speaker says (see Neale , , forthcoming b).
12  For an almost identical argument against semantic content (in Neale’s terminology: any no-
tion of what is said that isn’t an intention-based notion of what a speaker says), see Neale (: 
; : .).
no explanatory work to do. Neale gives almost identical arguments against any notion of what is 
said that isn’t an intention-based notion of what the speaker said (: ; see also : ). I 
will refer to these objections as the dispensability argument.
The most interesting kind of response to the dispensability argument would address Neale’s 
challenge directly by arguing that we need some notion of semantic content in order to construct 
an explanatory semantic theory. This response takes seriously the idea that we should counte-
nance semantic content only if we have a role for it to play, but contends that we need semantic 
conent to play the role of the semantic values that a semantic theory assigns to expressions. Ac-
cording to half a century of accumulated wisdom, compositional semantics works by showing 
how expressions’ semantic contents (relative to contexts) add up to sentences’ semantic contents. 
So one conceivable response to Neale’s dispensability argument would be that semantics can’t be 
done without semantic content.
One of the broad purposes of this dissertation is to counter this objection to the dispensability 
argument—to produce a proof-of-concept for a kind of semantic theory that doesn’t traﬃc in se-
mantic content. On the Gricean view that I sketched in Chapter One, the role of linguistic mean-
ing is not to determine truth conditions, but to enable eﬃcient communication. The explanatory 
role I assign to linguistic meaning is twofold: ﬁrst, linguistic meaning must provide evidence to 
interpreters of speakers’ communicative intentions, and, second, linguistic meaning must thereby 
constrain the communicative intentions that a rational speaker can have in uttering expressions. 
Based, in part, on a similar line of thought, Neale has proposed that compositional semantics 
should be in the business of showing how the constraints on what we can communicatively intend 
in uttering a sentence are built up from the constraints on what we can communicatively intend 
in uttering words (and, in particular, from the referential intentions we can have in uttering refer-
ring expressions). Neale uses the term ‘blueprints’ to describe meanings, construed as constraints 
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on intentions (, ).13  Neale is perhaps clearest about this point as it applies to the seman-
tic properties of quantiﬁers and referring expressions:
I prefer to watch those [varietals of noun phrase] that are useful emerge from act-syntactic re-
ﬂections, by which I mean reﬂections on the most fundamental features of speech acts as they 
are regulated by (or projected through the lens of) syntax. … That may sound mysterious, but 
the basic idea is quite simple. We might put forward a preliminary act-syntactic, speciﬁcation 
of the class of referring expressions that declares an expression E a referring expression if and 
only if (a) E is used regularly or systematically to perform such-and-such types of intentional 
acts—or at least could be so-used in a sense of ‘could’ that would require some explica-
tion—and (b) E has such-and-such syntactic distribution. (Neale : )
Although others have made similar programmatic remarks about the idea that semantics should 
be a theory of constraints on intentions, nobody has shown how this idea can be ﬂeshed out into a 
detailed and systematic compositional semantics.14  It is therefore open to the defender of seman-
tic content to protest that the proof is in the pudding—that until the details of this alternative 
kind of semantics are worked out, we should assume that the only workable conception of seman-
tics is one that employs a notion of semantic content. Part of my goal in the remainder of this dis-
sertation will be to show how to construct a semantic theory that builds on Neale’s programmatic 
remarks, and thereby refutes the idea that semantics without semantic content is impossible.
Before I reach that positive proposal, I want ﬁrst to oﬀer a more direct objection to the no-
tions of semantic reference and semantic content. Whereas Neale’s argument from dispensability 
makes the claim that we can do without semantic content, my argument aims to show that we 
can’t have semantic content even if we want it. I will demonstrate this by showing that any attempt 
to undestand the notion of semantic content for a variety of expressions will inevitably lead us to 
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13 “A semantic theory speciﬁes the constraints that word meanings and syntax place on what A 
can say by uttering X, a blueprint for X” (Neale : ).
14 Schiﬀer has likewise proposed in various places that the meaning of a sentence is a constraint 
on either the communicative intentions a speaker can have in uttering the sentence or on the type 
of speech act that a speaker can perform with the sentence (e.g., , , ). But, unlike 
Neale, Schiﬀer does not attempt to generalize this point to the meanings of sub-sentential expres-
sions.
some speaker-based notion instead, and that we should extend this result to all other expressions 
for methodological reasons. Call this the argument from collapse. 
The argument begins with the following two questions:
(Q) In virtue of what does an utterance of a simple demonstrative d refer to a given individual 
x in a context c?
(Q) In virtue of what does a speaker refer to a given individual y by uttering a simple demon-
strative d on a particular occasion?
If semantic reference and speaker reference (as applied to demonstratives) are really distinct no-
tions with diﬀerent explanatory roles, then the answers to these two questions must diﬀer. I con-
tend that our best answer to (Q) will collapse into our best answer to (Q).
The main reason I’ve chosen to focus on simple demonstratives is that the existing literature 
on demonstrative reference has already done much of the work of establishing my conclusion. At 
one point, it was commonly held that the reference of a demonstrative was ﬁxed by an accompa-
nying demonstration (e.g., Kaplan a). The paradigmatic example of such a demonstration is 
the act of pointing at one’s referent, and some philosophers have even argued that it is some 
physical fact about this accompanying act of pointing that ﬁxes the referent of a demonstrative 
(Quine ). As many philosophers have pointed out, however, demonstratives needn’t be ac-
companied by an act of pointing, or by any other overt demonstration. Moreover, demonstration-
theoretic accounts of demonstrative reference fail to explain the fact that even utterances of de-
monstratives that are accompanied by demonstrations sometimes refer to objects other than the 
object(s) at which the speaker points. One relevant kind of case involves deferred reference, as, for 
example, when a speaker points at a token object in order to refer to an associated type, or when a 
speaker points to a member of a group in order to refer to the group. It seems clear that any ac-
count of demonstrating capable of doing justice to these cases would have to ground the notion in 
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intention-recognition. Other philosophers and many linguists have attempted to answer (Q) by 
arguing that the reference of a demonstrative in a context is whichever object is most salient in 
the context (Heim and Kratzer ; Mount ; Larson and Segal ; Wettstein ). If the 
notion of salience is taken intuitively, however, then it seems that salience is neither necessary nor 
suﬃcient for demonstrative reference, since it is possible for the intuitive referent of a demonstra-
tive to be less salient than some other object (Michaelson ; Sperber and Wilson /). 
Moreover, salience-theoretic accounts of demonstrative reference have roughly the same prob-
lems with deferred reference as demonstration-theoretic accounts, since an utterance of a demon-
strative may refer to a type whose token is salient, or to a group one of whose members is salient. 
Just like the notion of demonstrating, then, it seems clear that the notion of salience is a place-
holder for something about the speaker’s intentions.
The literature has now mostly converged on the view that demonstrative reference is ﬁxed by 
the speaker’s directing or referential intentions.15  The fact that the best accounts of demonstrative 
reference ground reference in intentions is a key step in my argument, since, as I’ll argue below, 
the best accounts of speaker reference likewise ground referring in intending. But this still leaves 
open the possibility that demonstrative semantic reference and demonstrative speaker reference 
are grounded in two diﬀerent kinds of intentions. In the seminal paper in which he ﬁrst distin-
guished the notions of semantic reference and speaker reference, Kripke () defends this sort 
of view, though not with respect to demonstratives.
In a given idiolect, the semantic referent of a designator (without indexicals) is given by a gen-
eral intention of the speaker to refer to a certain object whenever the designator is used. The 
speaker’s referent is given by a speciﬁc intention, on a given occasion, to refer to a certain ob-
ject. If the speaker believes that the object he wants to talk about, on a given occasion, fulﬁlls 
the conditions for being the semantic referent, then he believes that there is no clash between 
his general intentions and his speciﬁc intentions. (Kripke : )
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15 E.g., Bach (, ); Kaplan (b); King (, ); King and Stanley (); Kripke 
();  Michaelson (); Siegel (); Soames (b).
Kripke applies his distinction between general and speciﬁc intentions to puzzles about both deﬁ-
nite descriptions and proper names. For example, he argues that Donnellan’s () referential 
uses of deﬁnite descriptions are best understood as cases in which a speaker has an object-
dependent speciﬁc intention about a referent that is not the same object that is picked out by the 
speaker’s general intention to refer to whichever object satisﬁes the description. But Kripke’s way 
of explicating the intentions underlying speaker reference and semantic reference can’t help us to 
draw a distinction between speaker reference and semantic reference when it comes to demon-
stratives. This is because his account of the facts in virtue of which an expression e semantically 
refers to an object x take for granted that there is some fact about the speaker’s language—some 
linguistic convention, say—that connects e to o in a way that is independent of the speaker’s spe-
ciﬁc intentions, such that the speaker can intend to refer to o with e with the help of this fact. But 
it is precisely this sort of fact about demonstratives that I’ve been searching for in order to answer 
(Q), and coming up empty.16
King () argues that demonstrative semantic reference is distinguished from demonstra-
tive speaker reference by virtue of the fact that the intentions underlying semantic reference are 
constrained in a way that the intentions underlying speaker reference are not:
I think of the fact that a speaker intends an object to be the value of an occurrence of a demon-
strative and the fact that a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer who knows the common 
ground of the conversation would take the speaker to intend that a certain object be its value 
to be objective features of a context of utterance. Call the former the speaker fact and the latter 
the hearer fact. A context is appropriate for a sentence containing demonstratives if each oc-
currence of a demonstrative in it is associated with a speaker fact and a hearer fact and these 
facts “involve” the same object (i.e. the intended object in the speaker fact is the object that 
would be taken to be intended in the hearer fact). For a given occurrence of a demonstrative in 
an appropriate context, call this latter object the coordinated object. Then I view the meaning of 
a demonstrative as a function that maps an appropriate context to the coordinated object. I 
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16 To be clear: Kripke makes no attempt to apply his distinction between speaker reference and 
semantic reference to demonstratives, and there is no reason to think that he took the distinction 
to so apply. It follows from what I’ll say later that Kripke’s notion of semantic reference is without 
theoretical utility in the case of deﬁnite descriptions, proper names, or any other expression, as 
well. But I needn’t oﬀer speciﬁc arguments in favor of those points here.
take the latter to be the semantic value of the occurrence of the demonstrative in the context. 
Finally, I take the lexical meanings of demonstratives to require that a use of a demonstrative 
be supplemented by a speaker’s intention that is recognizble by an ideal hearer in just the way 
that the demonstration account held that the lexical meanings of demonsatratives require that 
a use be supplemented by a demonstration. (King : )
In eﬀect, then, King thinks that the semantic referent of a demonstrative d in a context c is which-
ever object x the speaker intends to be the value of d in c, provided that his his intentions meet 
certain recognizability constraints. I see two serious problems with this view. First, King’s referen-
tial intentions are meant to ground the notion of semantic reference, but the content of each of his 
referential intentions is that some object x be the value of some expression e. But what is it for x to 
be the value of e if not for e to refer to x. This kind of circularity—grounding the notion of refer-
ence in an intention to refer—is a general problem with most intention-based accounts of refer-
ence, and I will return to it below. The second problem with King’s account is that it cannot dis-
tinguish semantic reference from speaker reference. In personal correspondence, King has sug-
gested that semantic reference diﬀers from speaker reference because the intentions underlying 
the former, but not the intentions underlying the latter, are constrained by what a competent 
hearer could understand. But, as Griceans have long argued, communicative intentions (and, so, 
the referential intentions underlying speaker reference) are constrained in this way as well, and so 
it’s not clear to me how King’s proposal could help him to draw the distinction he needs.17
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17 My two worries about King’s proposal are related. Below, I’ll follow Bach (), Neale (forth-
coming a), Schiﬀer (), and Stine () in arguing that the referential intentions underlying 
speaker reference are best understood a kind of communicative intention, and that all other ac-
counts that have been oﬀered wind up construing referential intentions as intentions to refer (or 
something similar). But communicative intentions are reﬂexive; they are intentions to produce 
some response in an addressee in part via their recognition of the intention to produce this re-
sponse. And so, one cannot rationally have a communicative intention to produce a response r 
unless one’s beliefs leave open the possibility that one’s addressee, if rational, will recognize this 
intention. So, the only non-circular way of spelling out the contents of referential intentions (that 
I know of) gives rise to the recognizability constraints on speaker reference that collapse it into 
King’s notion of semantic reference.
The ﬁrst of my two worries about King’s view is quite general: most accounts of referential in-
tentions are articulated by saying that a given utterance u of a demonstrative refers to an object x 
in virtue of the fact that the speaker intended that u refer to x.18  This sort of formulation, which 
attempts to ground the notion of demonstrative semantic reference in the notion of a speaker’s 
intention to refer, is inadequate as stated. If the concept of reference involved in the speaker’s in-
tention to refer is the concept of speaker reference, then the collapse of demonstrative semantic 
reference into demonstrative speaker reference is trivial, since for a demonstrative to semantically 
refer to x is just for its speaker to intend to refer to x with it. If the appealed-to concept of refer-
ence is the notion of semantic reference, on the other hand, then explications of this form are cir-
cular. Any account of referential intentions must articulate their contents in a way that does not 
include any notion of reference or referring.
To my knowledge, the only plausible attempts to non-circularly spell out the contents of refer-
ential intentions in this way are those of Bach (), Neale (forthcoming a), Schiﬀer (), and 
Stine () all of whom understand referential intentions as kinds of, parts of, or aspects of Gri-
cean communicative intentions. Here, for example, is Bach’s explication:
To refer to something is to use a singular term with the intention (part of one’s communicative 
intention) of indicating to one’s audience the object of the attitude one is expressing. (Bach 
: )
Schiﬀer () oﬀers a more detailed and elaborate account of referring in the same, intention-
based spirit. He also distinguishes between a generic notion of referring to an object in producing 
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18  This is how Michaelson () describes what he calls the ‘standard account’. As he points 
out, the view is often attributed to Kaplan (b), as in the following passage from Siegel: “[A]c-
cording to [Kaplan’s (b) view] what he calls a “directing intention” ﬁxes reference (p. ). 
This view diﬀers from the one Kaplan held in [a], according to which intentions do not ﬁx 
reference. A directing intention to refer to something is an intention to refer to a thing on which 
one has focused one’s attention” (Siegel : , fn.). As Michaelson (: : fn.) points out, 
however, Kaplan explicitly restricts his discussion to cases involving “perceptual demonstratives”, 
and so he may not have held the more general view (b: ).
an utterance and a notion of referring to an object with a particular token expression that one ut-
ters. Neale (forthcoming a: §) reconstructs Schiﬀer’s () account as follows:
Referring-In
In (the course of) uttering x, S refers to A if, and only if, in uttering x, S means an A-dependent 
proposition.
Referring-With
In uttering x, S refers to A with e if, and only if, () e is properly contained in x, and () (∃H)
(∃R) s.t. in uttering x, S intends H to recognize that S was referring to A in uttering x, at least 
partly on the basis of their mutual knowledge that R(e, A).
I think that some theory of referring along these lines—one that grounds speaker reference in 
communicative intentions—has to be right. I will provisionally adopt the following proposal as a 
necessary condition on the posession of a referential intention, leaving the possibility of some fur-
ther conditions open.19
(RI) Referential Intention
S has a referential intention to refer to an object, property, or relation x with an utterance type e 
in producing an utterance u only if e is a proper part of an expression of which u is a token and 
there exists an x-dependent proposition p, addressee A, and binary relation R such that S pro-
duces u, thereby intending:
() to produce a state of entertaining p in A;
() A to recognize S’s intention ();
() A’s act of entertaing p to be at least partly on the basis of her recognition of (); 
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19 This account is watered down from Schiﬀer’s in that it does not make use of the notion of mu-
tual knowledge. I will argue in Chapter Four that linguistic meaning is not grounded in mutual 
knowledge, and I think that one could adjust this argument to support the conclusion that mutual 
knowledge is not required for referring to an object with a token expression. Much like (GI) from 
§.—my speciﬁcation of the intentions required for performing a comunicative illocutionary 
act—(RI) might have to be augmented with further conditions before it would count as suﬃcient.
() A’s act of entertaing p to be at least partly on the basis of A’s sensitivity to the fact that 
R(e,x).
Bach’s, Neale’s, Schiﬀer’s, Stine’s, and my own explications of referring are interesting because of 
what they have in common. First, they are the only non-circular theories of referential intentions 
in the literature, and the only theories to satisfyingly spell out the contents of referential 
intentions.20  Second, by making referential intentions a kind of communicative intention, they 
allow for a satisfying account of why the notion of referring should be posited in order to explain 
communication. Although these account make speakers’ communicative intentions explanatorily 
prior than her referential intentions (since the latter are explicated in terms of the former), refer-
ential intentions might be epistemically prior to full-blown communicative intentions from the 
point of view of an interpreter. You might come to recognize the communicative intentions be-
hind my utterance of ‘Kent is right’ in part by ﬁrst coming to recognize the referential intentions 
that I have in uttering ‘Kent’, for example. By uttering ‘Kent’ as part of my utterance of ‘Kent is 
right’, then, I can give you evidence that the content of my overall communicative intention is a 
Kent-dependent proposition, which takes you some of the way toward identifying the whole 
proposition. This is a notion of referring that is tailor-made to play a role in explaining the eﬃ-
ciency of linguistic communication in the way that I advocated in §., and that relies on the 
same Gricean resources that I drew on there.
Third, communicative-intention-based accounts of referring are all clearly attempts to expli-
cate speaker reference rather than anything in the neighborhood of semantic reference. Indeed, 
they are the best and most plausible explications of speaker reference available. In other words, 
these explications are the best-available answers to (Q). But, as I have attempted to show, at-
tempting to answer (Q) inevitably leads to these same accounts. This narrative, which is borne 
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20 Schiﬀer’s/Neale’s explication of referring-with is stated in terms of refering-in, but this is per-
fectly ﬁne, since referring-in is not explicated in terms of any other notion of referring.
out by the literature on demonstrative reference, is the basis for my claim that the notion of de-
monstrative semantic reference collapses into the notion of demonstrative speaker reference.21
Suppose that the preceding argument is sound, and that—to echo Strawson—referring is not 
something that demonstratives do; it is something that speakers can do with demonstratives. In 
that case, how should we conceive of the linguistic meanings of simple demonstratives? In par-
ticular, how can we account for the fact that the simple demonstratives ‘this’ and ‘that’, and there-
fore the sentences () and (), have diﬀerent meanings? In keeping with the constraint-
theoretic proposals of Neale and Schiﬀer, we can explicate the meaning of a demonstrative in 
terms of the constraints it puts on the referential intentions of a speaker who utters it. As a very 
rough ﬁrst pass, we might say that the communicative intentions of a speaker who utters ‘this’ 
may do so only with communicative intentions about relatively proximal non-persons (in some 
perhaps metaphorical sense of ‘proximal’), whereas a speaker who utters ‘that’ may do so only 
with communicative intentions about relatively distal non-persons (in some perhaps metaphori-
cal sense of ‘distal’).22  I will spell this out in my preferred, speech act-theoretic way in §.. (I will 
also replace the modal-sounding notion of constraint with a disposition-theoretic account of the 
connection between words and their meanings in Chapter Four.)
Although the argument from collapse is easy to run on demonstratives because the existing 
literature has already pushed toward the conclusion that demonstrative reference is grounded in 
referential intentions, I am conﬁdent that similar arguments could be run on other semantically 
underspeciﬁed expressions. I sketched how some of those arguments would go in §.. These ar-
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21 See also Bach (: chs.+, , , ms), Burton-Roberts (: –), Fodor and Le-
pore (), and Schiﬀer (: ), who argue that speakers’ intentions can’t be considered 
part of the context of utterance in any sense of context that could be relevant to semantics. I am 
sympathetic to these arguments, but it is important to distinguish them from the argument from 
collapse, which is instead based on the conclusion that there is no explanatory role for a notion of 
semantic reference that is distinct from the notion of speaker reference.
22 Cf. Evans () and Neale (b).
guments would have to show, for some underspeciﬁed expression e, that there is no way to distin-
guish the facts that ﬁx e’s content in a context from the facts that determine what a speaker di-
rectly and literally means in uttering e in the same context. The key step would be to show that if 
there is a fact about e’s content in a given context, this fact must be grounded in the speaker’s 
communicative intentions. I sketched arguments of this sort for a few semantically underspeciﬁed 
expressions in §..
If I am right about everything I’ve said so far, one possibility that still remains is that we 
should adopt a mixed content/constraint semantics. This is roughly the position of Kent Bach 
() and Michael Devitt (forthcoming), both of whom hold that the semantic content of a sen-
tence containing a demonstrative is a gappy proposition or propositional radical. The sentence (), 
on this view, would express the propositional radical ():
() That stinks.
() < ____distal , STINK>
The idea here is that the VP ‘stinks’ in (), which is not semantically underspeciﬁed, contributes 
its semantic content to the proposition (), whereas the demonstrative ‘that’ contributes merely a 
constraint on how the speaker can intend to ﬁll in the corresponding gap. We can think of the 
subscripted ‘distal ’ as a kind of propositional metadata—not as a component of the proposition 
itself, but as a limitation on what can be a component in the subscripted position.
We should prefer a pure constraint semantics over this kind of mixed content/constraint the-
ory on methodological grounds. As I argued in §., we should spell out the nature of linguistic 
meaning by ﬁrst spelling out its explanatory role. Mixed content/constraint accounts ﬁnd linguis-
tic meaning playing two distinct roles: the meanings of context-insensitive expressions play the 
role of ﬁxing the expressions’ semantic contents, whereas the meanings of semantically underspe-
ciﬁed expressions play the diﬀerent role of constraining the intentions a speaker can have in utter-
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ing the expressions. Whereas we cannot adopt a semantic theory on which meaning plays a 
wholly content-determining role for the reasons I’ve spelled out here, we can easily adopt a wholly 
constraint-based semantics by saying that the meanings of context-insensitive expressions also 
function by constraining speakers’ intentions, but simply do so to a greater degree. The meaning 
of ‘stinks’ is so strict that, in uttering it, I can only have the intentions involved in referring to the 
property of stinking. Assuming that it is better to have meaning play a uniﬁed explanatory role 
than a mixed explanatory role, and that a wholly constraint-based account of linguiatic meaning 
is possible, I submit that these considerations give us a reason to adopt such a fully-general ac-
count.
On this view, to say that an expression e is semantically underspeciﬁed is to say that it the that 
e’s meaning places relatively loose constraints on the communicative intentions of someone who 
utters e. This is a powerful way to think of underspeciﬁcation because speech-act types can be 
broadly individuated in a variety of ways, and so expressions’ meanings can give rise to their se-
mantic underspeciﬁcation in a variety of ways. I will try to precisify this point in the next section 
in the course of spelling out the basics of the speech-act-theoretic approach to lexical and com-
positonal semantics.
2.3  Speech-Act-Theoretic Semantics
What would a constraint-based semantic theory look like? I want now to take an initial step to-
ward answering this question by articulating the basic framework of speech-act-theoretic seman-
tics, according to which semantic values are types of speech acts.
Speech-act-theoretic semantics is inspired by Grice’s () theory of utterance-type mean-
ing. According to Grice, a sentence S is meaningful for a group G just in case the members of G 
have “a procedure in their repertoires” for uttering S if they have communicative intentions of a 
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certain kind (: –).23  Because Grice also takes the performance of a speech act to be a 
matter of producing an utterance with these same sorts of intentions,24  we can interpret him as 
holding that linguistic meaning is a relation borne by expressions to types of speech acts. For ex-
ample, it follows from Grice’s view that the meaningfulness of ‘Paul philosophizes’ boils down to 
the fact that speakers have a procedure in their repertoires for uttering the sentence if they overtly 
intend to bring about the belief (in some addressee) that they believe that Paul philosophizes. This 
explication is equivalent, by Gricean lights, to the idea that the sentence’s meaning is constituted 
by speakers’ shared procedure for uttering it in order to assert that Paul philosophizes. Along 
similar lines, we can say that Grice takes the meaningfulness of ‘does John philosophize?’ to be 
constituted by speakers’ shared procedure for uttering the sentence in order to ask whether John 
philosophizes. Given this theory of linguistic meaning, it makes sense to think of a sentence’s se-
mantic value as a certain type of illocutionary act—the type that speakers have a procedure to 
perform by uttering the sentence. Moreover, Grice argues that the procedure we have for per-
forming illocutionary acts using sentences are constituted by our procedures for referring and 
predicating with the sentence’s simple parts (: –). Given this view, it is natural to say 
that a Gricean compositional semantic theory would be one that showed how the types of acts of 
referring and predicating that are the semantic values of words add up to the types of illocution-
ary acts that are the semantic values of sentences.25
In order for Grice’s theory to count as a constraint semantics, we need only interpret his talk 
of having a procedure in one’s repertoire in the right way. In particular, we need to say that for a 
speaker to have a procedure in her repertoire that links an expression E to a type of communica-
tive intention CI entails that the speaker can have an intention of type CI only if she utters E or 
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23 I will discuss this part of Grice’s theory of meaning in greater detail in §..
24 Grice (: –). For more explicit statements of this Gricean theory of speech acts, see 
§. and the works cited there.
25 This is just a ﬁrst pass. I will have much more to say in Chapters Four and Five. 
some other expression similarly linked to CI. The nature of the modal, ‘can’, in this statement is an 
issue that a full-ﬂedged metasemantic theory would have to resolve. I will replace this statement 
with a more satisfactory account of linguistic metasemantics in Chapter Four.
I won’t try to give a speech-act-theoretic semantics for a large fragment of English here, but I 
can give a simple sketch, elaborate enough to precisify the discussion of underspeciﬁcation that I 
have outlined so far. For now, I won’t attempt to show how the meanings of sentences and other 
clauses are composed, as that will be my goal in Chapter Two. Instead, I will assume that every 
clause #(φ) consists of a sentence radical φ embedded within a mood-marker #. My goal here will 
be to give a simple account of the compositional semantics of moodless sentence radicals, and I 
will assume that the semantic value of a sentence radical is a force-free speech-act type of express-
ing some proposition. I don’t thereby intend to commit myself to the idea that speakers can per-
form force-free acts of expressing propositions in isolation; rather it is compatible with everything 
I’ll say here that expressing a proposition is always part of, or an abstraction away from, an illocu-
tionary act of some kind, just as it is compatible with what I say here that acts of referring and 
predicating are only ever performed as parts of, or abstractions away from, illocutionary acts. (I’ll 
have much more to say about what I mean by this in Chapter Five.) 
 On my preferred formulation, an actic semantics consists of two parts: ﬁrst, an assignment of 
types of acts to semantically primitive expressions, and, second, a collection of compositional 
priniciples assigning diﬀerent kinds of acts of predicating to diﬀerent types of binary-branching 
syntactic constructions. (Again, I will spend a good deal of Chapter Five justifying this formula-
tion and comparing it to other options.) Here are the rules for a very small fragment of English:
‘stinks’ ? a type that may be tokened only by referring to the property of being stinky.26
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26 ‘?’ symbolizes whatever relation holds between an expression and the type of act that serves 
as its semantic value.
‘Fido’ ? a type that may be tokened by referring to Fido.
‘everyone’ ? a type that may be tokened by referring to the property of applying to everyone
Sentence Radical Composition [S [NP][VP]]
S’s semantic value is a type that can be tokened by expressing a proposition by referring to an 
object x in a way that tokens NP’s semantic value, referring to a property F in a way that tokens 
VP’s semantic value, and predicating F of x.
Sentence Radical Composition [S [DP][VP]]
S’s semantic value is a type that can be tokened by expressing a proposition by referring to a 
property F in a way that tokens DP’s semantic value, referring to a property G in a way that to-
kens VP’s semantic value, and predicating F of G.
The resulting theory-fragment allows us to show how the types of acts of expressing propositions 
that are performable with the sentences ‘Fido stinks’ and ‘Everyone stinks’ are constituted by the 
types of speech acts performable with their parts. I will consider a theory capable of dealing with 
a larger fragment in Chapter Five.
The key to understanding semantic underspeciﬁcation is that the semantic value of an under-
speciﬁed sentence radical will be a broadly-individuated speech-act type—one that can be to-
kened by expressing a variety of propositions. In cases of lexical underspeciﬁcation, this will be 
because the semantic value of a semantically primitive constituent of the sentence radical is a type 
that can be tokened by referring to diﬀerent objects on diﬀerent occasions. For example:
‘that’ ? a type that may be tokened only by acts of referring to non-persons that are relatively 
distal from the speaker’s perspective (in a perhaps metaphorical sense).
‘he’ ? a type that may be tokened only by acts of referring to males.
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‘I’ ? a type that may be tokened only by acts of referring to oneself.
The basic idea is straightforward: an expression’s meaning plays the role of narrowing down the 
kind of speech act that someone might be performing in uttering the expression, but not neces-
sarily to the point of uniqueness. The interpreter’s task—which is to non-demonstratively infer 
which speech act the speaker is performing—is made easier because her sensitivity to the expres-
sion’s meaning cuts down the space of possibilities about what the speaker might mean. Because 
each speech-act type X—whether a communicative illocutionary act or an act of referring—can 
be individuated in terms of the kinds of communicative intentions a speaker must have in order 
to perform a token of X, we could equivalently formulate the semantic values of words and sen-
tences in terms of the kinds of communicative intentions a speaker might have in uttering them. 
(This point will be crucial to the account of mood that I will defend in Chapter Three.) On this 
account, each expression’s semantic value plays the role for which I posited meaning in §1.3. The 
semantic values of semantically underspeciﬁed expressions play the same role, but do so in a 
more loosely-constraining way.
To account for DP restriction, we can formulate principles that deliver results like the follow-
ing for DPs of the form ‘Every NP’:
‘Every NP’ ? a type that may be tokened only by acts of referring to the property of applying to 
every ψ (where ψ may be any restriction of the property that a speaker can refer to in tokening 
NP’s semantic value).27
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27  This treatment of quantiﬁer phrases is a rough ﬁrst pass. A proper treatment would have to 
take a stand on whether implicit restriction is triggered only in cases of determiners which are 
downward monotonic with respect to their nominals (see Barwise and Cooper ; Neale ), 
and would have to be more precise about what it means to say that a property ψ is a restriction of 
a property φ.
If Stanley and Szabó () are right that nominals contain aphonic restrictor variables, then our 
compositional principles will have to be more complex in order to take into account the complex 
acts of predicating involved in referring to a restricted property with a DP’s nominal. (I will have 
more to say about these complex acts of predicating in Chapter Five.)
The meanings of several of the other underspeciﬁed expressions that I discussed in §. could 
be captured by compositional principles that assign them the following semantic values. Again, 
each of these is a rough ﬁrst shot, and ﬁnal versions would have to be sensitive to whatever hid-
den syntactic structure is present in the expressions’ underlying syntax.
‘It’s raining’ ? a type that may be tokened only by acts of expressing a proposition that it’s rain-
ing at l at t, where l is a particular location and t is a particular time.
‘Elmar’s shark’ ? a type that may be tokened only by acts of referring to a shark that bears R to 
Elmar, where R is a particular relation.28
‘[Adj expensive [NP F(x)]]’ ? a type that may be tokened only by acts of referring to the prop-
erty of having a cost that is higher than some degree relevant to the cost of F’s, where F may be 
any property.29
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28 If Peters and Westerståhl () are right, then it may be better to give a more complex, quan-
tiﬁcational account of the possessive. Nothing about the framework I am defending here would 
conﬂict with such an account, although the quantiﬁcational approach would require showing how 
‘Elmar’s shark’ can be used to performa a complex act of referring to a property of properties.
29  This is a simpliﬁed account based on Kennedy’s () defense of the idea that comparative 
adjectives contain hidden variables that determine a contextually salient standard on the basis of 
some contextually salient comparison class. I
Following Kratzer (), we can represent a modal claim ‘must φ’ as including variables for a 
conversational background f and an ordering source g, where each of these is taken as a sentential 
variable.30 We can then give a preliminary account of modals as follows:
mustf,g φ ? a type that can be tokened by expressing a proposition that some proposition p is 
true in the q-best worlds at which r is true, where p, q, and r are propositions that one could 
express by tokening φ, f, and g, respectively.
These could all be elaborated and improved, but they successfully illustrate my general strategy 
for understanding the semantics of any given underspeciﬁed expression, which is to specify the 
limits on the kinds of speech acts that a speaker can perform in uttering the expression. As the 
examples illustrate, these limits may be speciﬁed in a variety of ways, in keeping with the varieties 
of semantic underspeciﬁcation that we encounter in natural language. 
Conclusion and Mile-Marking
In Chapter One, I sketched my overall pragmatic and methodological framework for understand-
ing communication and language use, and argued that linguistic meaning must play a speciﬁc 
kind of role in order to ﬁt into that framework. In this chapter, I have argued not only that 
speech-act-theoretic semantics allows meaning to play that role, but also that truth-conditional 
semantics is internally unstable in a way that causes it to collapse into the speech-act-theoretic 
approach.
The argument can be summed up straightforwardly: if truth-conditional semantics is work-
able, then there must be some property of sentences, sentences-in-contexts, or utterances of sen-
tences that ﬁxes their truth conditions. But if this is so, then there must be some fact in virtue of 
which sentences (etc.) have these properties that can be distinguished from the facts in virtue of 
109
30 Like Kratzer, I’ll remain neutral about where, if any, these variables are located in modal sen-
tences’ syntactic structures.
which speakers express propositions with sentences. But, given scrutiny to semantically under-
speciﬁed expressions, it becomes clear that semantic content collapses into a speaker-based, 
intention-constituted notion, and so semantics must be the study of constraints on speakers’ in-
tentions.
I have also begun to sketch the basic components of speech-act-theoretic semantics as I un-
derstand it. Over the course of the next several chapters, I will ﬂesh out this sketch considerably. 
In Chapter Three, I will expand the theory to cover sentences and embedded clauses, with a par-
ticular emphasis on mood. In Chapter Four, I will replace the notion of constraint on intentions, 
as well as the modal force implicit in my many statements here that an expression’s semantic value 
is the type of speech act that a speaker can perform with it, with a more fully-articulated 
disposition-based metasemantics. In Chapter Five, I will explain in greater detail what it is for 
word-sized speech-act types to add up to sentence-sized speech-act types, and give a fuller treat-
ment of the syntax–semantics interface and the nature of compositionality.
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CHAPTER THREE: ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS AND THE SEMANTICS OF MOOD
In the last chapter, I began to show how to construct a lexical and compositional semantic theory 
for a language. But my account there was incomplete, because it didn’t account adequately for the 
semantics of whole clauses. The speech acts that we perform with clauses (and sentences in par-
ticular) aren’t limited to expressing propositions. Rather, in uttering a sentence, a speaker per-
forms an illocutionary act. The semantics of whole clauses—and their mood in particular—raises 
a variety of diﬃcult issues that have occupied many semanticists’ attention, particularly over the 
past several decades. I turn to the semantics of mood here. Although I will only have space to 
adequately address the imperative mood in this chapter, I believe that my account generalizes to 
interrogatives and declaratives as well.
Introduction: Mood, Meaning, and Semantics
These three sentences diﬀer with respect to mood:1
(1) Oliver buys Dan a drink. declarative
(2) Oliver, buy Dan a drink! imperative
(3) Does Oliver buy Dan a drink? interrogative
No syntactic criterion individuates the moods cross-linguistically (Han ), and linguists have 
argued that the clause-types must be individuated in terms of both syntactic structure and seman-
tic function (Kaufmann : §..; Portner ; Sadock and Zwicky ). Within a given 
language, mood is a syntactically realized property of clauses: each clause has a mood and no 
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1  Linguists tend to call the relevant property ‘clause-type’, so as to disginguish it from verbal 
mood, which is a distinct morphosyntactic property of verbs (Portner ; Kaufmann ). 
Because philosophers use ‘mood’ almost exclusively to pick out the clause-level property that dis-
tinguishes ()–(), things will be simpler if I use ‘mood’ and ‘clause-type’ interchangably, stipua-
lating that I will never mean verbal mood by ‘mood’.
clause has more than one. The three clause-types on display in ()–() are not the only ones, but 
they are the only types that are universal to all languages, and they are the only ones that I will 
focus on here.
()–() have a lot in common. With the apparent exception of ‘does’ in (), they contain oc-
currences of all and only the same words, in the same order, and in closely related syntactic ar-
rangements. The sentences seemingly have some component of their meanings in common, 
though the details about this are pre-theoretically fuzzy. Each of ()–() would normally be used 
to talk about the same things—namely, Oliver, Dan, and the relation of buying a drink for some-
one. Seemingly—though this turns out to be a matter of contention—the three sentences can also 
be used to perform speech acts with the same propositional content: that Oliver buys Dan a drink. 
Despite these similarities, the syntactic diﬀerences that distinguish ()–() also signal seman-
tic and pragmatic diﬀerences. We might stick to the idea that ()–() can be used to express the 
same proposition, but we must also recognize that they  are typically used to perform speech acts 
that diﬀer in illocutionary force: whereas () can be used to assert or suggest, () can be used to 
request or command, and () can be used to ask whether. These diﬀerences in what we typically do 
with ()–() reﬂect diﬀerences in their meanings. My primary topic here is the semantics of 
mood, although this is closely connected to the pragmatic diﬀerences as well.
My aim is to defend a Gricean, speech act theoretic account of of mood, according to which 
the semantic value of a clause is the type of illocutionary act with whose potential it is endowed, 
and according to which illocutionary acts are individuated by the kinds of intentions speakers 
have in performing them. The semantic values of declarative, imperative, and interrogative sen-
tences are types that may be tokened only by assertive acts, directive acts, and acts of questioning, 
respectively. The result will be a semantic analysis of mood that builds on the key ideas of the act-
theoretic semantic framework that I began to develop in Chapter Two.
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I will focus mainly on the case of imperatives, for two reasons. First, the fact that many inter-
rogatives are also wh-phrases (e.g. ‘who are you?’) makes comparing them with clauses of other 
types more complicated. Second, and more importantly, Griceans disagree with most contempo-
rary semanticists in a fundamental way about the nature of questioning: Griceans take questions 
to be a genre of directive speech acts, whereas most contemporary accounts treat questions and 
directives as distinct categories of speech act. Because the accounts I will be comparing take the 
semantics of interrogatives to be intimately tied to the pragmatics of asking questions, this dis-
agreement about the pragmatic issues makes it cumbersome to compare semantic views.
My plan is the following. In §., I articulate the explanatory goals of a semantic theory of 
imperatives. In §. I outline my own theory of imperatives and articulate the most threatening 
criticism of it—namely, that it fails to account for imperative clauses embedded within the scope 
of logical operators. In §., I consider and reject several prominent theories of mood that take 
the semantic values of non-declaratives to be either propositions or truth conditions. In §., I 
consider dynamic theories of the imperative, which understand the meanings of imperatives in 
terms of the eﬀects that uttering them will have on conversational context. I reject dynamic theo-
ries in §., arguing that they collapse into Gricean, act theoretic views like my own. In §., I 
show how a Gricean, act theoretic view like my own can account for embedded imperatives.
3.1  What Do We Want from a Semantics for Imperatives?
A variety of explananda have been proposed for a theory of the semantics of mood. I consider six 
categories here, the ﬁrst four of which I take to be genuine explananda, and the last two of which I 
look on with greater suspicion.
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3.1.1  Imperative Meaning
The most basic requirement of a semantics for the imperative is to explain what is distinctive 
about the meanings of imperatives. We have very strong pre-theoretic intuitions that imperative 
sentences (e.g., ‘Oliver, buy Dan a drink!’) have diﬀerent meanings than their declarative counter-
parts (e.g., ‘Oliver buys Dan a drink.’). A more theory-laden reason for taking their meanings to 
diﬀer arises from the fact that semantics often uses as data intuitions about the truth conditions of 
(utterances of) sentences. But our intuitions also suggest that (utterances of) imperatives aren’t 
the right sorts of things to be true or false.  A semantic theory of the imperative should precisify 
and explain all of these observations
A full semantic account of imperatives would also have to explain how imperatives’ distinctive 
meanings arise compositionally from the meanings of their parts and their syntactic structures. 
This is not possible in the present state of inquiry because the syntactic features that distinguish 
the major clause-types in English and across languages are poorly understood.2  I will therefore 
follow most other semanticists working on non-declaratives by making minimal assumptions 
about the grammar of clause-types, and of the imperative in particular. I will assume that clauses 
of each type can be factored into mood markers that encode their clause-type—symbolized by ‘⊦’ 
for declarative, ‘!’ for imperative, and ‘?’ for interrogative—and moodless sentence radicals that 
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2  See Han () and Zanuttini, Pak, & Portner () for discussions of how the syntax of im-
peratives bears on their semantics.
encode the constraints they place on which propositions speakers can express with them.3  I sym-
bolize clauses by preﬁxing their mood-markers: 
(1*) ⊦(Oliver buy Dan a drink)
(2*) !(Oliver buy Dan a drink)
(3*) ?(Oliver buy Dan a drink)
I can therefore safely reframe the question about the semantics of imperatives as the following 
one: what is the semantic contribution of the mood-marker ‘!’?
3.1.2  Imperative Use
Closely conneted to the semantic question about imperatives is a pragmatic question, raised by 
the fact that imperatives are used to perform speech acts of a particular type. I will call speech 
acts of this type ‘directives’, where this label should be understood as applying to a genus that sub-
sumes a variety of distinct types of illocutionary acts (including, for example, commands and re-
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3 See, for example, Charlow (), Davidson (), Grice (), Lewis (, b), Sadock 
(), Schiﬀer (: –), Searle (: ), Starr (ms). For an extended defense of the view 
that mood-markers can be factored out at LF across languages, see Han (). Not all of the 
theories I will discuss below can usefully be taken as representing the meanings of imperatives 
this way; e.g., Hanks (, ) takes the semantic contribution of mood to be inseparable 
from the meanings of the rest of sentences (see §..). Portner (, ) and Zanuttini, Pak, 
& Portner () take the semantic values of imperatives to be properties (see §..). This latter 
idea—recast as the idea that the semantic values of imperatives’ mood-free radicals are acts of re-
ferring to properties—could be made to ﬁt nicely with the version of speech-act-theoretic seman-
tics that I defend here, particularly if the contents of intentions and directive speech acts are 
properties rather than propositions. On this issue, see footnote  of Chapter One, where I provi-
sionally adopt the assumption that intentions and directive acts have propositions as their con-
tents. To go along with that idea, I will here assume that directives contain mood-free sentence 
radicals whose semantic values are types of acts of expressing propositions. Moreover, I will con-
tinue with my awkward-sounding technical usage in schematic reports like ‘A intends to p’ and ‘S 
directs A to p’, which I use to report the facts that A bears the intenting relation to the proposition 
p and that the content of S’s act of directing is an A-dependent proposition p, respectively. If it 
turns out that any of these provisional assumptions is bad, it would be unproblematic to rewrite 
this chapter in a way that adopts the alternative assumptions.
quests). A semantic theory of imperatives should explain, or set the stage for pragmatics to ex-
plain, how imperatives’ disinctive meanings give rise to their distinctive use.4
We might also want our account to explain some facts about the felicity conditions of impera-
tives—why, for example, the following snippets of dialogue are defective in some way (Starr ms: 
§.):
(4)  a. Unicorns don’t, never have, and never will exist.
 ⋮
 # b. Bring me a unicorn!
(5)  a. The door is open.
 ⋮
 # b. Open the door!
Both of these data are instances of much more general phenomena. As () demonstrates: for any 
sentence radical φ, it is (usually) infelicitous to follow an utterance of ⸢⊦φ⸣ with an utterance of ⸢!
φ⸣. But the phenomenon is obviously more general than that description would suggest. What 
Starr here takes note of is a particular, linguistically-bound case of a general fact about directive 
communicative acts—namely, that it doesn’t make sense to direct someone to make something 
the case when that thing already is the case. Suppose that (a) had not already been uttered, for 
example, but that it was merely obvious to everyone involved in the conversation that the door 
was already open. It would be equally as problematic to utter (b) in this situation as it would be 
to utter it in the wake of an utterance of (a). The same would be true of any attempt, linguistic or 
nonlinguistic, to direct someone to open the door. Quite generally: it does not make sense to di-
rect someone to do what’s already done. Whatever explanation we give of cases like () and () 
therefore shouldn’t be tied too closely to language.
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4 For other articulations of this desideratum, see Charlow (: §.), Davidson (: ).
3.1.3  Embedded Imperatives
Imperative clauses seem to embed within the scope of at least some binary connectives. In some 
cases, as in ()–(), both clauses thus embedded are imperatives.
() Buy me a drink and make it a stiﬀ one!        !φ and !ψ
() Buy me a drink or leave me alone!        !φ or !ψ
In other cases, imperatives and declaratives can apparently be mixed inside the scopes of connec-
tives.
() If the bartender comes back, buy me a drink.5        (if ⊦φ)(!ψ)
() a. Give me all your money or the puppy gets it.         !φ or ⊦ψ
 b. You mow the lawn or I’ll clean the garage (Starr ms: §.)
() a. Say that again and I’ll scream. !φ and ⊦ψ
 b. Stay here and I’ll go to the store. 
() If he comes back, buy me a drink and I’ll pay you back. (if ⊦φ)(!ψ and ⊦σ)
There is less than full agreement about how the logical forms of sentences like these should be 
understood, and this lack of agreement is connected to the fact that the grammar of mood is itself 
a matter of dispute. Even given our simplifying assumption that a clause’s mood can be factored 
out and represented as a preﬁxed mood-marker, several questions remain about the grammar of 
()–(). 
For example: how do the scopes of mood-markers interact with the scopes of connectives? 
Should () be represented as (*a), with the mood-marker taking wide scope, or as (*b), with 
mood-markers taking narrow scope?
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5  It might be best not to think of ‘if ’ as a binary connective; I group conditional imperatives in 
with mixed-mood conjunctions and disjunctions because many of the same issues arise for both.
(6*)  a. !(A buy S a drink and A make it a stiﬀ one)        !(φ and ψ)
 b. !(A buy S a drink) and !(A make it a stiﬀ one) !φ and !ψ
If mood-markers always take wide scope over connectives, as in (*a), then things are relatively 
simple. For this would mean that there aren’t any embedded imperatives after all: what appear to 
be embedded imperatives would actually be complex sentence radicals embedded under a single 
imperative mood-marker.
One prima facie reason to think that this strategy won’t work, and that mood-markers at least 
sometimes take narrow scope with respect to logical connectives, is the existence of sentences like 
()–(), which embed clauses of two diﬀerent types. Mixed-mood sentences like these seemingly 
cannot be treated as complex sentence radicals embedded under single mood-markers, because 
they contain too many mood-markers, and the resulting sentences are apparently neither simply 
declaratives nor simply imperatives but instead complex combinations of the two. It seems that 
the meanings of imperative clauses must make it possible for them to be conjoined and disjoined 
with, and conditionalized on, declarative clauses.
One way out of this conclusion would be to suppose that sentences like ()–() are not as 
they appear. One way of implementing this idea, as it applies to () and (), would be to hold 
that they are actually the conditionals (*) and (*) in disguise.
(9*)  a. If you don’t give me all your money, the puppy gets it. ⊦(If not-φ)(ψ)
 b. If you don’t mow the lawn, I’ll clean the garage. 
(10*)  a. If you say that again, I’ll scream. ⊦(If φ)(ψ)
 b. If you stay here, I’ll go to the store. 
Charlow argues that we should apply this strategy to at least some mixed-mood conjunctions and 
disjunctions. He motivates it by pointing out that it is plausible that (a) and (a) can be used to 
perform the same speech acts as (a*) and (a*). Nonetheless, Charlow acknowledges that “there 
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is a mystery about how to account for” these disguised conditional readings: “the pressure is to 
come up with an analysis of the relevant connectives (‘or’ and ‘and’) that allows them to transform 
imperatives into subordinate clauses functioning to restrict the domain of quantiﬁcational modals 
like ‘will’” (: fn.). In other words: even in cases where conditional readings are plausible, it 
wouldn’t be trivial to show how these readings could arise grammatically. Moreover, if we inter-
pret (a) and (b) as cases of genuine disjunctions and conjunctions, rather than as disguised 
conditionals, it seems that we can give a pragmatic explanation of their conditional readings. De-
clarative disjunctions sometimes “sound like” conditionals, after all (‘Either the money is in my 
bank account or the puppy gets it’), as do declarative conjunctions (‘John says that one more time 
and I’ll scream’), and whatever pragmatic explanation we give of the conditional readings of these 
cases can likely be extended to cases like (a) and (a).
What about conditional imperatives, such as ()? Some authors have argued, on the grounds 
that mood signals force and we don’t perform illocutionary acts with the consequents of condi-
tionals, that mood-markers always take wide-scope in conditionals, so that the logical form of a 
conditional imperative is !((if φ)(ψ)).6   But there are excellent reasons to disagree. One is the exis-
tence of conditionals like (), whose consequents conjoin an imperative and a declarative. The 
grammaticality of () counts against taking the mood-markers in conditional imperatives to 
have wide scope, because, once again, it seems that we have too many mood-markers (Starr ms: 
§.). But suppose that we stick to the idea of reinterpreting mixed-mood conjunctions as dis-
guised conditionals and give the consequent of () the same treatment, thereby yielding (*):
(*) If he comes back, then if you buy me a drink, I’ll pay you back. 
 ⊦(if φ)((if ψ)(σ))
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6 E.g., Dummett (: –).
Again, it is intuitively plausible to read () as (*), although, again, the grammatical implemen-
tation of this proposal is not straightforward, and a pragmatic explanation might turn out to be 
preferable. 
But we shouldn’t hold out much hope that all of this wide-scopery will work out. The strategy 
hinges on our ability to read mixed-mood conjunctions and disjunctions as indicative condition-
als, and, as Starr (ms: §.) shows, we can’t always do this. First, consider (b) and its conditional 
counterpart, (*b):
() b. You mow the lawn or I’ll clean the garage !φ or ⊦ψ
(*)  b. If you don’t mow the lawn, I’ll clean the garage. ⊦(If not-φ)(ψ)
Starr persuasively argues that (b) has a purely disjunctive reading that cannot be assimilated to 
(*b):
(Context: It’s Friday and we have a list of chores to do over the week- end. We’ve decided to 
that one of your chores is mowing the lawn and one of mine is cleaning the garage, though 
there are others. We have to do one chore total today. Right now, we are considering which 
one.) 
[X] a. Me:  I don’t know, you mow the lawn or I’ll clean the garage.
 b. You:  I’m ﬁne with either.
It is often said that disjunctions which mix imperatives and declaratives only have a negative 
conditional meaning (Dummett ). For example, [Ya] means that if you don’t mow the 
lawn, I will take away your cell phone. But unlike [X], a response like [Yb] only evidences that 
you did not understand what I said.
[Y]  a. Me: You mow the lawn or I’ll take away your cell phone! 
   b. You:  I’m ﬁne with either.
This seems to show that imperatives can scope under or. (Starr ms: §.)
Some mixed-mood conjunctions likewise can’t be read as conditionals. Consider (b), which is 
similar to one of Starr’s examples. 
() b.  Stay here and I’ll go to the store. !φ and ⊦ψ
(*)  b.  If you stay here, I’ll go to the store.  ⊦(If φ)(ψ)
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On at least one natural reading of (b), the speaker is not saying that her going to the store is 
conditional upon her addressee staying where they are. 
These readings threaten our attempt to do away with narrow-scoped mood. Moreover, there is 
no problem with embedding these true mixed-mood conjunctions and disjunctions in condition-
als, and so these readings also to put an end to our ambition of understaning mood as taking wide 
scope over them as well.
Perhaps there is a way to explain these cases away, and to retreat once again to the position 
that mood always scopes over the connectives, but I can’t see how that would work. And yet, some 
prominent semantic theories of mood seem to hang on the wide-scope analysis. For example, a 
central tenet of Portner’s (, ) inﬂuential theory is that imperatives’ semantic values diﬀer 
in type from those of declaratives (this is how he explains the fact that imperatives are not truth-
apt). But, assuming that Portner also accepts the standard wisdom that conjunction and disjunc-
tion range only over pairs of arguments of the same semantic type (Partee and Rooth ), it 
follows that there are no mixed-mood conjunctions or disjunctions, and that apparent examples 
like () and () must be explained away. This constitutes a serious problem for Portner, whose 
account I will return to in §...
The framework I will defend here is compatible with either hypothesis about the relative 
scopes of mood-markers and connectives. I show how it could account for the possibility that 
mood-markers always take wide scope in §.., and how it can be adjusted to accomodate the 
view that mood-markers take narrow scope in §..
3.1.4  Illocutionary Underspecification
Imperatives can be used to perform speech acts with a variety of diﬀerent kinds of illocutionary 
force. Perhaps the most obvious examples are commands and requests, but ordinary language in-
cludes many verbs that can be used to talk about acts that are literally and directly performable 
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with imperatives. There is very little agreement about the most perspicuous and explanatorily 
fruitful way of classifying illocutionary acts into categories, and I won’t attempt a comprehensive 
scheme here, but here are a few example sentences together with the types of directive acts that we 
might characteristically perform with them:7
()  a.  Have a cookie! suggestion/permission
 b.  Have a nice day!/Drop dead! wish/curse
 c. Take the number  bus. advice
 d. Leave your name at the tone. instruction
 e.  Don’t eat before you swim! warning
 f.  Go ahead, use heroin (and see what happens)! malefactive/dare
 g. Go ahead, eat my lunch.  concession
 h. Don’t sit down prohibition
 i. Sit down! command
 j. Please sign this form. request
It is crucial that we are not mislead by examples like these into thinking that something about the 
meanings of sentences like (a–i) encodes the speciﬁc illocutionary forces listed with them. In 
the right circumstances and with the right tones of voice, most of the sentences on the left could 
be used to perform speech acts of most of the types listed on the right. The type of illocutionary 
force listed to the right of each example sentence merely labels a reading of the sentence that we 
are likely to jump to when encountering the sentence in isolation. This point is somewhat compli-
cated by the presence of expressions like ‘go ahead’ in (f) and (g) and ‘please’ in (j), which 
clearly push us, in virtue of their meanings, toward particular ways of interpreting the sentences. 
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7 Some of these examples are borrowed from Starr (ms: §.). I don’t think all of the kinds of illo-
cutionary acts he mentions there are really directives, however; some (such as what he calls “pas-
sive advertisements”, as in, ‘win a cruise to Jamaica’) are best understood as kinds of indirect di-
rective acts (see §..). 
But we should recognize two important points with respect to expressions like these, whose de 
facto function seems at least sometimes to involve indicating illocutionary force. First, it is possi-
ble to concede or dare without uttering ‘go ahead’ and to request without uttering ‘please’. In their 
force-indicating role, these expressions serve as linguistic substitutes for information that could 
otherwise be supplied extralinguistically. For example: if I utter ‘eat my lunch’ in a defeated tone 
while throwing my hands in the air, and immediately after my addressee has asked to eat my 
lunch, it will be obvious enough that I am conceding. Second, even when an expression that nor-
mally indicates a certain illocutionaty force is uttered, extra-linguistic facts may make it possible 
(and, in some cases, inevitable) that the speaker performs some other illocutionary act. For ex-
ample: if a police oﬃcer who has just pulled me over says, ‘please blow into this tube’, it will be 
clear to me, notwithstanding the oﬃcer’s odd gesture at politeness, that I am being given a com-
mand.
So one explanandum represented by examples like (a–o) consists of the fact that most im-
perative sentences can, in varying circumstances, be used to perform illocutionary acts with a va-
riety of diﬀerent forces. Semantics should contribute to an explanation of this open-endedness by 
assigning meanings to imperatives that help explain why they can be used in so many ways. On 
the other hand, all of the types of illocutionary force listed in () are species of a single genus: 
they are all types of directive force. So a semantics for imperatives should also explain why the 
open-endedness of imperative meaning has this particular limit.
Finally, we should recognize that this point generalizes in two ways.
(i) This kind of open-endedness-within-limits is also a feature of other clause-types. Declara-
tives can be used to perform assertions, suggestions, assurances, and so on. Our vocabulary for 
the acts we perform using interrogatives is less rich, but we may wish to distinguish between (for 
example) questioning, interrogating (Schiﬀer), begging for information, and wondering out loud. 
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It would therefore be nice if our explanation of the open-endedness of imperative meaning were 
part of a general theory of illocutionary underspeciﬁcation.
(ii) Illocutionary underspeciﬁcation resembles other kinds of semantic underspeciﬁcation, 
such as the kinds of underspeciﬁcation that are displayed by indexicals, demonstratives, quantiﬁer 
phrases, and so on. In all such cases, the meaning of a word, phrase, or clause underspeciﬁes some 
property of the speech acts that can literally and directly be performed with it. Indexicals’ mean-
ings underspecify the propositional contents that can be expressed with them. Clauses’ meanings 
underspecify the illocutionary acts that can be performed with them. It is therefore reasonable to 
expect that a fully general account would explain all of these kinds of underspeciﬁcation in simi-
lar ways.
3.1.5  Imperative Logic?
Now I reach the ﬁrst of two proposed explananda that deserve a more critical look than the pre-
vious four. This is the idea that imperative sentences can stand in consequence relations. This 
claim is common to many recent attempts to give a semantic theory of imperatives—particularly 
the emerging dynamic approaches that I will discuss in §.. The idea of imperative consequence 
is usually motivated by examples, such as these:
()  a.  Attack at dawn if the weather is ﬁne. 
 b.  The weather is ﬁne.
 c. So, attack at dawn! Parsons (: )
() a. Take out the trash and mow the lawn! 
 b. So, take out the trash! Charlow (: §.)
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It might be tempting to conclude from examples like these that imperatives are closed under the 
same consequence relation as declaratives—that, in other words, the following generalization 
holds: 
Simple Imperative Consequence
For any set of imperative sentences (closed under logical connectives) !Σ, and where ⊦Σ is a set of 
declarative sentences obtained by substituting a ‘⊦’ for each ‘!’ in every sentence in ⊦Σ, and for any 
sentence radical φ:  !Σ ⊨ !φ  iﬀ   ⊦Σ ⊨ ⊦φ.
But as both Charlow (: §.) and Starr (ms: §.) both stress, there are counterexamples to 
this principle. The counterexample both discuss most carefully is the imperative version of Ross’s 
paradox:
()  a. Post the letter! 
 ⊭ b. Post the letter or burn the letter!8
Charlow argues that although counterexamples to Simple Imperative Consequence like () 
shouldn’t dissuade us from attempting to give a logic of imperatives, they complicate the project 
by necessitating the development of a nonclassical imperative logic. Starr (ms) makes accounting 
for () one of the central explananda of his semantics, arguing that we should strive for both a 
univocal semantics for the connectives and a single consequence relation that applies to both im-
peratives and declaratives, and that attempting to account for counterexamples like () gives us 
good reason to adopt broadly revisionist, dynamic notions of both consequence and truth.
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8  It is worth noting that, while Starr represents the logical form of (b) as ⸢!φ and !ψ⸣, Charlow 
represents it as ⸢!(φ and ψ)⸣. So although both take the invalidity of () to be a counterexample to 
a precisiﬁcation of my Simple Imperative Consequence principle, in fact they have diﬀerent preci-
siﬁcations in mind, depending on how closure under logical connectives is understood when it 
comes to imperatives.
Rather than taking all of this at face value, I think it’s crucial to ask what an account of im-
perative consequence would be a theory of. What are we saying when we say that an imperative 
sentence can follow from another sentence, or vice versa? To put things in a more overtly meta-
physical regiseter: in virtue of what does a consequence relation between imperative sentences 
hold? In my view, the semanticists who appeal to intuitions about imperative consequence fail to 
adequately address these questions. Insofar as they do provide answers, or are committed to an-
swers, those answers often turn out to conﬂict, so that “imperative consequence” winds up pick-
ing out rather diﬀerent kinds of relations in the context of diﬀerent theories.9
Even before we get into the details of particular theories, there are excellent reasons to think 
that any consequence relation for imperatives will be revisionary, not just in the sense that it will 
be nonclassical, but also in the sense that its subject matter will be diﬀerent than the subject mat-
ter traditionally aimed at by logicians. Josh Parsons gives us a nice way of approaching this issue 
by pointing out that the idea of imperative consequence gives rise to the following inconsistent 
triad:
() (i) There are non-trivially valid arguments containing imperatives.
 (ii) Imperatives are not truth-apt.
 (iii) Validity is truth-preservation.
Following Parsons, we can classify approaches to imperative consequence as type-, type-, or 
type-, depending on whether they reject (i), (ii), or (iii), respectively.
As we’ll see in §., several inﬂuential semantic approaches to imperatives claim, partly on 
grounds independent of consequence, that imperatives are truth-apt. This makes a type- theory 
of imperative consequence seem attractive, for the obivous reason that it would allow imperative 
consequence to be just the same sort of relation as classical consequence—namely, necessary 
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9 Charlow (ms) makes this point nicely in arguing for pluralism about both the subject matter and 
the mechanics of imperative consequence.
truth preservation, standardly formalized in possible worlds semantics by saying that the seman-
tic value ⟦σ⟧ of each sentence σ is a set of possible worlds, and that, for any set of sentences Σ = 
{φ,...,φn} and sentence ψ, Σ ⊨ ψ iﬀ  ∩(⟦φ⟧,...,⟦φn⟧) ⊆ ⟦ψ⟧. 
This way of thinking about consequence—even as it applies to declarative sentences—is in-
compatible with commitments I’ve already incurred in the last two chapters. Speciﬁcally: I don’t 
think that declarative natural language sentences are the right sorts of things to be the bearers of 
truth or the relata of consequence relation—only propositions and psychological states with 
propositional content are. But even if declaratives did stand in consequence relations, in the tradi-
tional sense of necessary truth preservation, there would still be signiﬁcant further obstacles to 
extending that account to imperatives. The most obvious obstacle to type- accounts is that of ex-
plaining away our strong intuitive sense that imperatives just aren’t the right sorts of things to be 
called true or false. Moreover, this sense can be backed up with reasons. As several philosophers 
have argued, there are foundational reasons to be suspicious of the idea that imperatives are in the 
business of being true or false. For one thing, we don’t use imperatives to make true or false 
claims, and so it’s hard to see why imperatives should have truth conditions, or how they got them 
(Charlow ; Parsons ). And, it’s not merely our fuzzy intuitions that need to be explained 
away; it also seems that truth cannot play its usual explanatory roles when it comes to impera-
tives:
It is not just manners or style that lead us to blanch when we are asked to ascribe truth or fal-
sity to an imperative. Such ascriptions are ungrammatical. How is an explanation of the in-
consistency of, say, !φ and ¡¬φ supposed to get going, if we cannot grammatically express the 
reductio assumption in our metalanguage?
??  Suppose it is true that go to your room and that you may stay up. Then...
What good are truth conditions for imperatives if they do not enable us to explain, in terms 
that are, at a minimum, intelligible to us, the things we are interested in explaining? (Charlow 
: §.)
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So it’s not enough for a type- account of imperative consequence to assign truth conditions to 
imperatives that vindicate all of our intuitions about imperatives standing in consequence rela-
tions; the account must also explain why imperatives have those truth conditions, why they don’t 
seem to have them, and why their truth conditions don’t seem to play some of the usual explana-
tory roles. 
Seemingly invalid arguments like (), which suggest that imperative consequence is not clas-
sical, also give us a reason to think that developing the technical aspects of a type- account 
would be diﬃcult. Seemingly, it would involve articulating a nonclassical consequence relation 
and explaining why that nonclassical notion of consequence applies to imperatives but not to de-
claratives. In practice, this has been a factor that has pushed theorists away from type- accounts 
and toward type- (or type-+) accounts, on which consequence does not boil down to truth 
preservation, or at least not when imperatives are involved.10 
Several type- theories have been oﬀered in the literature (see, e.g., Parsons ; Vranas 
, ). One way of going type- that will become signiﬁcant later is to adopt a dynamic the-
ory of consequence, according to which a theory of consequence is not about truth preservation 
(although some deﬁned notion of truth preservation may coincide with consequence in some 
cases). Rather, dynamic theories of consequence say that a sentence ψ follows from a series of sen-
tences φ,...,φn just in case updating a context with successful utterances of φ,...,φn (in order) 
would make a successful utterance of ψ in the newly-updated context redundant—i.e., just in case 
any context updated with φ,...,φn (in order) is a ﬁxed point for ψ. Formally: φ,...,φn ⊨ ψ iﬀ, for 
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10  For a persuasive summary of some of the factors that cause the search for a type- theory to 
collapse into a type- theory, see Parsons (, ). For some other arguments that we should 
think outside the box when it comes to the question of what a theory of imperative consequence 
would be a theory of, see Charlow (: §., fn.; ms).
any context C, C[φ],...,[φn][ψ] = C[φ],...,[φn].11  It should be clear that adopting a dynamic no-
tion of consequence forces a signiﬁcant departure from traditional theories, not only of the tech-
nical details of the consequence relation, but also of the nature of logic itself. So, although various 
independent motivations for dynamic semantic and dynamic logic have been articulated,12  any 
particular such motivation is not to be taken lightly, and it is therefore worth exploring all other 
options before a massively revisionary conception of both the nature and content of the conse-
quence relation is adopted. Moreover, as I will argue in §., dynamic semantic theories are prem-
ised on misguided theories of communication. 
Both type- and type- theories start from the assumption that declarative sentences stand in 
consequence relations, and attempt to show how these relations can be extended to imperative 
sentences as well. My view is that propositions are the relata of consequence, and that natural lan-
guage sentences do not stand in consequence relations, even indirectly by expressing propositions 
relative to contexts. On my view, our intuitions about consequence, which may seem to be 
prompted by collections of delcarative sentences, are actually prompted by the propositions that 
we easily and involuntarily imagine speakers asserting with those sentences. Given these views, it 
should come as no surprise that I don’t think that imperative sentences stand in consequence rela-
tions either. In other words, I hold a type- theory of “imperative consequence”—a theory on 
which there is no such thing.
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11  This notation, which is adopted by Starr (ms), is due to Veltman (). I will explain it in 
greater detail below. The basic idea is that [φ] is the context change potential (CCP) of a sentence 
φ, where a CCP is a function mapping contexts into contexts, and C[φ] is the result of applying 
[φ] to a context C. As Veltman explains, his reason for adopting the postﬁx notation is that it 
makes it easier to represent the result of applying a series of CCPs to a single context, as in the 
example in the text.
12  An inﬂuential recent defense of dynamic consequence is van Benthem (). For formally 
precise criteria of when dynamic semantics and dynamic consequence are required, see 
Rothschild and Yalcin (ms) and Bonnay and Westerståhl (ms).
Type- theories incur the burden of explaining why imperatives have truth conditions but 
seem not to, as well as the burden of specifying and motivating an imperative consequence rela-
tion that deviates from classical logic. Type- theories also incur the latter burden, as well as the 
foundational burden of motivating a substantial paradigm shift away from a tried-and-tested view 
about the nature of consequence and the subject matter of logic. Going type- incurs none of 
these burdens. Since the only reasons for believing in imperative consequence are our intuitions 
that there are valid arguments whose premises or conclusions contain imperative clauses, the only 
explanatory burden incurred by type- theories is to show why these intuitions are misguided. I 
will articulate my own type- theory, as well as my explanation of the intuitions that give rise to 
the notion of imperative consequence, in §... 
3.1.6  Imperative–Modal Connections?
Another purported datum about which I am suspicious is the idea that the meanings of impera-
tives are in some way intimately related to the meanings of deontic modals. The most extreme 
form of this idea is manifested in theories that take the meaning of an imperative clause !φ to be 
identical to that of a modal clause □φ, with ‘□’ expressing deontic necessity (e.g., Aloni ; 
Han ; Lewis b; Kaufmann and Schwager ; Schwager a,b). Other theories posit 
weaker, but still quite prominent, relationships between the semantics of imperative sentences 
and their corresponding modal sentences (e.g., Charlow ; Portner ; Starr ms). I will dis-
cuss these idea in §. and §.. For now, I want to consider the data that has led some theorists 
to posit these semantically-relevant relationships between imperatives and modals in the ﬁrst 
place.
One source of support for an imperative–modal connection arises from the fact that argu-
ments involving deontic modals exhibit some of the same peculiarities as arguments involving 
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imperatives. As originally noted by Ross (, ), and as remarked upon by many contempo-
rary semanticists (Charlow : §.; Starr ms: .), () is strikingly reminiscient of ():
()  a. Post the letter! 
 ⊭ b. Post the letter or burn the letter!
()  a. You ought to post the letter. 
 ⊭ b. You ought to post or burn the letter.
Before drawing any sweeping conclusions from this single datapoint, however, it is a good idea to 
recognize it as an instance of a broader pattern.
()  a. You intend to post the letter. 
 ⊭ b. You intend to post or burn the letter.
()  a. You desire to post the letter. 
 ⊭ b. You desire to post or burn the letter.
()  a. You fear posting the letter. 
 ⊭ b. You fear posting or burning the letter.
()  a. You have reason to post the letter. 
 ⊭ b. You have reason to post or burn the letter.
()  a. Posting the letter is the thing to do. 
 ⊭ b. Posting or burning the letter is the thing to do.
The following generalization is plausible: taking ‘☺’ to schematize either the imperative mood-
marker, a deontic modal expression, or operators that express normative, connative, or otherwise 
action-guiding states about some agent:
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()  a. ☺φ 
 ⊭ b. ☺(φ or ψ)
Whereas many approaches to imperative meaning make hay of the similarity of () and (), the 
theory I will present in §. places greater emphasis on the relationship between () and (), in 
that it grounds the performance of directive speech acts in the intention to produce intentions, 
and in that it traces the etiology of our intuitions about “imperative inference” back to our sensi-
tivity to the norms governing the rationality of jointly-held intentions. Might there be a way to 
bring our explanations of () and ()–() under the same explanatory roof? One plausible op-
tion for how to do this would be to hold that the semantic function of all of the operators schema-
tized by ‘☺’ is to aﬀect one’s interlocutors’ noncognitive, action-guiding attitudes. This is part of 
the agenda of contemporary expressivism.13  It would go beyond the intended scope of this chap-
ter to discuss or evaluate expressivism in any detail. Suﬃce it to say that my own account of the 
semantics and pragmatics of imperatives—but not necessarily modals or moral language—could 
be construed as expressivist in something like the contemporary sense, since I ground the per-
formance of directive speech acts (and therefore the semantics of imperatives) in the intention to 
produce action-guiding mental states—speciﬁcally, intentions—in one’s addressee. Of course, if 
this makes me an expressivist, it also makes Grice, Strawson, and Schiﬀer expressivists.
Perhaps the most intuitive source of support for an imperative–modal connection is the idea 
that the act of telling someone to do something can sometimes constitute a reason why they 
ought to do it. Portner defends a broad generalization of this idea, arguing that part of the pur-
pose of uttering an imperative !φ in a world w is to update the ordering source g relative to which 
deontic modals are interpreted, such that if g* is the updated ordering source, g*(w) = g(w)∪{⟦φ⟧}. 
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13 See, for example, Blackburn (), Gibbard (, ).
Some of the predictions of this view seem right. For example, it nicely explains the felicity of the 
following snippet of discourse:
() a.  A: Go present this proposal to our bankers today! 
 b.  B: I should take the  a.m. ﬂight to New York then. (Portner : )
But there are plenty of uses of imperatives that seem recalcitrant here. For example, Portner’s ac-
count makes the wrong prediction about ():
()  a.  A: Have some tea! 
 ? b.  B: I should boil some water then.
The problem with () seems to be that it would be most natural to use (a) to invite or permit 
someone to have some tea, and it follows from an accepted invitation or permission only that one 
may do what one has been invited to do, not that one should do it. Another of Portner’s theory’s 
strange predictions happens to feature in an argument he gives against a Gricean account of the 
kind I will defend here.
One might think that we should simply assign imperatives a general directive interpretation, 
and allow the subvarieties to emerge from pragmatic reasoning of the communicative-
intentional sort. That is, the speaker counts on the addressee to be able to determine his/her 
intention in uttering an imperative, and this will involve ﬁguring out what subvariety of direc-
tive force must be intended. While this type of Gricean reasoning certainly plays a role, it 
cannot be the whole story. A key piece of evidence for this point concerns the ‘‘psycho boss’’. 
You’re being sent out of town to a meeting, and your boss says:
[] Be there at least two hours early.
By itself, [] can be taken as an order, and if your boss is that kind, you might well under-
stand it that way. Next the boss says:
[] Then, have a bite to eat.
If [] was taken as an order, [] is bizarre. You have to take it as an order too, and your boss 
must be crazy to order you around at that level of detail. Of course it makes sense to interpret 
[] as a suggestion, but then you have to interpret [] as a suggestion too. Why can’t [] be 
understood as an order and [] as a suggestion? You might think it’s just socially impossible 
to switch from being the ordering-boss to being the suggesting-boss so abruptly, but a parallel 
sequence with overt operators wouldn’t be odd in the same way as []–[]:
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[] a. You are ordered to be there at least two hours early. 
 b. Then, I suggest you have a bite to eat. (Portner : )
For reasons I needn’t fully articulate, but which are intimately related to Portner’s account of “the 
connections between the semantics of imperatives and the semantics of modals” (: ), his 
account predicts that we can’t go back and forth between diﬀerent kinds of directive speech acts 
willy nilly. Portner thinks that a Gricean theory along the lines of the one I will propose below 
makes the opposite prediction. (I’m not so sure that it makes any such prediction, but never-
mind.) In the quoted passage, Portner claims that the data bears his prediction out. I emphatically 
disagree, and, indeed, I think that Portner’s objection to a Gricean account works better as an ob-
jection to his own account. There is nothing bizarre about the same speaker following an order/
command with a suggestion. Indeed, Portner’s examples ()–() and () strike me as perfectly 
natural, and I fail to see why Portner thinks otherwise. 
In short, I think that the idea of an imperative–modal connection is considerably overblown, 
and that the degree to which many contemporary theories are designed to accommodate it is not 
among their strengths. Of course, there is an obvious sense in which diﬀerent kinds of impera-
tives and modals are connected, but the Gricean theory I will oﬀer here can account for that. I 
will argue that imperatives are used to perform directive speech acts, and that particular forms of 
directive speech acts are individuated in terms of the reasons on the basis of which their speaker 
intends her addressee to follow her directions. In addressing to you a commanding that p, I in-
tend to bring about your intention to bring about p on the basis of my authority to require you 
bring about p. If I really do have this authority, then there is an obvious sense in which you should 
then intend to bring about p—namely, you should do p because I told you to. Likewise, if I advise 
you to bring about p, I intend you to recognize that p is in your interest. If p really is in your inter-
est, then you should do p because it is in your interest. But I needn’t really have authority in order 
to command you to do something, and p needn’t really be in your interest in order for me to ad-
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vise you to make p the case, and a theory of imperatives should also recognize this as well. This 
point bears emphasizing: suppose that I utter ‘take the number  bus’, thereby giving you bad ad-
vice—suppose, for example that taking the number  bus would be in your interest, but taking the 
number  bus wouldn’t. And suppose that you accept my advice. The sentence ‘you should take 
the number  bus’ does not become true, even if we interpret the deontic modal ‘should’ relative 
to a teleological ordering source. The imperative–modal connection is therefore a weak one that 
depends not only on the content of a speaker’s intentions, but, at least in some cases, on their apt-
ness. We shouldn’t try to account for this sort of imperative-modal connection using the tools of 
semantics.
3.2  Act-Theoretic Semantics for Mood, Part 1
Now that we have a better idea of what a good theory of the semantics and pragmatics of impera-
tives should look like, I want to begin arguing that a speech act-theoretic semantics built on the 
foundation of a Gricean theory of communication is what we need. I won’t ﬁnish articulating the 
theory until §., but I will lay out the basics here.
3.2.1  A Speech Act-Theoretic Semantics for Imperatives
The speech-act-theoretic account of clause types that I will oﬀer here is built on top of the Gri-
cean account of communicative illocutionary acts that I outlined in §.. The basic idea behind 
the theory is that the diﬀerent clause-types are used to perform diﬀerent types of illocutionary 
acts: we perform assertives with declaratives, directives with imperatives, and questions with in-
terrogatives. What’s novel to my theory is how this platitudinous-seeming idea is ﬂeshed out 
within the semantic framework that I began to outline at the end of Chapter Two. 
I begin with the stipulation that the component of the compositional semantic theory that I 
began to outline at the end of Chapter Two is actually a fragment that deals only with the seman-
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tics of sentence radicals. Taking φ as a schematic variable ranging over sentence radicals, we add 
the following three compositional principles to our semantics:
Declarative Composition [S ⊦φ]
S’s semantic value is a type that is tokenable by an assertive act whose content could be ex-
pressed by tokening the semantic value of φ .
Imperative Composition [S !φ]
S’s semantic value is a type that is tokenable by a directive act whose content could be expressed 
by tokening the semantic value of φ .
Polar Interrogative Composition [S ?φ]
S’s semantic value is a type that is tokenable by an act of asking-whether whose content could be 
expressed by tokening the semantic value of φ .
This ﬁrst draft will come in for signiﬁcant revision in §., but the main ideas of the view are al-
ready intact here, and it is already easy to see how this account satisﬁes most of the criteria out-
lined in §.. By assigning them diﬀerent types of illocutionary acts as their semantic values, I 
both explain how and in what way the three clause-types diﬀer in meaning (§..) and I explain 
how this diﬀerence in meaning is connected to a diﬀerence in use (§..). At the end of Chapter 
Two, I argued that it makes sense to think of the semantic value of an expression as a constraint 
on the kinds of communicative intentions that a speaker can have in uttering it, and that, as Gri-
ceans, we can represent these constraints as types of speech acts. The semantics for clause-types 
that I’ve just sketched ﬁts nicely into this picture. The semantic value of a sentence is a type that 
can be tokened by performing a certain range of illocutionary acts.14  The meaning of the clause’s 
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14 As I said in Chapter Two, my use of ‘can’ in this sentence is sloppy and under-developed. I will 
replace it with a fuller account of the metasemantic relation borne by expressions to their seman-
tic values in Chapter Five.
sentence radical constrains the act of expressing a proposition that can be performed in uttering 
the clause (in a way that is compositionally determined in accordance with the kinds of principles 
outlined in Chapter Two), and the meaning of the clause’s mood-marker constrains the force of 
acts that can be tokened in uttering it.
The account of underspeciﬁcation that I defended in Chapter Two also yields a parsimonious 
explanation of the fact that the meaning of each clause-type underspeciﬁes the particular types of 
illocutionary act that are performable with sentences of that type (§..). In Chapter Two, I ar-
gued that the semantic values of semantically underspeciﬁed expressions are act-types that are 
individuated more broadly than are the act-types serving as the semantic values of other expres-
sions. For example: whereas the semantic value of ‘loves’ may be tokened only by referring to the 
love relation, the semantic value of ‘he’ may be tokened by referring to any male. In the same vein, 
the semantic value of an imperative sentence ⸢!φ⸣ is a type that can be tokened by any directive 
act—including a command, a request, an invitation, etc.—whose content can be expressed by to-
kening the semantic value of ⸢φ⸣. Of course, not every situation lends itself to every kind of direc-
tive act, just as not every situation lends itself to referring to any male. Aside from the constraints 
imposed by the meanings of the expressions we utter, other constraints on how we can reasonably 
intend to aﬀect our addressees are imposed by a potentially limitless (or, at least, impossible to 
spell out in advance) array of features of the situation in which we speak.
3.2.2  Intuitions about “Imperative Consequence”
In §.., I pointed out that one source of data that has animated the semantic literature on im-
peratives is the intuitive sense that there are some valid arguments whose premises or conclusions 
contain imperative clauses. Since most semanticists  take their job description to include the pre-
diction and explanation of how consequence plays out in the languages they study, data about 
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imperative consequence naturally seem to fall within the explanatory scope of a semantic treat-
ment of imperatives. I argued that there are three ways of handling this intuitive data: 
type- theories reject the idea that imperatives stand in a genuine consequence relations, and 
incur the burden of explaining away our intuitions that they do.
type- theories accept imperative consequence, hang onto the idea that consequence is truth 
preservation, and incur the burdens of (a) explaining how and why imperative sentences are 
truth-apt depsite seeming not to be, and (b) articulating and motibating a nonclassical logic of 
imperatives.
type- theories accept imperative consequence, take our intuitions that imperative are not 
truth-apt at face value, and incur the burdens of (a) motivating a move away from the idea 
that consequence is truth preservation, and (b) articulating and motibating a nonclassical 
logic of imperatives.
Most of the recent literature on imperatives has revolved around type- and type- theories. In 
§.., I began to advocate a type- approach on which our apparent intutions about sentences 
standing in consequence relations are actually intuitions about the properties of speech acts that 
we reﬂexively take the sentences to be evidence of. I am now in a better position to spell out the 
details of that account.
In performing a directive speech act, one intends to bring about certain intentions in an ad-
dressee. Possession of any given intention rationally commits an agent to having certain other in-
tentions and rationally prohibits her from having still others. For example: intending to buy Ol-
iver and Rachel drinks rationally commits me to possessing an intention of buying Oliver a drink, 
and also rationally prohibits me from intending to avoid buying Rachel a drink. Our sensitivity to 
these facts about the norms governing rational intention possession are the ultimate source of our 
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intuitions about apparent instances of imperative consequence. Consider the intuition that () is 
a valid argument, for example:
() a. Take out the trash and mow the lawn! 
 b. So, take out the trash!
The explanation is easiest to grok if we label the following four intentions:
(i) The intention to take out the trash and mow the lawn.
(i) The intention to produce (i) in an addressee A.
(i) The intention to take out the trash.
(i) The intention to bring about (i) in A.
In addressing a literal and direct speech act to A in uttering (a), a speaker S would normally 
possess (i), and so intends to bring about (i) in A.15  Possession of (i) would rationally commit 
A to also possess (i). I assume the following general principle: 
Constraint Principle (CP)
If being in mental state x rationally commits one to being in mental state y, then intending to 
produce x in an agent rationally commits one to intending to produce y in the same agent.
It follows that intending to produce (i) in A rationally commits S to intending to produce (i) in 
A. But this is just to say that S’s possession of (i) rationally commits S to possessing (i) as well. 
And (i) is an intention that S would typically have in performing a literal and direct speech act 
with (b). So, any speaker with intentions of the type that uttering (a) typically signals is ra-
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15  This is somewhat misleading, since ‘the trash’ and ‘the lawn’ are incomlete descriptions that 
could be intended to pick out diﬀerent trash and diﬀerent lawns on diﬀerent occasions of use. I 
will ignore this detail for simplicity. This example also glosses over problems about embedded 
imperatives that I will return to in §.. and §..
tionally committed to having intentions of the type that (b) typically signals. This sort of fact is 
what our intuitions about “imperative consequence” track.
In this respect, these intuitions are much the same as the ones that give rise to the idea that 
declarative sentences stand in consequence relations. The meaning of ‘Paul plays bass and Ringo 
drums’ is such that someone who performs a literal and direct assertion with it must intend an 
addressee to to believe that Paul plays bass and Ringo drums.16  But, assuming that the principles 
governing what it is rational to believe validate conjunction elimination, anyone who believes that 
Paul plays bass and Ringo drums is also rationally committed to believing that Paul plays bass. It 
follows by (CP) that anyone who performs an assertion with a conjunction has intentions that 
rationally commit them to the intentions that would be involved in performing assertions with 
each of the conjuncts.17  In this way, our intuitions that declarative sentences stand in consequence 
relations will mirror our sensitivity to the norms governing rational belief possession, which are, 
plausibly, imposed (at least in part) by the consequence relation governing beliefs’ propositional 
contents.
Couldn’t we deﬁne consequence in the following way? For a set of sentences Σ = {φ,...,φn} and 
sentence ψ, Σ ⊨ ψ iﬀ possessing the intentions required to performing literal and direct speech 
acts with all of φ,...,φn rationally commits one to possessing the intentions required in perform-
ing a literal and direct speech act with ψ. There is a good reason not to draw this conclusion. 
Namely: sentences’ meanings underspecify the intentions involved in performing a literal and di-
rect speech act with them; they thus constrain our communicative intentions in ways that are 
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16 Again, this description glosses over several potential sources of semantic underspeciﬁcation in 
the sentence arising from both proper names (which Paul and which Ringo?) and generics (how 
much and in what way do they have to play bass and drum in order for the proposition to be 
true?). 
17 Does this mean that anyone who asserts p also asserts all of the logical consequences of p? No: 
being rationally committed to intending q is not the same thing as intending q. Moreover, we may 
want to delimit rational commitment to some subset of the logical consequences of our belief-
s—say, just the ones that are obvious in some sense. All of this is consistent with my points here. 
much weaker than might initially seem to be the case. For example: once we face up to the reality 
of semantic underspeciﬁcation, the following three inferences are invalidated by the proposed cri-
terion:
() a. Take out the trash and mow the lawn! 
 b. So, take out the trash!
() a. Elmars shark bit me and drew blood. 
 b. So, Elmar’s shark bit me.
() a. One plus one equals two. 
 b. So, one plus one equals two.
By the proposed criterion, (b) doesn’t follow from (a) because ‘the trash’ underspeciﬁes the 
intentions that would determine which trash is being talked about, and so, one could produce lit-
eral and direct utterances of (a) and (b), tokening their respective semantic values, such that 
one’s intentions in uttering the former do not rationally commit one to having the intentions one 
might have in uttering the latter. Likewise in the case of the possessive ‘Elmar’s shark’ in (), 
which could be used to pick out diﬀerent relations between Elmar and a shark depending on the 
intentions with which it is uttered. In both cases, it is only if we imagine these (and other) inten-
tions to be held ﬁxed that the criterion proposed above predicts that () and () are valid ar-
guments. But this is just to say that it is not the norms governing () and () themselves that 
our intuitions track, but the norms governing particular speech acts that we reﬂexively imagine 
() and () to be evidence of. Our intuitions seem to be about the sentences themselves only 
because we involuntarily ﬁll in a back story that holds a speaker’s referential intentions constant in 
an intuitive way across the sentences, thereby treating them as evidence of particular speech 
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acts.18  Given the theory of illocutionary force proposed in §. and the account of illocutionary 
underspeciﬁcation proposed in §.., the proposed criterion of validity also invalidates (). This 
is because (a) could be used to perform a suggestion and (b) could be used to perform an 
assertion. According the account I gave earlier—(GI) in §.—suggesting that p involves intend-
ing merely to bring about an act of considering whether p, and having this intention does not ra-
tionally commit an agent to also possessing an intention to bring about belief that p. Even more 
broadly: there is nothing written into the meanings of any of the sentences above that guarantees 
that they be addressed to the same agent, and this is another form of constancy that we must as-
sume in order for the kind of consequence I’ve just spelled out to make sense. I therefore con-
clude that our intuitions about sentences standing in consequence relations issue, quite generally, 
from our tendency to see sentences as evidence of speech acts, and to make a variety of assump-
tions about the nature of those speech acts that are unwarranted on the basis of the meanings of 
the sentences alone.19
Aside from explaining away our intuitions about imperative consequence, the type- account 
I have oﬀered also has several other virtues. One is that it explains the apparent invalidity of (), 
which is a motivation for Starr’s dynamic account of consequence.
()  a. Post the letter! 
 ⊭ b. Post the letter or burn the letter!
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18 It is this artiﬁcial constancy of referential intentions that indexical logics attempt to mimic. But, 
as I argued in Chapter Two, those logics are highly misleading for this very reason.
19  Does this position threaten the whole enterprise of formal logic? No! Logics are built around 
formal languages that lack mood, semantically underspeciﬁed expressions, and other features that 
prevent natural language sentences from being mapped directly onto propositions. The sentences 
of intepreted formal languages can therefore be treated as symbolic proxies for propositions in a 
way that natural language sentences cannot. Moreover, if we treat propositions as either sets of 
worlds or as structured entities, we can simply deﬁne consequence as a relation on the proposi-
tions themselves.
Someone who intends to post a letter is not rationally committed to intending to either post or 
burn the letter, and so intending to produce the former intention does not rationally commit one 
to intending to produce the latter.
So-called imperative inconsistency gets a similar explanation:
()  a. Buy me a drink!
 b. Don’t buy me a drink!
An agent who intends to buy me a drink is rationally prohibited from intending not to buy me a 
drink, and so, in intending to produce the former intention rationally prohibits me from intend-
ing to produce the latter intention in the same agent.
One nice feature of this account is that it can be marshalled to explain some other data that 
have interested contemporary semanticists, but which they typically don’t take to be a matter of 
logical consequence. For example, we can explain the infelicity of (), which Starr uses to moti-
vate his dynamic semantics.
()  a. Unicorns don’t, never have, and never will exist.
  ⋮
 # b. Bring me a unicorn!
The infelicity of uttering (b) after (a) results from the wider principle governing the interaction 
of beliefs and intentions that one can’t rationally intend to do something that is ruled out by one’s 
beliefs.20  If a speaker has asserted that unicorns don’t exist by uttering (a), then directing the 
same addressee to bring him a unicorn by uttering (b) would involve intending to bring about 
an intention that is incompatible with the belief intended earlier. But knowingly intending to 
bring about an irrational or impossible intention would itself be irrational or impossible. Moreo-
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20  For endorsements of various versions of this principle, see Bratman (), Donnellen (: 
), Grice (: ), and Neale (: §.).
ver, as I pointed out in §.., this is an instance of a phenomenon so general that it would not 
make sense to explain it semantically. Rather, the infelicity of () should be explained on the basis 
of constraint on the rationality or possibility of intention possession, given one’s other beliefs and 
intentions. This is the same kind of explanation that I have given for our intuitions about apparent 
instances of imperative consequence.
In appealing to the notions of rational commitment and rational prohibition, I needn’t settle 
on a particularly precise theory of those notions. Based on what I’ve said so far, my commitments 
paint at best a partial picture of what those notions entail, including at least the following princi-
ples: 
• Agents are rationally committed to believe propositions that are (obvious) logical consequences 
of the contents of their current beliefs, and rationally prohibited from believing propositions 
that are (obviously) logically contradicted by the contents of their current beliefs.
• Agents are rationally prohibitted from simultaneously intending two (obviously) contradictory 
propositions.
• Agents who intend p and q are rationally committed to intending p and to intending q.
• Agents whose beliefs rule out p are rationally prohibitted from intending p.
• Agents are rationally prohibited from intending to do something that they believe has already 
been done.
Each of these principles is plausible, independently motivated, and outstrips the explanatory pur-
view of semantic and pragmatic theory. There are various ways in which we might want to elabo-
rate and systematize them. For example, we might wish to generalize the ﬁrst principle by closing 
the contents of rational beliefs not only under logical entailment but also under a probabilistic 
extension thereof. Moreover, it may be possible to develop a much more general and systematic 
account of the relations that must obtain between intentions’ contents in order for agents to be 
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rationally committed to or prohibited from jointly possessing intentions.21 We might also wish to 
add further principles concerning desire, and perhaps also other intentional states. It is at least 
possible that we could cook up a formal system to model rational commitment and prohibition 
quite generally. Would this formal system be a logic? Not in the narrow sense in which I use the 
term—as a label for the theory of the consequence relation, which is narrowly a matter of truth 
preservation. Of course, there are well-attested, broader uses of ‘logic’, according to which a logic 
is any old formal system used to track relations between representations. And, to some extent, 
which of these uses of ‘logic’ we adopt is a verbal matter. All that matters for my purposes—and 
what makes my theory of imperative consequence a type- account—is that we recognize that a 
“logic” of rational commitment, if we’re even able to give one, will be a formal system of this 
broader kind, and won’t be a theory of truth preservation.
3.2.3  Making as if to Illocute
We sometimes utter imperative sentences without intending to produce an intention in anyone, 
just as we sometimes utter declarative sentences without intending to produce a belief in anyone. 
Utterances of these kinds may seem to be counterexamples to semantic theories, like the one I’ve 
constructed here, that understand the meaning of mood in terms of illocution, which is in turn 
understood in terms of communicative intentions. Several authors have claimed that these puta-
tive counterexamples are genuine counterexamples.22  Here are some of the cases used by Wilson 
and Sperber () in their argument:
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21 Much work in philosophy and artiﬁcial intelligence has gone into systematizing and formaliz-
ing the relations that must obtain between a rational agent’s beliefs and intentions—e.g. Bratman 
(, ), Broome (), Cohen and Levesque (a,b), Grice (), Setiya ().
22 E.g., Davidson (), Starr (forthcoming a), Wilson and Sperber ().
() a. Peter: I’m not going, but, hypthetically, how would one get to the station?
 b. Mary: Take a number  bus.
 —Mary doesn’t intend to get Peter to intend to take the bus.23
()  Go on, throw it. Just you dare.
 —The speaker doesn’t really intend for Peter to throw the snowball.
()  Get well soon. 
—Peter has no control over if/when he will get well, and so can’t intend to.
()  Start, damn you!
 —Mary utters this alone in her car to her car, which can’t have intentions.
()  Please don’t be late again.
 —Peter can’t hear Mary say this, and the result is predetermined.
The semantic value of each of (b)–() is a type of speech act that can be tokened only by di-
recting someone to bring about p, where this requires communicatively intending to produce an 
intention that p in that someone. Moreover, I have suggested that the role of a sentence’s semantic 
value is to constrain the speech acts that speakers can perform with the sentence. But, in the rele-
vant circumstances, each of (b)–() is uttered without intentions of the relevant kind. What 
gives?
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23  This is slightly diﬀerent from Wilson and Sperber’s example, in that it makes the hypothetical 
nature of Peter’s question. Wilson and Sperber argue that all or most acts of advising and permit-
ting with imperatives can’t be understood as “attempt[s] to get the hearer to perform the action 
described” because “there is no reason to think that [the speaker] cares whether [the hearer] fol-
lows her advice” (: –). In general, I think argument is ﬂawed—on par with saying that I 
don’t intend you to believe that I believe p in asserting p because I ultimately don’t care one way or 
the other. The mere fact that I have produced the utterance is good evidence that I care, at least a 
little bit. Moreover, there is nothing incoherent about communicatively intending to produce an 
eﬀect about which I have no preferences (perhaps beyond the most basic desire to be coopera-
tive).
The short answer is that the content and force of the illocutionary act a speaker peforms in 
producing an utterance—and the fact that she performs a speech act at all—are wholly consti-
tuted by the speaker’s intentions. Although a sentence’s meaning constrains those intentions by 
constraining how an addressee will normally interpret the speaker, the relevant kind of constraint 
is not binding.24  This is because there are other ways in which an addressee can work out a 
speaker’s intentions. A speaker can be sensitive to these other ways and exploit them in order to 
communicate non-literally. All of this should sound familiar to anyone who knows about Grice’s 
() theory of implicature or Searle’s () theory of indirect speech acts.25 
Notice that each of (b)–() could, in other circumstances, be used to perform directive 
speech acts that token the types that my theory identiﬁes with their semantic values. Mary could 
utter (b) in order to command or advise Paul to take the bus, for example, and she could utter 
() in order to rudely command her masseuse to begin massaging her feet. I reserve the notion 
of a literal speech act for cases of this kind, wherein the speech act performed by uttering an 
expression tokens the expression’s semantic value. The speech acts described by (b)–() do not 
count as literal by this deﬁnition. Instead, each of (b)–() describes an act of pretending to per-
form—or, to borrow Grice’s turn of phrase, making as if to perform—a directive illocutionary act 
in order to perform another, indirect act.
If I am right about this, then the question we should ask about cases like (b)–() is this: 
why would the speaker pretend to perform a directive speech act? What are they thereby trying 
(intending) to accomplish, and why would pretending to perform a directive act be a way to ac-
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24 This raises to salience the question of what I mean by ‘constrain’. I will replace this vague notion 
with something more precise in Chapter Five.
25  Searle focuses on cases of performing one illocutionary act indirectly by performing another 
one directly, and neglects cases in which we indirectly perform an act by pretending to perform 
another one. Grice rectiﬁes this with his discussion of making as if to say, but focuses his discus-
sion of implicature and the maxims of conversation narrowly on what amount to direct and indi-
rect assertive acts, neglecting indirect directive and interrogative acts.
complish that? The answers to these questions vary from case to case. In some cases, such as when 
acting in a play, pretending to perform a speech act may be an end in itself, or, insofar as it does 
serve some further goal (such as, for example, entertaining an audience), intending to accomplish 
this goal does not contstitute the performance a further illocutionary act. I am tempted to assimi-
late some audienceless utterances, including perhaps () and (), to this paradigm. In uttering 
() to her car, Mary makes as if to command her car to start, but unless her intentional stance is 
running wild (which, admittedly, is a possibility in the heat of the moment), she does not thereby 
intend to produce any sort of cognitive response in the car. And, unlike self-directed utterances 
like writing in one’s diary, where it is natural and unproblematic to construe the addressee of an 
illocutionary act as being one’s future self, this is not plausible in many cases of acting or talking 
to one’s car or under one’s breath. Why, if not to perform an illocutionary act, does Mary produce 
() and ()? A plausible answer, I think, is that she pretends to issue commands to her car and 
to Peter, respectively, in order to vent her feelings of frustration or powerlessness at them. Why 
would pretending to command something or someone be a way to vent one’s frustration at that 
thing or person? A plausible, if rough-hewn answer, is that to perform a command is to presup-
pose that one has a certain amount of power or authority over whatever one commands, and that 
pretending to have this power or authority feels good when one is powerless and frustrated. Ob-
viously, this explanation is folksy and incomplete, and to render it more satisfying would require 
saying more about the psychology of frustration. I am optimistic that the explanation could be 
ﬂeshed out in this way.
In other cases, we pretend to directly perform an illocutionary act in order to indirectly per-
form an illocutionary act of another kind. In Grice’s reference letter case, for example, a letter-
writer makes as if to say (i.e., pretends to directly assert) that a student is punctual and has good 
handwriting in order to implicate (i.e., indirectly assert) that the student is not a very good phi-
losopher (; : ). Examples of implicature typically focus on assertive acts—performing 
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or making as if to perform one such act in order to indirectly perform another—but this reﬂects 
only the limited interests of theorists rather than the limited scope of the phenomenon. We fre-
quently make as if to ask questions in order to request things other than information—for exam-
ple, by uttering, ‘Could you pass the salt?’ Likewise, we sometimes pretend perform assertive acts 
in order to perform directive acts—as, for example, when we say, ‘you left the light on’ in order to 
request that it be turned oﬀ.26  As (b) illustrates, we sometimes make as if to perform a directive 
act in order to perform an assertive one: Mary doesn’t intend to produce an intention in Peter to 
take the number  bus, but she does intend to produce a belief that taking the number  bus is a 
way that he could get to to the station. It’s tempting to interpret this as a run-of-the-mill quality 
implicature: Peter asked a question—he requested (true) information. A cooperative response 
from Mary would require that she provide that information, most likely by performing an asser-
tive act. Since directive acts aren’t aimed at providing information, and aren’t truth apt, to peform 
one would be to do something uncooperative. So, in seeming to perform one, she ﬂouts the 
maxim of quality,27  and the best explanation of why she did so is that she was intending to inform 
Peter that p was an answer to his question, rather than directing him to bring about p. 
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26 Searle argues that indirect directives are particularly common “because ordinary conversational 
requirements of politeness normally make it awkward to issue ﬂat imperative sentences (e.g., 
‘Leave the room’) or explicit performatives (e.g., ‘I order you to leave the room’), and we therefore 
seek to ﬁnd indirect means to our illocutionary ends (e.g. ‘I wonder if you would mind leaving 
the room’). In directives, politeness is the chief motivation for indirectness” (Searle a: ). 
Searle is undeniably right that the rudeness of a directive act can often be defrayed by performing 
it indirectly. It is far less clear why this might be.
27 Grice’s formulation of the maxims of conversation is designed only for occasions when provid-
ing information—i.e., performing an assertive speech act—is the way to make a cooperative con-
tribution to a conversation. This is most obvious in the case of the maxim of quality, which re-
quires making one’s contribution a true one that is supported by evidence (: ). Since some 
cooperative contributions to a conversation, including questions and directives, are not merely 
untrue but not apt to be true, the maxim as stated covers only certain kinds of contribution, per-
haps because it is a special case of a broader maxim of quality that governs questions and direc-
tives as well. Some revision may also be required for the maxim of quantity, since it is stated in 
terms of providing the right amount of information. I don’t attempt to articulate these revisions or 
generalizations here.
In the same vein, Mary should be understood as performing indirect speech acts with () 
and (). In uttering (), she makes as if to dare Peter to throw a snowball in order to indirectly 
command him not to. This is akin to an ironic assertion whereby a speaker makes as if to assert a 
proposition in order to indirectly assert the proposition’s negation.28 There are various things that 
Mary could be trying to do in uttering (), but one plausible candidate is that she is indirectly 
reporting her desire that Peter get well soon by making as if to request that he do so. Again, it 
makes sense that pretending to request would be a good way to report desire, because one of the 
intentions that constitutes a request that p is the intention to produce an intention that p, partly 
on the basis of the speaker’s desire that p. A request, in other words, is always in part the signaling 
of a desire; in the nonliteral and indirect case of (), that desire is all Mary communicates.
3.2.4  The Problem of Embedded Imperatives
The most serious potential roadblock for the Gricean, act-theoretic picture I’ve been advocating is 
raised by the fact that clauses—mood-markers and all—seem to embed within the scope of logi-
cal connectives. This is illustrated by ()–(), each of which contains at least one imperative 
clause embedded inside the scope of a connective.
(6) Buy me a drink and make it a stiﬀ one!        !φ and !ψ
(7) Buy me a drink or leave me alone!        !φ or !ψ
(8) If the bartender comes back, buy me a drink.        (if ⊦φ)(!ψ)
() a. Give me all your money or the puppy gets it.         !φ or ⊦ψ
 b. You mow the lawn or I’ll clean the garage (Starr ms: §.)
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28  Wilson and Sperber seem to suggest that dares are generally quasi-ironic in this way. But as 
most of my childhood friends could have told you, many dares are meant to be taken literally.
() a. Say that again and I’ll scream. !φ and ⊦ψ
 b. Stay here and I’ll go to the store.
(11) If he comes back, buy me a drink and I’ll pay you back. (if ⊦φ)(!ψ and ⊦σ)
Act-theoretic semantics aims to explain the meanings of declaratives and imperatives by saying 
that they can be used to perform assertive and directive speech acts, respectively. Sentences like 
()–() raise a serious problem for this view. One way of stating this problem is to note that each 
of ()–() contains more than one clause, but isn’t used to perform more than one illocutionary 
act. Moreover, () contains two imperative clauses, but, in uttering the sentence, one wouldn’t be 
performing a directive act that would token either clause’s semantic value. (The analogous point 
can be made about disjoined declaratives and assertion.) So the problem is this: if a clause’s mean-
ing is a matter of the speech act it is used to perform, how can we account for its semantic contri-
bution to sentences in which it is embedded, given that they aren’t used to perform the relevant 
kind of speech act?
We could avoid this problem if it were possible to treat all sentences, including ()–(), as 
consisting of a single mood-marker scoping over a (perhaps complex) sentence radical. In that 
case, most of compositional semantics would consist of a recursive speciﬁcation of the types of 
acts of expressing propositions that we can perform with sentence radicals, and the semantics of 
mood could be handled with a single composition rule for each mood-marker, along the lines 
presented in §..:
Imperative Composition [S !φ]
S’s semantic value is a type that is tokenable by a directive act whose content could be expressed 
by tokening the semantic value of φ .
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But, for reasons I discussed in §.., the prospects for this strategy aren’t good. Sentences like 
(b) and (b) seemingly can’t be reinterpreted as complex sentence radicals ﬂanked by a single 
mood-marker. Moreover, this problem ramiﬁes, because sentences like (b) and (b) can them-
selves be embedded inside the scope of logical operators and in the consequents of conditionals. 
This means that the kind of composition represented by ()–() is genuinely semantic and pro-
ductive, and it follows that our problem can’t be solved simply by specifying a handful of further 
speech act-types to serve as the semantic values of genuine, mixed-mood sentences. Rather, we 
need a way of recursively specifying the types of speech acts performable with complex, mixed-
mood sentences on the basis of speciﬁcations of the types of speech acts performable with their 
parts. This solution will also have to explain how the semantic value of a sentence can be a type of 
speech act even though we don’t perform a speech act of that type when uttering the sentence in a 
variety of embedded positions.
This is an instance of what is often called the Frege–Geach problem, which, in its various 
guises, has often been seen as devastating to views that cash out the semantic contributions of 
some expressions in terms of their speech act potentials.29  Below, I will argue that the problem has 
a solution that draws on distinctively Gricean resources. Because this solution also takes some 
inspiration from dynamic approaches to imperatives, which I discuss in §§.–., I will leave my 
discussion of it until §..
3.3  Content-Theoretic Accounts of Imperatives
The theory of mood that I began to outline in the last section is one way of articulating and ex-
panding upon idea that the semantic function of a sentence’s mood is to encode the force of the 
speech acts that can be literally and directly performed with the sentence. Other ways of working 
out the same idea can be found in the work of Hare () and Searle (, ). I think that 
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29 See, e.g., Dummett (: ch.), Geach (), Schroeder (), Starr (forthcoming a).
my way of ﬁlling out this idea is preferable to the alternatives for two reasons. First, it is built on 
the foundation of a Gricean speech act theory that is preferable to (e.g.) Searle’s () version of 
speech act theory for the reasons spelled out in §.. Second, the speech-act theoretic semantic 
framework in which my theory is framed is independently motivated (see Chapter One) and 
takes seriously the demands that a semantic theory be a ﬁnitely statable account of how sentence 
meanings are built up from word meanings (see Chapters Two and Six). These points notwith-
standing, I agree with the basic idea behind Hare’s and Searle’s view: that the meaning of mood 
should force us away from the idea of sentence meanings as truth conditions or propositions, and 
into the realm of speech act theory.
In this section, I want to consider three ways of resisting this basic idea by identifying the se-
mantic values of imperatives with semantic contents—truth conditions or propositions of some 
kind. Views of this kind are motivated by the astounding successes enjoyed by truth-conditional 
semantics over the last half century. As I suggested in Chapter Two, one could have been forgiven 
during much of this period for taking compositional semantics to be tantamount to either truth-
theoretic semantics in the style of Davidson, model-theoretic semantics in the style of Montague, 
or structured proposition-theoretic semantics of the kind defended by Soames (). The domi-
nance of these ideas, which were developed primarily with declarative sentences in mind, has led 
semanticists to attempt to account for non-declaratives within them as well. For Davidson (), 
this meant developing a version of the performative-reductionist analysis discussed in §... Al-
though Montague ignored nondeclaratives,30 Lewis () quickly developed the best-known ver-
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30 Given Montague’s brief career as a semanticist, this statement may not be entirely fair. But there 
is some textual evidence that Montague’s lack of engagement with nondeclaratives was not due to 
mere lack of time. Montague’s only allusion to mood comes in the context of his claim that the 
explanatory goals of syntax are entirely subordinate to those of semantics. Montague makes this 
claim after ﬁrst saying that syntax should be interested primarily in characterizing “the set of de-
clarative sentences” (b: , n.). Although it might be claimed that this passage is compati-
ble both declarative-reductionism and modal-reductionism, Montague’s claim here at least sug-
gests that he holds the even stronger view that non-declaratives fall outside the scope of semantic 
theory.
sion of performative-reductionism as an approach to non-declaratives within a broadly Montago-
vian framework, and went on to develop a version of modal-reductionism (Lewis b), which 
is the kind of theory I’ll discuss in §... In §.., I’ll discuss Hanks’ recent attempt to extend a 
structured proposition-theoretic semantic framework to non-declaratives by rethinking the na-
ture of propositions themselves. What all these account share is the idea that the core of a seman-
tic theory of imperatives should take the form of a theory of the special features of the semantic 
contents of imperatives.
3.3.1  Performative-Reductionism
Performative-reductionism, which was the earliest-to-develop content-theoretic approach to 
nondeclaratives, is so-called because its central idea is that either the logical forms or semantic 
values of sentences that look to be non-declarative on the surface are actually akin to those of de-
clarative, explicit performative sentences. For example, this sort of approach might try to construe 
(a) as having a logical form akin to that of (b):
()  a. Buy me a drink.
  b. I (hereby) direct that you buy me a drink.
Views of this general kind have been defended by a variety of authors,31  including David Lewis:
I propose that these non-declaratives ought to be treated as paraphrases of the corresponding 
performatives, having the same base structure, meaning, intension, and truth-value at an index 
or on an occasion. And I propose that there is no diﬀerence in kind between the meanings of 
these performatives and non-declaratives and the meanings of the ordinary declarative sen-
tences considered previously. (Lewis : ).
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31  See also Ross () and Cresswell (: ch.). Davidson () considers, but ultimately 
rejects, a closely-related proposal on which the logical form of a directive !φ is akin to that of the 
pair of sentences, ‘I (hereby) direct that. φ’. (This is an instance of Davidson’s broader paratactic 
theory of attitude reports and indirect speech—see Davidson ().) Most of the arguments 
against Lewis’s version of performative-reductionism also apply to Davidson’s version, and David-
son’s version also suﬀers from the more general ﬂaws of his paratactic theory of indirect speech 
(see, e.g., Burge ; Schiﬀer ; Starr forthcoming a: §..–...
Aside from reducing away those pesky non-declaratives, the big attraction of performative-
reductionism is that explicit performatives share many of the features of non-declaratives that 
demand explanation. For example, the explicit performative (b) can seemingly be used to per-
form the same range of speech acts as the imperative sentence (a).32  Most notably: explicit per-
formatives themselves seem not to be truth apt, thus mirroring one of biggest apparent road-
blocks to a truth-conditional analysis of nondeclaratives. In order to overcome this roadblock, 
Lewis claims that performatives, and so non-declaratives, really are truth apt, but that they seem 
to lack truth conditions for pragmatic reasons.
I would wish to say that ‘I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow’ is true on an occasion of ut-
terance iﬀ the utterer does then bet his audience sixpence that it will rain on the following day; 
and, if the occasion is normal in certain respects, the utterer does so bet; therefore his utter-
ance is true. Austin says it is obviously neither true nor false, apparently because to utter the 
sentence (in normal circumstances) is to bet. Granted; but why is that a reason to deny that the 
utterance is true? To utter ‘I am speaking’ is to speak, but it is also to speak the truth. This 
much can be said in Austin’s defense: the truth-values (and truth conditions, that is intensions) 
of performatives and their [non-declarative] paraphrases are easily ignored just because it is 
hard for a performative to be anything but true on an occasion of utterance. Hard but possible: 
you can be play-acting, practicing elocution, or impersonating an oﬃcer and say ‘I command 
that you be late’ falsely, that is, say it without thereby commanding your audience to be late. I 
claim that those are the very circumstances in which you could falsely say ‘Be late!’; otherwise 
it, like the performative, is truly uttered when and because it is uttered. It is no wonder if the 
truth conditions of sentences embedded in performatives and their non-declarative para-
phrases tend to eclipse the truth conditions of the performatives and non-declaratives them-
selves. (Lewis : )
However satisfying this explanation is when it comes to explicit performatives—and I ﬁnd it rela-
tively satisfying—the same line of thought is less convincing when applied directly to non-
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32 A frequent complaint against performative reductionism and its close relatives alleges that the 
approach cannot account for illocutionary underspeciﬁcation, since any way of ﬁlling in the blank 
in ⌜I (hereby) ____ that you φ⌝ will be too speciﬁc to cover the range of acts performable with 
any given mood (e.g., Davidson ; Starr forthcoming a). But once we recognize illocutionary 
underspeciﬁcation as a special case of semantic underspeciﬁcation more generally (see §..), we 
can say that whatever expression goes in the blank merely places loose constraints on which kinds 
of illocutionary act can be named with it. Thus my use of ‘direct’ rather than ‘command’ or ‘re-
quest’ in (b).
declaratives. When someone lacking authority utters, ‘I order you to leave the park,’ it makes 
sense to respond by saying, ‘False: you don’t have the authority to do that’, just as this response 
makes sense to a non-athoritative utterance of ‘I hereby place you under arrest’. But the same re-
sponse seems considerably more infelicitous following the imperative sentence, ‘Leave the park!’ 
So although Lewis does a nice job of explaining away the apparent non-truth-aptness of explicit 
performatives, his explanation seemingly does not transfer over to non-declaratives themselves. 
This is particularly problematic for Lewis and other performative-reductionists, who take per-
formatives to have semantic values identical to their non-declarative counterparts. 
Moreover, although non-declaratives and their corresponding explicit performatives (such as 
(a) and (b)) can be used to perform a similar range of illocutionary acts, their other semanti-
cally relevant properties don’t match. As Charlow (: §.) and Parsons () point out, non-
declaratives and their performative counterparts have intuitively very diﬀerent logical proﬁles. 
And as Starr (forthcoming a: §..) points out, they make diﬀerent semantic contributions to 
sentences in which they’re embedded.33  All of this suggests that non-declaratives cannot be re-
duced to performatives.
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33  A syntactically-loaded version of performative reductionism holds that nondeclaratives are 
grammatically very similar to performatives at some semantically relevant level of representation 
(Sadock ). For arguments that this idea gets the syntax of imperatives all wrong, see Han 
() and Starr (forthcoming a: §..). But, since both Han and Starr also defend the idea that 
mood can be factored out at the semantically relevant level of syntactic representation (see 
§..), it seems to me that their criticisms don’t rule out a version of performative reductionism 
on which mood markers have the semantic functions, if not the same syntactic structures, of ex-
plicit performative phrases. This syntactically un-loaded version seems to be all that Lewis had in 
mind in saying that non-declaratives “paraphrase” performatives.
3.3.2  Modal-Reductionism
A second proposal for reducing the meanings of imperatives to those of declaratives is modal-
reductionism, according to which imperative clauses have semantic values that are either identical 
or otherwise closely related to those of corresponding deontic modals, as in ().35
()  a. Buy me a drink.
  b. You [ought/must/should] buy me a drink.
It has frequently been noted that pairs of sentences like () can be used to perform a range of 
similar speech acts. It is typical to give a pragmatic explanation of this fact, according to which 
uttering a deontic modal of the form □φ is a somewhat standardized way of indirectly perform-
ing a directive illocutionary act that one might have performed directly with an imperative of the 
form !φ (Searle : –). Perhaps the most basic idea behind modal-reductionism is that this 
overcomplicates things, and that the right way to capture the close relationship between the use 
conditions of (a) and (b) is to say that they have the same semantic value.
The full-blown defenses of modal reductionism that have emerged over the past ﬁfteen years 
have leaned heavily on the sorts of considerations that I discussed with less than full enthusiasm 
in §.. (e.g. Han ; Kaufmann ). For example, several authors have noted argued that 
imperatives and deontic modals have similar logical proﬁles (e.g., Aloni ; Charlow : 
§.; Portner ). My response in §.. was that a wide variety of operators used to express 
action-guiding states have similar logical proﬁles, and so these intuitions about logical proﬁle do 
no more to establish an imperative-modal connection than they do to establish an imperative-
intention connection of the kind that I advocate. 
Another point sometimes marshalled in favor of modal-reductionism is that many kinds of 
directive illocutionary act correspond to diﬀerent ﬂavors of modal, where the ﬂavor of a modal is 
determined by the nature of its ordering source (e.g., Han ; Kaufmann : ch.; Portner 
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34 Some proponents of modal reductionism include Aloni (), Han (), Kaufmann (), 
and Lewis (b).
).35  To take just two of a variety of possible examples, the grounds on which one commands 
one’s addressee corresponds naturally to a deontic ordering source—which can be thought of as a 
function from worlds to sets of propositions about what one ought to do from the perspective of 
some authority or set of rules, and the grounds on which one advises one’s addressee correspond 
naturally to a teleological ordering source, which we can think of as a function from worlds to 
sets of propositions about an agent’s goals or interests.36 Given this pattern of correspondences, it 
becomes tempting to assimilate illocutionary underspeciﬁcation to the semantic underspeciﬁca-
tion exhibited by modals by adopting a form of modal reductionism on which diﬀerent types of 
directive speech act are simply modals interpreted relative to diﬀerent kinds of ordering sources 
(see, e.g., Kaufmann : chs.–). But again, this argument fails to achieve any interesting gen-
eralizations that aren’t already present in the speech act-theoretic semantics for imperatives that I 
outlined in §.. This is because every body of information that can serve as a modal base (at a 
world) can also serve as a reason on the basis of which a speaker can intend her addressee to 
adopt a certain intention—i.e., as a value for ρ in the illocutionary intention schema (GI) that I 
outlined in §.. 
(GI) Gricean Illocution
 S performs an illocutionary act α in uttering u iﬀ S utters u intending:
 () to produce thereby a certain response Δ in a certain addressee A;
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35 On Kratzer’s () treatment (see also Portner : §.), a modal □φ is evaluated relative to 
a world w, modal base f, and ordering source g, where f(w) and g(w) are sets of propositions, and 
such that □φ is true relative to w, f, and g iﬀ φ is true in the worlds in ∩f(w) that are ranked best 
according to g(w), where a world w is ranked at least as highly as w by g(w) iﬀ at least as many of 
the propositions in g(w) are true at w as are true at w. In short: an ordering source at a world 
determines which propositions are best at that world; in the context of a modal-reductionist 
analysis of imperatives, this amounts to specifying which of the addressee’s potentioal actions it 
would be best for her to perform, relative to a particular standard. 
36 There is much disagreement over how to carve up modal bases terminologically, but the details 
don’t matter much here. My usage corresponds roughly to Portner’s (). 
 () A to recognize S’s intention ();
() A’s response Δ to be at least partly on the basis of her recognition of () and (in 
some cases) partly on the basis of some further reason ρ.
Whereas the modal reductionist identiﬁes the source of directive underspeciﬁcation as the under-
speciﬁcation of an ordering source (at a world) g(w), I identify it as the underspeciﬁcation of a 
speaker’s intended reasons ρ for her addressee to form an intention Δ. For any given performance 
of a direct and literal directive act with an imperative sentence, the modal reductionist and I are 
(respectively) free to think that g and ρ will be ﬂeshed out such that g(w) = ρ. In other words: our 
theories make substantially similar predictions because we hold that the things we do with im-
peratives are underspeciﬁed by their meanings relative to substantially similar bodies of 
information.37
Kaufmann (: §..) argues for modal reductionism on the grounds that imperatives can 
be used to answer questions that deontic modals would provide direct answers to, as in ():
()  a. How should I get to the station?
  b. You should take the number  bus.
 c. Take the number  bus.
On its own, this is a very weak argument for the view that (b) and (c) have the same semantic 
value. After all: in nearly any circumstance in which it would be felicitous to ask a question by ut-
tering any of (a)–(h) (among many others), it would be felicitous to answer by uttering any of 
(a)–(h) (among many others).
()  a. How should I get to the station?
 b. How do I get to the station?
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37 One big diﬀerence between the two views is that the modal reductionist typically oﬀers no story 
about what determines which ordering source is relevant on a particular occasion, beyond vague 
hand waving at context. For criticisms of this sort of hand waving, see Chapter Two.
 c. How will I get to the station?
 d. How does one get to the station?
 e. I’m not going, but, hypothetically, how does one get to the station?
 f. Which way is it to the station?
 g. Which way to the station?
 h. Which bus goes to the station?
()  a. You should take the number  bus.
 b. The number  bus.
 c. The number  bus goes [there/to the station]..
 d. Take the number  bus.
 e. You could take the number  bus.
 f. I recommend taking the number  bus.
 g. I usually take the number  bus.
 h. Most people take the number  bus.
So, the fact that (b) and (c) are both good ways to answer (a) gives us no more reason to 
identify their semantic values than we have for identifying the semantic values of all of (a)–
(h). In general, since asking a question places very speciﬁc constraints on what would count as 
a cooperative response from one’s addressee, they create situations that are pregnant with the po-
tential for indirect speech acts. For this reason, it is reasonable to expect that of most of the above 
Q&A data should be explained by appealing to indirect speech acts of one kind or another (see 
§..; Grice ; Searle a). More generally, this fact about questions and their answers casts 
signiﬁcant doubts on most arguments for semantic theses—such as Kaufmann’s—that rely on data 
about which utterances constitute good answers to questions asked with particular sentences.
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In addition to being supported by only shaky evidence (some of which I haven’t reviewed 
here—see Kaufmann () for a comprehensive defense), modal-reductionism faces signiﬁcant 
challenges. One obvious challenge is that modals like (b) are obviously truth apt, whereas im-
peratives seemingly aren’t. Both van Rooy () and Kaufmann () attempt to navigate 
around this roadblock by drawing an analogy between imperatives and performative uses of mo-
dals. Intuitive examples of performatively used modals include the following sentences, uttered by 
an authority ﬁgure:
()  a. You should buy me a drink.
 b. You must show up on time for work.
As I’ve already pointed out, an obvious explanation of performative uses of modals is that they are 
just those utterances whereby one makes as if to assert a modal proposition in order to direct 
someone to bring about the modal’s prejacent. As Searle points out, this explanation locates per-
formative uses of modals within a broad pattern of other ways of indirectly performing directive 
speech acts—a pattern that, due to its broad linguistic diversity, is almost certainly best explained 
pragmatically (: –). Nevertheless, it has been tempting for semanticists to become ex-
cited by the following symmetry: a modal is used performatively if it is used to alter what is nec-
essary or possible rather than to assert that something is necessary or possible. This can be put in 
satisfyingly Kratzerian terms by saying that to use a necessity modal performatively is to use it to 
alter the modal base and/or ordering source so that it conforms to the prejacent, rather than to 
assert that the prejacent follows from the worlds in the modal base that are best with respect to 
the ordering source. Van Rooy () goes so far as to argue that this distinction between de-
scriptive and performative uses of modals is wholly semantic, and posits a lexical ambiguity to 
encapsulate this idea. If so, then perhaps imperatives are synonymous with performative modals 
only. Kaufmann (: §..) oﬀers a host of convincing arguments against this unpromising 
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line of thought, but goes on to argue that performative uses of modals can be isolated on the basis 
of a variety of pragmatic facts about the contexts in which they occur. A use of a modal □φ 
counts as performative, she argues, just in case it occurs in a context—here consisting of a Stal-
nakerian context set c, a modal base f, and an ordering source g—that meets the following 
conditions:38
AuthorityCondition
The speaker is an epistemic authority on f and g : for each w in the context set and any world w 
compatible with the speaker’s beliefs in w : f(w) =  f(wʹ′) and g(w) = g(wʹ′). (Kaufmann : 
§..)
Epistemic Uncertainty
Both φ and ¬φ are compatible with the speaker’s beliefs: for each w in the context set, there are 
wʹ′ and wʹ′ʹ′ compatible with the speaker’s beliefs in w: φ is true in wʹ′ and φ is false in wʹ′ʹ′. (Kauf-
mann : §..)
Ordering Source Restriction 
If there is a contextually salient decision problem to which □φ is an answer, then g is prioritizing 
(deontic, bouletic or teleological) and considered by speaker and addressee to be the criterion for 
resolving the decision problem. Otherwise, g is speaker-bouletic. (Kaufmann : §..)
I am doubtful that conditions on context like these represent the best way to distinguish perfor-
mative uses of modals from descriptive uses, but I won’t dwell on all of the sources of those 
doubts here. Kaufmann’s idea about imperatives is that since the above conditions set apart per-
formative uses, and since the disguised modals that we call imperatives can only be used perfor-
matively, we should take the imperative mood-marker to encode a semantically triggered presup-
position to the eﬀect that all of the above conditions are met, thereby assuring that imperatives 
(whose presuppositions are met) always function as performative modals in actual conversation. 
This is Kaufmann’s account of the meanings of imperatives.
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38  These helpfully clear glosses of Kaufmann’s conditions are borrowed from Starr (ms: §.), 
mainly because Kaufmann’s own formulations are framed in technical vocabulary and notation 
that would take a while to set out.
Needless to say, this is all very complicated, and there is reason to worry that the degree of 
complexity on display in Kaufmann’s account far outweighs its explanatory advantages. Starr ar-
ticulates this point nicely:
How simple and plausible is this addition to the semantics of imperatives? This presupposi-
tional content is of unparalleled richness that exceeds imperatives’ actual content. While the 
ﬁrst two presuppositions are reasonable things to expect from an exclusively performative mo-
dal, the third is a surprising and disjunctive presupposition. It is at least controversial that the 
addition of these presuppositions meets the standard of simplicity. (Starr ms: §.)
Starr goes on to articulate a series of other objections to Kaufmann’s account, mostly revolving 
around the fact that it does nothing that cannot be accomplished more perspicuously by other 
means. If it isn’t already obvious, I agree.39
3.3.3  Hanks contra the Content–Force Distinction
The semantic accounts of imperatives discussed in the last two subsections revolve around diﬀer-
ent versions of the idea that we should assign familiar propositional semantic contents to impera-
tives, and then add on a pragmatic explanation for why imperatives can be used to perform direc-
tive acts and seem not to be truth apt. Hanks (, ) defends the bolder proposal that we 
should reconceive of the nature of propositional content itself by building illocutionary force into 
propositions and collapsing the force–content distinction. On his theory, declarative, imperative, 
and interrogative sentences express propositions of fundamentally diﬀerent kinds, each of which 
is a type that can be tokened by the performance of diﬀerent kinds of mental acts or speech acts. 
Whereas declarative sentences express assertive propositions, which may be tokened by speech 
acts of asserting or mental acts of judging, interrogative sentences express interrogative proposi-
tions, which may be tokened by speech acts of asking and mental acts of wondering, and impera-
163
39  Other arguments against modal reductionism aboud. Hanks points out, for example, that we 
report utterances of modals and imperatives in diﬀerent ways, so that the following sentence is 
not contradictory: ‘Jones told smith that she ought to go to the store but did not tell Smith to go 
to the store’ (: ).
tive sentences express imperative propositions, which may be tokened by directive speech acts and 
mental acts or states of desiring, wishing, or intending (Hanks : ). Hanks argues that 
these distinct act-types are distinguished by the diﬀerent kinds of combinatory acts that unify 
their parts into a structured whole—predicating (or applying), asking, and wanting (or attempting), 
respectively. These combinatory acts that unify propositions, rather than any components  of 
propositions, are the semantic contributions of the suite of morphosyntactic features that com-
prise the declarative, interrogative, and imperative moods, respectively. Hanks (: ,) rep-
resents the propositional contents of clauses of diﬀerent types as follows:
()  a. George is clever.
 b. ⊦⟨George, CLEVER⟩
()  a. Is George clever?
 b. ?⟨George, CLEVER⟩
()  a. George, be clever!
 b. !⟨George, CLEVER⟩
In these representations, ‘⊦’, ‘?’, and ‘!’ aren’t grammatical mood-markers in the way I used them 
above. Rather, they represent the distinct varieties of combinatory act that uniﬁy the propositions 
(43b), (44b), and (45b), according to Hanks. 
Hanks’ account resembles my own in several respects. First, Hanks thinks that at least many 
expressions’ semantic values are types that may be tokened by speech acts. (His account diﬀers 
from mine in that these types may also be tokened by mental acts and states—a point I’ll return 
to.) I also agree with Hanks’ suggestion that the semantic values of clauses of diﬀerent types are 
types that may be tokened by illocutionary acts of diﬀerent kinds, and that the semantic contribu-
tion of a sentence’s mood is intimately related to the illocutionary force of the speech acts that can 
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be performed with it. As will become clear in Chapter Six, my speech act-theoretic semantic 
framework is similar to Hanks’ act-theoretic framework in certain other ways as well.
But Hanks’ views are also dissimilar from mine in several ways, all of which count, I think, in 
favor of my theory. I argued in Chapter Two, for example, that expressions’ semantic values 
should not be identiﬁed with the propositional contents that they are used to express on particu-
lar occassions. As we’ll see, one of Hanks’ arguments for his theory takes this dubious assumption 
about semantic content as a key premise. For closely related reasons, I also think Hanks makes a 
mistake in holding that the types that serve as sentences semantic values can be tokened by 
thoughts as well as speech acts. If a broadly Gricean theory of speech acts is correct, then illocu-
tionary acts are constituted by speakers’ audience-directed communicative intentions, and should 
be typed in terms of the kinds of intentions required to perform them. But this surely isn’t true of 
intentional psychological states such as ordinary beliefs and desires. Of course, Hanks presumably 
doesn’t accept a Gricean theory of speech acts, but he does not oﬀer an alternative theory of the 
metaphysics illocutionary acts or the mind–language interface, and I am doubtful that any such 
alternative could make sense of the idea that whatever it is that constitutes an act of asserting p is 
the same thing that constitutes an act of believing p.
Hanks gives several arguments for his theory. In two recent papers, he shows how his frame-
work allows for solutions to persistent puzzles about the semantics of proper names () and de 
se attitude ascriptions (). Even if we assume that these solutions are successful, however, they 
don’t give us a reason to prefer Hanks’ theory over a speech act-theoretic semantics like the one 
defended here, because Hanks’ solutions draw on a resource that is common to both ap-
proaches—namely, the possibility of individuating the act-type that serves as an expression’s se-
mantic value either more broadly or more narrowly than we individuate the contents expressed by 
uttering the expression on particular occasions (see Chapter Two for my use of this technique). 
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Hanks’ strongest positive argument in favor of his view revolves around embedded questions. 
He notes that most of the mainstream theories about the semantics of interrogatives hold that 
their semantic values are diﬀerent sorts of things than the semantic values of declaratives: whereas 
declaratives are normally held to express propositions, interrogatives are often held to express 
properties of propositions or sets of propositions (Hamblin ; Karttunen ; Groenendijk 
and Stokhof , ). This is problematic, says Hanks, because interrogative clauses can em-
bed in many of the same contexts as declarative that-clauses, whose semantic values are stan-
dardly taken to be propositions. Hanks uses knowledge ascriptions as his main example:
() (a) Jones knows that Smith is tall. 
 (b) Jones knows whether Smith is tall. (Hanks : )
As Hanks points out, (a) and (b) can diﬀer in truth value, and this must be due to some dif-
ference in the semantic values of declarative that-clauses and interrogative whether-clauses. Se-
manticists like those cited above attempt to account for this by saying that interrogative clauses 
have diﬀerent types of semantic values than declarative clauses, but this leads to the unwelcome 
consequence that ‘knows’ is ambiguous. Hanks gives two objections to positing this ambiguity: 
ﬁrst, doing so does nothing to explain the fact that both that- and whether-clauses can embed in 
certain other positions—e.g., ‘…depends on…’—and so it seems inevitable that positing an ambi-
guity to solve our problem with () will force us to posit various other ambiguities as well. Sec-
ond, that-clauses can be coordinated with whether-clauses in knowledge ascriptions, as in ():
() Jones knows that Smith is tall and whether Wilson is Married. (: )
Hanks concludes that the semantic values of declaratives and interrogatives must be the same 
type of thing (so that they can be coordinated), but diﬀerent ﬂavors of that type (so that (a) and 
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(b) can have diﬀerent truth conditions), and he argues that his theory of propositions best ex-
plains these data.
Although this argument is more compelling than Hanks’ other arguments for his view, and 
although it presents a serious challenge to the other available theories of embedded interrogatives, 
it remains inconclusive. One problem arises from the fact that whether-clauses (and wh-phrases) 
cannot embed in all positions where that-clauses can embed:
()  (a) Jones believes whether Smith is tall and whether.
  (b) Jones desires whether Smith is tall and whether.
  (c) Jones guesses whether Smith is tall and whether
An obvious explanation of the ungrammaticality of (a)–(c) would be that whether-clauses 
don’t have semantic values of the same kind as that-clauses. But, obviously, we can’t accept the 
soundness of both this argument and Hanks’ argument. Another prima facie roadblock to Hanks’ 
argument is the fact that diﬀerent attitude verbs can be coordinated with the same complement, 
as in ():
() Jones both hopes and believes that his favorite team will win.
According to Hanks, belief reports and hope reports express propositions that relate agents to 
fundamentally diﬀerent kinds of propositions: my beliefs relate me to assertive propositions and 
my hope relate me to imperative propositions. But we would have to do posit a substantial hidden 
grammatical structure in () to get a reading on which Jones’ belief that his favorite team will 
win and his hope that his favorite team will win relate him to two distinct propositions. The most 
natural thing to say about () is that it reports two diﬀerent relations that Jones bears to the same 
proposition—the force-neutral proposition that Jones’ favorite team will win.
167
Although these considerations do not refute Hanks’ argument, they do strongly suggest that 
the syntax and semantics of embedded interrogatives is much more complex than his arguments 
assume. As Groenendijk and Stokhof argue: “if one takes into consideration certain constructions 
involving interrogatives, a ﬂexible approach to the relationship between syntactic categories and 
semantic types may be of great help” (: ). Although I don’t have anything to say about the 
details, it is my suspicion that some of this ﬂexibility will need to be posited in order to account 
for ()–(), and that the result will undermine Hanks’ argument from ()–() to the conclu-
sion that declaratives, imperatives, and interrogatives express fundamentally diﬀerent kinds of 
propositions.
Another of Hanks’ arguments revolves around his claim that we must adopt an act-theoretic 
account of propositions in order to solve the problem of the unity of the proposition (: §). 
This is the problem of saying what it is in virtue of which a structured proposition is a representa-
tional unity greater than the mere collection of its parts. What, for example, distinguishes the 
proposition that Fred loves Mary from the proposition that Mary loves Fred? Assuming that 
propositions are structured entities, both of these propositions are made up of the same compo-
nents—namely, Mary, Fred, and the binary LOVE relation—and so we need an account of what 
uniﬁes these components in speciﬁc, diﬀerent ways in the diﬀerent propositions. Hanks argues 
that we must solve this problem by appealing to the combinatory acts—paradigmatically, the act 
of predicating—that speakers perform in speaking and thinking. It is these acts, says Hanks, that 
provide the compositional glue that holds propositions together. This idea is radical because it 
reverses the explanatory relationship that is normally held to obtain between intentional states 
and their propositional contents: whereas intentional states are normally held to represent things 
as being a certain way in virtue of having propositional content that represents things as being 
that way, Hanks maintains that intentional states and speech acts are the fundamental bearers of 
representational content and that propositions represent things as being a certain way in virtue of 
168
being types of intentional states and speech acts that represent things as being that way. In Hanks’ 
words, representations “are things that we produce in speaking and thinking about the world” 
(: ). 
Suppose that Hanks is right that the problem of the unity of the proposition forces us to un-
dertake this sweeping reconceptualization of the natures of representation, intentionality, and 
propositional content, and to identify propositions with types of complex acts. Does this give us a 
reason to adopt Hanks’ semantic account of mood? To see that it does not, we need only recog-
nize that Soames () has defended the same sweeping reconceptualization of the nature of 
representation, intentionality, and propositional content in response to the problem of the unity 
of the proposition, but has done so without collapsing the force–content distinction. On Soames’ 
view, propositions are types of force-neutral mental acts, and all such mental acts are uniﬁed by 
neutral acts of predication. Soames argues that performing any mental act or speech act with the 
proposition ⟨George, CLEVER⟩ as its content requires entertaining the proposition that George is 
clever, and that this is accomplished by predicating cleverness of George, thereby unifying George 
and cleverness into a representational whole. But he also argue that taking a speciﬁc mental atti-
tude, such as belief or desire, toward this proposition, or performing any particular illocutionary 
act whose content is the proposition, requires performing some further mental act or speech act, 
beyond the act of predicating that constitutes entertaining the proposition. So although Soames 
oﬀers essentially the same solution to the problem of the unity of the proposition as Hanks, he 
does so without collapsing the force–content distinction, and therefore without committing him-
self to anything like Hanks’ account of the meaning of mood.
Soames’ act-theoretic, but also force-neutral, solution to the problem of the unity of the 
proposition should lead us to question why Hanks’ theory works the way it does. For Hanks, 
combinatory acts like predication play two distinct roles simultaneously. First, they play the role 
of the glue that holds propositions together. Second, they play the role of distinguishing assertive, 
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interrogative, and directive speech acts (as well as those acts’ mental analogues). Soames shows us 
how to construct a theory that is broadly similar to Hanks’, but in which these two explanatory 
roles come apart. We should therefore ask: what are the costs and beneﬁts of collapsing the two 
roles? 
Hanks might respond that collapsing the two roles gives us substantial conceptual economy, 
but Hanks’ collapse also carries signiﬁcant disadvantages. To see why, we need to generalize the 
notion of a combinatory act in two ways. First, notice that although I don’t identify semantic val-
ues with propositional contents, I still need to say what distinguishes the semantic value of ‘Fred 
loves Mary’ from the semantic value of ‘Mary loves Fred’. In other words, any theory, such as my 
own, that takes semantic values to be non-propositional nonetheless incurs the problem of the 
unity of the semantic value. So, in talking about the problem of the unity of the semantic value, I 
can generalize over both my theory and Hanks’ theory. Second, notice that the problem of the 
unity of the semantic value aﬀects complex sub-sentential semantic values as well as the semantic 
values of whole sentences. Just as there is a problem of what uniﬁes the semantic value of the sen-
tence ‘Fred loves Mary’ and thereby distinguishes it from the semantic value of ‘Mary loves Fred’, 
there is a problem of what uniﬁes the semantic value of the complex VP ‘loves Fred more than 
Mary’ and thereby distinguishes it from the semantic value of ‘loves Mary more than Fred’. What-
ever we take the semantic values of ‘loves’, ‘Mary’, ‘Fred’, and ‘more than’ to be, we need some ac-
count of what uniﬁes them in two diﬀerent ways as the distinct semantic values of these two dif-
ferent VPs.40  A consequence is that whatever plays the role of unifying complex expressions’ se-
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40 I will return to this problem and oﬀer my solution in Chapter Six, where I argue that semantic 
values are uniﬁed by force-neutral combinatory acts like predication, and that the notion of 
predication must be generalized to include combinatory acts that unify complex subsentential 
semantic values. For example: we refer to the property of loving Mary by referring to Mary, refer-
ring to the loving relation, and predicating the latter of the former. We can then predicate the 
complex property thus referred of Fred, thereby expressing the proposition that Fred loves Mary. 
Chapter Six explores how to give a rigorous account of the syntax–semantics interface that is 
compatible with this account.
mantic values, it can’t in general be the semantic contribution of mood, which is a syntactic prop-
erty of clauses and not subsentential expressions. Since Hanks also has to say what uniﬁes com-
plex, sub-sentential semantic values, he also has to posit some other, sub-sentential combinatory 
acts. Moreover, these combinatory acts will have to be force-neutral, since the same VP can ap-
pear in clauses of diﬀerent kinds, presumably with the same semantic value in each case, and 
since Hanks takes force-loaded combinatory acts to be the semantic contribution of sentences’ 
moods. So, even Hanks is committed to there being some combinatory acts that can unify seman-
tic values in a force-neutral way. It makes sense, then, to wonder why he takes the combinatory 
acts that unify speech acts’ contents to be the same combinatory acts that constitute their illocu-
tionary force.
In running together the semantic contribution of a clause’s mood and the act that uniﬁes the 
clause’s semantic value, Hanks gets into other kinds of trouble as well. He argues that the semantic 
value of a sentence is a type of speech act/mental act whose content and force/attitude are insepa-
rable. But, as he notes, the fact that embedded clauses aren’t uttered with their usual force is in 
tension with this view.
Suppose I sincerely utter “If Jones likes Smith then Smith likes Jones”. Clearly,I have not as-
serted that Jones likes Smith. But the sentence “Jones likes Smith” has the very same content 
when it occurs inside this conditional as it does when it occurs alone. Hence, there cannot be 
an element of assertion in this content. Otherwise I could not use the sentence without assert-
ing it. (Hanks : )
The same problem arises for clauses embedded under negation, disjunction, and in some other 
positions. Hanks attempts to solve the problem by arguing that it is part of the semantic import of 
these operators that they cancel the force of propositions embedded in them:
This argument assumes that what is absent from the content of a sentence when it is used as 
the antecedent or consequent of a conditional is always absent from that content. But another 
way to view these facts is to hold that assertive force is always part of the content of an indica-
tive sentence, but this element of force is cancelled when the sentence is uttered as part of a 
conditional. This is one of the semantic eﬀects of the word “if ”. “If ” cancels the assertive force 
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of the content of the sentence that follows it—this is a semantic feature of the conditional. In-
tuitively, “if ” signals to the hearer that what follows is not being asserted. (Hanks : –)
Hanks compares his proposed semantic cancellation to a couple of pragmatic ways that the force 
of a speaker’s utterance can be cancelled. One of these is retraction, as in an utterance of ‘Jones 
likes Smith. No, I take it back.’ However, Hanks argues that retraction diﬀers from the kind of 
cancellation involved in conditionalization, negation, and disjunction, because cancellation-via-
retraction literally happens after the fact—one ﬁrst performs a speech act, and then cancels it—
whereas one never performs the illocutionary act associated with a clause embedded in a context 
that involves semantic cancellation. Hanks next draws an analogy between his notion of semantic 
force-cancellation and the way in which a speech act’s force gets cancelled when uttered in a ﬁc-
tional context, such as when performed in a play or written into a poem. Hanks quotes a passage 
in which Frege argues from the fact that a sentences in ﬁctional contexts are used with their cus-
tomary content but not their customary force to the conclusion that force must be distinct from 
content. Hanks responds that assertoric force is part of the content of a declarative sentence ut-
tered by an actor on stage, but that “there are conventions about being on stage or writing poetry 
that cancel the assertive force that would normally accompany utterances of those sentences” 
(: ). 
The general point is that an utterance of an indicative sentence counts as an assertion of the 
content of that sentence unless some other factor intervenes to cancel the assertive force of that 
content. This intervening factor can be the presence of a connective like “if…then…” or it can 
be the fact that the sentence is uttered by an actor on stage, or any numberof other things (e.g. 
intonation). (Hanks : )
At this point, we should keep in mind that this account of cancellation is needed only because 
Hanks holds that combinatory acts like predication play the following two roles at once: (a) they 
unify clauses’ semantic values, and (b) they constitute the illocutionary force of clauses’ semantic 
values. In arguing that various linguistic and conversational contexts can cancel the customary 
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force with which a clause is uttered, Hanks therefore concludes that combinatory acts don’t play 
the (b)–role in those contexts. But Hanks still needs combinatory acts to play their (a)-role: the 
problem of the unity of the semantic value is every bit as urgent when it comes to the semantic 
values of the antecedents of conditionals, for example. It follows that the (a)–role and the (b)–role 
can sometimes come apart, so that whatever plays one role can be present when whatever plays 
the other is made to be absent. In other words: we still predicate cleverness of George, even when 
uttering ‘George is clever’ in the antecedent of a conditional. But, in that context, the act of predi-
cating is, eﬀectively, force-neutral. So, in addition to needing force-neutral combinatory acts to 
unify complex sub-sentential semantic values, Hanks needs eﬀectively force-neutral combinatory 
acts to do the job of unifying clausal semantic values in a range of special contexts. Still, he thinks 
that we should maintain that the combinatory acts that unify clausal acts are paradigmatically 
force constituting. At this point, it seems that it would be simpler if Hanks adopted a view, like-
Soames’ and my view, on which combinatory acts play only the (a)–role, and that the (b)–role is 
instead played by the features of communicative intentions that I outlined in §..
Further diﬃculties with Hanks’ account arise when we consider some of the ways in which 
clauses of diﬀerent types interact, both grammatically and in conversation. What can his account 
say about the semantic values of clauses embedded under logical connectives, for example? First 
notice that Hanks is barred from taking the sort of approach that I explored in §.., on which 
mood takes scope over connectives. This is because Hanks needs the combinatory acts that are 
the semantic contributions of the moods of embedded clauses to play the role of unifying those 
clauses’ semantic values. Only uniﬁed propositions can be conjuncts, disjuncts, and the antece-
dents and consequents of conditionals, and Hanks holds that it is the semantic contribution of 
mood that does the job of unifying propositions. 
One problematic consequence of this view is that negation must take scope over the impera-
tive mood in sentences like ():
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(46) (a) Don’t leave me here!
 (b) ¬(!φ)
The interaction between mood (and particularly imperative mood) and negation is a fraught topic 
(Han : ch.) and semanticists have expressed doubt that negation ever takes scope over 
mood (e.g., Starr ms: §.). Moreover, reading (a) as having the structure of (b) gives rise to a 
serious internal inconsistency in Hanks’ view. On one hand, Hanks is committed to the idea that 
negation, as a matter of its semantics, creates a force-cancelling environment, but on the other 
hand, (a) would normally be used to perform a directive speech act. But if this directive force 
isn’t semantically contributed by the mood of !φ because this contribution is cancelled by being 
embedded under negation, then where does its directive force come from? In fact, the very same 
problem arises for negated declarative sentences like (47):
(47) (a) Peter isn’t right.
 (b) ¬(φ)
Hanks needs negation to scope over mood in sentences like (47a) in order to explain why we 
don’t assert negated propositions. But in that case, where does an utterance of (47a) get its asser-
toric force? Not the mood of the embedded declarative clause, whose usual contribution of force 
has been cancelled. This is a genuine conundrum for Hanks.41
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41 It might be tempting to say that Hanks can solve his problems with negation by taking it to be 
something other than a sentence connective. For example, perhaps he could hold that the logical 
form of (a) has a structure like (c), with negation serving as part of the semantic value of a 
complex predicate expression:
(46) (a) !(λxλy[x doesn’t leave y here]addresseec, speakerc)
But on this view, it’s hard to see how Hanks can capture a wide variety of inference patterns—such 
as modus tollens or disjunctive syllogism, that assume that negation can be treated as a sentence 
connective. Quite generally, we should be suspicious of any view according to which negation can 
never function as a sentence connective.
The fact that Hanks’ account requires mood to take narrow scope with respect to connectives 
also makes mixed-mood sentences like (8)–(11) problematic. To get at this problem, ﬁrst consider 
what Hanks says about disjunctions whose disjuncts are both declaratives:
Although a speaker asserts neither disjunct by uttering ‘George is clever or Karla is foolish’, 
she still performs an assertion and hence an act of predication. The speaker asserts that 
George is clever or Karla is foolish. How should we understand the act of predication con-
tained in this assertion? Let p and q be propositions expressed by declarative sentences, that is, 
types of predicative actions. To assert that p or q is to predicate a disjunctive relation, ex-
pressed by ‘or’, of p and q. Two propositions p and q bear this disjunctive relation just in case 
either p is true or q is true. As types of predicative acts, the propositions p and q are true or 
false and hence can stand in this disjunctive relation. (: ).
Here Hanks implies that the syntactic environment ‘…or…’ cancels the assertoric force of the se-
mantic contributions of its embedded clauses’ moods, but itself has the semantic equivalent of 
declarative mood, in the sense that its semantic contribution is not merely the disjunction rela-
tion, but also the assertorically-loaded predication of that relation. This account is quite obviously 
incompatible with imperative disjunctions like (), which we don’t use to perform assertive 
speech acts.
() Buy me a drink or leave me alone!        !φ or !ψ
Perhaps we could generalize Hanks’ account of ‘…or…’ by saying that it does not semantically 
contribute any particular kind of combinatory act, but instead contributes a combinatory act that 
is underspeciﬁed with respect to its force, such that its force is inherited from the semantic con-
tributions of the clauses it embeds. This would deliver the same result as holding that mood takes 
scope over disjunction. But this strategy leaves us without an explanation for mixed-mood dis-
junctions like ():
() a. Give me all your money or the puppy gets it.  
 b. Mow the lawn or I’ll clean the garage.
175
What combinatory act uniﬁes the semantic value of (b)? The answer can be neither assertive-
predication nor its directive counterpart, since we perform neither an assertive not a directive 
speech act with a literal utterance of (). It is not clear what Hanks could say about this.
The problems I have just enumerated are all broadly grammatical in nature, but by running 
together whatever plays the semantic value-unifying role with whatever plays the force-
constituting role, Hanks’ view is also in tension with some conversation-level phenomena. Imag-
ine the following dialogue:
() (a) Mary loves Fred.  [uttered by Dan]
 (b) Does Mary love Fred? [uttered by Rob]
 (c) That’s what I just said. [uttered by Dan]
The most natural interpretation of (c) is that Dan uses ‘that’ to refer to the proposition Rob ex-
pressed with (b) and ‘what I just said’ to refer to the proposition he himself had expressed in 
uttering (a), and then identiﬁes those two propositions. Moreover, this reading correctly pre-
dicts that Dan says something true in uttering (c). But this interpretation is not available to 
Hanks because his theory predicts that Dan and Rob express diﬀerent propositions in uttering 
(a) and (b). Speciﬁcally: Dan expresses an assertoric proposition in uttering (a) and Rob 
expresses a distinct, interrogative proposition in uttering (b). So, assuming that ‘that’ and ‘what 
I just said’ are being used as devices of propositional anaphora in (c), what Dan says thereby 
must be false. This recalcitrant prediction is good prima facie evidence against Hanks’ view.42 
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42 It is also worth pointing out that nothing in this example hangs on the fact that (c) involves 
indirect quotation, since the following dialogue makes roughly the same point: A: ‘Can every even 
integer greater than  be expressed as the sum of two primes?’; B: ‘That’s Goldbach’s conjecture.’
3.4  Dynamic Theories of Imperatives
With an array of doubts cast upon content-theoretic approaches to imperatives, I turn my atten-
tion to dynamic theories. I use the term ‘dynamic’ to discuss two kinds of approaches, one 
broadly pragmatic and the other semantic. The basic idea behind all dynamic approaches is that 
we should understand linguistic expressions in terms of their eﬀects on the shared and evolving 
context in which a conversation takes place. Context, on this view, is a body of representations 
that is constructed from the shared propositional attitudes of the participants in a conversation, 
and that both makes possible and is updated by the speech acts that these participants perform.43 
Dynamic accounts understand speech acts in terms of their eﬀects on context, and then give ei-
ther a pragmatic or a semantic explanation for why uttering sentences of certain kinds allows 
speakers to have the relevant kind of contextual eﬀect. Following Karen Lewis (, , forth-
coming), I will say that what distinguishes dynamic semantic theories from dynamic pragmatic 
theories is whether the contextual eﬀect of uttering a sentence is built directly into the sentence’s 
meaning or explained in terms of broad considerations about rational cooperation.
As an illustration, consider Stalnaker’s () theory of assertion. Stalanker argues that we 
should think of the context of a conversation as—or at as least including—a representation of the 
participants’ shared presuppositions. This can be modeled either as the common ground—the set 
of propositions mutually presupposed by the speakers—or as the context set—the set of possible 
worlds compatible with all of the speakers’ presuppositions. Stalnaker proposes that we under-
stand assertion in terms of its essential eﬀect on the context, which, he argues, is to add the as-
serted content to the common ground and thereby cull incompatible worlds from the context set. 
Stalnaker takes this eﬀect to be an essential component of the illocutionary force of asserting. 
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43 This notion of context has gone by several diﬀerent names: ‘common ground’ and ‘context set’ 
(Stalnaker ), ‘conversational scoreboard’ (Lewis a), ‘conversational record’ (Thomason 
), ‘information structure’ (Roberts /), ‘discourse context’ (Roberts ), ‘informa-
tion state’ (Veltman ), ‘conversational state’ (Starr ms) and so on. 
(The distance from this claim to the claim that illocutionary acts are constituted by their essential 
eﬀects will come come under scrutiny in §..)
Stalnaker counts as giving a dynamic pragmatic account of declarative sentences because he 
appeals to general pragmatic resources to explain why uttering a declarative sentence, whose con-
tent is a proposition, is a good way to add that proposition to the common ground and thereby 
perform an assertion. But we could just as easily go the route of dynamic semantics and build the 
essential eﬀect of assertion into the meanings of declarative sentences. In a dynamic semantic 
theory, sentences’ semantic values are context change potentials—functions mapping contexts to 
contexts. Following Veltman (), we can capture this idea by saying that a dynamic semantic 
theory for a language ℒ speciﬁes an update system ⟨Σℒ, 𝒞, ∙[∙]⟩, where Σℒ is the set of sentences 
of ℒ, 𝒞 is the set of possible states of the context, and ∙[∙] is a function that assigns to each sen-
tence σ ∈ Σℒ a function ∙[σ] that maps context states into context states (∙[σ] : 𝒞 ⟼𝒞). We can 
construct a dynamic semantic account of declarative meaning paralleling Stalnaker’s by taking 
each possible context-state c ∈ 𝒞 to be a set of propositions (i.e., a possible state of the common 
ground). Then, taking the semantic value ⟦ψ⟧ of a sentence radical ψ to be a set of worlds (i.e., the 
proposition it expresses), we can make the following generalization about the semantic values of 
declarative sentences:44
For every context-state c ∈ 𝒞 and every indicative sentence ⸢⊦ψ⸣ ∈ Σℒ :
c[⊦ψ] = c ∪ {⟦ψ⟧}
In English: the context change potential of a declarative sentence adds the content of its sentence 
radical to the common ground.
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44 Following Veltman’s notation, I will specify the output of an expression φ’s context change po-
tential on a context c by postﬁxing the function to its argument: ‘c[φ]’. Moreover, I will assume 
that the semantic value of a sentence radical ψ is a proposition ⟦ψ⟧.
Dynamic accounts of non-assertoric speech acts typically build on Stalnaker’s theory of asser-
tion by positing richer contexts whose structures represent more of what is happening in a con-
versation, and by showing how the essential eﬀects of non-assertoric speech acts can be under-
stood in terms of the way in which they aﬀect this added structure. For example, the most inﬂu-
ential theory of questioning among contemporary linguists holds that the essential eﬀect of a 
question is to partition the common ground into sets of possible answers (Ginzburg a,b, 
; Roberts /, ). These partitions on the common ground are sometimes called a 
conversation’s issues or questions under discussion; they can be thought of as representing the cur-
rent set of unresolved topics of conversation, and further details about the relative priority of 
questions and the order in which they were asked or ought to be resolved can be represented by 
imposing further structure on the ‘question unde discussion stack’ (Roberts /: §.). Just 
as part of the appeal of Stalnaker’s dynamic theory of assertion is that it yields predictions about 
how past assertions aﬀect what can be said later in a conversation—for example, by aﬀecting how 
context-sensitive expressions are interpreted—the dynamic theory of questioning has been used 
to predict and explan a variety of facts about how conversations unfold—for example, how asking 
a question can aﬀect the relevance of future questions and assertions (Roberts /). And, 
as in Stalnaker’s account of assertion, we can either write the essential eﬀect of questioning di-
rectly into the meaning of the interrogative mood by adopting a dynamic semantic framework, or 
we can give a pragmatic explanation of why uttering an interrogative sentence is a good way to 
partition the context set. One plausible version of a pragmatic account of this kind might appeal 
to the idea that interrogatives’ semantic values—which are typically identiﬁed with properties of 
propositions or sets of propositions—are of a diﬀerent semantic type than declaratives’ proposi-
tional semantic values, and so “belong” in a diﬀerent dimension of the context. As we’ll see in the 
next two sections, both of thse strategies have been extended to dynamic accounts of imperatives.
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3.4.1  Dynamic Pragmatic Theories of Imperatives
Dynamic theories of directive force follow the same strategy as dynamic theories of asserting and 
questioning: they posit further structure in contexts and explicate the directive force of an act in 
terms of the act’s eﬀect on this further structure. Dynamic pragmatic theories of imperatives also 
rely on the strategy of assigning semantic values of a type diﬀerent than those of declaratives and 
interrogatives, such that each type of semantic value is native to a particular dimension of context. 
Whereas declaratives are taken to express propositions and interrogatives express sets of proposi-
tions, the dynamic pragmatic theories I’ll consider here both take imperatives to express proper-
ties. 
Taking up an idea ﬁrst proposed by David Lewis (b), dynamic accounts take directive 
speech acts to update an aspect of the context that represents agents’ mutually agreed-upon prac-
tical commitments—their obligations, preferences, or plans. Perhaps the most inﬂuential such 
account due to Portner (, , ). In addition to the Common Ground (CG) and Ques-
tions Under Discussion (QUD), Portner posits a  contextual To-Do List (TDL), which he models 
as a function from each participant in a conversation α to lists of properties of the form 
⌜λx : x = α . Fx⌝ (: ). The content of an imperative sentence, on Portner’s account, is also 
a property of this form, and the essential eﬀect of a directive act is to add such a property to the 
addressee’s To-Do List. As the name would suggest, the To-Do List is a representation of the ac-
tions—or, more broadly, states of the world—that are taken, by participants in a conversation and 
for the purposes of the conversation, to guide agents’ rational behavior.
We may think of the Common Ground and To-Do List as being the public, or interactional, 
counterparts of the individual agent’s beliefs and desires. That is, as far as the participants in 
an interaction go, an agent’s actions will be judged rational to the extent that, if undertaken in 
any world compatible with the Common Ground, they would tend to make this world maxi-
mally highly ranked according to that agent’s To-Do List. (Portner : )
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Rather than deﬁning the publicly accepted criteria on rational behavior directly in terms of the 
To-Do List, Portner uses it to deﬁne a partial ordering on worlds compatible with the Common 
Ground (CG) for each agent α  (: ):
Partial Ordering of Worlds
(∀w,w ∈ ∩CG)((w <α w)  iﬀ
(∃φ ∈ TDLα)(φwα =  & φwα =  & (∀ψ ∈ TDLα)(ψwα =  → ψwα = )))
In something closer to English: a world w is better than a world w from the perspective of an 
agent’s To-Do list just in case the agent has more of the properties on her list in w than in w. 
Portner argues that this partial ordering ﬁgures in the following principle governing the rational 
behavior of the participants in a conversation (: ):
Agent’s Commitment
For any agent α, the participants in the conversation mutually agree to deem α’s actions ra-
tional and cooperative to the extent that those actions in any world w∈∩CG tend to make it 
more likely that there is no w∈∩CG such that w <αw.
To act rationally for the purposes of the conversation, according to Portner, is to act so as to gain 
as many of the properties on one’s To-Do List as possible. On this view, the essential eﬀect of a 
directive speech act is to indirectly alter what the participants in the conversation mutually agree 
that the addressee ought, rationally, to do.45 
Portner explains the connection between imperatives and directive force pragmatically. Fol-
lowing Stalnaker () and Roberts (/), he holds that declaratives express propositions 
and interrogatives express sets of propositions. He adds the new claim that imperatives express 
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45 Portner () also argues that the To-Do List helps determine the ordering source relative to 
which deontic modals are interpreted. I am skeptical that this is a feature, rather than a bug, of 
Portner’s approach (see §..), but that aspect of his view is separable from the rest.
properties whose arguments are restricted to the addressee at a context of utterance. For example, 
(a) expresses the property (b) in a context c:
() (a) Leave!
 (b) λx : x = addresseec . x leaves  (Portner : )
All of this furnishes Portner with an elegant explanation of several of the central explananda of a 
semantics for imperatives. Each clause-type correspond to a dimension of context by virtue of the 
fact that clauses of that type have as their semantic values entities of the sort that belong in the 
relevant dimension of context. Since properties of speakers are the sorts of things that go on To-
Do Lists, proferring such a property by uttering an imperative sentence makes it obvious that one 
is trying to add it to someone’s To-Do List, and the fact that the property can only be possessed by 
one’s addressee makes it obvious whose To-Do List it belongs on. Both the distinctive meaning 
and the distinctive use of the imperative mood are thus explained. The apparent non-truth-
aptness of imperatives is explained by the fact that their contents—properties instead of proposi-
tions—aren’t truth-apt.
If we interpret Charlow’s () theory of imperatives as a genuine dynamic pragmatic one, 
then it is similar to Portner’s in several respects, although he takes imperative semantic values to 
be diﬀerent kinds of properties than Portner.46  Charlow refers to the context of conversation as a 
representor ⟨S, Λ⟩, with a set of possible worlds S representing information and a set of action-
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46 I’ve hedged in describing Charlow’s theory as a dynamic one because it’s not clear that Charlow 
himself conceives of his theory in that way. Charlow frequently suggests that the pragmatic func-
tion of a speech act is to update an addressee’s mental state, rather than to update mutually repre-
sented states of the context. In the text, he deﬁnes the notion of representor ⟨Sa, Λa⟩ “for an agent 
a”, and says that it represents “a’s information” and “a’s plans” (: §.). If we take this descrip-
tion literally, then Charlow’s theory of illocutionary force is already much closer to a Gricean one 
than the other theories I will discuss in this section. The distinction between dynamic and Gri-
cean theories of illocutionary force will be the main topic in §., and so I’ll return to this issue 
there. For now, I will present Charlow’s theory as if it were a standardly dynamic one, with the 
disclaimer that this may not be what Charlow intends.
descriptors Λ representing agents’ plans (I will follow Charlow in representing each agent a’s plans 
as Λa). Charlow takes imperatives to express requirement conditions on plans, and to perform a 
directive speech act by uttering an imperative !φ is to “tell an agent what to plan” by expressing 
“the property a plan has if it is decided on φ” (: §.). A plan Λ “is decided on φ, in the rele-
vant sense, iﬀ φ is required relative to Λ” (: §.). Charlow then deﬁnes the relevant notion of 
requirement by deﬁning a partial ordering on worlds as follows.
A plan for an agent a, Λa thus determines a set of propositions PΛa : the set of propositions p 
such that for some α ∈ Λa, p is the proposition that a performs α. Such a set of propositions 
can straightforwardly determine a preorder on possibilities as follows.
w ≤Λa v  iﬀ  {p ∈ PΛa : v ∈ p} ⊆ {p ∈ PΛa : w ∈ p}
In English, w is at least as good as v, with respect to Λa, iﬀ w involves a’s performance of at 
least those actions in Λa that a performs in v, and perhaps more besides. (: §.)
Charlow calls the worlds that are minimal with respect to the ordering ≤Λa the Λa–best worlds, 
and refers to the set of these worlds as minΛa. This setup allows Charlow to capture his idea that 
the essential eﬀect of a directive is to impose a requirement on a plan, and that a speaker can do 
this by uttering an imperative sentence that expresses that requirement as a property of the ad-
dressee’s plan. Charlow models the semantic value of (a) as (c), for exmaple:
() (a) Leave!
 (c) λΛa .  only if  ∀w ∈ minΛa : {w} ⊨ addresseec leaves
In English: (a) “places the following as a condition on a plan: the plan must prefer [worlds in 
which the addressee leaves] to [worlds in which the addressee doesn’t leave]; a plan receives a 
positive verdict (i.e., ) only if it meets this condition. … By encoding such a property, an impera-
tive…tells an agent what/how to plan” (: §.).
Again: this explains both the semantic and pragmatic diﬀerence between imperatives and de-
claratives in terms of the fact that they are used to update the context in diﬀerent ways: whereas a 
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declarative is used to add its content—a proposition—to the context’s information coordinate, an 
imperative is used to impose its content—a property—as a requirement on the plan coordinate. 
The intuition that imperatives aren’t truth-apt is likewise explained by saying that they express 
properties rather than propositions.47
So, despite their diﬀerences, Portner’s and Charlow’s accounts share most of their obvious 
strengths. They also share some weaknesses. One peculiarity of both accounts is that they apply, 
as stated, only to requirement directives and not to permission directives. Both Portner and Char-
low need to tell an additional story about how I can permit you to have some tea by saying ‘have 
some tea!’, for example. Portner () gives a fairly elaborate pragmatic explanation of these 
cases. Charlow gives distinct semantic accounts of requirement and permissive readings of im-
peratives, suggesting that he takes imperatives to be systematically ambiguous between the two 
readings. The need to explain away permission directives in these ways is not a damning problem 
for Portner and Charlow, but it would be nicer if they didn’t have to.
A much more serious problem for both Portner and Charlow arises from embedded impera-
tives. Portner does not attempt to give an account of conditional imperatives, although he makes 
it clear in a recent paper that doing so is on his To-Do List (: §). Charlow takes conditional 
imperatives to express restricted properties of plans—a notion that requires only a simple exten-
sion of his account of imperatives (: .). But Charlow’s account seems not to be general 
enough, because he treats conditional declaratives and conditional imperatives as two distinct 
phenomena, requiring distinct clauses in his semantics. But this means that he has no way of ac-
counting for conditionals, such as (), whose consequents are mixed-mood conjunctions or dis-
junctions.
184
47 Charlow also goes on to give an account of imperative consequence by deﬁning a relationship 
between imperatives and closely related modals, thus preserving the supposed virtues of modal-
reductionism in this respect (: .).
() If he comes back, buy me a drink and I’ll pay you back. (if ⊦φ)(!ψ and ⊦σ)
In order to account for the meaningfulness of (), what we need is an account of conditionals 
that generalizes across consequents with diﬀerent moods and combinations of moods, and Char-
low does not oﬀer this. Although there may be some way of accomplishing this in his system, it is 
not obvious how it would work.
Serious problems for both Portner and Charlow arise when we consider mixed-mood con-
junctions and disjunctions such as () and ():
() a. Give me all your money or the puppy gets it.         !φ or ⊦ψ
 b. You mow the lawn or I’ll clean the garage (Starr ms: §.)
() a. Say that again and I’ll scream. !φ and ⊦ψ
 b. Stay here and I’ll go to the store. 
These sentences pose problems for Portner and Charlow because standard wisdom in contempo-
rary semantics says that conjunction and disjunction range only over pairs of semantic values of 
the same type (e.g., Partee and Rooth ), but both Portner and Charlow take the semantic val-
ues of imperatives and declaratives to be of diﬀerent types (cf. Starr ms: §.). Charlow considers 
treating (a) and (a) as conditionals in disguise, but as we saw in §.., not all mixed-mood 
conjunctions and disjunctions can be treated in this way. Charlow’s response is to redeﬁne con-
junction and disjunction in terms of a general notion of what it is for a sentence φ to hold at a 
representor ⟨S, Λ⟩ (represented as ⌜⟨S, Λ⟩ ⊨ φ⌝). Here are Charlow’s deﬁnitions (: §.):48
⟨S, Λ⟩ ⊨ ⊦φ iﬀ ∀w ∈ S : φ is true at w
⟨S, Λ⟩ ⊨ ¬⊦φ iﬀ ∀w ∈ S : φ is not true at w
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48 I have made some adjustments to Charlow’s deﬁnitions in order to avoid introducing otherwise 
unnecessary terminology and notation. As in Charlow’s version, uppercase Greek letters range 
over both declarative and imperative clauses.
⟨S, Λ⟩ ⊨ !φ only if ∀w ∈ minΛa : φ  is true at w
⟨S, Λ⟩ ⊨ (if φ)(!ψ) only if ∀w ∈ minΛa ∩ {wʹ′ : φ is true at wʹ′} : ψ is true at w
⟨S, Λ⟩ ⊨ (Φ⋀Ψ) iﬀ ⟨S, Λ⟩ ⊨ Φ and ⟨S, Λ⟩ ⊨ Ψ 
As Charlow explains, this treatment allows him to make sense of mixed-mood conjunctions, 
while also allowing him to capture some high-level generalizations about how the semantics of 
sentences connects up to their pragmatics:
…there is no problem understanding a conjunction of the form (!φ ∧ ψ). This expresses the 
property a representor has iﬀ it satisﬁes the property expressed by !φ as well as that expressed 
by ψ. Eﬀectively, then, we are claiming that sentences of any type express the very same sort of 
semantic object: in general, sentences express properties of representors. Imperatives express 
properties that bear on the planning parameter of a representor, while declaratives express 
properties that bear on its informational parameter. Sentences are not typed according to the 
semantic type of their denotation, since all sentences express characteristic functions of repre-
sentors. Instead, they are typed according to the kind of property of a representor they express. 
(Charlow : §.)
This result is very elegant, and my own account of mood-mixing—which I’ll outline in §.—
shows its inﬂuence. But we should also take note of the fact that the deﬁnition of holding-at given 
above does not include disjunction. Instead, Charlow deﬁnes disjunction in terms of conjunction 
in a footnote:
Disjunction is deﬁned in terms of negation and conjunction as follows. S ⊨ (φ ∨ ψ) iﬀ S ⊨ 
¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ ψ ) . This holds iﬀ  ∀w ∈ S : {w} ⊨ ¬φ∧¬ψ iﬀ ∀w∈S : {w} ⊨ ¬φ or {w} ⊨ ¬ψ iﬀ ∀w∈S : 
{w} ⊨ φ or {w} ⊨ ψ. This is the correct notion of disjunction for the sake of our cognitively ori-
ented semantics: for a disjunction (φ ∨ ψ) to hold (“be known”) at S, it is required only that, for 
every world in S, at least one of φ or ψ holds at that world. This is crucially (and correctly) dis-
tinct from a notion of disjunction on which (φ ∨ ψ) holds at S iﬀ S ⊨ φ or S ⊨ ψ. Knowing (φ ∨ 
ψ) does not require knowing at least one of φ or ψ; one can know a disjunction without know-
ing which disjunct is true. (Charlow : §., fn.)
But, as Starr explains, this account of disjunction is seriously ﬂawed, in that it seemingly can’t ac-
count for disjoined imperatives.
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However [Charlow’s] analysis of disjunction is problematic. For declaratives, disjunction can-
not be deﬁned as ⟨S, Λ⟩ ⊨ Φ∨Ψ ⟺ ⟨S, Λ⟩ ⊨ Φ or ⟨S, Λ⟩ ⊨ Ψ. That would imply that if an agent 
accepts a disjunction then their information supports one of the disjuncts. But you can accept 
Gabe is sleeping or he’s awake without knowing that he’s sleeping or that he’s awake. So disjunc-
tion is instead deﬁned in terms of conjunction and negation: ⟨S, Λ⟩ ⊨ Φ∨Ψ ⟺ ⟨S, Λ⟩ ⊨ 
¬(¬Φ∧¬Ψ) (Charlow : §.). Since imperatives do not embed under negation, and it is 
unclear what such an embedding would should mean, this semantics does not capture impera-
tives scoping under disjunction or mixed disjunctions…. (Starr ms: §.)
So although Charlow accounts for mixed-mood conjunction, he fails to give a suﬃciently general 
account of the semantics of conditionals, and he fails to account for imperatives embedded under 
disjunction. Portner’s theory fares even worse in this regard: he has not yet attempted to account 
for any of the data embedded imperatives, and there are good reasons to think that he cannot do 
so. Dynamic pragmatic theories of mood thus show a good deal of promise, but also leave much 
to be desired.
3.4.2  Dynamic Semantic Theories of Imperatives
Dynamic semantic theories build the essential eﬀects of illocutionary acts directly into clauses’ 
meanings by identifying their semantic values with context change potentials. Theories of this 
kind promise many of the same explanatory advantages as dynamic pragmatic theories, but with-
out the challenge of giving a pragmatic explanation of the connection between clause-type and 
illocutionary force. Since this challenege is part of what led to Portner’s and Charlow’s troubles 
with embeddings, it’s worth seeing if a dynamic semantic account can do better.
Although dynamic semantic variants of many of the accounts I’ve looked at so far are poten-
tial options, the most fully articulated dynamic semantic theory of imperatives in the literature is 
due to Starr (ms).49  His account is built around the idea that contexts are information rela-
tions—sets of ordered pair of propositions (ms: §.). The ordering of these pairs represent mu-
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49  Lascarides and Asher () oﬀer an alternative dynamic semantic treatment of imperatives 
that I won’t consider here.
tual preferences that the participants in a conversation have (for the purposes of the conversation) 
for the ﬁrst coordinate of each pair over the second coordinate. A preference for the proposition 
that Oliver buys Dan a drink (p) over its negation could be represented by the pair ⟨p, ¬p⟩, for ex-
ample, and a context’s information relation r might contain many such pairs. (In order to handle 
disjunction, Starr oﬃcially identiﬁes a conversation’s context with a set R of information relations. 
I’ll return to this point below.) Starr next goes on to show how other dimensions of context can be 
deﬁned in terms of information relations. He deﬁnes the information in a context (cf. Stalnaker’s 
Context Set) as the set i of worlds that are related by information relations, and the contextual 
questions (or issues) of a context (cf. Roberts’ Questions Under Discussion) as the set of proposi-
tions p such that {⟨p,∅⟩,⟨i–p,∅⟩} is among the context’s information relations (ms: §.).50 
Whereas asserting adds information to the context and questioning add issues, the essential eﬀect 
of directive acts, according to Starr, is to change “the preferences to which an agent is publicly 
committed” by introducing new (non-trivial) preferences to the context’s information relation(s) 
(ms: §.–.).
Starr implements these ideas formally as follows (ms: §.):
…!A changes R by adding a preference for live A-worlds over live non-A-worlds. Since R is a 
set of info relations, this involves adding to a new preference each info relation r ∈ R. This se-
mantics, applied to an atomic imperative, can be stated in update semantics format (Veltman 
):
Basic Imperative Semantics 
Where α is an atomic radical and ā= ir− a, R[!α] = {r∪ {⟨a,ā⟩} | r ∈ R  a = ir[α]}.
What are A and ir [A]? A is the original sentence minus its mood; a propositional radical 
(Wittgenstein : §n). It is not a well-formed sentence, but as a sub-sentential constituent 
it still has a semantics. It operates just on information ir because it is the informational core of 
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50  One might wonder whether this way of modeling questions does justice to the phenomenon: 
does it really make sense to identify the propositions we’re mutually wondering about as just 
those propositions whose truth we would prefer to the empty proposition (which, by the way, is 
also identiﬁed with every necessarily false propisition)? This certainly sounds strange to me: why 
can’t we recognize an alternative as open while preferring some necessary falsehood to it? Perhaps 
this is just one of those unsatisfying spandrels of possible worlds semantics that we just have to 
pretend not to notice.
the sentence. But it is not a ‘move in the language game’ because it doesn’t operate on R. In-
formation is modeled in terms of possible worlds, and for convenience possible worlds are 
treated as functions that map every radical to a truth-value. A radical’s semantic role is to 
eliminate worlds where it’s false:
Basic Radical Semantics 
For any atomic radical α, i[α] = {w ∈ i | w(α) = }
We can simplify this picture somewhat by saying that a propositional radical φ expresses a propo-
sision ⟦φ⟧, deﬁned as sets of possible worlds. Taking ir to be the information contained in an in-
formation relation r, we can then say that the semantic function of an imperative sentence !φ is to 
add the preference ⟨p,¬p⟩ to every r ∈ R, where p = ir∩⟦φ⟧ and ¬p = ir–⟦φ⟧. In something closer 
to English: the semantic function of an imperative is to add a preference to each information rela-
tion in the context for the worlds that are compatible with both that information relation’s infor-
mation and the imperative’s radical over the worlds that aren’t compatible.
The pragmatic upshot of this account resembles those of Portner’s and Charlow’s accounts: the 
speech acts that we perform in uttering declaratives and imperatives are understood in terms of 
the way they shape mutual information and action-guiding states, respectively. Starr then deﬁnes 
a choice function whose role is to take “a body of preferences and returns the set of alternatives a 
rational agent should pursue given those preferences” (ms: §.). Starr then formulates a principle 
governing the behavior it is rational to pursue (for the purposes of the conversation) in terms of 
these good alternatives, which he sums up as follows:
…adding to the preferences that an agent is publicly committed to can change which alterna-
tives they can be expected, for the purposes of the conversation, to pursue if they are rational. 
This fact shows that understanding the conversational dynamics of imperatives in terms of 
preference change explains how they serve their conversational function: to promote some al-
ternative(s) that the speaker might be publicly expected, at least for the purposes of the con-
versation, to pursue. (Starr ms: §.)
This account of the pragmatics of imperatives closely resembles Portner’s in several respects. Like 
Portner, Starr takes the pragmatic aim of an imperative to be that of updating public action-
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guiding representations in terms of which rational behavior is deﬁned for the purposes of the con-
versation. The two italicized features—that Portner and Starr take the essential eﬀects of directive 
acts to be public and as-if attitudes—will loom large in §..
Starr goes on to give an analogous semantics for declaratives, followed by mood-neutral 
treatments of conjunction, disjunction, and conditionals. Declaratives update the context’s infor-
mation in roughly the way Stalnaker envisioned, but, because of the complexity of Starr’s frame-
work, the deﬁnition looks more complicated than the dynamic semantic translation of Stalnaker 
that I outlined at the start of this section:
Declarative Semantics 
Where aρ = ∪({a}[ρ]), R[⊦ρ] = {{⟨aρ, aρ′r∈R ∶ ⟨aρ, aρ⟩ ∈ r  aρ ≠ ∅}
• Filter the alternatives in each info relation with ρ, throwing out pairs that would promote 
∅ and eliminating any info relations that would contain only these pairs. (Starr ms: §.)
Starr’s clause for conjunction is straightforward, but notable because it is neutral with respect to 
the moods of the clauses conjoined:
R[Φ∧Ψ] = (R[Φ])[Ψ]
In English: the result of updating the context with a conjunction is the same as the result of up-
dating the context with the ﬁrst conjunct followed by updating the resulting context with the sec-
ond conjunct. Disjunction is more complicated. As Starr points out, there is a sense in which both 
conjunctions of imperatives and disjunctions of imperatives introduce preferences for both of 
their coordinated clauses, but we need a way of capturing this that also captures the fact that dis-
junction is weaker than conjunction. Borrowing an idea from recent dynamic work on disjunc-
tions of declaratives, Starr argues that we can treat disjunctions as introducing preferences in dis-
tinct information relations, which are then unioned.
R[Φ∨Ψ] = R[Φ]∪R[Ψ]
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In English: the result of updating the context with a disjunction is the union of the two results of 
updating the conject with each of the disjuncts. An example is helpful here. Take ():
() Buy me a drink or leave me alone!        !φ or !ψ
Suppose that we’re in a simpliﬁed context R={r} in which the only things we’re wondering about 
are whether you’ll buy me a drink (p) and whether you’ll leave me alone (q), and in which we 
don’t yet have any mutual preferences regarding these alternatives. Starr’s theory predicts that () 
will have the following eﬀect on this context: ﬁrst, it will generate a context R such that R = 
R[!(you buy me a drink)] = {r∪ {p ∩ ir , ir–p∩ir}}, next it will generate a context R = R[!(you leave 
me alone)] = {r∪ {q ∩ ir , ir–q∩ir}}, and then it will yield the output context R+ = R∪ R. In other 
words: disjunctions create new information relations—one including a preference for each dis-
junct—that live on alongside the old information relations in the context.
My proposal…is that disjunctions of imperatives put in play a preference for each disjunct, ei-
ther of which can be acted on, while both of the preferences put in play by a conjunction must 
be acted on. To capture this, I model a conversational state not as a simple info relation, but a 
set of them. For a simple case where R = {r}, the idea is that a conjunction of imperatives in-
troduces two new preferences into r, while the disjunction of two imperatives will spawn two 
info relations: one where the preference of the ﬁrst disjunct has been added to r and one where 
the second disjunct has been added to r. (Starr ms: §.)
The justiﬁcation of this account of disjunction ultimately comes through in the way that Starr’s 
choice function generates a condition on rational behavior from sets of information relations, but 
the intuitive idea is fairly clear: disjoined imperatives introduce two diﬀerent options for what to 
prefer, only one of which we must act in accordance with in order to be rational. We can sum up 
Starr’s predictions about mixed-mood conjunctions and disjunctions in similar terms. In utter-
ing,‘buy me a drink and I’ll save your seat’, I introduce both a preference that you buy me a beer 
and the information that I’ll save your seat. In uttering ‘buy me a beer or I’m leaving’, I split the 
context into two distinct options, at least one of which (but not necessarily both) we must behave 
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in accordance with in order to count as rational: the ﬁrst now includes a preference that you buy 
me a beer, and the second now includes the information that I’m leaving.
Starr next shows how to give an account of conditionals that is neutral between declarative, 
imperative, and interrogative consequents.51  
From what I can tell, there is no natural way to elucidate this account clearly in nontechnical Eng-
lish, but we can get a bit closer. As long as updating R with Ψ after updating it with Φ doesn’t 
eliminate any worlds (i.e., as long as R[Φ] is a ﬁxed point for ·[Ψ]), then (if Φ)Ψ updates each in-
formation relation r in the context to produce a new information relation r+, as follows: for each 
information relation r in R, r+ is the union of r and r*, where r* is what you would get by updat-
ing r with (Φ and Ψ). Although this account is not straightforward, it does have a signiﬁcant ad-
vantage that isn’t enjoyed by any other theory of conditionals on the market—namely, it is deﬁned 
over consequents of any mood or any grammatical mixture of moods. Starr argues that his ac-
count makes the right predictions about how uttering a conditional aﬀects the context. For exam-
ple, uttering a conditional imperative (if ⊦φ)!ψ eﬀectively adds a conditional preference to the 
context—a preference for the content of ψ only relative to information at the context that is com-
patible with the content of φ. Given Starr’s further assumptions about how these conditional pref-
erences guide what is rational for agents to do, this is an elegant result. As we’ve seen, giving a 
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51 Starr’s theory of conditionals generalizes from a dynamic strict conditional analysis of the kind 
that has recently been defeded by, e.g., Gillies (, , ). Because Starr’s theory hangs on 
the viability of a dynamic strict account of conditionals, it is worth noting that this analysis is 
quite controversial.
similarly general account of conditionals represents a serious hurdle for Portner and Starr, and so 
Starr’s theory bests theirs in this regard.
Starr also oﬀers a novel explanation of our intuition that imperatives are non truth evaluable:
a sentence type is truth-evaluable just in case the question of truth can arise for its instances. 
The idea is that a sentence type is truth-evaluable when learning about its truth or falsity of 
one of its tokens is informative. This amounts to the following deﬁnition. A sentence type T is 
truth-evaluable just in case there exists a w where an instance of type T is true and there exists 
a w where is false. (Starr ms: §.)
This account relies on Starr’s dynamic take on truth: “φ is true in w just in case accepting φ, when 
you have the information that {w}, returns the same information” (ms: §.). The result does a 
nice job of predicting that imperatives (and interrogatives) aren’t truth evaluable, with only the 
following small cost: in deﬁning truth-aptness in this way, Starr gives up the option of saying that 
some well-formed declarative clauses—such as category mistakes or, for example, ‘colorless green 
ideas sleep furiously’—aren’t truth-apt. Assuming that Starr has something else to say about de-
clarative sentences that, as it were, aren’t even false, this seems not to be a huge price to pay.
In these and other ways, then, Starr’s view does the best job of predicting the empirical data 
about imperatives. The most serious problems for Starr’s account are, I think, foundational in na-
ture. I will raise some of these problems—most of which are also problems for dynamic pragmatic 
views—in §.. A problem that is more speciﬁc to the dynamic semantic approach is raised by 
Charlow, who argues that dynamic semantics embodies a misunderstanding of the division of ex-
planatory labor by requiring that semantic theories include a full theory of belief and preference 
update.
…the change a preference state undergoes when it shifts to requiring φ is very diﬀerent from 
the simple shift involved in simply adding φ to your stock of preferences. The former requires 
an account of how prior preferences—ones that conﬂict with the preference for φ so as to 
block the global preference state from requiring φ—are revised so that conﬂict is ameliorated. 
Such an account would appear to be a matter of proper concern for epistemology, rather than 
semantics; we should not build a substantive theory of (rational) preference-revision into any 
part of our semantics.
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I say this as a proponent of a picture of semantics on which a semantic theory for a sentence 
is a theory about what sort of cognitive instruction that sentence proﬀers (Section .). How-
ever, cognitive instructions, as I understand them, are relatively thin things. An assertion that 
φ might accurately be described as a cognitive instruction whose force is to propose to get the 
addressee to accept that φ. When φ conﬂicts with an agent’s prior information, then, in order 
to fully accept the assertion, the agent cannot simply add the proposition that φ to her stock of 
beliefs. She must revise her prior beliefs to eliminate the source of conﬂict. Not just any old 
revision will do; the revision must be, for example, conservative with respect to those priors. 
How rational agents revise priors conservatively is the topic of a vast amount of work in for-
mal and informal epistemology, rather than natural language semantics.
That seems to me like the correct division of theoretical labor. The job of natural language 
semantics is to associate sentences with general, and relatively skeletal, cognitive instructions. 
These have a plausible claim to being what is meant by utterances in natural language. It is the 
job of epistemologists (and theorists interested in rational changes in attitudes, more gener-
ally) to give a substantive account of how rational agents can comply with these instructions. 
… 
In a slogan: semantics furnishes a theory of cognitive directives. Epistemology furnishes a 
substantive theory of diachronic compliance for cognitive directives. What is left to the se-
mantics? It would seem to be just the idea that imperatives propose to make their prejacents 
required. (Charlow : §..)
Charlow’s point strikes me as quite forceful: because dynamic semantics identiﬁes sentences’ se-
mantic with functions that map each state of the context into another state, theories in the genre 
burden themselves with the task of fully specifying the updates associated with particular sen-
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tences, thereby plunging foolhardily into the fraught territory of epistemology and artiﬁcial 
intelligence.52
Dynamic accounts have mostly succeeded in ignoring Charlow’s problem by focusing on 
highly idealized conceptions of the nature of conversation. For example, Stalnaker () and 
Roberts (/) premise their respective accounts of asserting and questioning on the as-
sumption that the sole goal of conversation is to come to a mutual agreement about how the 
world is by adding information to the common ground and eliminating worlds from the context 
set. This idealized model is incompatible with the datum that we sometimes assert propositions 
that contradict what we’ve previously presupposed. All of the simpliﬁed examples in Starr’s essay 
embody an analogous idealization away from conﬂicting preferences. Of course, there is nothing 
wrong with idealizations in general, but this one obscures a serious problem, for it is only once 
the the idealization away from contradictory information or preferences is lifted that drawing the 
right boundary between semantics and epistemology becomes crucial and problematic. 
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52 In response to Charlow’s worry, Starr oﬀers the following reply:
Calculating the ideally rational preferences that should result from combining a new im-
perative and a body of preferences is indeed a challenging feat that requires much more than 
grasping a linguistic convention. But it is not this feat I claim competent speakers routinely 
carry out once they become ﬂuent with imperatives. The preferences that result from the 
semantic process of updating with an imperative may not even be rational, they needn’t re-
ﬂect all of the consequences an ideally rational agent would draw and they certainly do not 
guarantee that the agent will choose to bring about the alternative that is best according to 
them. Words are vessels by which we steer from mental state to mental state. But they are 
just one of the tools we rely on to set and convey our tack. Rationality—our general ability 
to make sense of the world and each other—serves as our compass, weaving a coherent 
route from mere waypoints. The approach to imperatives developed below not only pre-
serves this role for rationality (pragmatics) in language use, it explains some of the rational 
processes involved in a precise and independently motivated way. (Starr ms: §)
I’m not sure what to make of this reply. Starr is quite explicit that the semantic value of an impera-
tive, together with the prior context, jointly determine the state of the posterior context, and that 
the context (with the help of a choice function) determines “which alternatives [participants] can 
be expected, for the purposes of the conversation, to pursue if they are rational” (ms: §.). I don’t 
see how to square that with Starr’s comment in the quoted passage that the “preferences that re-
sult from the semantic process of updating with an imperative may not even be rational” and 
“needn’t reﬂect all of the consequences an ideally rational agent would draw”.
3.5  From Dynamic Pragmatics to Griceanism
Dynamic theories of imperatives seem to be the most promising on oﬀer. But dynamic theories 
collapse into Gricean, speech act theoretic accounts when suﬃcient attention is paid to the theo-
ries of communication underlying the two approaches.
3.5.1  Updating, Proposing, and Intending
The ﬁrst stage in my argument concerns the nature of the essential eﬀects in terms of which dy-
namic accounts deﬁne illocutionary force. I will argue that if these eﬀects can serve as the basis 
for an account of illocutionary acts, then they must be regarded as the eﬀect that a speaker com-
municatively intends to have in performing the illocutionary acts, rather than as the eﬀects that 
performances of illocutionary acts actually have.
In arguing that the essential eﬀect of assertion is to add information to the common ground, 
Stalnaker goes most of the way toward agreeing with this conclusion. To see this, we can ﬁrst get 
clear about Stalnaker’s deﬁnition by reconstructing it as (CEA).53
Characteristic Eﬀect of Assertion (CEA)
A speaker asserts ⟦⊦φ⟧ by uttering ⊦φ at a stage t of a conversation only if either (a) it updates the 
context so that that 𝓒t+ = 𝓒t ∪ {⟦⊦φ⟧} and ct+ = ct ∩ ⟦φ⟧ or (b) her assertion is rejected but would 
have updated the context in this way had it not been rejected.
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53  This reconstruction is based on Stalnaker’s assumption that the semantic value ⟦⊦φ⟧ of a (de-
clarative) sentence ⊦φ is a set of possible worlds. The reconstruction is also based on the idealized 
assumption that conversations can be broken up into stages, such that a conversation moves from 
stage t to stage t+ when a participant produces an utterance at t, and such that Ct and ct are the 
states of the common ground and the context set at t, respectively.
Stalnaker makes it clear that he does not intend (CEA) as an attempt to deﬁne, analyze, or reduce 
assertion to its characteristic eﬀect, and he gives several reasons for thinking that any such at-
tempt will be hopeless.54
I should emphasize that I do not propose this as a deﬁnition of assertion, but only as a claim 
about one eﬀect which assertions have, and are intended to have—an eﬀect that should be a 
component, or a consequence, of an adequate deﬁnition. There are several reasons why one 
cannot deﬁne assertion in terms of this eﬀect alone. One reason is that other speech acts, like 
making suppositions, have and are intended to have the same eﬀect. A second reason is that 
there may be various indirect, even nonlinguistic, means of accomplishing the same eﬀect 
which I would not want to call assertions. A third reason is that the proposed essential eﬀect 
makes reference to another speech act—the rejection of an assertion, which presumably can-
not be explained independently of assertion. (: )
Stalnaker also considers cases which seem to tell against his characteristic eﬀect’s being necessary 
for assertion—cases in which a speaker produces an assertion but fails to produce its essential ef-
fect—including case in which the speaker knows that her assertion will fail to have its essential 
eﬀect. He rejects these putative counterexamples on the following grounds:
My suggestion about the essential eﬀect of assertion does not imply that speakers intend to 
succeed in getting the addressee accept the content of the assertion, or that they believe they 
will, or even might succeed. A person may make an assertion knowing it will be vetoed, a labor 
negotiator may make a proposal knowing it will be met by a counterproposal, or a poker player 
may place a bet knowing it will cause all the other players to fold. Such actions will not be 
pointless, since they all have secondary eﬀects, and there is no reason why achieving the sec-
ondary eﬀects cannot be the primary intention of the agent performing the action. The essen-
tial eﬀects will still be relevant even when it is a foregone conclusion that the assertion, legisla-
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54 Stalnaker himself sometimes dispenses with these subtleties in later articles, making his account 
seem like a proposal about what makes a speech act an assertion. This has led some commenta-
tors to interpret him as oﬀering a constitutive account of assertion. For example, MacFarlane 
(: §) quotes the following passage when presenting Stalnaker’s account of assertion as deﬁ-
nitional: “I suggested that an assertion should be understood as a proposal to change the context 
by adding the content to the information presupposed. This is an account of the force of an asser-
tion, and it respects the traditional distinction between the content and the force of a speech act. 
Propositional content is represented by a (possibly partial) function from possible worlds to 
truth-values; assertive force is represented by the way in which any such function is used to 
change the context that the speaker shares with those to whom he is speaking” (Stalnaker : 
–). It is tempting to understand Stalnaker’s talk of “a proposal to change the context” as an 
account of assertion as an act performed with the intention to change the context.
tive act, proposal, or bet will be rejected, since one generally explains why the action has the 
secondary eﬀects it has partly in terms of the fact that it would have had certain essential ef-
fects had it not been rejected. (: )
The key point here, as I understand it, is that the clause about rejection in (CEA) is crucially im-
portant. Stalnaker takes the characteristic eﬀect of assertion to be a necessary condition only for 
unrejected assertions. A speech act is an assertion, according Stalnaker, only if either it has the its 
essential eﬀect or would have had that eﬀect were it not been rejected.
This reading is not entirely satisfactory, since it ignores the fact that the two passages I’ve 
quoted seemingly contradict one another over the issue of whether essential eﬀects are intended. 
In the ﬁrst passage, Stalnaker says that the characteristic eﬀect is one that assertions “are intended 
to have”, but in the second passage he says that his “suggestion about assertion does not imply that 
speakers intend to succeed in getting the addressee accept the content of the assertion.” We might 
try to reconcile these remarks by taking Stalnaker’s use of ‘accept’ in the second quoted passage to 
pick out an attitude stronger than presupposition, but this reading does not square with the rest of 
what Stalnaker says in the second quoted passage. It is therefore not entirely clear how to read 
Stalnaker on this issue.
Assuming that we want to endorse the spirit of Stalnaker’s account of assertion, what should 
we think about whether essential eﬀects must be intended? Must a speaker intend to add p to the 
common ground in order to assert p? The answer, I think, is yes. Consider Stalnaker’s reason, in 
the second passage, for suggesing otherwise—that we sometimes assert p knowing full well that 
our assertion will be rejected, and that we typically do this in order to have another, indirect ef-
fect. This should call to mind Grice’s distinction between saying and making as if to say, and my 
distinction between performing a speech act and making as if to (or pretending to) perform a speech 
act (§..). One way to motivate these distinctions is by means of considerations like the follow-
ing: (i) for any acts X, Y, and Z, if I am pretending to do X in order to do Y, then I am not really 
doing X but merely pretending to do X, and (ii) if I know that I cannot do X by doing Z, then I 
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cannot really do X by doing Z, but I can at best (at least in some cases) merely pretend to do X by 
doing Z. If these principles are right, then a Gricean cannot hold that I assert that p by uttering u 
if I know that I won’t get my addressee to believe that I believe that p by doing so. Stalnaker 
should say something similar: if I know that I won’t have a certain eﬀect e on the context by utter-
ing u, then, by uttering u, all I can really be doing is making as if to produce e in order to indi-
rectly have some other eﬀect. We can preserve the idea that adding a proposition to the common 
ground is an essential eﬀect of assertion by saying that, in cases where the speaker knows they 
won’t get p into the common ground, they merely make as if to assert p.
With Stalnaker’s worrying cases explained away, it makes sense to reconstrue the essential ef-
fect of assertion as the essentially intended eﬀect of assertion: a speech act counts as asserting p 
only if the speaker intends to add p to the common ground. An excellent positive reason for re-
construing Stalnaker in this way is that it gives him a way of distinguishing illocutionary acts 
from perlocutionary acts: to successfully assert that p requires only intending to add p to the 
common ground, and to successfully communicate via one’s assertion requires only adding the 
proposition that one had this intention to the common ground; to add p to the common ground 
goes a step further, and into the realm of perlocution. This takes us one step closer to Grice and 
allows us to drop the notion of rejection from the deﬁnition.
I am far from the ﬁrst person to make these observations. They are most inﬂuentially articu-
lated in the form of Thomason’s () dynamic account of speaker meaning, which aims to 
combine the best aspects of Stalnaker to Grice:
To mean p is to intentionally reveal an intention to make p asserted through the hearer’s rec-
ognition of the status of an intention or plan of the speaker’s. (Thomason 1990: 345)
At ﬁrst glance, this doesn’t look like a promising start toward an account of the nature of asser-
tion: because it deﬁnes communicative intentions as intentions “to make p asserted”, it looks to be 
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giving an account of speaker meaning in terms of assertion, and not—as in the Gricean account 
presented in §.—vice versa. But this appearance is superﬁcial. Thomason goes on to say that “to 
make p asserted is to add p to the presumptions of the conversational record” (). In other 
words, to make p asserted is merely to have the essential eﬀect of assertion. It would be less con-
fusing to rewrite Thomason’s deﬁnition as follows.
To mean p is to intentionally reveal an intention to [add p to the common ground] through the 
hearer’s recognition of the status of an intention or plan of the speaker’s.
But this is clearly an account of assertive force, not an account of speaker meaning in general. We 
need similar deﬁnitions, with diﬀerent essential eﬀects plugged into the brackets, to account for 
other kinds of illocutionary force. Suppose that we adopt Portner’s account of the essential eﬀect 
of directive force, for example. Plugging it in, we get the following account of directive force:
To direct A to F is to intentionally reveal an intention to add F to the A’s To-Do List through 
the A’s recognition of the status of an intention or plan of the speaker’s.
Undoubtedly, there is plenty of room to argue about the precise formulation of these deﬁnitions. 
For example: we could plug in diﬀerent essential eﬀects for directive force, and we could ﬂesh out 
those eﬀects formally in ways that look like Portner’s, Charlow’s, or Starr’s theories. We could al-
so—if we were so inclined—go through a series of counterexamples, remedies, and epicycles par-
allel to those explored by Griceans in their quest to deﬁne speaker meaning. But my goal has been 
merely the following: to establish that the move from Stalnaker’s account to Thomason’s, via the 
addition of intending and intention-recognition to Stalnaker’s deﬁnition, is warranted, and to es-
tablish that Thomason’s account would have to be reworded and reconstrued to account for dif-
ferent kinds of illocutionary force.
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3.5.2  Collapse into Griceanism
Immediately after articulating the above-quoted deﬁnition of speaker meaning, Thomason oﬀers 
a puzzling comparison of his view to Grice’s:
Notice that this is a considerable departure from Grice’s  deﬁnition; and it makes plan 
recognition central to meaning. … It is also much less convoluted than Grice’s deﬁnition; nev-
ertheless, it gives much the same results as Grice’s, over a healthy spread of cases. (: )
There is much to disagree with here. First, I doubt that Thomason’s deﬁnition is really “less convo-
luted” than Grice’s. Rather, I suspect that he has merely elided complexity by relying on the no-
tions of revealing a plan and recognizing the status of a plan; making those notions fully explicit 
would bring the wording of Thomason’s deﬁnition closer to Grice’s.55  Second, Thomason implies 
that the fact that his deﬁnition “makes plan recognition central to meaning” sets it apart from 
Grice’s explication of speaker meaning. But speaker meaning is all about intention-recognition for 
Grice, and plans are just complex intentions or structures of intentions; so Thomason’s deﬁnition 
is, in this respect, somewhere between a tweak and a notational variant of Grice’s. Third—as I am 
about to show—there are interesting cases in which Thomason’s deﬁnition does not give “the 
same result as Grice’s”, and these diﬀerences reﬂect well on Grice’s account and poorly on Thoma-
son’s. 
Most broadly, I am skeptical about the extent to which Thomason’s deﬁnition “is a consider-
able departure from Grice’s  deﬁnition”. I think it would be better to call it a slight but signiﬁ-
cant departure, and a departure for the worse. Once dynamic approaches to illocutionary force 
are framed in terms of Thomasonian plan/intention-recognition, the distance from Thomason’s 
dynamic approach to a Gricean approach is the distance from thinking that our aim in speaking 
is to aﬀect the shared conversational context to thinking that our aim in speaking is to aﬀect the 
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55 I suspect that another reason that Thomason’s deﬁnition may seem simpler is that it hasn’t yet 
been subjected to a barrage of counterexamples at the hands of philosophers like Stephen Schiﬀer.
psychological states of our addressees. This is the short distance from a bad theory of communi-
cation to a good one.
One kind of reason for preferring the Gricean approach is pretheoretic and intuitive: in con-
versing with another agent, it just seems wrong to say that my aim in speaking is not to change 
their beliefs, but to change the context. Normal speakers don’t seem to even have the relevant 
concept of context, and even if they did, I doubt that it would ﬁgure in their intentions in speak-
ing to other people. Yet, dynamic theorists are quite explicit about their commitment to the idea 
that what constitutes the speaker’s half of communication is an intention to aﬀect the conversa-
tion’s context rather than to aﬀect the addressee’s mental state.
On the present view, it is the common ground, not the speaker, that’s “informed”, and it is mu-
tual belief behavior, and not knowledge, that’s sought. This permits a generalization over rhe-
torical questions, quiz questions, etc., which are problems for more solipsistic views of infor-
mation in discourse. (Roberts /: , fn)
A communicative intention is “a plan to move the conversation from one state to another, 
where conversational state is an abstract record of what's ‘going on’ in the conversation.” (Mur-
ray and Starr : slide )
The intuitive point is that this just seems wrong: in asserting that I am from Canada, what I’m 
really aiming to do is to get you to believe that (I believe that) I am from Canada. It seems to me 
dubious to say that my aim is to change the state of the context.
So far, this point is merely intuitive, and far from decisive. To develop the intuition into an ar-
gument, we need to think more carefully about what dynamic theorists mean by ‘context’. Most 
often, dynamic pragmatic and semantic theorists holds that context is somehow constructed from 
the mutual attitudes of the participants in a conversation. This view is most naturally applied to 
the part of the context that represents participants’ shared information—often called common 
ground—and various authors have identiﬁed this part of the context with the set of propositions 
mutually believed (e.g., Bach and Harnish ) or mutually known (e.g., Clark and Marshall 
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) by the participants in a conversation.56  Most inﬂuentially, Stalnaker deﬁnes the common 
ground as the set of propositions presupposed by all of the participants in a conversation:
Roughly speaking, the presuppositions of a speaker are the propositions whose truth he takes 
for granted as part of the background of a conversation. A proposition is presupposed if the 
speaker is disposed to act as if he assumes or believes that the proposition is true, and as if he 
assumes or believes that his audience assumes or believes that it is true as well. Presuppositions 
are what is taken by the speaker to be the common ground of the participants in a conversation, 
what is treated as their common ground or mutual knowledge. The propositions presupposed in 
the intended sense need not really be common or mutual knowledge; the speaker need not 
even believe them. He may presuppose any proposition that he ﬁnds it convenient to assume 
for the purpose of the conversation, provided he is prepared to assume that his audience will 
assume it along with him. (Stalnaker : )
Dynamic theorists use the state of a conversation’s context to explain what can happen at a given 
stage of the conversation—which presupposition triggers can be felicitously uttered, for example, 
or which entities are picked out by anaphora. It therefore makes sense to think of common 
ground as determined by what speakers present themselves as knowing, rather than by what 
speakers actually know. The attitudes in which the state of the context is grounded should there-
fore be public attitudes (cf. Thomason : §§–) and as-if attitudes. Stalnaker’s notion of pre-
supposition satisﬁes both constraints. In arguing that we should understand an act’s directive 
force in terms of its (intended) eﬀect on an action-guiding dimension of context, Portner and 
Starr make it clear that they take this action-guiding aspect of context to be constituted by public, 
as-if attitudes as well, albeit action-guiding attitudes such as preferences, plans, or practical 
judgments.57
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56 Mutual knowledge is also sometimes called ‘common knowledge’. I go into greater detail about 
these and other related mutual attitudes in Chapter Four.
57 As I pointed out in §.., Charlow diverges on this issue. In arguing that an act’s force is con-
stituted by the type of eﬀect it characteristically has on a representor, he deﬁnes a representor as 
modeling the attitudes of particular addressees, rather than public, as-if attidudes. If this interpre-
tation is correct, then he already agrees with my point in this subsection.
We may think of the Common Ground and To-Do List as being the public, or interactional, 
counterparts of the individual agent’s beliefs and desires. That is, as far as the participants in 
an interaction go, an agent’s actions will be judged rational to the extent that, if undertaken in 
any world compatible with the Common Ground, they would tend to make this world maxi-
mally highly ranked according to that agent’s To-Do List. (Portner : )
The characteristic eﬀects associated with each sentence type are not understood as eﬀects on 
the agents’ private information, questions or preferences. Building on Stalnaker , , 
they are eﬀects on what is mutually taken for granted for the purposes of the agents’ linguistic 
activities. So the basic idea of a preference semantics for imperatives amounts to the idea that 
Dance Frank! makes Frank’s dancing mutually preferable to Frank’s not-dancing (for the pur-
poses of the conversation). (Starr ms: §)
Stalnaker spells out his notion of presupposition in terms of speakers’ dispositions to behave as if 
they have certain private attitudes. One serious challenge for Portner and Starr is to give a similar 
account of how the public, as-if, action-guiding attitudes they posit are grounded in agents’ pri-
vate attitudes (and perhaps dispositions). What individual states of mind do a group of agents 
have to be in, in order to have a certain mutual preference for the purposes of a conversation? 
This challenge is non-trivial, and it is far from clear how it can be met. Lewis gives the most thor-
ough treatment of the issue of what determines dimensions of context. In the context of his meta-
phorical treatment of the context as a conversational scoreboard, he distinguishes each conversa-
tional participant’s “mental scoreboard” from the public “conversational score”, and gives a func-
tionalist account of the relationship between the two notions and the private psychological states 
of speakers:
Conversational score is, by deﬁnition, whatever the mental scoreboards say it is; but we refrain 
from trying to say just what the conversationalists’ mental scoreboards are. We assume that 
some or other mental representations are present that play the role of a scoreboard, in the fol-
lowing sense: what they register depends on the history of the conversation in the way that 
score should according to the rules. The rules specifying the kinematics of score thereby spec-
ify the role of a scoreboard; the scoreboard is whatever best ﬁlls this role; and the score is 
whatever the scoreboard registers. (a: )
But even if we assume that some psychological state or other can play the role of the private real-
izer of the public, as-if, action-guiding dimension of the context (which is by no means obvious), 
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this would not be enough for Portner and Starr. They also need the psychological state in question 
to be fundamentally non-cognitive. And this is a tough aim to achieve. Following Stalnaker’s 
model, the most natural way of glossing the idea of public, as-if preferences (to take Starr’s ac-
count as an example), would be as those preferences that each participant “takes for granted as 
part of the background of a conversation”, where a speaker takes a preference for granted in this 
way if he is “disposed to act as if he assumes or believes that [the preference exists], and as if he 
assumes or believes that his audience assumes or believes that it [exists] as well.” But this gloss is 
not available to Starr, because it would make public preferences a special case of presuppositions, 
and that, in turn, would make directive force a special case of assertive force. So, Portner and 
Starr not only owe us an explanation of how their proposed action-guiding dimensions of context 
are grounded in agents’ private psychological states; these psychological states also mustn’t boil 
down to agents’ presuppositions about  action-guiding states. 
Supposing that such an account can be given, further problems lurk. Now that we have a bet-
ter idea of what it would be for a speaker to intend to update the context, how plausible is it that 
this is what performing a speech act consists in? For example: does performing an assertion re-
quire intending to produce mutual presuppositions in all of the participants in a conversation, or 
does it require intending to produce a belief in a particular addressee? There are excellent reasons 
to prefer the latter answer to the former. The former answer would imply that, in order to assert p, 
I have to intend to bring it about that I will presuppose that my addressee presupposes p. But this 
simply isn’t the case. To take just one obvious and straightforward counterexample: I could assert 
that p in a suicide note. Although this would presumably involve intending that my addressee be-
lieve (that I believe) p, it would not involve intending that there be any point at which my ad-
dressee and I mutually presuppose p. Indeed, if I’m really serious about the note, then my beliefs 
rule out the possibility that such a mutual presupposition will ever obtain. The same goes for di-
rective speech acts: I can direct my executor to do various things via my will, in which case I in-
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tend for the eﬀect of my speech act to obtain only after I won’t be around to participate in the mu-
tual attitudes that would constitute the public, as-if, action-guiding dimension of context. This 
gives us good reason, I think, to deny that the intended eﬀects of speech acts are public.
There are also problems with the idea that the intended eﬀects are as-if attitudes rather than 
genuine attitudes. This is particularly clear in the case of directives: what I ultimately care about in 
directing you to do something is that you do it; producing an intention (or other action-guiding 
state) is ultimately a means to that end. But whereas there are clear connections between agents’ 
private action-guiding states and their actions, the connection between as-if action-guiding states 
and action is far less clear. Starr, for example, uses his notion of public, as-if preferences to explain 
which actions are preferable “for the purposes of the conversation”. But, even if we can make sense 
of something’s being preferred for the purposes of a conversation, what is the connection between 
this notion and speakers’ actions? One possible answer might be Portner’s: “as far as the partici-
pants in an interaction go, an agent’s actions will be judged rational” only if they bear some rela-
tion to the action-guiding dimension of the context. But contexts, like conversations, are ﬂeeting, 
and we often direct our addressees to do something long after the conversation will come to an 
end. In this case, what we hold our addressee responsible for is actually planning (or preferring, 
etc.) to do what we directed them to do, and for following through on that plan (preference). It’s 
hard to see what bearing the mutual, as-if plans (or preferences, etc.) of a past conversation could 
have at that point.
In defending his conception of assertion in terms of intended eﬀects on the common ground 
(“conversational record”), Thomason attempts to address this disconnect between our public, as-if 
attitudes and our actions:
In saying that assertion does not aim intrinsically at belief, I have driven a wedge between 
communication and belief. Of course, this also divorces communication from action—and 
perhaps one motivation of the belief-based approaches was to connect the two. On the view 
I’m advocating, what is the connection between assertion and belief? Well, the conversational 
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record is like a courtroom record; it is evidence, but we may not choose to believe all of it. 
What we choose to believe from what we are told is a special case (but a maximally complex 
special case) of what to make of evidence. (Thomason : )
If the contents of the common ground are evidence, what are they evidence of? They might count 
as evidence of the other speakers’ private attitudes—albeit defeasible evidence, given that presup-
posing p is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for believing p. In fact, the question of how public, as-
if attitudes can count as evidence about agents’ private attitudes merely recapitulates the problem 
of how agents’ public, as-if attitudes are connected to their actions. Boiled down to its essentials, 
the problem is this: what reliable connection is there between agents’ as-if attitudes and their real 
attitudes, such that their as-if attitudes can constitute either partial reasons for action or evidence 
of their real attitudes? This is an open and unanswered question—and one that becomes more 
confusing in the case of public, as-if action-guiding states, since plans and preferences just don’t 
seem to be the sorts of things that could count as evidence anyway.
In §.., I argued that the essential eﬀects of illocutionary acts must be reconceived as essen-
tially intended eﬀects. In this subsection, I have argued that these essentially intended eﬀects must 
be eﬀects that we intend to have on our addressees, and not on contexts constituted by public, as-
if attitudes. Together, these two arguments eﬀect the collapse of dynamic accounts of illocutionary 
force into Gricean accounts.
3.5.3  Objections and Replies
How might dynamic theorists reply to my arguments? One way would be to point out cases in 
which we do seem to speak with the intention of updating a public, or as-if representation rather 
than the private attitudes of an addressee. For example, Roberts argues that dynamic views allow 
us to avoid a common kind of putative counterexample to Gricean accounts:
On the present view, it is the common ground, not the speaker, that’s “informed,” and it is 
mutual-belief behavior, and not knowledge, that’s sought. This permits a generalization over 
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rhetorical questions, quiz questions, etc., which are problems for more solipsistic views of in-
formation in discourse. (Roberts /: , fn.)
Rhetorical questions and quiz questions are sometimes seen as problems for Gricean speech act 
theory because they involve uttering interrogative sentences without the usual sorts of intentions: 
in asking a rhetorical question, one doesn’t intend one’s addressee to answer, and, in asking a quiz 
question, one doesn’t intend them to answer on the basis of a belief that the speaker desires to 
know the answer. This problem is similar to the one about audienceless utterances, advice, and 
similar cases considered in §.., and my response is similar as well. Rhetorical questions are ob-
vious cases of making as if to ask a question in order to indirectly perform an assertive speech act. 
Quiz questions, on the other hand, may be perfectly literal and direct acts of questioning—at-
tempts to get one’s addressee to assert an answer—but they diﬀer from typical questions because 
of the grounds on which the questioner expects her addressee to intend to answer. In asking a 
prototypical question, we intend that our addressee form an intention to answer partly because 
she recognizes that we desire to know the answer. In asking a quiz question, we intend that our 
addressee form an intention to answer partly because she recognizes that we want her to demon-
strate knowledge of the answer. This account draws on the theory of illocutionary underspeciﬁca-
tion outlined in §.., and mirrors my explanation of how acts of commanding, requesting, and 
advising can all be performed literally and directly by uttering an imperative.
Thomason sketches another case that seems better handled by his theory than by Grice’s—that 
of “a congressman interviewing a witness at a hearing. What the congressman has to assume in 
order to keep track of the conversation and what he believes are two diﬀerent things” (: ). 
Moreover, as with other cases in which the participants in a conversation know that what matters 
is what is preserved for posterity, rather than what their addressee comes away thinking, it is 
plausible that a witness being interviewed by a congressman would intend her speech acts pri-
marily to change the public record in a very real sense. But this just shows how diﬀerent testifying 
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before congress is from regular conversation. As opposed from the kind of “testimony” that inter-
ests epistemologists, congressional testimony is a kind of conventional speech act in Bach and 
Harnish’s () sense, which is to say that its performance is partly grounded in extra-linguistic 
social institutions or conventions, such as, for example, the congressional record. Regular conver-
sation diﬀers from cogressional testimony at least this regard, and so it would be a bad idea to use 
this fact to shed light on communication or linguistic meaning in general.
The most interesting argument against Griceanism and in favor of a dynamic approach rests 
on the putative explanatory power of dynamic approaches to context. By positing shared and 
evolving contexts that are constituted by speakers’ mutual, as-if attiudes, dynamic theorists have 
attempted to explain and predict a wide range of linguistic phenomena. For example, Stalnaker’s 
notion of common ground (and closely related notions), has been used to give semantic accounts 
of many diﬀerent kinds of context-sensitive expressions.58 A dynamic notion of context has often 
appealed to in explanations of the felicity of uttering presupposition triggers.59  Portner () 
uses facts about the To-Do List to make predictions about the felicity conditions and semantic 
values of deontic modals. And Roberts (/) uses features of the Questions Under Discus-
sion to make predictions about which contributions to a conversation will be relevant. If we adopt 
a Gricean theory of speech acts rather than a dynamic one, do we have to give up these and simi-
lar dynamic explanations of context-sensitive linguistic phenomena?
The short answer is no. Context plays two roles in dynamic theories: it is what is updated by 
speech acts, and it determines the properties of context-sensitive expressions. What my argu-
ments in this section have shown is that we should abandon the idea that context plays the ﬁrst 
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58  Expressions that have been given semantic treatments that appeal to dynamic notions of con-
text include indicative conditionals (e.g., Stalnaker ), deﬁnite descriptions (e.g., Heim ; 
Lewis a; Roberts , ), demonstratives (e.g., Roberts ), anaophoric pronouns 
(e.g., Heim ; Kamp , ), proper names (Cumming ), and so on.
59  E.g., Beaver (), Chierchia (), Heim (). For an overview, see Beaver and Geurts 
().
role. It does not follow that there is no role for context or mutual, as-if attitudes in a theory of lan-
guage use, and it is consistent with everything I’ve said here that these attitudes play some or all of 
the roles alluded to in the last paragraph. All that my arguments here commit me to is the conclu-
sion that updating the context is not the constitutive aim of performing a speech act; we can still 
say that context update is a common kind of downstream perlocutionary eﬀect of performing a 
speech act that is normally expected by the speaker. On my view, the problem with dynamic theo-
ries is that they collapse the distinction between these downstream perlocutionary eﬀects and in-
tended eﬀects that are actually constitutive of speech acts. And it may be that semantic theories 
should pick up on how these downstream eﬀects license future speech acts. (That said, I must 
admit that I am skeptical about many appeals to context in semantics and pragmatics, including 
most of the appeals alluded to above; I gave some reasons for this skepticism in Chapter Two.)
3.6  Griceanism and Embedded Imperatives
Just one problem for my Gricean account of imperatives still remains. Assuming that we cannot 
maintain that mood always takes wide scope (which it seems we can’t—see §.. and §..), 
how can the Gricean account for genuine cases of imperative embedded under logical operators? 
Consider again our stock of examples:
() Buy me a drink and make it a stiﬀ one!        !φ and !ψ
() Buy me a drink or leave me alone!        !φ or !ψ
() If the bartender comes back, buy me a drink.        (if ⊦φ)(!ψ)
() a. Give me all your money or the puppy gets it.         !φ or ⊦ψ
 b. You mow the lawn or I’ll clean the garage 
() a. Say that again and I’ll scream. !φ and ⊦ψ
 b. Stay here and I’ll go to the store. 
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() If he comes back, buy me a drink and I’ll pay you back. (if ⊦φ)(!ψ and ⊦σ)
In constructing an act-theoretic semantic account for sentences like these, we can draw on some 
of the successes of dynamic accounts. First, notice that many of these sentences aren’t used to per-
form illocutionary acts of any of the usual types. Whenever indicatives and imperatives are mixed 
under a connective, for example, the result is neither an assertion or a directive but a speech act of 
a diﬀerent, sui generis kind. For example, a hypothetical imperetive sentence (if ⊦φ)(!ψ) is not 
used to perform an assertive or a directive act, but some third kind of act that is systematically 
related to both. We could call acts of this kind hypothetical directives. Intuitively, hypothetical di-
rectives are constituted by a communicative intention to produce a contingency plan in an ad-
dressee. For example: performing a literal and direct speech act with () intuitively involves in-
tending one’s addressee to enter a mental state such that if she comes to believe that the bartended 
has come back (together with certain other beliefs, such as the belief that I am still thirsty), she 
will form an intention to buy me a drink.
We need to enrich the Gricean theory of speech acts in order to account for these hybrid 
speech acts. The natural way of doing this would be to match up hybrid sentences with hybrid il-
locutionary act-types via the diﬀerent kinds of eﬀects that a speaker who utters such a hybrid sen-
tence thereby intends to have on an addressee. Because dynamic theories understand the seman-
tic values of multiple-clause sentences directly in terms of their essential eﬀects on context, dy-
namic theorists of mood have already developed many of the theoretical tools that we need to do 
this.
Charlow’s account can provide some inspiration. Recall that he winds up identifying the se-
mantic values of sentences with properties of representors, where a representor ⟨Sa,Λa⟩ is a 
model-theoretic representation of an agent a’s information Sa and the agent’s plan Λa. Charlow 
spells out the semantic values of declarative and imperative clauses, as well as several of their pos-
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sible combinations, by giving a recursive speciﬁcation of the conditions under which a sentence φ 
holds at a representor ⟨S, Λ⟩ (represented as ⌜⟨S, Λ⟩ ⊨ φ⌝). 
⟨S, Λ⟩ ⊨ ⊦φ iﬀ ∀w ∈ S : φ is true at w
⟨S, Λ⟩ ⊨ ¬⊦φ iﬀ ∀w ∈ S : φ is not true at w
⟨S, Λ⟩ ⊨ !φ only if ∀w ∈ minΛa : φ  is true at w
⟨S, Λ⟩ ⊨ (if φ)(!ψ) only if ∀w ∈ minΛa ∩ {wʹ′ : φ is true at wʹ′} : ψ is true at w
⟨S, Λ⟩ ⊨ (Φ⋀Ψ) iﬀ ⟨S, Λ⟩ ⊨ Φ and ⟨S, Λ⟩ ⊨ Ψ
A sentence holds at a representor just in case the representor has the property that the sentence 
denotes, and representors are just abstract representations of agents’ beliefs and plans (intentions). 
Moreover, Charlow thinks of speech acts as proposals for updating an addressee’s mental state. So, 
Charlow’s account is not far away from a Gricean, act-theoretic one: the distance is roughly that 
which I covered in §... In other words, we can bring Charlow’s insights into a speech act-
theoretic semantics of the sort that I outlined in §. by construing the properties Charlow iden-
tiﬁes with the denotations of clauses as the eﬀects that a speaker would have to communicatively 
intend to have on an addressee in order to token the clauses’ semantic values.
The implementation of this kind of idea within the framework outlined in Chapter Two and 
§. is relatively straightforward, but leaves open many options. One option would be to model 
speakers’ overall psychological states using model-theoretic structures of the same kind that dy-
namic theorists use model the context, and to specify the communicatively intended eﬀect associ-
ated with each clause type in terms of the communicatively intended eﬀect associated a given sen-
tence radical. This could proceed in a way that is precisely structurally analogous to the any of the 
ways in which dynamic semanticists specify the context-change potentials of clauses in terms of 
the context-change potentials of sentence radicals. The fact that this way of proceeding is possible 
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makes the task of giving a speech-act-theoretic semantics for mood as trivial as shopping around 
to the diﬀerent dynamic views and combining their best qualities.
I will take a diﬀerent approach here—one that draws on the same notion of rational require-
ment that I used in §.. to explain intuitions that purport to be about imperative consequence. 
We begin by giving compositional principles for each of the three major clause-types:
Declarative Composition [S ⊦φ]
S’s semantic value is a type that is tokenable by an act constituted by the communicative inten-
tion to produce a cognitive state whose content is a particular proposition that can be expressed 
by tokening φ’s semantic value.
Imperative Composition [S !φ]
S’s semantic value is a type that is tokenable by an act constituted by the communicative inten-
tion to produce an intention whose content is any proposition that can be expressed by token-
ing φ’s semantic value.
Next we give generalized act-theoretic compositional principles for each of the sentential connec-
tives. The simplest case is conjunction, which I’ll use to illustrate the overall strategy 
(⋀C) Conjunction Composition [S S and S]
S’s semantic value is a type that is tokenable by any speech acts constituted by communicatively 
intending to produce a mental state e in one’s addressee, where e meets the following condition: 
for some mental states e and e that one can communicatively intend to produce in an ad-
dressee by uttering S and S, respectively, to be in e is to be in a state such that one is rationally 
committed to being in both e and e and if one is in both e and e then one is rationally com-
mitted to being in e.
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The key notion here is that of rational commitment, which I appealed to in §.. in order to ex-
plain the intuition that some arguments that involve imperatives can be valid. If the mental states 
we’re considering are just beliefs, then logic places strict limits on our rational commitments: 
we’re rationally committed to believing whichever propositions are entailed by the propositions 
we believe and we’re rationally prohibited from believing whichever propositions are logically in-
consistent with the propositions we believe.60  From this conception of rational commitment, it 
follows that if we plug in declarative clauses for S and S in (⋀C), the semantic value of S will be a 
type that we can token by asserting a conjunctive proposition each of whose conjuncts could have 
been asserted by uttering S and S, respectively.61  
What if we plug in an imperative for S and a declarative for S, as in ()?
(10) Stay here and I’ll go to the store! !φ and ⊦ψ
In this case, (⋀C) predicts that one way to token ()’s semantic value would be by performing 
the sort of hybrid speech act that would be constituted by communicatively intending that my 
addressee both intend to stay here and believe that I am going to the store. This is the correct pre-
diction. Moreover, since norms of rational commitment govern intentions and combinations of 
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60  It should be clear that these rules place only hard upper and lower bounds on rational com-
mitment, and we should expect that, for example, probability theory will spell out more ﬁnely-
grained norms.
61 (⋀C) leaves other interesting possibilities open, even when we’re just dealing with declaratives. 
For example, since I could assert that Frank eats with ‘Frank eats’ and merely suggest that Linda 
drinks with ‘Linda drinks’, (⋀C) leaves open the possibility that I could utter ‘Frank eats and 
Linda drinks’ with the communicative intention to produce an eﬀect in an addressee that would 
combine a belief that Frank eats and an act of considering whether Linda drinks. The resulting 
speech act would neither be an assertion nor a suggestion, but a hybrid of the two. Can we really 
do this? I think so: all we need to get the right reading is a combination of the right circumstances 
and, perhaps, a bit of hesitant intonation or an uncertain facial expression while uttering the sec-
ond conjunct. If I am right about this possibility, then it constitutes a reason for preferring my 
view over any view that takes assertive force to scope over conjunction.
beliefs, (⋀C) gives us the resources to explain the intuition that certain conjunctions that involve 
imperatives are either infelicitous or inconsistent (see §..).
Things play out in more or less the same way in the case of disjunction:
(⋁C) Disjunction Composition [S S or S]
S’s semantic value is a type that is tokenable by any speech acts constituted by communicatively 
intending to produce a mental state e in one’s addressee, where e meets the following condition: 
for some mental states e and e that one can communicatively intend to produce in an ad-
dressee by uttering S and S, respectively, to be in e is to be in a state such that if one is also ra-
tionally prohibited from being in e, then one is rationally committed to being in e, and vice 
versa.
Charlow oﬀers no composition principle for disjunction, and Starr argues that the obvious way 
for Charlow to derive one—i.e., saying that ⟦S or S⟧ = ⟦¬(¬S and ¬S)⟧—won’t work because 
imperatives don’t scope under negation (see §..). The principle (⋁C) avoids this problem. In 
essence, (⋁C) gives a functional speciﬁcation of the kind of mental state that we can intend to 
produce by uttering a disjunction. Any state we can intend to produce with a disjunction of two 
declaratives can be identiﬁed with a belief in the disjunction of two propositions. Any state we can 
intend to produce in uttering a disjunction of two imperatives can be thought of as an intention to 
do at least one of two things. And any state we can intend to produce by uttering a mixed declara-
tive–imperative disjunction will be a hybrid cognitive–practical dilemma: a state that rationally 
compells one to intend one thing if one disbelieves a second thing, and to believe the second 
thing if one does not intend the ﬁrst. 
As usual, things are most complicated with conditionals—particularly because we need an 
account that generalizes across conditionals with both declarative and imperative consequents, as 
well as combinations of the two. Rather than attempt to account for all conditionals at once, I will 
215
oﬀer an account of strict conditionals ﬁrst, in the hope that I will be able to generalize the account 
to indicative and counterfactual (declarative) conditionals later. The following principle is a rough 
ﬁrst shot at what we need.
(if-C) Conditional Composition [S (if S)(S)]
S’s semantic value is a type that is tokenable by a speech act constituted by communicatively in-
tending to produce a mental state e in one’s addressee, where e meets the following condition: 
for some belief e and some mental state e that one can communicatively intend to produce in 
an addressee by uttering S and S, respectively, to be in e is to be in a state such that also being 
in e rationally commits one to be in e as well.
If S is a declarative clause and e is the belief that p, then (if-C) amounts to a functional speciﬁca-
tion of a mental state of believing a conditional proposition, which we can think of as the proposi-
tion that p is entailed by the contents of e. If S is an imperative clause and e is the intention to 
bring about p, then (if-C) gives a functional speciﬁcation of a diﬀerent kind of mental state—
namely, a contingency plan to intend that p should one come to have the belief e. Again, this is 
roughly the right result, though it may require further ﬁne-tuning, and though it will have to be 
extended or reﬁned in order to deal with indicative and counterfactual conditionals. But, despite 
its sketchiness, the account also holds the promise of capturing the meanings of more complex 
conditionals with mixed-mood consequents, such as ():
(11) If he comes back, buy me a drink and I’ll pay you back. (if ⊦φ)(!ψ and ⊦σ)
Applying both (⋀C) and (if-C) to (), we get a functional speciﬁcation of a mental state e such 
that (roughly) if one is in e and one also believes that [an intended individual] has come back 
[from an intended place to an intended place], then one is rationally committed to intend to buy 
[the speaker of ()] a drink and to believe that [the speaker of ()] will pay one back. Notice 
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that this is not the functional speciﬁcation of either a belief or an intention, but a complex and 
hypothetical hybrid of the two. This is plausibly the right result.
These compositional principles diﬀer from the ones outlined in Chapter Two because they tie 
the semantics of expressions directly to the types of communicative intentions that a speaker can 
have in uttering the expressions, rather than taking a detour through the type of speech act they 
can perform in uttering a sentence. In simple cases, this is avoidable by introducing vocabulary 
for new types of hybrid illocutionary acts. For example, if we know that a hypothetical directive to 
p if q is constituted by an intention to bring about a contingency plan to bring about p only if one 
believes q, then we can give a compositional principle for conditional imperatives in the following 
way:
Conditional Directive Composition [S (if ⊦φ)(!ψ)]
S’s semantic value is a type that is tokenable by a hypothetical directive that p if q, where p is a 
proposition that could be expressed by tokening ψ’s semantic value and q is a proposition that 
could be expressed by tokening φ’s semantic value.
But this strategy doesn’t generalize, because mixed-mood clauses can be embedded within one 
another, and so it isn’t enough to posit hypothetical directives, conjoined and disjoined asser-
tive–directive hybrids, and so on; we would also have to posit conditional assertive–directive hy-
brids, assertive–(directive–assertive) hybrids, and so on. This means that our composition rules 
for expressions with recursive potential that scope over mood can’t be given in terms of a ﬁnite 
list of speech act types; instead, they must recursively specify speech act types by recursively 
specifying their underlying communicative intentions themselves. This is no problem: on a Gri-
cean account, each new type of communicative intention thus speciﬁed will constitute a new type 
of illocutionary act, even if we don’t have a name ready for it. The composition rules given above 
are general enough to accomplish this.
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It’s worth noticing a couple of things about this solution to the problem of embedded non-
declaratives. First, it takes inspiration from the playbook of the dynamic theorists like Charlow 
and Starr. In fact, I think it improves on the current menu of dynamic options, particularly when 
it comes to disjunction. But in learning from dynamic pragmatics and semantics, I have avoided 
taking on board the misguided dynamic theory of communication. Second, this account of em-
bedded non-declaratives depends intimately on the Gricean foundations of my speech act-
theoretic semantics. Not just any theory of illocutionary acts will do. This is interesting because it 
shows how the nuts and bolts of compositional semantics are intimately tied to foundational is-
sues about the nature of communication.
3.7  Conclusion and Mile-Marking
In this chapter I have argued that the best account of the meaning of mood is a speech act-
theoretic semantics built on a Gricean pragmatic foundation. The semantic value of a clause is a 
type of speech act, such that this type is individuated in terms of the types of communicative in-
tentions that a speaker can have in performing a literal and direct speech act with the clause. All 
of the other major semantic accounts of mood are ﬂawed in some way or other, and the best of 
the lot—dynamic pragmatic and semantic theories—collapse into the Gricean account once they 
are combined with a good (i.e., Gricean) theory of communication.
I have not attempted to show how this account extends to interrogative clauses here, but I be-
lieve that such an extension is both possible and warranted. Indeed, because the best contempo-
rary semantic accounts of interrogatives are framed in dynamic semantics (e.g. Roberts /
), the arguments I gave in §. should apply to them as well. Because of the vastness of the 
literature on interrogatives—it is even larger than the literature on imperatives—I don’t have 
space to address it adequately here.
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My conclusions here lend further support to the overall goal of the dissertation, which is to 
establish that meaning is a relation borne by utterance-types to speech act-types, and that the se-
mantic values of expressions for the purposes of compositional semantics are the types of speech 
acts to which they’re thus related. Following on my argument from semantic underspeciﬁcation 
in the last chapter, I take this chapter to constitute a second broad and persuasive argument for 
this view. But much remains to be done. In Chapter Four, I will investigate the nature of the rela-
tion that a type of speech act must bear to a type of utterance in order to count as its semantic 
value. In Chapter Five I will investigate the ways in which this conception of semantics should 
both shape and be shaped by our understanding of the syntax–semantics interface.
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CHAPTER FOUR: METASEMANTICS WITHOUT LINGUISTIC CONVENTION
In virtue of what do expressions have meaning? Most contemporary answers to this question are 
forms of conventionalism, according to which an expression has meaning for a group of speakers 
in virtue of linguistic conventions in which the speakers participate. One of my goals in this chap-
ter is to show that conventionalism is false—to show, in other words, that the facts that constitute 
linguistic meaning aren’t facts about convention. Although a theory of convention might have 
some role to play in causal explanations of how linguistic meaning comes about and persists, con-
vention is not necessary for linguistic meaning and can’t feature in the kind of constitutive expla-
nations aimed at by metasemantics.
My objections to conventionalism are based on the idea that the adequacy of a theory of lin-
guistic meaning should be measured, at least in part, by its ability to explain the eﬃciency of lin-
guistic communication. In §., I draw out the consequences of the methodological framework 
introduced in §. for metasemantics. I then deploy this premise in three arguments. The ﬁrst 
two, which appear in §. and §., target Lewisian conventionalism, which is named after David 
Lewis’s (, a) inﬂuential theory of convention, and which I’ll explore in §.. My third 
argument, which appears in §., is more general: it aims to show that all forms of conventional-
ism depend on the conﬂation of causal and constitutive forms of explanation.
The debate into which I am wading takes place in the context of a genre of metasemantic the-
ory that was inaugurated by Grice with the following brief proposal:
“x meansNN (timeless) that so-and-so” might as a ﬁrst shot be equated with some statement or 
disjunction of statements about what “people” (vague) intend (with qualiﬁcations about “rec-
ognition”) to eﬀect by x. (: )
This explication is almost comically rife with tentativeness and hedging. Nonetheless, it should be 
regarded as establishing the framework for ensuing debates about metasemantics. Lewis, Stephen 
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Schiﬀer (, , ), and most other conventionalists hold, like Grice, that utterance-types 
(including linguistic expressions such as words, phrases, and sentences) are meaningful for a 
community of speakers in virtue of facts about community members’ mental states. These con-
ventionalist theories, as well as Grice’s own mature metasemantic views, should be thought of as 
attempts to improve on Grice’s early sketch by better articulating the natures of these psychologi-
cal states. On this broad construal of the debate, Grice and the conventionalists agree about what 
they’re up to. The diﬀerence is that Grice, in his later () work, formulates the skeleton of a 
metasemantic theory from which all convention-like notions can be expunged without losing the 
core of his view. In this regard, I take Grice’s mature approach to be more promising, and I will 
use it as a jumping-oﬀ point for the positive view that I develop in §..
The Grice-inspired metasemantic theory that I defend also supports the broader goals of this 
dissertation, because it is a feature of the theory that meaning is a ternary relation borne by utter-
ance types and speech communities to types of speech acts. The types of speech act thus related to 
an utterance is its meaning for a given community—its semantic value for the purposes of com-
positional semantics. Chapter Five will be concerned with the implications of this view for com-
positional semantics and the syntax–semantics interface.
4.1  Metasemantic Methodology
What is the goal of metasemantics, and how should it be pursued? The metasemantic theories of 
Grice, Lewis, and Schiﬀer all take the form of statements giving necessary and suﬃcient condi-
tions for expressions’ meaningfulness. I will refer to these statements as ‘explications’. I take the 
goal of explication to be the articulation of a constitutive (non-causal) metaphysical relation 
stronger than supervenience—either metaphysical reduction or grounding.
This conception of the goals of metasemantics probably isn’t compatible with the intentions 
behind every instance of ‘=df’ and ‘iﬀ’ in the work of Grice, Lewis, and Schiﬀer. In particular, 
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Grice’s original aim seems to have been conceptual analysis rather than metaphysical reduction. I 
therefore adopt an anachronistic interpretation of Grice. I do so for two reasons. First, I am more 
optimistic about the possibility of successful explications when they are read as metaphysical 
claims. Second, this anachronistic reading creates dialectical friction between Grice, on one hand, 
and Lewis and Schiﬀer, on the other, since the latter philosophers’ goals were clearly metaphysical 
rather than conceptual.1
Much of the vocabulary deployed by metasemanticists in describing their project—including 
my own use of the phrase ‘in virtue of ’—is now typically thought by metaphysicians to express 
the grounding relation rather than metaphysical reduction.2 It is therefore plausible that what me-
tasemantics should be concerned with is the question of what grounds linguistic meaning, rather 
than the question of what meaning reduces to. Grounding is often understood as a weaker meta-
physical relation than reduction, in the sense that a fact F may ground a fact F even if F is 
merely suﬃcient, but not necessary, for F.3  If metasemantics should aim at grounding, rather 
than reducing, facts about linguistic meaning, then we mustn’t rule out the possibility that no sin-
gle condition is both necessary and suﬃcient for meaning. Since the question of whether meta-
semantics should aim at reduction or grounding likely can’t be worked out in advance of substan-
tial ﬁrst-order metasemantic theorizing, I will consider both options.
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1  The idea that metasemantics aims at metaphysical reduction is most explicit in the work of 
Schiﬀer (, , ).
2 See also Neale’s (, , forthcoming a) use of phrases like ‘is constitutive of ’, ‘makes it the 
case that’, and ‘in virtue of ’, in discussing both Grice’s and Schiﬀer’s metasemantics.
3  I follow Rosen’s () discussion of grounding. In particular, I will follow Rosen in holding 
that if the fact that p reduces to the fact that q, then the fact that p is grounded in the fact that q 
(: ). On this view, grounding and reduction are both stronger than supervenience, since a 
fact F may supervene on a fact F despite not being grounded in F—for example, where F is 
the fact that += and F is the fact that Stephen Schiﬀer is not Claudia Schiﬀer (cf. Rosen : 
–; and Schaﬀer : ). For other inﬂuential discussions of grounding, which diverge 
from Rosen in various ways, see Fine (, ) and Schaﬀer ().
How can we know whether a metasemantic theory succeeds? The answer is tied to the fact 
that meaning is a theoretical posit. Like our knowedge of facts about bosons and unconscious 
mental states, our knowledge of facts about meaning must derive from the role that we give to the 
concept of meaning in a theory that explains something else. In the course of reconstructing 
Schiﬀer’s (: ) metasemantic project, Neale makes essentially this point by saying that expli-
cations in metasemantics
earn their keep not by yielding results that conform precisely to native speaker’s intui-
tions—though these are where we start, of course—but in virtue of their interlocking roles in 
an explanatory theory of the “semantic” properties of marks and sounds… (forthcoming a)
I take a similar methodological outlook to be embodied in Lewis’s dictum:
In order to say what a meaning is, we may ﬁrst ask what a meaning does, and then ﬁnd some-
thing that does that. (: )
These remarks suggest a way of judging the merits of metasemantic proposals in keeping with the 
methodological outlook that I outlined in §.. The goal of a metasemantic theory is to give an 
account of the facts that constitute linguistic meaning—facts to which meaning reduces, or facts 
that ground it. The success of a metasemantic theory is to be measured, at least in part, on the ba-
sis of how well it explains the role of meaning in eﬃcient communication. In particular: an ade-
quate metasemantic theory must predict that the utterance types involved in eﬃcient linguistic 
communication are meaningful. The key thrust of my arguments in what follows is that conven-
tionalist metasemantic theories fail to meet this constraint.
4.2  Lewisian Conventionalism
By ‘conventionalism’, I mean any metasemantic theory that gives convention an explanatory role 
to play. I will eventually object to all forms of conventionalism, but I will begin by using Lewisian 
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conventionalism as my primary case study. I do this because Lewisian conventionalism is the 
best-worked-out and most popular exemplar of the genre.
Lewisian conventionalism can be summed up by the innocent-sounding statement that the 
meaning of an expression is constituted by the group’s convention to use a language. For 
Lewisians, however, ‘language’ and ‘convention’ are technical terms. A language, according to 
Lewis, is
a function, a set of ordered pairs of strings and meanings. The entities in the domain of the 
function are certain ﬁnite sequences of types of vocal sounds, or of types of inscribable marks; 
if σ is in the domain of a language ℒ, let us call σ a sentence of ℒ. The entities in the range of 
the function are meanings: if σ is a sentence of ℒ, let us call ℒ(σ) the meaning of σ in ℒ. 
(a: )4
A convention, according to Lewis, is a regularity R in some community G that meets the follow-
ing conditions: 
(i) everyone in G believes that everyone else in G acts in accordance with R; 
(ii) there is a general preference among individuals in G for conformity to R; 
(iii) the belief that R exists gives everyone in G a reason (together with their other goals) to con-
tinue conforming to R; 
(iv) there is at least one other possible regularity R′ that would serve the purposes of the mem-
bers of G just as well if they were to conform to it instead; and 
(v) it is mutual knowledge among members of G that (i)–(iv) obtain.
These two technical concepts, which Lewis sees as precisiﬁcations of our colloquial notions, are 
the building blocks of Lewisian conventionalism. Lewis tells us that a sentence S has a proposition 
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4  Lewis goes on to suggest that sentence meanings can be thought of as sets of possible worlds 
(i.e., propositions), but later adjusts that idea to account for various forms of context-sensitivity 
(). I will mostly speak of expressions being meaningful or having meaning, where this should 
be understood as neutral on the issue of which entities, if any, should be identiﬁed with expres-
sions’ meanings. For a helpful discussion of this issue, see Schiﬀer (: ch. ).
P as its meaning for a group G just in case, for some language L that maps S to P, there prevails in 
G a convention to utter sentences only if L maps them to true propositions (and to expect others 
to do the same).5
There are several well-known objections to the particulars of Lewis’s own theory, my plan is to 
whittle away the aspects of it that give rise to the best-known problems, revealing a core that is as 
plausible as possible and that is shared by all adherents to Lewis’s overall metasemantic strategy. I 
will then argue in §. that all theories sharing this common Lewisian core are false.6
One way to object to Lewis’s theory is to argue that one or more of the clauses of his deﬁnition 
of convention fails to obtain in cases of human language use. For example, Burge () imagines 
isolated speech communities whose religious beliefs dictate that their language is the only possi-
ble one, or that they ought to continue to speak their language even if they could no longer com-
municate with each other. These communities would be counterexamples to Lewis’s condition (v) 
as it applies to his conditions (iii) and (iv), and perhaps also to (iii) and (iv) themselves. In order 
to sidestep Burge’s objections and others like them, I will abstract away from both the particular 
kind of regularity that forms the basis of linguistic conventions and from the particular clauses 
(i)–(iv) of Lewis’s deﬁnition of convention. Given this ﬁrst way of broadening the view, a metase-
mantic theory counts as a form of Lewisian Conventionalism if it requires for the meaningfulness 
of an expression e in a group G that the members of G have mutual knowledge that p, where p is 
some proposition about how e is used by the members of G. This condition on a Lewisian theory 
is met by Lewis’s own theory, which requires that language users have mutual knowledge of con-
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5  This statement most clearly echoes Lewis’s () theory. In place of Lewis’s convention of 
“truthfulness and trust”, Schiﬀer argues that the relevant convention is one of uttering a sentence 
S only if one speaker-means that p, where p = L(S) (, , ). Williamson suggests that 
the relevant regularity is that one utter S only if one knows that that p, where p = L(S) (). 
None of my criticisms is speciﬁc to any of these views.
6  For some other objections to Lewisian Conventionalism, see Devitt (: ch.), Hawthorne 
(, ), Gilbert (), Kölbel (), Laurence (), Magidor and Hawthorne (), 
Petit (), and Schiﬀer (, ).
ditions (i)–(iv) as they apply to a regularity of truthfulness and trust in some language, but it 
would also subsume any adjustments to Lewis’s theory that are designed to avoid objections of the 
kind raised by Burge.
Next, I want to consider mutual knowledge and some of its weaker relatives.7  According to the 
best-known, iterative deﬁnition, A and B mutually know that p if and only if:
(1a) A knows that p. 
(1b) B knows that p.
(2a) A knows that B knows that p.
(2b) B knows that A knows that p.
(3a) A knows that B knows that A knows that p. 
(3b) B knows that A knows that B knows that p. 
And so on, ad inﬁnitum.
A useful generalization of this notion, which is spelled out by Clark and Marshall (), is shared 
knowledgen, which a pair of agents possess just in case they satisfy conditions (a)–(nb) of the 
deﬁnition of mutual knowledge. Mutual knowledge is shared knowledge∞.
Lewis () and Schiﬀer () oﬀer similar reasons for thinking that mutual knowledge 
should be a necessary condition on the meaningfulness of an expression in a community, and 
their reasoning shows that they want their metasemantic theories to explain the eﬃciency of 
communication in the way that I outlined in §. and §.. Suppose that A utters ‘the sunset is 
beautiful’ to B, thereby intending to communicate that the sunset is beautiful. We might try to 
explain B’s success in interpreting A by supposing that A and B both participate in a regularity of 
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7 The term ‘mutual knowledge‘ is used by Schiﬀer (), Clark and Marshall (), and others 
for what Lewis (, ) and Barwise (: Ch.) call ‘common knowledge’.
truthfulness and trust in some language L such that L(‘the sunset is beautiful’) = the proposition 
that the sunset is beautiful. But, as Lewis and Schiﬀer point out, this condition is not suﬃcient to 
explain the eﬃciency of linguistic communication, since B might mistakenly believe that A par-
ticipates in a regularity of truthfulness and trust in Lʹ′, such that Lʹ′(‘the sunset is beautiful’) = the 
proposition that the sunrise is ugly. This sort of false higher-order belief could lead B to interpret 
A as meaning by his utterance that the sunrise is ugly, or could lead A, for similar reasons, to 
change his speech behavior to put it in conformity with what he thinks B will expect. In order to 
rule out this kind of miscommunication, A and B would have to have shared knowledge that 
they both participate in a regularity of truthfulness and trust in L (rather than, for example, Lʹ′). 
But this condition is also insuﬃcient to ward oﬀ miscommunication, since A might know that B 
participates in the regularity of truthfulness and trust in L but mistakenly believe that B believes 
that A participates in a regularity of truthfulness and trust in Lʹ′, and this higher-order belief 
would short-circuit the potential for communication in much the same way as the previous case. 
This kind of miscommunication would be warded oﬀ if A and B had shared knowledge that they 
they both participate in a regularity of truthfulness and trust in L. Lewis and Schiﬀer argue that 
this kind of problem can iterate indeﬁnitely, and conclude that the only way to explain the reliable 
eﬃciency of linguistic communication is to require that A and B possess shared knowl-
edge∞—mutual knowledge—of the the linguistic regularity in which they both participate. The 
fact that this argument is based on the need to ensure the eﬃciency of linguistic communication, 
and that it supplies crucial support for Lewisian conventionalism, will become signiﬁcant in §..
I also want to consider three proposals for weakening of the standard notion of mutual 
knowledge. The ﬁrst is due to Schiﬀer, who argues that, for the purposes of deﬁning mutual 
knowledge, an agent can count as knowing that p despite the fact that “the thought that [p] never 
once entered [his] head”, and also despite the fact that he “might have to be ‘convinced’ or 
‘brought to see’ that he is entitled to claim to know” that p (: ). One reason to go along 
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with Schiﬀer on this weakening is to avoid commitment to the idea that agents with mutual 
knowledge have an inﬁnite number of warranted true beliefs, which might seem psychologically 
dubious. For reasons in this ballpark, Lewisians have generally argued that agents can be counted 
as possessing mutual knowledge on the basis of shared situations that furnish them with inde-
pendent justiﬁcatory “premises” (Lewis ), “conditions” (Schiﬀer ), or “heuristics” (Clark 
and Marshall ) from which mutual knowledge could, in principle, be derived.8  In eﬀect, 
Schiﬀer’s idea is to reduce the psychological demands of mutual knowledge by replacing it with 
entitlement to mutual knowledge—an epistemic state that a pair of agents are in if they would be 
justiﬁed were they to make any of the judgements corresponding to the clauses of the deﬁnition of 
mutual knowledge.
Bach and Harnish () propose a diﬀerent notion in place of mutual knowledge. They ﬁrst 
suggest replacing knowledge with mere belief because it seems that the extra ingredients in 
knowledge don’t actually do any work: if a group of speakers believe (and believe that they be-
lieve, etc.) that a certain sentence is a reliable way to get a certain point across, then those beliefs 
become self-fulﬁlling. Second, Bach and Harnish point out that since humans can’t entertain 
higher-order thoughts beyond a certain degree of complexity, there is no need to posit an inﬁnite 
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8  See McCarthy et al () and Barwise (: Ch.) for model-theoretic arguments that the 
iterated deﬁnition of mutual knowledge given earlier is unsatisfactory because it does not entail 
that two agents with mutual knowledge will mutually know that they have mutual knowledge. 
Barwise considers two other deﬁnitions, including Harman’s () “ﬁxed point” deﬁnition and a 
“shared situation” deﬁnition that Barwise attributes to Lewis (), Schiﬀer (), and Clark 
and Marshall (). The last of these is what I call “entitlement to mutual knowledge”. Barwise 
argues that although the ﬁxed point deﬁnition is useful for information-theoretic purposes, the 
shared-situation deﬁnition is preferable for theorizing about actual agents (: ).
number of higher-order beliefs. What they wind up suggesting in place of mutual knowledge is 
shared belief plus (just to be safe) a ban on countervailing higher-order beliefs (: , fn.).9
Finally, I want to consider an alternative to mutual knowledge that is inspired by Stalnaker’s 
notion of presupposition. According to Stalnaker, “a proposition is presupposed if the speaker is 
disposed to act as if he assumes or believes that the proposition is true, and as if he assumes or 
believes that his audience assumes or believes that it is true as well” (: ). Whereas entitle-
ment to mutual knowledge and shared belief are true weakenings of mutual knowledge, in the 
sense that any group of agents who mutually know that p will also possess entitlement to mutual 
knowledge that p and shared beliefn that p (for any n), shared presuppositionn is not a proper 
weakening of mutual knowledge (for any n). As Stalnaker points out, presupposing a proposition 
is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for either knowledge of or belief in it, since we may presuppose 
something contrary to our beliefs for the sake of a conversation (: ). Instead, what matters 
for shared presuppositionn is that agents are disposed to act as if they possess shared beliefn for 
the purposes of the conversation.
Say that A and B possess some shared attitude that p just in case they possess either the enti-
tlement to shared knowledgen, shared beliefn, or shared presuppositionn that p, for some n ≥ . In 
that case, say that a theory is an instance of Generalized Lewisian Conventionalism just in case it 
requires for the meaningfulness of an expression e for a group G that the members of G possess 
some shared attitude that p, where p is a proposition about how e is used by the members of G. 
I turn now to two arguments that, even on this very broad construal, no form of Lewisian 
Conventionalism can be correct.
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9 Bach and Harnish use the term ‘mutual belief ’ for their proposed weakening of mutual knowl-
edge. I deviate from their terminology for the sake of terminological consistency. My conventions 
are straightforward: for any propositional attitude Ψ which can be reported using a verb whose 
third person singular conjugation is φ, and for any proposition p, two agents posses shared Ψn 
that p just in case they satisfy clauses a–nb of the result of replacing every instance of ‘knows’ 
with φ in the iterated deﬁnition of mutual knowledge given above. Two agents possess mutual Ψ 
that p just in case they possess shared Ψ∞ that p.
4.3  Against Shared Attitudes
The strategy of Generalized Lewisian Conventionalism is to explain the eﬃciency of linguistic 
communication within a speech community by saying that the community’s members have 
shared attitudes about the linguistic regularities in which they participate. This idea, even in its 
watered-down state, becomes problematic when we consider situations in which agents commu-
nicate eﬃciently with language despite being in an epistemically poor position with respect to 
their linguistic regularities. Situations of this kind can result from the diﬀerences in vocabulary, 
dialect, and register that separate us all to varying degrees. 
As an illustration of this point, consider the following scenario. A and B are diplomats at the 
United Nations who have plenty of reasons to think that they don’t speak the same language. In 
particular, each has plenty of evidence that the other doesn’t speak English. In fact, the last time 
they encountered one another, they really didn’t speak a common language. In the mean time, 
however, they’ve both been secretly taking English lessons. Suppose that A has learned of a terror-
ist plot and believes that it is urgently important that he inform the UN Security Council. On the 
way to deliver the news, however, he gets trapped in the UN elevator and begins to have a heart 
attack. The only other person in the elevator is B. In a desperate attempt to get his message to the 
Security Council, A produces a frantic succession of utterances in all of the languages he speaks, 
one of which, drawing on his secret English lessons, is of the sentence,
(S) Tell the Security Council that I’ve uncovered a terrorist plot! 
As a result of B’s secret English lessons, he understands A’s utterance of (S). That is: B comes to 
recognize, as a result of hearing A’s utterance of (S), that A meant to request that B inform the Se-
curity Council that A has uncovered a terrorist plot. Call the moment at which B understands A 
time t.
The datum here is that A succeeded in getting speciﬁc and complex information across to B 
quickly, and in a context in which he likely couldn’t have gotten the same point across non-
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linguistically. In other words, this is a case of eﬃcient linguistic communication in the sense out-
lined in §.. Given that we posit meaning in order to explain just this sort of datum, it’s quite 
clear that we should say that (S) has the same meaning for A and B. But this fact cannot be ex-
plained by Lewisian Conventionalism: at no time up to t did A and B have any shared attitude 
whose content was a proposition about a linguistic regularity in which they both participate. A 
uttered (S) in desperation, with a very low credence that B would understand, and with good rea-
sons to think that B wouldn’t understand. Unless B is a particularly emotive interpreter, A still has 
no reason to think that B has understood him at t, any more than he has reason to think that B 
understood any of his other utterances. Given their past experiences, A still has many reasons to 
believe that B probably hasn’t understood at t, and if he continues to produce further utterances in 
other languages, A can’t even be counted as presupposing that B has understood. 
Depending on how the situation plays out after t, A and B might come to have shared attitudes 
as a result of their exchange. It may be tempting to predict, for example, that A and B will come to 
believe or presuppose that they both speak English at some time after t. But it is not enough for 
the Lewisian to point to a shared attitude that arises from A’s utterance; the Lewisian must show 
that the relevant shared attitude constituted the potential for eﬃcient communication between A 
and B, and thereby explains how their communication at t took place. Even if A and B come to 
possess a shared attitude about the way they use (S) as a result of A’s utterance, this shared fact 
will be explanatorily posterior to their episode of successful communication. We can suppose, 
moreover, that it is with his dying breath that A produces his utterance of (S), and that he then 
dies so quickly that by the time B understands what A said—by time t, that is—A is already dead. 
In this case, there is no moment at which the requisite shared attitude could be in place, such that 
the meaning of (S) for A and B could be constituted by it. Nonetheless, A and B will have com-
municated eﬃciently, and this fact demands just the sort of explanation that a metasemantic the-
ory should provide.
231
One tempting reply to this objection is that (S) is already meaningful for A and B before t, even 
if they don’t realize it, since A and B are both members of the wider English-speaking community, 
each of whose members knows that everyone in the English-speaking community speaks English, 
knows that everyone in the community knows this, and so on. In other words, perhaps a fact of 
the following kind constitutes the meaningfulness of (S) for A and B:
(4) (a) A is a member of the English-speaking community (a.k.a. ESC).
 (b) B is a member of ESC. 
 (i) Everyone in ESC uses (S) in thus-and-such way.
 (ii) Everyone in ESC [is entitled to know/believes/presupposes] (i). 
 (iii) Everyone in ESC [is entitled to know/believes/presupposes] (ii).
 And so on, ad inﬁnitum.
On some ways of construing what it would be for groups to have shared attitudes, the conjunction 
of conditions (i)–(n) would be suﬃcient for the English-speaking community to count as possess-
ing a shared attituden that they use (S) in thus-and-such way. Could this, together with (a) and 
(b), constitute the meaningfulness of (S) for A and B?
To see why not, ﬁrst notice that () is not a suitable basis, by Lewis’s and Schiﬀer’s own lights, 
for explaining how A and B can communicate eﬃciently using (S). The basic problem is that B 
can satisfy () while also having false beliefs about how A uses (S) (and vice versa). Recall Lewis 
and Schiﬀer’s reason for requiring that speakers of L have shared knowledge that they conform 
to a regularity in L: if they didn’t have shared knowledge that they conform to a regularity in L, 
then one might mistakenly believe that the other conforms to a regularity in another language, Lʹ′, 
which could lead to systematic miscommunication. But exactly the same kind of communication-
disrupting false belief is left open by (), since () is compatible with B mistakenly believing that 
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A is a member of the Englishʹ′-speaking community, where Englishʹ′ diﬀers from English in that it 
assigns a diﬀerent meaning to (S). So, by parity of reasoning with Lewis’s and Schiﬀer’s own ar-
gument for grounding meaning in shared attitudes, () can’t explain the meaningfulness of (S) for 
A and B; we would have to add a further condition to the eﬀect that each of A and B knows that 
the other is a member of the English-speaking community, which is precisely what they fail to 
know in the UN case.
This raises the issue of what it is for mutual knowledge to be possessed by a group (as opposed 
to a pair of individuals). Schiﬀer articulates the dilemma:
How is one to understand the phrase ‘mutual knowlege* amongst the members of G’? Does 
this mean that each member of G knows of each member of G that he knows…? Or does it 
merely mean that that every member of G knows that anyone who is a member of G knows 
that…? The mutual knowledge* condition must be taken in the second of these two senses. 
(Schiﬀer : )
We can think of Schiﬀer’s two glosses as the de dicto and de re readings of ‘mutual knowledge in 
G’, respectively. Schiﬀer prefers the de dicto reading because it is more realistic to think that it 
could be satiﬁed by an actual speech community, but he does not delve into the consequences of 
this choice for his theory of linguistic convention. One of the implications of my argument is that 
nothing short of the de re reading of ‘mutual knowledge in G’ is suﬃcient for Lewis’s and Schiﬀer’s 
purposes. And since actual speech communities sometimes don’t satisfy the de re reading, this is a 
serious problem for Lewis and Schiﬀer.
We needn’t agree with Lewis’s and Schiﬀer’s motivations for positing mutual knowledge to see 
that a fact with the shape of () can’t explain how A and B are able to communicate eﬃciently 
with (S). The crux of the problem is simple: even if I know that a certain group G uses an 
expression e in a certain way, that knowledge can’t help me to interpret your utterance of e unless I 
also know (or believe, or presuppose, etc.) that you are a member of G. And this brings us back to 
where we were four paragraphs ago: although A’s utterance of (S) might bring about B’s knowledge 
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that A is a member of the English-speaking community, this newfound knowledge can’t be used 
to explain the meaningfulness of (S) for A and B, since we needed the meaningfulness of (S) to 
explain how B was able to understand what A said in the ﬁrst place.
My UN example is hypothetical, but relevantly similar situations arise in real life all the time. 
The essential ingredients for one familiar type of case are a piece of vocabulary that is technical, 
obscure, or otherwise native to a particular dialect or register, together with a set of social condi-
tions that, for reasons having to do with politeness, snobbishness, or whatever else, might lead 
someone to use such a word or phrase despite justiﬁed doubts that their audience will under-
stand. Conversations of this sort should be very familiar from academic contexts, with their con-
stantly shifting and only partially overlapping technical vocabularies. They also arise frequently 
when traveling in a country where one’s language is not commonly spoken but in which it would 
be rude or annoying to ask each interlocutor whether she speaks it before using it to engage with 
them.10  The phenomenon is an unsurprising by-product of the fact that no two speakers have 
identical vocabularies, together with the fact that it is often socially inappropriate, ineﬃcient, or 
impossible to ensure, in advance of deploying a given expression, that one’s addressee will under-
stand it.
This line of argument shows that Lewisian conventionalism fails on its own terms—as an at-
tempt to reduce the semantic facts to facts about shared attitudes. Since a fact may ground an-
other without being necessary for it, this line of reasoning still leaves open the possibility that 
Lewisian shared attitudes ground linguistic meaning some of the time, but I don’t regard this view 
as attractive, both because it fails to tell us anything about what grounds many actual instances of 
linguistic meaning, and because I think that we can ﬁnd a more general and explanatory account 
of what constitutes meaning. I will expand on these considerations in the next two sections.
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10 Petit () makes a closely related point using similar examples.
4.4  The Meaning Without Use Problem
Hawthorne (, ), Lewis (), and Schiﬀer (, ) discuss a diﬀerent sort of prob-
lem for Lewisian conventionalism under the heading of the meaning-without-use problem. Al-
though I think that my argument in §. to be decisive, I wish to consider the meaning-without-
use problem because it can help us to diagnose a diﬀerent sort of problem with the Lewisian me-
tasemantic strategy.
The problem can be laid out as follows. Due to the productivity of natural languages and the 
ﬁnitude of human discourse, there are many sentences that will be meaningful for a group despite 
never having been uttered by any of the group’s members. Indeed, some meaningful sentences 
will never be used. Lewisian conventionalism says that a language L is used by a community of 
speakers just in case they participate in a convention of uttering sentences of L only if a certain 
condition is met—only if L maps the sentences to true propositions, for example. The problem 
arises because community members will vacuously satisfy any such condition with respect to 
hitherto unuttered sentences. Take a language L* that diﬀers from L only in the meanings that it 
assigns to sentences that haven’t been uttered by the members of a certain community G. On the 
Lewisian account as it was originally laid out, and as I’ve laid it out above, there is no fact that 
could determine which of L or L* is the actual language of G. L and L* may assign radically diﬀer-
ent meanings to every sentence that has so far gone unused, and so, on Lewisian conventionalism 
there can be no fact of the matter about the meanings of unused sentences. This is a disastrous 
result: not only are many unused sentences intuitively meaningful; we also need them to be de-
terminately meaningful in order to explain the fact that we regularly communicate eﬃciently with 
novel sentences.
Lewis attempts to deal with this problem by arguing that the language determined by any par-
ticular spoken fragment of a language is speciﬁed by the unique extrapolation of whatever gram-
mar applies to the fragment. The idea of an extrapolation of a grammar, according to Lewis, “pre-
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supposes the distinction between straight and bent” grammars (: ). Lewis doesn’t oﬀer a 
deﬁnition of what counts as a straight grammar, but he suggests that “any grammar that any lin-
guist would actually propose” would be straight in the relevant sense (). This distinction be-
tween straight and bent grammars would rule out grammars specifying languages following 
straightforward compositional principles that break down only for sentences above one thousand 
words in length, for example.
Presumably, a grammar counts as straight insofar as it exempliﬁes an appropriately weighted 
cluster of the principles that guide theory choice—predictiveness, consistency, parsimony, pro-
jectability, etc. Still, straightness looks to be a vague criterion, and there is no guarantee that all of 
the straight grammars of of a language fragment will agree about how to extend it. Even if we ig-
nore these defects of the straightness criterion, however, Schiﬀer (, ) has demonstrated 
other good grounds on which to reject it. His criticism boils down to the fact that we might some-
times have good reasons to think that a community’s language use is guided by a bent grammar. 
This might happen, for example, if the community learns the language in a classroom where they 
are explicitly taught the bent grammar. In this case, it is conceivable that that there is a grammar 
for the community’s spoken fragment that is straighter than the one guiding their language use, 
and that might even diverge from it in the meaning it would assign to possible or future utter-
ances.
Another kind of counterexample stems from the hypothesis that language use relies on a 
grammar that is internally represented by or embodied in the language-processing mechanisms of 
the mind. This view is accepted by many linguists and philosophers of language. But if it is true, 
then there is no reason to assume that the grammar guiding any particular speaker’s language use 
is a straight one. Lewis recognized this possibility, but argued that we should still rely on “straight 
extrapolation” in order to settle questions of meaning, since otherwise, “whenever we resort to 
extrapolation to answer questions of syntax and semantics, we are engaged in risky speculation 
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about the workings of the brain” (). Schiﬀer rightly ﬁnds this position wanting. Surely, if 
given a choice between a grammar chosen on the basis of general principles of theory choice and 
one that actually plays a crucial  causal role in determining how a speaker uses and understands a 
sentence, the latter is the better candidate for the grammar that determines what the sentence 
means for the speaker. The fact that a bent, psychologically real grammar would be more diﬃcult 
to discover than a straight one is inconvenient, but convenience is not a valid principle of theory 
choice.
In response to this line of thought, Schiﬀer proposes that we replace Lewis’s criterion with an 
overtly psycholinguistic one (: ):
What makes L a language that is used by x even though the used fragment of L is also a frag-
ment of inﬁnitely many languages other than L is that it’s the language determined by the in-
ternally represented generative grammar implicated in x’s language-understanding processes.
Schiﬀer’s solution to the meaning-without-use problem is preferable to Lewis’s solution because it 
grounds the meaningfulness of unused sentences in psychological facts that play a role in explain-
ing how speakers could communicate eﬃciently with the expressions, were they to deploy them. 
But the resulting metasemantic theory has its own defects. Lewis anticipated such an account 
three decades earlier, when he rejected it on the following grounds (a: ):
I am much less certain that there are internally represented grammars than I am that languages 
are used by populations; and I think it makes sense to say that languages might be used by 
populations even if there were no internally represented grammars. 
Oddly enough, an earlier incarnation of Schiﬀer (a, ) sides with Lewis against the more 
recent Schiﬀer (). The earlier Schiﬀer argues that since language comprehension could be 
achieved by some means other than an internally represented grammar—his alternative is an in-
ternalized mechanism for translating public language into the language of thought—building the 
idea of such a grammar into our theory of meaning would make it insuﬃciently general.
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Schiﬀer’s () psycholinguistic proposal is ﬂawed on other grounds. Given linguistic varia-
tion within speech communities, it seems unlikely that any two members of a speech communi-
ty—let alone all the members of the community—share just the same internally represented 
grammar. This point is obvious if we individuate grammars ﬁnely—in terms of the lexical items 
over which they are deﬁned, for example, or in terms of states of speakers’ language faculties (as 
in Chomsky’s I-Language hypothesis ()). Fine-grained individuation conditions would be 
necessary if we want grammars to fully determine a Lewisian language. But even if we individuate 
grammars coarsely—in terms of compositional principles deﬁned over semantic categories, for 
example, or even as a generative procedure deﬁned over syntactic categories—we might still ﬁnd 
two members of a single speech community with diﬀerent internally represented grammars.
The crucial point for my purposes here is that it is possible for a single linguistic expression to 
have the same meaning for two speakers even if their internally represented grammars diﬀer with 
respect to the expression’s syntactic or semantic structure. Consider a speaker S who uses and un-
derstands the complex noun phrase ‘gender gap’ in the familiar way, but who has learned the 
phrase as an idiomatic unit. S does not know the words ‘gender’ or ‘gap’, at least in the sense that S 
is undisposed to utter either word separately, and would fail to understand an utterance of either 
word outside the context of the whole phrase. Although, in eﬀect, S treats ‘gender gap’ as a single 
word, I think it is reasonable to say that sentences containing it mean the same thing for him that 
they do for the rest of us. In fact, we have to say this in order to explain the fact that we would 
have no problem communicating eﬃciently about gender gaps with S. Nonetheless, it is plausible 
that S’s internally represented grammar diﬀers from ours, at least in how it treats the expression 
‘gender gap’. I can think of no way of individuating grammars that would be coarse enough to get 
by this point, but ﬁne enough to play the role that Schiﬀer needs for it in his metasemantic theory.
The problem raised by all of this is that Schiﬀer therefore has no way of accounting for the 
publicity of linguistic meaning—the fact that expressions are meaningful for groups rather than 
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for individual speakers. In inserting the notion of an internally represented grammar into his so-
lution to the meaning-without-use problem, Schiﬀer looks too far into speakers’ minds for the 
psychological facts that ground linguistic meaning, overcompensating for Lewis’s () anti-
psychologistic solution, which fails to look far enough into speakers’ minds. What’s needed is an 
approach that grounds meaning in psychological facts taken at just the right level of abstrac-
tion—a level that emphasizes our linguistic commonalities without overstating them and without 
understating them.
Some other time-slices of Schiﬀer (, ) have recognized this need, and suggested that 
we deﬁne the actual language relation in terms of whatever mental state plays the right sort of role 
in the psychology of language use, whether that role is played by a grammar, a translation manual, 
or something else: “knowledge of meaning needn’t be any one kind of state but is rather any state 
that plays the ‘knowledge of meaning’ processing role” (: , emphasis Schiﬀer’s). To make the 
point, Schiﬀer adopts the language of thought hypothesis, and deﬁnes an L-determining translator 
as “a language-processing mechanism that determines a mapping of each sentence of L onto a 
Mentalese sentence that means in Mentalese what the L sentence means in L” (: ). He 
then puts forward the following hypothesis (ibid.):
A language L is used by a population P iﬀ there is a practice in P of meaning in L and the proc-
essing of L utterances proceeds via an L-determining translator.
It is important to note that the language of thought hypothesis, and Schiﬀer’s accompanying no-
tion of a language-determining translator, are not essential to the spirit of his view. More gener-
ally, his point is merely that a language user has some psychological mechanism that (a) explains 
how he gets from an auditory perception of some sentence to a mental representation of what the 
speaker said, and (b) is ﬁne-grained enough to determine the meanings of sentences that haven’t 
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been used yet.11  We can’t be sure of the details until we do a lot more psycholinguistics, but this 
somewhat vague hypothesis is the best explanation of how speakers interpret utterances of new 
sentences, and it also gives us a way, in principle at least, of nailing down the language a speaker 
uses.
I think that if we interpret Schiﬀer in the right way, he is very nearly right. It is not obvious 
that he would interpret himself in this way, however. His two examples of psychological mecha-
nisms that might play the knowledge of language processing role are an internally represented 
grammar and an internally represented public-language-to-mentalese translator—either way, 
something about a person’s mind that would presumably stay stable from one conversation to the 
next, absent a language class.
But the meaning of a sentence is protean. ‘What grounds the electric current’ means some-
thing diﬀerent for a group of analytic metaphysicians than it does for a group of electricians. 
Many sentences are meaningful only for one group but not the other. But a speaker may be a 
member of both groups, or a combined group. Likewise, the sentence, ‘ow’s she gon’, baye?’ is 
meaningful for a group of Newfoundlanders, but not for a group of non-Newfoundlanders, nor—
crucially—is it meaningful for a mix of the two. ‘Ponds are bigger than lakes’ means something 
diﬀerent for a group of Newfoundlanders than for a group of non-Newfoundlanders, and may not 
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11  Schiﬀer gives a slightly diﬀerent version of his theory inThe Things We Mean (: ch.). 
There, he deﬁnes the notion of a sentence’s character*, which is an ordered pair, <A,P>, such that 
A is the type of direct and literal illocutionary act that is typically performed by uttering the sen-
tence, and A is what one typically says in uttering it. He struggles with the question of whether to 
identify meanings with characters*. He ultimately explicates knowledge of a sentence S’s meaning 
as possession of some mental state that takes the knower from an auditory perception of an utter-
ance of S to the knowledge that the utter has performed a literal, direct speech act with a force 
and content that conform to S’s character*. This formulation improves on the version presented in 
‘Actual Language Relations’ (), mainly in that it accounts for the fact that the meaning of a 
sentence constrains the forces, as well as the contents, of the speech acts we can perform with it. 
The earlier Schiﬀer recognized this too, but chose to abstract away from it in stating his solution 
to the meaning-without-use problem. 
mean anything deﬁnite or consistent for a mixed group.12  An individual can move between 
groups of metaphysicians, electricians, Newfoundlanders, and many others, communicating eﬃ-
ciently with the other members of each. In doing so, the individual doesn’t merely continue to ut-
ter the same sentences and hope for the best. Assuming he is sensitive (in some sense) to the lin-
guistic dispositions of the group into which he moves, his own dispositions will change in various 
ways to increase the chances of communicative success with the new interlocutors.13  Since what-
ever brings about these changes is part of what explains the unique eﬃciency of verbal communi-
cation—and since it is part of what explains people’s abilities to move from perceptions of utter-
ances to correct interpretations of speech acts—they should be taken into account by a theory of 
sentence meaning. But my internally represented grammars or translation manuals presumably 
aren’t protean in this way. So the psychological states on which meaning supervenes must go be-
yond grammars and translation manuals.
Nonetheless, I think that Schiﬀer’s ‘processing role’ idea is basically on the right track, as long 
as we throw out the bits about public languages and conventions, and take the processing role to 
be constituted by some mental state or combination of mental states that are less stable than an 
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12  ‘Ow’s she gon’, baye?’ is a informal equivalent of ‘how do you do today, sir?’ in the dialect of 
English spoken in Newfoundland. Newfoundlanders also use ‘pond’ to refer to lakes and ‘lake’ to 
refer to ponds.
13  I think this phenomenon is obvious enough, especially to anyone who has started conversing 
with a non-philosopher immediately after participating in a heated and jargon-rich philosophical 
discussion. But sociolinguists have also done some interesting research on it. For example: soci-
olinguistic ‘convergence’ one of the key concepts of Communication Accomodation Theory, 
whose proponents have amassed loads of empirical data suggesting that convergence occurs along 
a wide variety of linguistic axes. See Giles et. al (1991) for an overview. In a similar vein, Arm-
strong (2013) and Ludlow (forthcoming) have documented a wide variety of ways in which the 
meanings of expressions can vary from moment to moment in a conversation, and developed the 
theory of microlanguages to explain it. Although both Armstrong and Ludlow base their theories 
on Lewisian conventionalism, it seems that they suﬀer from a particularly serious version of the 
meaning-without-use problem, and cannot appeal to Schiﬀer-style internally represented gram-
mars for the reasons mentioned in the main text.
internally represented grammar. If we do this, then Schiﬀer’s theory winds up looking a lot like 
the one that I’ll oﬀer in §..
4.5  Against Convention
In light of the foregoing argument, it might be tempting to go in search of a non-Lewisian theory 
of convention—a theory not built on a foundation of shared attitudes about linguistic regulariti-
es—in the hope that this would allow us to hold on to a form of metasemantic conventionalism 
while avoiding Lewisians’ cognitive and epistemic overcommitments.14  My next argument aims to 
show that this tactic is misguided, and that metasemantics should make no appeal to conventions 
of any kind.
The thrust of this objection is that it is possible for two agents to communicate eﬃciently with 
language despite not participating in any linguistic convention. Given that we must posit meaning 
in order to explain the eﬃciency of this communication, we need to suppose that the expressions 
involved in these conventionless episodes of communication have meaning for the agents in-
volved. It follows that convention is not a necessary underpinning of linguistic meaning, and that 
facts about meaning cannot be reduced to facts about convention. I will go on to show that this 
argument, together with the distinction between causal and constitutive explanations, gives us 
reason to reject the thesis that facts about meaning are grounded in facts about convention.
I count a metasemantic theory as a form of conventionalism if it gives some role to any notion 
that can be regarded as a precisiﬁcation of our ordinary notion of convention. I will rely on the 
assumption that a convention, in this ordinary sense, is a way a group has of doing something 
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14 Margaret Gilbert (), Ruth Millikan (, ), Seumas Miller (), and Brian Skyrms 
(, ) have defended alternative theories of convention. Of these, Gilbert’s and Miller’s 
theories appeal to mutual knowledge in ways that make them vulnerable to variations on my ar-
gument from §. Any theory of meaning that gives convention a prominent role is susceptible to 
my next objection—particularly those of Millikan and Skyrms, since they deﬁne convention in 
essentially diachronic and causal, rather than synchronic and constitutive, terms.
that is (in a relevant sense) arbitrary, and that results either from an explicit agreement or from a 
self-perpetuating regularity in the group. This statement can be thought of as placing a pre-
theoretic adequacy condition on theories of convention; in order to count as a full theory, several 
of the key terms in it would have to be made more precise. My claim is that no notion of conven-
tion meeting even this basic condition should play a role in metasemantics.
Given these assumptions about convention, all that my argument requires is that a group of 
speakers could ﬁnd themselves in a state that makes eﬃcient linguistic communication possible, 
but that the state either doesn’t qualify as arbitrary or didn’t come about by means of an explicit 
agreement or a self-perpetuating regularity. The potential examples tend to be science ﬁctional: 
consider the case of a person whose linguistic abilities were endowed by a bump on the head or a 
lightning strike, or a creature whose ability to converse with English speakers is innate and immu-
table. The fact that I must look outside everyday life to ﬁnd a clear example makes this argument 
somewhat more speculative than my objection to Lewisian conventionalism. Nonetheless, I can 
see no good reason for denying that any of these scenarios is possible. If a subset of humans had 
evolved to speak English (and only English) from birth, we would still have to posit linguistic 
meaning in order to explain their ability to communicate, despite the fact that their words’ mean-
ings would be no more arbitrary or self-perpetuating than any other feature of their biology (cf. 
Peacocke : –).15  Likewise, although it is enormously unlikely for a lightning bolt or a 
bump on the head to scramble an individual’s brain in such a way as to endow him with the abil-
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15  There may be an evolutionary sense in which humans’ number of limbs is an arbitrary and 
self-perpetuating regularity. Even if so, it seems to me that these are not the same senses of ‘self-
perpetuating’ or ‘arbitrary’ that would make a regularity conventional. A way of doing things is a 
convention only if it is arbitrary in the sense that the very individuals who participate in the con-
vention could have achieved their ends just as well by other means. Given plausible and widely-
held assumptions about alethic modality, an individual person could not have evolved to have a 
radically diﬀerently genotype than he or she actually has. If populations can somehow be indi-
viduated independently of their members, then biological traits may be arbitrary and self-
perpetuating at the population level, but they are neither arbitrary nor self-perpetuating for the 
individuals who possess them.
ity to speak a new language, there is a long philosophical tradition of accepting the possibility of 
such freak events, and I can see no reason to diverge from this tradition. In essence, the problem 
is this: whatever it is about our minds/brains that puts us in a position to communicate eﬃciently 
with language, it is possible that a pair of speakers could ﬁnd themselves in just the same state, but 
by unconventional means.
There is, of course, a literature on an issue that superﬁcially resembles this one, springing from 
Davidson’s () example of the Swampman, who springs fully-formed from the swamp as a re-
sult of an improbable lightning strike. Some deny, on grounds of externalism about mental con-
tent, that the Swampman has genuine beliefs and desires, and some may be tempted for similar 
reasons to deny that a lightning bolt could endow someone’s words with genuine meaning. I don’t 
know what to think about whether the Swampman has genuine intentional states, but I think that 
this line of objection to my own argument is mistaken, given the diﬀerent explanatory roles 
played by mental content and linguistic meaning. As I have laid it out, a signiﬁcant part of the 
project of a theory of linguistic meaning is to explain the eﬃciency of linguistic communication, 
and communication, as I understand it, requires that the communicators already have contentful 
mental states. The relevant thought experiment, for my purposes, is one in which an agent who 
already possesses normal, contentful mental states acquires, by means of some unlikely accident, 
the ability to eﬃciently communicate these states via language. Explaining the eﬃciency with 
which they communicate using their newfound linguistic abilities would be just as worthwhile as 
explaining the eﬃciency with which we communicate, and if linguistic meaning is worth positing 
in our case, it is also worth positing in theirs.
So convention is not necessary for meaning, and facts about meaning therefore don’t reduce 
to facts about convention. Although the possibility of meaning without convention does not, by 
itself, show that facts about meaning are never grounded in facts about convention, a slightly dif-
ferent construal of the same considerations should push us to accept that conclusion as well. A 
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useful way of putting the upshot of the foregoing argument is that although the facts about groups 
of speakers in virtue of which utterance-types have meaning for them might come about and be 
sustained by conventional means, this needn’t be so. This way of putting things raises an impor-
tant distinction between two diﬀerent kinds of explanatory relations: constitutive determination 
(or grounding) on one hand, and causal determination on the other. The causal dimension of 
convention-invoking explanations is built into the idea of convention as I spelled it out earlier: 
conventions must be either explicitly agreed upon in advance or self-sustaining regularities. Most 
theories of linguistic convention, including those of Lewis, Schiﬀer, and Gilbert (), mix 
causal and constitutive explanations in ways that would be diﬃcult to pry apart.16  In thus trying 
to answer a constitutive question about meaning—an ‘in virtue of what…’ question—by citing 
facts about the etiology of meaning, conventionalist metasemantic theories conﬂate two diﬀerent 
kinds of explanation.17
Why not mix constitutive and causal explanations? Because, at least in some cases, the same 
constitutive explanation of some fact is compatible with diﬀerent causal explanations, and linguis-
tic meaning seems to be one such case. Suppose that C, C, and C are speech communities that 
are psychologically identical to each other at a time t in all of the respects that make eﬃcient lin-
guistic communication possible, despite the fact that C got that way be means of a self-
reinforcing regularity, C got that way by biological evolution, and C got that way by means of a 
very unlikely series of lightning strikes. Since all three communities would be equally capable of 
eﬃcient linguistic communication at t, and since this capability would be rooted in the same psy-
chological facts about them at t, we would have the same reasons for positing the same particular 
cases of linguistic meaning for each. The same metasemantic theory would be true of all three 
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16 By contrast, Skyrms () and Millikan () aim at purely causal explanations of the devel-
opment and persistence of meaning that are neutral about constitutive questions.
17 On the causation/grounding distinction, see Audi (forthcoming: §), Clark and Liggins (: 
), Fine (: –), and Rosen (: ).
communities, in other words, but we would need a diﬀerent causal explanation of the origins and 
persistence of meaning in each case. If this is correct, then we need a metasemantic theory to give 
an account of the facts underlying meaning that is silent as to their origins. 
4.6  A Dispositional Metasemantics
Each of the three preceding sections contains a diﬀerent kind of objection to conventionalism, 
and each section also comes with a lesson about what a good metasemantic theory would have to 
look like. In §., I argued that metasemantics must avoid placing the kinds of cognitive or epis-
temic demands on speakers that gets Lewisian theories into trouble. In §., I argued that meta-
semantics must identify the psychological facts underlying linguistic meaning at just the right 
level of abstraction—not so coarsely so as to fall prey to the meaning-without-use problem, but 
not so ﬁnely as to erase the possibility that meaning is public. I also argued that the psychological 
states must be ﬂexible enough, and sensitive enough to changing circumstances, to explain the 
various ways in which meaning is protean. In §., I argued that metasemantics must focus on a 
purely constitutive explanation of meaning, and should be compatible with a variety of possible 
causal stories about how meaning arises and persists. In this section, I will outline a metasemantic 
theory that meets all of these desiderata. The main inﬂuences on this theory is Grice’s mature me-
tasemantic views, though my own theory departs from Grice’s in some details, and goes beyond it 
in others.
Grice’s most detailed metasemantic proposal can be found in his  article, ‘Utterer’s Mean-
ing, Sentence Meaning, and Word Meaning’.
“For group G, utterance-type X means ‘*ψp’ ” =df. “At least some (many) members of group G 
have in their repertoires the procedure of uttering a token of X if, for some A, they want A to 
ψ† that p, the retention of this procedure being for them conditional on the assumption that at 
least some (other) members of G have, or have had, this procedure in their repertoires.” (: 
)
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Although it requires unpacking and elaboration, I think this explication shows promise in some 
of the ways that conventionalist metasemantic theories fail.
The second clause of Grice’s deﬁnition—about the retention of procedures—is his nod to the 
idea that linguistic meaning is conventional, or at least self-reinforcing. But notice that unlike 
Lewis’s appeal to convention, around which his whole metasemantic approach is constructed, 
Grice’s nod to convention is easy to excise. Grice aims at a constitutive account of meaning with 
the ﬁrst half of his explication and a causal account of meaning with the second half. In light of 
my argument in §. for keeping these aims distinct, I will drop the second half.18
“For group G, utterance-type X means ‘*ψp’ ” =df. “At least some (many) members of group G 
have in their repertoires the procedure of uttering a token of X if, for some A, they want A to 
ψ† that p.”
Most of the metasemantic work here is being done by the notion of having a procedure in one’s 
repertoire, and I will turn to it shortly. Since the explication contains several other troubling ob-
scurities, I ﬁrst want to subject it to some sympathetic reconstruction.
First, consider the form of the second relatum in Grice’s explicandum.
‘*ψp’
Grice calls the schematic operator variable ‘*ψ’ a “dummy mood indicator” () or “mood 
marker” (). It “corresponds to the propositional attitude ψ-ing (whatever that may be), as, for 
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18 Grice sometimes casually refers to utterance-type meaning as ‘conventional meaning’, and this 
has led many commentators to label him a conventionalist (e.g., Laurence : ). Neale is one 
of the few commentators to explicitly deny this interpretation: “Grice’s use of the word ‘conven-
tional’ in ‘conventional meaning’ should not be taken too literally, for it is Grice’s view that lin-
guistic meaning is not to be explicated in terms of what other philosophers might think of as con-
vention” (Neale : fn). See also Chapman (: ) for an insightful discussion of Grice’s 
aversion to the notion of convention.
example, ‘⊢’ corresponds to believing (thinking) and ‘!’ corresponds to intending” (). Grice’s 
motivation here is to point out that the timeless meaning of a sentence bears an explanatory rela-
tion both to the proposition that a speaker would intend his addressee to entertain in uttering the 
sentence, and to the attitude the speaker would intend his addressee to take toward that proposi-
tion. Moreover, this latter dimension of the meaning of an utterance-type is tied to certain of its 
features—features that Grice schematically separates out as ‘*ψ’, but which typically take the form 
of mood, intonation (in speech), and punctuation (in writing). I have already outlined theories of 
illocutionary force and clausal mood that I take to be compatible with Grice’s views in §. and 
Chapter Three, respectively; Grice is hinting at similar accounts with his notation here.
Grice’s account can be rendered more perspicuous by framing it in the idiom of speech act the-
ory. Drawing on the equivalence between speaker meaning and the performance of illocutionary 
acts outlined in §., I will rephrase Grice’s explication as follows. 
“For group G, utterance-type X has meaning” =df. “At least some (many) members of group G 
have in their repertoires the procedure of uttering a token of X in order to perform a speech 
act of some type Y.”
Sentence meaning, on this reformulation of Grice’s view, is a ternary relation borne by complete-
utterance types (e.g., sentences) to groups of speakers and types of communicative illociutionar 
acts.19
With Grice’s other obscure locutions paraphrased away, it is plain that most of the work in 
Grice’s theory is done by his notion of having a procedure in one’s repertoire. Grice ultimately 
leaves this somewhat vague technical term as a primitive in his account, and so, at ﬁrst glance, the 
notion seems to be no more than a placeholder for a satisfying explication. Nonetheless, Grice’s 
formulation holds the promise of several advantages over conventionalist alternatives. First, eve-
rything Grice says is compatible with the possibility that two speakers can possess the same pro-
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19 For accounts of the nature and role of sentence meaning spelled out in terms of a similar ter-
nary relation, see Alston (), Neale (, ), Searle (), and Schiﬀer (, ).
cedure without possessing shared attitudes that they do. In other words, Grice’s explication can be 
construed so as to appropriately loosen the cognitive and epistemic requirements on the existence 
of meaning in a way that allows it to avoid my objections to Lewisian conventionalism in §.. 
Second: it is at least plausible that procedures are mental phenomena that are identiﬁed at a level 
of abstraction that is speciﬁc enough to solve the meaning-without-use problem by constituting 
the meaning of hitherto-unused expressions in a way that generalizes across speakers and is pro-
tean from one conversation to the next. Third: the notion of having a procedure in one’s reper-
toire gives some (albeit thin) content to the idea that meaning is constituted, not by convention 
itself, but by some facts that could be brought about and sustained either by conventional causal 
chains or in some other way. If the members of a speech community have a procedure in their 
repertoires that allows them to communicate eﬃciently using a sentence, then how they came to 
have the procedure—whether by convention, evolution, or lightning strike—is immaterial. This 
modiﬁcation of Grice’s theory aims to oﬀer an account of the facts constituting meaning that is 
neutral about their etiology, as it should.
Despite these potential virtues, it is clear from Grice’s struggle to further ﬂesh out his 
‘procedure’/‘repertoire’ formulation that even he found it to be unsatisfyingly obscure (: –
). I will now suggest that Grice could have proﬁtably replaced his notion of having a proce-
dure in one’s repertoire with the notion of overlapping communicative dispositions.
In fact, Grice brieﬂy considers substituting dispositions for procedures after outlining his pro-
posal, but quickly rejects this modiﬁcation after considering prim Aunt Matilda, who is not dis-
posed to utter a certain vulgarity under any circumstances despite its having meaning for her 
(). Based on just this example, Grice “abandon[s] the attempt to provide a deﬁnition” of hav-
ing a procedure in one’s repertoire, “and content[s] himself with a few informal remarks” ().
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I think Grice stopped too soon. One needn’t look further than his informal remarks about 
Aunt Matilda to see how he might have pursued a more satisfactory dispositional account. Grice 
asks us to consider a situation in which some utterance-type X
is current for some group G; that is to say, to utter X in such-and-such circumstances is part of 
the practice of many members of G. In any case my Aunt Matilda (a member of G) may be said 
to have a procedure for X, even though she herself would rather be seen dead than utter X, for 
she knows that some other members of G do have a readiness to utter X in such-and-such cir-
cumstances. [–]
Putting things in a less epistemically-loaded way: although Aunt Matilda is not disposed to utter a 
vulgarity under any circumstances, she is still disposed to interpret an utterance of a vulgar 
expression in a way that allows her to understand others who utter it. Although she lacks the per-
formative disposition—the disposition to utter the vulgar expression in order to perform a certain 
type of speech act—she does possess a corresponding interpretive disposition—the disposition to 
interpret speakers who utter the vulgar expression as performing speech acts of the right type. We 
can group performative and interpretive dispositions together as communicative dispositions. I’ll 
say that two speakers’ communicative dispositions overlap when one has a performative disposi-
tion to produce utterances of some type X in order to perform speech acts of type Y, and the other 
has an interpretive disposition to interpret utterances of the kind X as performances of the kind Y. 
Given the Gricean approach to speech act theory outlined in §., to have a performative disposi-
tion is to be disposed to produce a certain kind of utterance if one has a certain kind of commu-
nicative intention, and to have an interpretive disposition is to be disposed to interpret a speaker 
as having a certain kind of intention (component () of a communicative intention, as in the 
schema from §.) if the speaker produces a certain kind of utterance.
With these notions in hand, the following further modiﬁcation of Grice’s account becomes 
available:
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Utterance-Type Meaning (UTM)
“For group G, utterance-type X has meaning” =df. “At least some (many) members of group G 
are disposed to utter X in order to perform a speech act of type Y, and at least some (many) 
members of G are disposed to interpret utterances of X as speech acts of type Y.”
This account makes the potential advantages of Grice’s own formulation more concrete. Groups of 
speakers can have overlapping communicative dispositions without possessing any shared atti-
tudes about their language use, and so this account avoids Lewisians’ epistemic and cognitive 
overcommitments. Of course, agents’ communicative dispositions could conceivably be consti-
tuted by Lewisian shared attitudes, and so this explains the temptation to think that expressions 
would be meaninful in a commuty who met Lewis’s deﬁnition, but there is no reason to think that 
actual speech communities exemplify the deﬁnition. 
It’s plausible that language users’ communicative dispositions are partly constituted by the 
current states of their language faculties—on one way of talking, by their internally represented 
grammars (Chomsky ). But two agents needn’t have the same internally represented gram-
mar in order to have the same communicative disposition, or in order to have communicative 
dispositions that overlap in a way that makes it possible for them to communicate eﬃciently. Two 
agents could be disposed to refer to gender gaps using ‘gender gap’ even though one’s grammar 
treats it as an idiomatic unit and the other’s treats it as a syntactically and semantically structured 
noun phrase. This multiple realizability of communicative dispositions is what allows them to 
ground meaning in a way that avoids overcommitments about agents’ ﬁne-grained mental states. 
On the other hand, communicative dispositions are perfectly suited to ground the meaning-
fulness of previously unused expressions because an agent can possess a communicative disposi-
tion for an expression she has never used before. Where do we get all of these communicative 
dispositions to use expressions that haven’t been used before? I’ll argue in Chapter Five that it is 
the job of compositional semantics to answer that question by showing how our sentence-sized 
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communicative dispositions are systematically constituted by our word-sized communicative dis-
positions. The latter are dispositions to perform acts like referring, predicating, and expressing 
propositions with words, phrases, types of syntactic arrangement, and sentence radicals. The right 
collection of primitive communicative dispositions—dispositions to use semantically primitive 
expressions and syntactic structures in certain ways—can add up to a very large number of com-
municative dispositions to produce and interpret complex expressions, including expressions that 
have never been uttered before.
Although the way in which word-sized dispositions add up to sentence-sized dispositions is 
surely guided by something like internally represented grammars, the shiftyness of meaning 
across contexts gives us reason to suspect that other, less stable kinds of mental states play a role 
in grounding agents’ communicative dispositions as well. I am disposed to use the verb ‘ground’ 
one way when talking to an electrician and another way when talking to a metaphysician. It isn’t 
plausible that this shift in my dispositions would be best explained by moment-to-moment 
changes in my internally represented grammar, which, we have good reasons to believe, is rela-
tively cut oﬀ—or “informationally encapsulated”—from personal-level mental states like my be-
lief about the profession of my addressee (Fodor ). But it makes perfect sense to say that an 
agent’s communicative dispositions are partly constituted by subpersonal-level mental states, 
modular competencies, or tacit knowledge, and partly constituted by beliefs, desires, intentions, 
and other personal-level mental states. To describe the mind in terms of communicative disposi-
tions is to describe it at the right level of abstraction to explain how the mental states distributed 
throughout a speech community can together constitute meaning that is both public and protean 
in the right sorts of ways.
One potential complaint about (UTM) is that it gives rise to its own version of the meaning-
without-use problem, because it predicts that any sentences that the members of a community 
aren’t disposed to communicate with isn’t meaningful. For example: (UTM) predicts that any sen-
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tence that is too long or grammatically complex for any member in a community to understand 
will not be meaningful for the community. This might include some sentences containing triple or 
quadruple center embeddings—for example (Chomsky and Miller ):
(5) Anyone who feels that if so-many more students whom we haven’t actually admitted are 
sitting in on the course than ones we have that the room had to be changed, then probably 
auditors will have to be excluded, is likely to agree that the curriculum needs revision.
According to an inﬂuential strand of thought in contemporary linguistics (Bever ; Chomsky 
; Chomsky and Miller ), () is a perfectly grammatical sentence, in the sense that a 
normal English speaker’s internally represented grammatical competence determines a set of 
rules by which () abides. An English speaker might nevertheless intuit () to be ungrammatical 
because of a performance error—perhaps due to a lack of working memory. But the fact that the 
etiology of this performance error locates it outside of the speaker’s syntactic competence, which 
is the proper object of study of syntactic theory according to Chomsky (, , ), makes 
it irrelevant to the question of whether () is a well-formed sentence. 
But Chomsky and Miller don’t stop at syntactic well-formedness; they also claim that () has 
“a clear and unambiguous meaning” (: ), and most semanticists have gone along with the 
idea that semantics, like syntax, is the study of a semantic competence, which must be distin-
guished from performance. On this view, sentences with meaningful parts and the right gram-
matical structure should count as meaningful even if they are too long or complex to be uttered or 
understood. If this is the right way to think about linguistic meaning, then (UTM) suﬀers from its 
own version of the meaning-without-use problem, since it cannot predict the meaningfulness of 
unusable sentences.
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I don’t think that this objection holds any force. Even if Chomsky is right that we should ex-
plain ungrammaticality intuitions about sentences like () by appealing to a syntactic compe-
tence–performance distinction, it does not follow that we should posit the same kind of distinc-
tion in the domain of semantics. This is because syntax and semantics study diﬀerent kinds of 
properties—structure and meaning, respectively—which are posited to do diﬀerent kinds of theo-
retical work. Chomsky argues that syntax is the study of an idealized speaker-hearer’s faculty of 
language—a mental organ whose internal representations determine the speaker’s syntactic com-
petence (: ch.). The language faculty is posited to explain the individualistic and sub-
personal psychological facts that stand behind an individual’s acquisition and knowledge of lan-
guage. If Chomsky is right about this, then he’s right to posit a syntactic competence–perform-
ance distinction. Even so, meaning is a very diﬀerent kind of object of study, posited to explain 
the interpersonal phenomenon of eﬃcient communication, and so it must be a public property of 
utterance types. Moreover, given that our reason for positing linguistic meaning is to explain facts 
about the eﬃcient use of linguistic expressions in communication, we have no good reason to 
countenance the meaningfulness of expressions that aren’t usable in this way. 
Another virtue of (UTM) is that it gives a purely constitutive account of linguistic meaning 
that avoids commitments about how the facts underlying meaning causally came about. Which-
ever psychological states realize an agent’s communicative dispositions, there is no reason to deny 
that those very states could have come about via a self-reinforcing regularity, or via a lightning 
strike, via biological evolution, or via any number of other processes.
Finally, and most importantly, (UTM) grounds facts about meaning in facts that are tailored 
to explain why meaning plays the explanatory role for which we posit it. On the assumption that 
linguistic communication consists of the production and successful interpretation of speech acts, 
then we posit the meaningfulness of an utterance-type X for a group G in order to explain the fol-
lowing fact: if members of G were to perform a speech act of some type Y, they would be likely to 
254
do so by uttering X, and if members of G were to have an utterance of X addressed to them, they 
would interpret the utterer as performing a speech act of type Y. G-members’ possession of the 
right sorts of overlapping communicative dispositions is tailor-made to explain just this sort of 
fact. By contrast, the fact that a way of speaking is a regularity, or arbitrary, or self-reinforcing is 
not relevant to whether it can facilitate communication.
An added bonus of (UTM) is that it gives us a way of individuating speech communities in 
terms of the ways in which their members’ communicative dispositions overlap—at least to the 
degree that speech communities even need to be individuated. As stated—with “at least some 
(many) members of G” being required to possess the right communicative dispositions—these 
individuation conditions are extremely vague. We can try to make them more precise by ﬁxing 
the limiting case and working backward: a totally homogeneous speech community is one in 
which there is some set of expressions Γ is such that every member of the community possesses 
both a performative and an interpretive disposition that links the same type of speech act with 
each element of Γ, and no expression not in Γ is meaningful for any subset of the community. 
Since it is doubtful that any two natural language users have exactly the same vocabulary, it is 
doubtful whether there is any actual homogeneous speech community. But there are many com-
munities that fall short of this ideal in various respects that leave them capable of communicating 
eﬃciently in all sorts of ways, and so I maintain that the vagueness in (UTM) is appropriate. What 
matters to the theory, after all, is that we can posit meaning in all and only those cases where eﬃ-
cient communication is possible, and the theory does this in the right way, on a case-by-case ba-
sis. Although (UTM) cannot give us precise criteria by which to judge whether two agents, A and 
B, belong to the community of English speakers, for example, it can tell us whether they are able 
to communicate eﬃciently with any particular expression, and this is enough for a metasemantic 
theory to do.
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Conclusion and Mile-Marking
In this chapter, I have argued that the dominant, conventionalist view about what it is for an 
expression to have meaning is mistaken, and I have constructed a better view. This foray into me-
tasemantics furthers the overall goals of the dissertation in several ways. First, it tells us more 
about utterance-type meaning is, and does so in such a way that allows meaning to play the ex-
planatory role outlined in Chapter One. Second, it lends further support to the idea, ﬁrst argued 
for in Chapters Two and Three, that meaning is a relation borne by utterance types to types of 
speech acts. Third, it gives us a clearer picture of what compositional semantics is the study of: the 
structures of language-users’ communicative dispositions.
Much remains to be done. In particular, although I have given a sense of how I think seman-
tics should work (in Chapter Two), and although I have gone some way toward showing how 
compositional semantics will work (in Chapters Three and Four), it remains to ﬂesh out my the-
ory of compositionality and the syntax–semantics interface in a way that incorporates the meta-
semantic insights of this chapter. That will be my task in Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER FIVE: COMPOSITIONALITY IN SPEECH ACT THEORETIC SEMANTICS
Introduction
I have spent the last four chapters defending an account of the nature of utterance-type menaing, 
and linguistic meaning in particular. I’ve argued that for an expression to have meaning is for a 
community to be disposed to communicate with the expression in a certain way, and that the ex-
pression’s semantic value is the type of speech act that members of the community are disposed to 
perform (and interpret each other as performing) with it.
‘But’, my truth-conditional-semanticist opponent has surely been objecting since Chapter 
Two, ‘we need to identify sentence meanings with truth condition determining properties in or-
der to understand how word meanings can add up to sentence meanings!’ This complaint is not 
without motivation: compositional semantics—the study of this “adding up” of word meaning 
into sentence meaning—has not only been the most fruitful and precise branch of the study of 
linguistic meaning for the past half century; it has also been predicated on the idea that the role of 
meaning is to determine truth-conditions. This assumption, the truth-conditional semanticist 
might well complain, is not incidental to to the successes of truth-conditional semantics, but lie at 
their very core.
In order to fully counter this objection, I would have to show that speech-act-theoretic se-
mantics can account for every phenomenon that truth-conditional semanticists have accounted 
for over the last several decades, at least as well as they have. In Chapters Two and Three, I argued 
that speech-act-theoretic semantics deals with some phenomena better than mainstream ap-
proaches, but there is a long list of expressions, constructions, and readings that I haven’t begun to 
account for, and that extends long beyond the scope of a single dissertation. In this chapter, I will 
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tackle some more of what’s on that list, and I’ll attempt to do so in a wat that lays a  solid meth-
odological foundation so that more items to be easily ticked oﬀ in the future. 
5.1  What is Compositional Semantics About?
The principal explananda of compositional semantics are the learnability, productivity, and sys-
tematicity of natural language—the facts that we can become semantically competent with indeﬁ-
nitely many sentences in a ﬁnite amount of time, the fact that we can be semantically competent 
with sentences that have never been uttered before, and the fact that our competence with some 
sentences will be systematically correlated to our competence with other sentences that contain 
the same parts or structures. Compositional semantics is the study of some facts about humans, 
our minds, or our behavior that must be posited to account for these phenomena. My question in 
this section is: what are these facts?
Mainstream semanticists have oﬀered several diﬀerent answers to this question, none of 
which I ﬁnd particularly convincing. One account of the subject matter of compositional seman-
tics, which is defended by Davidson (, , ), is that a compositional semantic theory is 
what the user of a language (tacitly) knows, or is a rational reconstruction of what a language user 
could (tacitly) know, that would allow her to interpret the utterances of another user of the same 
language. The intuitive idea behind this formulation is that it explains how a speaker could know 
the meanings of an indeﬁnitely large number of expressions in a productive and systematic way in 
virtue of knowing the meanings of their parts together with rules for their recursive combination. 
One peculiarity of Davidson’s view is that he also holds that knowledge of a semantic theory 
would be neither necessary nor suﬃcient for the kind of linguistic competence that is the real tar-
get of his theory.
Kurt utters the words 'Es regnet' and under the right conditions we know that he has said that 
it is raining. Having identiﬁed his utterance as intentional and linguistic, we are able to go on 
to interpret his words: we can say what his words, on that occasion, meant. What could we 
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know that would enable us to do this? How could we come to know it? The ﬁrst of these ques-
tions is not the same as the question what we do know that enables us to interpret the words 
of others. For there may easily be something we could know and don't, knowledge of which 
would suﬃce for interpretation, while on the other hand it is not altogether obvious that there 
is anything we actually know which plays an essential role in interpretation. The second ques-
tion, how we could come to have knowledge that would serve to yield interpretations, does 
not, of course, concern the actual history of language acquisition. It is thus a doubly hypo-
thetical question… (Davidson : )
Given the double-dissociation that Davidson ﬁnds between actually knowing a semantic theory, 
on one hand, and being semantically competent, on the other, it is diﬃcult to see how modeling 
such knowledge could explain what Davidson seeks to explain. Moreover, as Pettit () has ar-
gued, knowledge and even belief seem to be the wrong categories to apply to whatever it is about 
speakers or their psychological states that grounds their semantic competencies or the meaning-
fulness of the expressions they use. After all: as I pointed out in §., agents can communicate ef-
ﬁciently despite having justiﬁably very low credences about the speciﬁcs of their interlocutors’ 
linguistic capacities.
Inspired by Chomsky’s view that syntax is the study of a specialized cognitive faculty of lan-
guage, some philosophers and linguists think that semantics aims to model the semantic compo-
nent of a grammar that is subpersonally represented in the minds of speakers.1  This internally 
represented grammar is part of the modular linguistic competence that guides speakers’ language-
using abilities.2 If this is correct, then compositional semantics aims to describe—at a certain level 
of abstraction—an algorithm that each language user carries around in their mind, whose inputs 
are syntactic representations of sentences and representations of lexical meanings, and whose 
outputs are representations of sentences’ meanings. I objected this view in §., where I argued 
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1 Versions of this view are defended or assumed by Borg (), Heim and Kratzer (), Larson 
and Segal (), and Partee ().
2  On the idea of modularity, see Chomsky () and Fodor (). It’s worth noting that both 
Chomsky and Fodor deny that semantics could be the study of anything modular in this sense, in 
part on the grounds that what semantics studies is not informationally encapsulated or internal to 
individuals’ minds in the right ways.
that the facts that ground linguistic meaning are both too protean and too sensitive to language 
users’ personal-level mental states (such as their beliefs about whom they’re talking to) to be con-
stituted entirely by sub-personal or modular mental states.
According to Montague (), semantics is a branch of mathematics whose aim it is to map 
out the possible relationships borne by a certain class of formal structures called languages to the 
special classes of model-theoretic structures that “interpret” them. Taken at face value, it’s hard to 
see how this vision of semantics could have anything to do with the language use of actual hu-
mans. In particular, it’s hard to see how a purely mathematical pursuit could help us to explain the 
eﬃciency of linguistic communication, which is the explanatory role I carved out for semantics in 
§.. This is where Lewis’s (, a) ideas about conventionalism are supposed to come in, 
since they open the possibility that semantics could be the study of a mathematical structure 
which would count as the actual language of a community in virtue of the linguistic conventions 
in which the community members participate. One advantage of this overall strategy is that it 
makes compositional semantics the study of a public, interpersonal phenomenon, and this holds 
the promise of allowing semantic theories to play a role in explaining the eﬃciency of linguistic 
communication. But, as I argued in §§.–., there is no notion of convention that can thus 
bridge the gap between Montagovian formal structures and human behavior.
On the theory I defended in §., expressions are metasemantically connected to their seman-
tic values by the overlapping communicative dispositions of the members of a speech community. 
To say that natural language is learnable, productive, and systematic is, on my view, just to say 
that speakers acquire a very large stock of communicative dispositions in a limited span of time, 
that they possess communicative dispositions with respect to sentences that neither they nor any-
body else has ever uttered or encountered, and that the possession of a communive disposition 
with respect to one sentence is systematically connected to the possession of communicative dis-
positions with respect to other sentences with the same syntactic structures and containing the 
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same lexical items. The job of compositional semantics is to show how we can have communica-
tive dispositions with these properties.
More speciﬁcally, a compositional semantic theory must show how the overlapping sentence-
sized communicative dispositions of the members of a community are constituted by their over-
lapping word-sized communicative dispositions.  To give the compositional semantics for a given 
sentence is to show how the communicative dispositions that link it to a certain type of commu-
nicative illocutionary act are constituted by (i) our dispositions to refer to certain kinds of objects, 
properties, and relations with the sentence’s semantically primitive parts (and to interpret others 
as doing the same), (ii) our dispositions to perform certain kinds of combinatory acts of predicat-
ing with the types of binary-branching syntactic structures (and to interpret others as doing the 
same), and (iii) our dispositions to perform certain kinds of communicative illocutionary acts 
with sentences in certain moods.3  By acquiring a ﬁnite stock of dispositions of types (i–iii), a per-
son thereby also acquires a far larger stock of productive and systematic communicative disposi-
tions that allow for the eﬃcient performance and interpretation of a wide range of communicative 
illocutionary acts.
5.1.1  Referential and Predicative Dispositions
I want now to say more about the nature of the referential dispositions that underly the meanings 
of words and phrases and the predicative dispositions that underly the semantic import of certain 
syntactic arrangements. First oﬀ, what is it to have a disposition to refer to some object or prop-
erty x with a word or phrase e? In Chapter Two, I endorsed a view of referring along the lines of 
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3  There may be many other features of utterance types that may feature in how speakers are dis-
posed to use and interpret them, and, if so, a compositional semantic theory will have to illumi-
nate the semantics of those features as well. To name just one example: it seems clear that the in-
tonational contour with which a sentence is uttered is semantically signiﬁcant, in the sense that a 
speaker might be disposed to perform two diﬀerent types of speech acts with two diﬀerent utter-
ance types that diﬀer only with respect to intonation contour.
those defended by Bach (), Neale (forthcoming a), and Schiﬀer (), and according to 
which referring is grounded in the referential intention with which a speaker produces an utter-
ance. Here’s the partial account of referential intentions that I provisionally adopted in §.:
(RI) Referential Intention
S has a referential intention to refer to an object, property, or relation x with an utterance type e 
in producing an utterance u only if e is a proper part of an expression of which u is a token and 
there exists an x-dependent proposition p,  and addressee A such that S produces u, thereby in-
tending:
() to produce a state of entertaining p in A;
() A to recognize S’s intention ();
() A’s act of entertaing p to be at least partly on the basis of her recognition of (); 
() A’s act of entertaing p to be at least partly on the basis of A’s sensitivity to the fact that, for 
some binary relation R, R(e,x).
For S to refer to something with a particular expression requires that S possess a referential inten-
tion of this kind. But what is required for S to be disposed to refer to a certain object x with an 
expression e, such that this disposition can ground the meaningfulness of e? Quite generally, a 
referential performative disposition is one that would make an instance of the following schematic 
counterfactual true: 
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(RPD-X) Referential Performative Disposition for X
If S had a referential intention satisfying (RI), and, for a certain property F, Fx, then the value of e 
in the instance of (RI) that could specify this intention might be X.4
The meanings of diﬀerent expressions that we could plug in for X in this schema will covary with 
diﬀerent values that might be plugged in for F. For example, if X is ‘Fred’, then F could be the 
property of being identical to Fred,5  but if we plug ‘I’ in for X, then F will be the property of being 
identical to the speaker. A referential interpretive disposition is one that overlapped with (RPD-
X) would be one that made an instance of the following schematic counterfactual true (holding 
the values of X and F constant):
(RID-X) Referential Interpretive Disposition for X
If A were to recognize that S had addressed an utterance of u to A, where ue was a proper part of 
u that tokened X, then A would come to believe that S intended to produce an x-dependent 
thought in A, such that F(x).
Actual referential intentions are kinds of communicative intentions, and so are also intentions 
that one’s addressee entertain some particular object-dependent proposition. So one can have a 
particular referential intention only in having a full-blown communicative intention. But one can 
be disposed to have a certain type of referential intention without being disposed to have any to-
ken of that type, just as a vase can be disposed to break when dropped without being disposed to 
break in any precise particular way. So a referential performative disposition, for example, will be 
one that links a certain expression to a general type of referential intention, individuated in terms 
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4 I have used a ‘might’ counterfactual rather than a ‘would’ counterfactual because there will often 
be diﬀerent expressions one could use to refer to a given object or property. For example, if some-
one has more than one name, then I might use one to refer to him on some occasions but another 
on other occasions.
5 This assumes that names are directly referential and syntactically unstructured—both controver-
sial assumptions.
of the value of F and e but not the values of x and p. I can be disposed to refer to males with ‘he’ 
without being thereby disposed to any one particular male, or to express any particular proposi-
tion.
Predicative dispositions, on my view, are the dispositions in virtue of which referential disposi-
tions “add up” to full-blown communicative dispositions. A predicative disposition is a disposi-
tion to refer to a certain kind of complex property or express a certain kind of proposition using 
an expression with a certain syntactic structure. I can’t see how to give a general counterfactual 
schema such that instances of it would be made true by all predicative dispositions, but here is an 
example that, hopefully, will get the general idea across:
(PPD-S) Predicative Performative Disposition for [S NP VP]
If (a) S had a referential intention r to refer to an object x with NP, (b) S had a referential inten-
tion r to refer to a property F with VP, and (c) S’s utterance u was a token of a sentence type 
whose syntactic structure is [S NP VP], then r and r would be components of S’s communica-
tive intention to produce a thought that x if F in an addressee.
In §., I will construct a version of speech-act-theoretic semantics on which every type of 
binary-branching node will be semantically signiﬁcant in a diﬀerent way and will therefore re-
quire its own compositional principle. Each one of these principles will be grounded in predica-
tive dispositions like (PPD-S) and in overlapping interpretive dispositions. 
Much more would have to be said about the nature of referential intentions and communica-
tive dispositions in order for the result to constitute a full account of the subject matter of compo-
sitional semantics, but I hope to have at least given a general picture of how a speaker’s stock of 
productive and systematic communicative dispositions could be grounded in a ﬁnite stock of ref-
erential and predicative dispositions.
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5.1.2  Sentence-Sized Acts and Word-Sized Acts
One question that may be invited by my talk of word-sized speech acts adding up to sentence-
sized speech acts, or of referential and predicative dispositions adding up to communicative dis-
positions, is the question of which of these speech acts and dispositions are more explanatorily 
fundamental. The answer is somewhat nuanced. 
Given the Gricean picture of referring that I sketched in §. and §.., a referential inten-
tion is always a kind of communicative intention, and so the notion of referring is not explanato-
rily prior to the notion of speaker meaning (or, equivalently, to the notion of performing a com-
municative illocutionary act). If word-sized speech acts aren’t more basic than sentence-sized 
speech acts, how is it that the former could add up to the latter in any interesting sense?
The answer is that compositional semantics is not the study of how complex speech acts are 
built out of more basic, independently performable speech acts. Rather, a compositional semantic 
theory speciﬁes the more speciﬁc features that deﬁne a given illocutionary act-type α in terms of 
the less speciﬁc features that deﬁne the referential and predicative act-types that one also tokens 
in tokening α. Equivalently: compositional semantics speciﬁes the speciﬁc types of communica-
tive intention that are the semantic values of complex expressions in terms of the less speciﬁc 
types of communicative intention that deﬁne the semantic values of the complex expressions’ 
parts and structures.
The purpose of thus specifying speciﬁc types of communicative act in terms of less speciﬁc 
types of communicative act is to show how the communicative dispositions linking meaningful 
sentences to their semantic values are grounded in the referential and predicative dispositions 
linking words and syntactic structures to their semantic values, respectively.
So, to sum up: acts of referring aren’t explanatorily or metaphysically prior to communicative 
illocutionary acts, and it is not possible to refer independently of performing an illocutionary act 
in the service of which one is referring. But, our referential and predicative dispositions are meta-
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physically more fundamental than the full-blown communicative dispositions underlying the 
meaningfulness of sentences.
5.2  The Syntax–Semantics Interface
So far, I have considered only how to give the semantics for a few, syntactically very simple ex-
pressions. I want now to consider how to extend this fragment a bit further, and, in the process, 
develop a few more tools that will allow for more development still. All of this revolves around the 
syntax–semantics interface, and so I will start by reviewing the contemporary orthodoxy about 
that interface as it is codiﬁed by Heim and Kratzer ().
5.2.1  Truth-Conditional Semantics and the Minimal Interface Principle
Following the work of Klein and Sag (), truth-conditional semantics has come to be regu-
lated by the ideal of what I’ll call a minimal syntax–semantics interface. A semantic theory has a 
minimal interface with syntax to the extent that its compositional principles are sensitive to few 
aspects of sentences’ phrase structures. A fully minimal interface would be one such that compo-
sitional principles would be sensitive to only the most superﬁcial tree-geometric syntactic fea-
tures. This is how Heim and Kratzer () put it:
The semantic interpretation component, then, can ignore certain features that syntactic phrase 
structure trees are usually assumed to have. All it has to see are the lexical items and the hier-
archical structure in which they are arranged. Syntactic category labels and linear order are 
irrelevant. ()
The general methodological principle can be summed up as follows:
Minimal Interface Principle
The mode of composition at a given node should be determined solely by how many daughters 
the node has and by the semantic properties of its daughters, not by any further syntactic fea-
tures of the node or its daughters.
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Like most other contemporary semanticists, Heim and Kratzer implement the Minimal Interface 
Principle by adopting a form of type-driven interpretation. In a type-driven semantic theory, ex-
pressions’ semantic values are either entities (type e), truth values (type t), or functions built up 
from objects of these two types. A verb phrase’s semantic value is a function from entities to truth 
values (type ⟨e,t⟩), for example, and a quantiﬁer phrase’s semantic value is normally taken to be a 
type ⟨⟨e,t⟩,t⟩ function from type ⟨e,t⟩ functions to truth values. This allows for a (mostly) minimal 
syntax-semantics interface because it opens up the possibility that semantic composition at binary 
branching nodes is a matter of mere functional application: the semantic value of any expression 
α with two daughters β and γ is either the value of β’s semantic value given γ’s semantic value as 
an argument or the value of γ’s semantic value given β’s semantic value as an argument. As Heim 
and Kratzer put it: “it’s the semantic types of the daughter nodes that determine the procedure for 
calculating the mother node” (1998: 44). It is the power of this functional typing system that al-
lows truth-conditional semantics to (mostly) get by without access to the ﬁne-grained syntactic 
features of expressions.
In practical terms, the Minimal Interface Principle shows up in Heim and Kratzer’s semantics 
as a scarcity of compositional principles. They begin with just three:
Terminal Nodes (TN)
If α is a terminal node, ⟦α⟧ is speciﬁed in the lexicon.
Non-Branching Nodes (NN)
If α is a non-branching node, and ⟦β⟧ is its daughter node, then ⟦α⟧ = ⟦β⟧.
Functional Application (FA)
If α is a branching node, {β, γ} is the set of α’s daughters, and ⟦β⟧ is a function whose domain 
contains ⟦γ⟧, then ⟦α⟧ = ⟦β⟧(⟦γ⟧). (Heim and Kratzer 1998: 43–4)
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It appears to have been the possibility of avoiding a proliferation of compositional principles, on 
one hand, and, perhaps more dimly, the prospect of a highly constrained syntax-semantics inter-
face, on the other hand, that has led to the rise of the Minimal Interface Principle as a guiding 
methodological tenet of contemporary semantics. Klein and Sag, who originally advocated type-
driven interpretation, justiﬁed their proposal by appeal to parsimony, saying that the approach 
“allows redundancy to be eliminated, and linguistically signiﬁcant generalizations to be ex-
pressed” (: ). Heim and Kratzer endorse the approach on more or less the same grounds 
(: –).
I say that Heim and Kratzer begin with just three compositional principles and wind up with a 
mostly minimal interface because they ultimately add “one or two additional principles to the 
above list” (: ). The principles they add violate the Minimal Interface Principle by depend-
ing for their application on ﬁne-grained syntax. Heim and Kratzer make it clear, however, that 
these additions should be considered deviations from their professed methodology:
...we will strive to keep [the list of compositional principles] as parsimonious as possible. 
When we look at a new construction for which we don't yet have a semantic analysis, we al-
ways try ﬁrst to accommodate it by adding only to the lexicon. (: ).
This is why I say that the Minimal Interface Principle is a methodological one—because although 
few contemporary semantic theories ultimately exemplify the principle to the letter, most such 
theories exemplify it in spirit, in the sense that they are shaped by it in a large number of the theo-
retical choices they embody.6
Contemporary truth-conditional semantics, it might be said, views natural language sentences 
as encoding the “structure and sequence” of applications of functional application, which is the 
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6  Some semanticists have pursued a minimal syntax-semantics interface farther than Heim and 
Kratzer—for example, by pushing even more complicated semantic machinery into the lexicon 
and by adopting type-shifting principles. I’ll brieﬂy discuss the actic analogue of type-shifting to-
ward the end of §3. For an overview of type-shifting in contemporary truth-conditional seman-
tics, see Pylkkänen and McElree (2006: §3).
primary way in which the semantic values of complex expressions are determined in terms of 
their parts.
5.2.2  The Unity of Linguistic Meaning
I will turn now to a brief comparison of speech-act-theoretic semantics and another variety of 
act-theoretic semantics, versions of which are defended by Hanks (, , , forthcoming) 
and Soames (). As in speech-act-theoretic semantics, Hanks and Soames identify the seman-
tic values of expressions with types of acts. The most notable diﬀerences between my view and 
those of Hanks and Soames are that (a) both Hanks and Soames think that the act types that serve 
as semantic values can be tokened by mental acts rather than (Soames) or in addition to (Hanks) 
speech acts, and that (b) both authors’ commitments to their versions of act-theoretic semantics 
spring from their commitments to act-theoretic accounts of the metaphysics of propositions. Spe-
ciﬁcally, both Hanks and Soames hold that a proposition is a type of complex act made up of sim-
ple acts of referring and predicating. Together with the view that sentence-sized semantic values 
are structured propositions whose constituents are the semantic values of the sentence’s parts—a 
proposal inﬂuentially defended by Soames (, ), which that both Soames and Hanks ac-
cept and which I rejected in Chapter Two—an actic theory of propositions entails an actic ap-
proach to semantics. 
Both Soames and Hanks embrace the semantic consequences of their theories of propositions. 
For Soames, the semantic values of words and phrases are types of acts of “thinking of ” objects, 
properties, and relations, and the semantic values of sentences, which he identiﬁes with acts of 
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entertaining the propositions expressed with by sentences, are types of complex acts of predicat-
ing properties and relations of one another and of objects.7
The proposition expressed by [‘ cubed >  squared’] ... is the complex event type of (i) 
thinking of the cubing function f and the number , and applying the former to the latter, (ii) 
thinking of the squaring function f and the number , and again applying the former to the 
latter, and (iii) predicating the relation being greater than of the result of applying f to , fol-
lowed by the result of applying f to . By contrast, the proposition expressed by [‘ > 
’] is the event type of thinking of the numbers  and , and predicating being greater 
than of the former, followed by the latter. Since these event types are diﬀerent, the proposi-
tions are diﬀerent. (Soames : )
Hanks holds a similar view, on which names’ semantic values are types of acts of referring to ob-
jects, predicates’ semantic values are types of acts of expressing properties and relations, and the 
semantic value of a sentence is a complex combinatory act performed on the relevant objects, 
properties, and relations. 
The proposition expressed by the sentence ‘George is clever’ is, I propose, a type of action a 
speaker performs when she asserts that George is clever. One component of this type is a type 
of act of referring to George. This type of reference act is the semantic contribution of the 
name ‘George’ to the proposition expressed by ‘George is clever’. (Hanks : )
Hanks agrees with Soames that the semantic value of a declarative sentence is a complex act of 
predicating, although they disagree about non-declarative sentences in ways that I discussed in 
§3.3.3.
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7 After initially suggesting an actic theory, Soames (2010) argues that we should identify proposi-
tions with types of cognitive events rather than with types of mental acts. He does this because he 
thinks that it sounds strange to say that the proposition that Scott philosophizes (for example) is 
something I did after midnight, or that something I’m doing right now can be either true or false. 
As Neale (2011) has pointed out, however, a view that identiﬁes propositions with types of cogni-
tive events will force us to say similarly strange things, for example that a token of the proposition 
that Scott philosophizes just happened, or that something true just took place in my mind. For 
this reason, Soames has returned to act-theoretic talk (forthcoming). In any case, my arguments 
here apply equally well if predication is conceived of as a combinatory event rather than as a com-
binatory act.
Both Soames and Hanks argue for their act-theoretic accounts of propositions, and, by conse-
quence, for their act-theoretic brands of semantics, on the grounds that these theories oﬀer a so-
lution to the problem of the unity of the proposition.8  This problem has often been framed as the 
challenge of saying what it is for a structured proposition to be a genuine unity, over and above 
the mere collection of its components. As Soames argues, however, the real problem lies in saying 
what it is in virtue of which a given structured proposition represents things as being one way 
rather than another—what it is in virtue of which a given proposition forms a genuine representa-
tional unity. What relations could the angled brackets or quasi-phrase-structural trees of typical 
structured proposition notation represent, such that the the proposition <Fred, <LOVE, Mary>>, 
for example, is true just in case Fred loves Mary (and not, say, just in case Mary loves Fred)? 
Soames argues that the only good answer is that these notations
encode the structure and sequence of cognitive acts of predication that are necessary and suf-
ﬁcient for entertaining the real propositions these abstract structures represent—where enter-
taining such a proposition is performing the acts of predication involved in tokening the event 
type that it is. (: )
A tempting, if perhaps oversimpliﬁed, way of describing Soames’ and Hanks’ conceptions of se-
mantics would be to say that natural languages are just diﬀerent (and presumably much richer) 
systems of notation for representing the structured acts we would have to perform in order to to-
ken the propositions expressed by natural language sentences. Predication thus plays a role for 
Soames and Hanks that is similar to the role played by functional application in truth-conditional 
semantics—that of the “compositional glue” that combines primitive semantic values into com-
plex semantic values.
I can’t use considerations about propositional unity to motivate speech-act-theoretic seman-
tics because I deny that propositions and their components are the right sorts of things to serve as 
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8 For some other recent work on this problem, see King (, , forthcoming) and Collins 
().
expressions’ semantic values (see §2.2). But given my  view that an expression’s semantic value is 
the type of speech act that we are disposed to perform with it, a similar concern about the unity of 
speech acts (and speech-act types) forces me to give predication the same sort of combinatory 
role that Soames and Hanks give it. The basic idea of the conception of compositional semantics 
that I have defended in this chapter is that the acts I perform in uttering a sentence’s parts add up 
to the complex act I perform in uttering the sentence. But what is it that makes the act I perform 
with the sentence ‘Rob drives’ a single, complex act of saying that Rob drives, over and above the 
series of acts I perform in uttering ‘Rob’ and then ‘drives’? The answer is that, in uttering ‘Rob 
drives’, I predicate the property of driving of Rob.
There is also a speech-act-theoretic analogue to Soames’ question about why propositions 
form representational unities. Why is the act that I perform with ‘Mary loves Fred’ an act of saying 
that Mary loves Fred rather than, for example, an act of saying that Fred loves Mary? More 
broadly: what is it about the acts we perform with a sentence’s parts in virtue of which they add 
up to a communicative illocutionary act of one kind rather than another?
Truth-Conditional Semantics must answer an analogous question: why is ‘Mary loves Fred’ 
true just in case Mary loves Fred and not just in case Fred loves Mary? The truth-conditional se-
manticist’s answer has to do with how sentences’ syntactic structures guide functional application 
up a sentence’s phrase structure, step-by-step. What we normally think of as the binary love rela-
tion is actually bifurcated, so that it can be applied to its arguments in two steps: the semantic 
value of ‘loves’ is a function that outputs the property of loving x when given an object x as an ar-
gument. It is thus the property of loving Fred that composes with Mary. Functional application 
occurs independently at each node, before the result is passed up the tree. Composition is local.
An act-theoretic semanticist must say something similar about how word-sized acts compose 
into sentence-sized acts. We perform the act of expressing the proposition that Mary loves Fred 
by referring to Mary and predicating the property of loving Fred of her. The act of referring to the 
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property of loving Fred is itself a complex one that consists of acts of referring to Fred and com-
bining the love relation with him. I will assume that this latter sort of combinatory act—the sort 
by means of which we combine relations with their second relata—is itself a kind of predication. 
That is: the act of referring to the complex property of loving Fred itself consists in the act of 
predicating the love relation of Fred.
This usage of the verb ‘predicate’ is a technical one. The word’s colloquial usage—or the usage 
that philosophers and grammarians are used to, anyway—picks out acts of the kind that we per-
form with predicates (i.e., verb phrases) on the referents of subjects (i.e., noun phrases). Nonethe-
less, I think my use of the word to pick out sub-sentential combinatory acts more generally is 
theoretically justiﬁed. First: we don’t have a nontechnical term for the kind of combinatory acts 
involved in performing complex subsentence-sized speech acts, and so some technical term is 
needed. Second: by saying that the combinatory acts whose structure is mapped out by the struc-
tures of natural language sentences are all acts of predicating, we can draw the sort of explicit par-
allel between functional application in truth-conditional semantics and predication in actic se-
mantics that suits my purpose in this section. This is ultimately a matter of terminological con-
venience: all that my argument requires us to recognize is that speech-act-theoretic semantics 
must posit some type of combinatory act corresponding to each branching node in a sentence’s 
phrase structure—an act by means of which tokens of the node’s daughters’ semantic values are 
compositionally combined into tokens of the node’s semantic value.
The following generalization thus emerges: speech-act-theoretic semantics associates complex 
acts with syntactically complex expressions by associating referential acts with semantically 
primitive expressions and diﬀerent kinds of acts of predicating with the diﬀerent binary-
branching structures into which the simple expressions are organized.
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5.2.3  The Act Mismatch Problem and Two Solutions
I now turn to the question of whether speech-act-theoretic semantics (or, by parity of reasoning, 
any act-theoretic semantics) can obey the Minimal Interface Principle. To make the case, I’ll at-
tempt to construct a simple speech-act-theoretic semantic fragment that mirrors the structure of 
type-driven semantic theories like Heim and Kratzer’s.
As I have already shown, type-driven theories succeed in obeying the Minimal Interface Prin-
ciple—or come reasonably close, anyway—only because they pack most of their semantic ma-
chinery into expressions’ semantic values. For a semantic theory to be type driven means that 
composition proceeds in a way that is predetermined by the functional types of its lexical entries 
in a way that depends only on a bare minimum of syntactic structure. Because predication plays 
the analogoue role in speech-act-theoretic semantics that functional application plays in truth-
conditional semantics, the only hope of constructing an actic theory that mirrors these features is 
to pack predication itself into expressions’ semantic values in such a way that what gets predicated 
of what at a given node does not depend on the node’s ﬁne-grained syntactic structure.
We are thus presented with a basic choice about how to structure an actic semantic theory:
Syntactically Driven Predication
What gets predicated of what at a given branching node α depends on α’s ﬁne-grained syntac-
tic structure.
Lexically Driven Predication
What gets predicated of what at a given branching node α does not depend on α’s ﬁne-grained 
syntactic structure, but is determined by facts about α’s daughters semantic values.
Trivially, Syntactically Driven Predication is incompatible with the Minimal Interface Principle, 
and so it seems that we must explore the possibility of building a semantic theory that implements 
Lexically Driven Predication. One thing that speech-act-theoretic semantics would have to do in 
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order to implement Lexically Driven Predication is to locate the type of act of predication that 
occurs at a given node in the semantic value of one of the node’s daughters. This mirrors truth-
conditional semantics, which locates the function that gets applied at a given node in one of the 
node’s daughters. This means that implementing the Minimal Interface Principle would require 
identifying the semantic value of a verb phrase (for example) with an act of predicating.
Diﬀerent act-theoretic semanticists diﬀer on this point. Hanks takes a clear stand in favor of 
Syntactically Driven Predication, arguing that predication is the semantic contribution of a 
clause’s mood (, ). It is less clear where Soames stands with regard to the two principles, 
but the fact that he distinguishes the act of predicating a property from the act of “thinking of ” it, 
rather than collapsing the two into a single act, suggest that Syntactically Driven Predication is at 
least an open option for him, since he can hold that a verb phrase’s semantic value is an act of 
thinking of a property, and that the act of predicating is supplied by a syntactically driven compo-
sitional principle. In their discussions the preﬁgure the version of speech-act-theoretic semantics 
I’ve defended here, both Neale and Grice seem to build predication into the semantic values of 
verb phrases in ways that suggest Lexically Driven Predication. Neale takes a verb phrase’s mean-
ing to be a matter of its own potential for the performance of an act of predication, thereby sug-
gesting that verb phrases’ semantic values are acts of predication (forthcoming b). Along similar 
lines, Grice argues that the meaning of a predicative adjective boils down to speakers’ shared pro-
cedure for predicating some property with it (: ), thereby at least suggesting the idea of 
identifying predicates’ semantic values with types of acts of predicating.
Aside from sub-sentential semantic values rich enough to drive semantic composition in a 
way that isn’t steered by ﬁne-grained syntax, the other ingredient that allows contemporary se-
mantic theories to (almost) obey the Minimal Interface Principle is a single, general purpose 
compositional principle for branching nodes—one that is broad enough to apply at each such 
node in a way that takes advantage of the rich compositional potential of the node’s daughters, but 
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without needing any information about the node’s ﬁne-grained syntactic structure to do so. For 
Heim and Kratzer, this principle is (FA). A speech-act-theoretic semantics with a minimal inter-
face needs a principle that is analogous but that replaces functional application with predication:
Daughter-Driven Predication (DDP)
For any expression α with β and γ as daughters, the semantic value of α is either (i) an act-type 
tokenable by performing a token of β’s semantic value on the referent of a token of γ’s semantic 
value, or (ii) an act-type tokenable by performing a token of γ’s semantic value on the referent 
of a token of β’s semantic value
Just as (FA) can deliver the semantic value of a node only if the node has one daughter whose se-
mantic value is a function whose domain contains the other daughter’s semantic value, (DDP) can 
deliver a node’s semantic value only if one daughter’s semantic value is an act-type of predication 
and the other daughter’s semantic value is some act-type that can be tokened by referring to suit-
able objects of predication. For the sake of uniformity and terminological convenience, I’ll call an 
object that a speaker refers to in performing an act of referring the act’s referent. So, in order to 
compose, expressions whose semantic values are tokened by acts of predicating must have sisters 
whose semantic values are types that are tokened by acts of referring.
All of this works out very nicely when it comes to the composition of nodes with [S NP VP] 
structure. (DDP) allows us to derive the conclusion that the semantic value of ‘Rob drives’ is an 
act-type of saying that Rob drives, for example, by positing the following semantic values for ‘Rob’ 
and ‘drives’:
‘Robert’ ? referring to Robert 9
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9 For clarity, I will leave out ‘a type tokenable by performing an act of…’ at the start of my speciﬁ-
cation of each expression’s semantic value.
‘drive’ ? predicating the property of driving (of some object, thereby expressing the proposi-
tion that it drives)
Just as the functional types of semantic values in truth-conditional semantics specify both the 
sorts of things they can act on (the functional types of the entities in their domain) and the sorts 
of things they output (the functional types of the entities in their range), the act-type of predicat-
ing that an actic semanticist identiﬁes with a predicative expression’s semantic value must specify 
the sorts of entities that can be its objects and the sort of act that an act of that type, aimed at a 
suitable object, adds up to. This information is given parenthetically in the above speciﬁcation of 
the semantic value of ‘drive’.
I could go on to posit semantic values for more names, verbs, and adjectives, including transi-
tive verbs (by appealing to the sort of considerations sketched in the previous section). The fol-
lowing is a good ﬁrst pass at the semantic value of the transitive verb ‘love’, for example:
‘love’ ? predicating the relation of loving (of some object, thereby predicating the property of 
loving that object)
But now I want to cut right to a big problem case: quantiﬁer phrases. For now, I won’t worry 
about what goes on within quantiﬁer phrases; I want to focus on the semantic values of quantiﬁer 
phrases themselves. Take the DP, ‘every parent’, for instance. It might at ﬁrst be tempting to say 
that we use this phrase to refer to every parent, but it has been clear since Frege and Russell that 
we don’t use quantiﬁer phrases to refer to the objects over which they quantify. That lesson isn’t 
completely obvious for ‘every parent’, but it is much more obvious when it comes to ‘some parent’ 
(cf. Russell’s remarks about the idea that ‘some man’ denotes “an ambiguous man” ()), and 
the lesson could not be clearer once we consider ‘no parent’. We must use such phrases to do 
something else.
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Once again, contemporary truth-conditional semantics can serve as our guide. Following 
Frege, Montague, and proponents of generalized quantiﬁer theory, it is now typical to think of 
quantiﬁer phrases’ semantic values as properties of properties. Truth-Conditional Semanticists, 
including Heim and Kratzer, identify these properties with type-⟨⟨e,t⟩,t⟩ functions—functions 
from type-⟨e,t⟩ functions (which serve as the semantic values of verb phrases) to truth values. The 
analogous actic move would be to think of the semantic values of quantiﬁer phrases as types of 
acts of predicating properties of properties. For example:
‘every parent’ ? predicating the property of applying to every parent (of some property, 
thereby expressing the proposition that it applies to every parent)
To express the proposition that every parent drives, for example, is to say of the property of driv-
ing that it applies to every parent—i.e., to predicate the property of applying to every parent of the 
property of driving. 
But now the foreshadowed problem comes into focus. By our earlier hypothesis, the semantic 
value of ‘drives’ is itself an act of predicating the property of driving, not the act of referring to the 
property of driving. This gives rise to an act mismatch: a pair of sister expressions whose semantic 
values are act-types that don’t compose. As reﬂected in our composition rule (DDP), a predicative 
act-type φ can compose only with a referential act-type; otherwise the tokens of φ will be infelici-
tous acts of predicating without objects. But in this case, neither expression’s semantic value is an 
act of referring whose referent can serve as the target of the act of predication that is the other ex-
pression’s semantic value. Instead, the daughters of ‘every parent drives’ are both types of acts of 
278
predicating, neither of whose tokens has any object to be performed on. Composition breaks 
down.10
This problem is vaguely reminiscent of the well-known type mismatch that arises in contem-
porary truth-conditional semantics when a quantiﬁer appears in a transitive verb’s object 
position.11  Despite this superﬁcial similarity, the two problems are quite distinct in both their 
scope and their causes. The act mismatch turns out to pose a problem that is both ubiquitous in 
natural languages and open to a uniform diagnosis, and it seemingly arises for any version of 
speech-act-theoretic semantics designed to have a minimal syntax–semantics.
The act mismatch problem arises due to a fundamental disanalogy between functional appli-
cation and predication that prevents the two from playing structurally similar roles in semantic 
theories. Type-driven truth-conditional semantic theories like Heim and Kratzer’s depend cru-
cially on the ability of unsaturated functions—functions that haven’t themselves been given ar-
guments—to serve as the arguments of other functions. Without this feature, type-driven seman-
tics would break down at any node both of whose daughters’ semantic values are functions. These 
are precisely the nodes at which act mismatches arise in act-theoretic semantics. This is because 
acts of predicating can’t be performed without an object on which to perform them. Unless one 
predicates a property of something, one hasn’t really predicated it at all. This is part of what it 
means to say that predication is a combinatory act. Unlike an unsaturated function, which can 
still serve as the argument of another function, an act of predication with no object can’t serve as 
the object of another act of predicating—because there can be no such act. This is the fundamen-
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10 At ﬁrst glance, it looks as though we could solve this problem by saying that if expression has an 
act-type of predicating a property ψ as its semantic value, then we can consider the expression’s 
referent to be ψ. But this doesn’t solve the problem because we would still need our compositional 
principles to tell us what gets predicated of what in act mismatch cases. As I will argue in my dis-
cussion of act shifting, this what gets predicated of what? problem can’t be solved without appeal-
ing to ﬁne-grained syntactic structure.
11 See Heim and Kratzer (1998: ch.7). 
tal disanalogy between functional application and predication, and it is what explains the ubiquity 
of act mismatches that arise in any actic theory that aspires to a minimal interface. Speciﬁcally: an 
act mismatch will arise in such a theory at any branching node neither of whose daughters would 
be given type-e or type-t semantic values by a truth-conditional semantic theory. In short: this 
problem has a totally diﬀerent scale from the problem posed by type mismatches in truth-
conditional semantics.
Can the act-mismatch problem be solved by any of the strategies that have been developed to 
deal with the type mismatch problem in truth-conditional semantics? Most such strategies 
wouldn’t work even if a suitable act-theoretic analogue could be found, because they are designed 
to deal with type mismatches only within the much narrower scope in which they appear in 
truth-conditional semantics.12  The only technique for type mismatch resolution that is both ame-
nable to an actic reinterpretation and easy to generalize is the strategy of employing type shifting 
principles to coerce semantic values into playing nice with one another.13  By analogy, we might 
try to resolve our act mismatch by developing a system of act-shifting rules, which would system-
atically adjust the types of acts serving as expressions’ semantic values in such a way as to ensure 
that every act of predicating is met with an act of referring with which it can compose. What 
would be needed from such a system of rules seems quite simple: for every expression whose 
daughters’ semantic values are both predicative act-types, one of the two must be transformed 
into a suitably corresponding referential act-type. For example: in order for (DDP) to apply to 
‘every parent drives’, we would need our act shifting principles to transform the semantic value of 
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12  Two examples are Montague’s () treatment of all NPs as quantiﬁer phrases and the later 
idea of raising quantiﬁers at LF (May , , ; Neale ). Both of these strategies are 
designed to deal only with type mismatches involving quantiﬁer phrases. Even if an actic ana-
logue could be devised, it is unclear how they could be generalized to help us with act mismatches 
in their ubiquity. (This isn’t to say that an act-theoretic semanticist would therefore have no other 
reasons to posit quantiﬁer raising; it just won’t help to solve the present problem.)
13  See Partee and Rooth () and Partee () for the original formulations of type shifting, 
and Pylkkänen and McElree (: §) for a contemporary overview of the technique.
‘drives’ from an act-type of predicating the property of driving into an act-type of referring to the 
property of driving.
But when we try to adopt act shifting principles that implement this strategy, we run into a 
diﬃcult problem. For every expression α, both of whose daughters β and γ have act-types of 
predication as their semantic values, our act-shifting principle(s) would have to correctly choose 
which daughter’s semantic value to shift. Suppose that the semantic value of β is an act of predi-
cating the property φβ and the semantic value of γ is an act of predicating the property φγ. Eﬀec-
tively, then, our act shifting principles must decide whether α’s semantic value is constituted by an 
act of predicating φβ of φγ, or an act of predicating φγ of φβ. Moreover, they must make this choice 
without appealing to the ﬁne-grained syntactic features of α, β, or γ, lest our attempt to construct 
a semantic theory that is blind to ﬁne-grained syntax collapse. Since the semantic values of β and 
γ are both acts of predicating properties, the only non-syntactic features that could distinguish 
them in the eyes of our act-shifting principles would have to be either (A) features the properties 
themselves—something about the diﬀerence between φβ and φγ—or (B) some feature, other than 
the properties being predicated, that distinguished the kinds of acts of predicating serving as the 
semantic values of β and γ. I will consider each of these possibilities in turn.
According to possibility (A), whenever our semantics encounters a node α, whose daughters β 
and γ have act-types of predicating the properties φβ and φγ, respectively, there must be a feature 
of either φβ or φγ that allows our act-shifting rules to decide which act-type to shift to an act-type 
of referring. But there is no such feature that will work. To see that this is the case, consider the 
fact that, for any property, we can always construct a verb phrase with which to predicate the 
property. Importantly for my purposes here, this includes properties of the sort that we normally 
predicate with quantiﬁer phrases. By the lights of the theory I have been exploring in this subsec-
tion, for example, the semantic value of ‘every parent’ is a type of act of predicating the property 
of applying to every parent. But by the lights of the same theory, this same property is also the 
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semantic value of the verb phrase, ‘applies to every parent’. What we need is a principle that, when 
confronted with a sentence consisting of a quantiﬁer phrase followed by a verb phrase, will shift 
the semantic value of the verb phrase but not the semantic value of quantiﬁer phrase, and that will 
do this solely on the basis of diﬀerences between the properties normally predicated with the two 
phrases. But if quantiﬁer phrases and verb phrases can be used to predicate the same properties, 
then no act shifting principle can possibly accomplish this task.
The following pair of sentences illustrate the problem:
(5) Every property applies to every property.
(6) Some property applies to some property.
First, notice that these sentences are perfectly intelligible. Indeed, (5) is false while (6) is true. But, 
by the lights of the semantic theory I’ve been working with, each of these sentences is made up of 
a quantiﬁer phrase and a verb phrase with the same semantic value—the act-type of predicating 
the property of applying to every property in (5), and the act-type of predicating the property of 
applying to some property in (6). Clearly, then, no act-shifting principle could tell us to shift these 
sentences’ verb phrases rather than their quantiﬁer phrases on the basis of information about the 
properties one predicates with them alone. Instead, an act shifting principle would have to dis-
criminate these two sentences’ daughters on the basis of their syntactic categories.
It might be objected that it doesn’t matter what gets predicated of what in (5) and (6), since 
the truth conditions work out the same either way. We might therefore formulate our act shifting 
principle(s) so that they choose which phrase’s semantic value to shift at random in such cases. 
But the following example illustrates that this strategy can’t work.
(7) Every object is abstract.
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Our theory predicts that the semantic value of ‘every object’ is an act-type of predicating the 
property of applying to every object, and that the semantic value of ‘is abstract’ is an act-type of 
predicating the property of being abstract. To deliver the correct reading of (7), on which it is 
false, an act shifting principle would have to transform the semantic value of ‘is abstract’ into an 
act-type of referring to the property of being abstract. If it were to transform the semantic value of 
‘every object’ instead, then our semantic theory would predict that (7) has a reading on which we 
use it to say that the property of applying to every object is abstract. Although this reading would be 
perfectly coherent—indeed, it would be true—it is a reading that (7) simply does not have. It’s 
quite clear from examples like this one that our hypothetical act shifting principle(s) would have 
to consistently shift the semantic values of VP’s in sentences with [S DP VP] structure. 
According to possibility (B), whenever our semantics encounters a node α whose daughters β 
and γ have act-types of predicating the properties φβ and φγ, respectively, there must be a feature 
of the semantic values of β or γ other than features of φβ or φγ that allows our act-shifting rules to 
decide which act-type to shift to an act-type of referring. What could these other properties be? 
One possibility is that acts of predicating themselves are typed, much in the same way that the 
functional semantic values of truth-conditional semantics are typed. On this view, we could spec-
ify an expression e’s semantic value by specifying both the object or property that the expression 
is used to refer to or predicate, but also the type of act it is as well. We could borrow our notation 
for these act-types from truth-conditional semantics, even if they wouldn’t mean quite the same 
things in this case (since we aren’t dealing with functional types).
‘Robert’ ? referringe to Robert
‘drive’ ? predicating⟨e,t⟩ the property of driving (of some object, thereby expressingt the 
proposition that it drives)
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‘every parent’ ? predicating⟨⟨e,t⟩,t⟩ the property of applying to every parent (of some property, 
thereby expressingt the proposition that it applies to every parent)
We could then formulate an act-shifting principle according to which, whenever two acts of 
predicating meet, the act whose type is lower is shifted to become an act of referring. This allows 
us to deal with (5) because the semantic value of the DP ‘every property’ is an act-type of predi-
cating⟨⟨e,t⟩,t⟩ the property of applying to every property, whereas the semantic value of the VP ‘ap-
plies to every property’ is an act-type of predicating⟨e,t⟩ the property of applying to every property, 
and so our act-shifting rule can convert the VP’s semantic value into an act of referring to the 
property of applying to every property on this basis.
This way of typing acts of predicating not in terms of their properties opens up the possibility 
of giving a speech-act-theoretic semantics that is structurally isomorphic to mainstream truth-
conditional semantics, but with the peculiar result that the typed functions used by truth-
conditional semanticists to represent properties’ semantic values would correspond, not to the 
properties we refer to and predicate with expressions, but to diﬀerent types of acts of referring 
and predicating themselves. 
It may, therefore, be possible to build predicating into the semantic values of non-referential 
expressions, and I plan to continue to explore this possibility in future work. Nonetheless, in the 
next section, I will continue to explore the version of speech-act-theoretic semantics that I have 
been assuming since Chapter Two, and according to which diﬀerent types of acts of predicating 
are the semantic values of diﬀerent kinds of binary-branching syntactic arrangements. I call this 
way of structuring a theory top-down speech-act-theoretic semantics.
5.2.4  Top-Down Speech-Act-Theoretic Semantics
The big diﬀerence between the version of speech-act-theoretic semantics I’ll explore here and the 
version that I explored in the previous subsection is that this theory supplies combinatory acts of 
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predication by means of an array of syntactically-driven compositional principles. A helpful way 
to understand this distinctive feature is to think of predication as being the semantic contribu-
tions of syntactic structures rather than those of particular words or phrases.
I’ll begin by tackling the sorts of expressions I’ve looked at so far.
‘Robert’ ? referring to Robert
‘Mary’ ? referring to Mary
‘Fred’ ? referring to Fred
‘drive’ ? referring to the property of driving
‘love’ ? referring to the love relation
‘parent’ ? referring to the property of being a parent
‘every’ ? referring to the every relation14
The common theme is reference. What we do with a words and phrases, according to the theory I 
am proposing, is refer to things, properties, and relations.15
I said that words and phrases have act-types of referring as their semantic values.  I have in 
mind, for example, that the semantic value of ‘loves Fred’—a complex verb phrase—is an act-type 
of referring to the complex property of loving Fred. This interpretation of phrases gives uniform-
ity to the theory, and it gives a consistent sort of target for compositional principles to aim at, 
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14 By the every relation, I mean the relation that one property bears to another just in case every 
possessor of the ﬁrst property possesses the second property.
15  Some act-theoretic semanticists who more or less agree with the spirit of my proposal would 
object to the uniformity of this formulation. Soames talks of “thinking of ” where I talk of refer-
ring, and Hanks talks of “referring” with names and “expressing” properties and relations with 
verbs. Although I have certainly departed from or extended the colloquial sense of ‘refer’ in my 
usage, I can see no reason to think that this results in more than a terminological disagreement 
with Soames and Hanks. 
both in what sort of acts they combine and in what they deliver. The following four compositional 
principles generate semantic values for all of the sorts of sentences I’ve considered so far.
Predication for [S [NP][VP]]
S’s semantic value is an act-type of expressing a the proposition that x is F that may be tokened 
by referring to x in a way that tokens NP’s semantic value, referring to F in a way that tokens 
VP’s semantic value, and predicating F of x.
Predication for [VP [Vt][NP]]
VP’s semantic value is an act-type of predicating the property of bearing R to y that may be 
tokened by referring to R in a way that tokens Vt’s semantic value, referring to y in a way that 
tokens NP’s semantic value, and predicating R of y.
Predication for [S [DP][VP]]
S’s semantic value is an act-type of expressing the proposition that F is G that may be tokened 
by referring to G in a way that tokens DP’s semantic value, referring to F in a way that tokens 
VP’s semantic value, and predicating G of F.
Predication for [DP [DET][VP]]
DP’s semantic value is an act-type of predicating the property of bearing F to G that may be 
tokened by referring to F in a way that tokens DET’s semantic value, referring to G in a way 
that tokens VP’s semantic value, and predicating F of G.
The basic idea here, as in §., is that we express propositions with sentence-radicals, refer to ob-
jects, properties, and relations with words and phrases, and predicate properties and relations of 
each other and of objects with syntactic structures. This small fragment can be built into a larger, 
recursive one with the addition of compositional principles for mood and logical connectives like 
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those I gave at the end of Chapter Three. The scope of this theory fragment is still a far cry from 
Heim and Kratzer’s, but it shows promise.
5.2.5  Too Many Intentions? Too Many Speech Acts?
According to the theory I’ve laid out, a speaker who does the usual thing in uttering the simple 
sentence ‘Paul philosophizes’ performs one speech act with ‘Paul’, another with ‘philosophizes’, 
another with the syntactic structure [S NP VP], another with the declarative mood, another with 
the whole sentence, and perhaps others with tense morphemes, intonation contours, and what-
ever other semantically signiﬁcant bells and whistles are hidden in the sentence. Moreover, the 
performance of each of these speech acts will be grounded in a diﬀerent kind of communicative 
intention. Upon hearing me say all of this, commentators have tended to respond that it is im-
plausible that we typically perform that many speech acts, or that we typically have that many in-
tentions, in speaking. And, of course, this objection becomes all the more intuitively forceful once 
we catalogue the speech acts and intentions involved in uttering more complex sentences (such as 
this one).16
Several things can be said in response to this worry. One is that it is an instance of a more 
general problem about individuating action, and philosophers of action have defended accounts 
of the individuation of action that produce similar proliferations of actions. For example, Gold-
man inﬂuentially defends the view that “two act-tokens are identical if and only if they involve the 
same agent, the same property, and the same time” (: ). The result of this is that what may 
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16 The best-articulated version of this objection that I’ve heard is due to Neale, who considers it in 
the manuscript of his forthcoming book, Linguistic Pragmatism (forthcoming b). In Neale’s formu-
lation, the initial appeal of speech-act-theoretic semantics is that it seems plausible that we do 
perform acts of referring and predicating in order to perform acts of asserting with sentences like 
‘Paul philosophizes’, but this initial appeal wears oﬀ once we start identifying every meaningful 
component of a complex sentence with yet another act type that a speaker tokens in uttering the 
whole sentence.
seem like going about one’s ordinary business turns out to involve the peformance of many token 
actions:
If we adopt this analysis of act-tokens, we shall obtain the result sought in the previous sec-
tion; that is, it will follow that John's moving his hand (at t), John's moving his queen to king-
knight-seven (at t), John's checkmating his opponent (at t), John's giving his opponent a heart 
attack (at t), etc., are all diﬀerent act-tokens. This is because the properties exempliﬁed in 
these cases are diﬀerent properties. The property of moving one's hand ≠ the property of 
moving one's queen to king-knight-seven ≠ the property of checkmating one's opponent ≠ 
the property of giving one's opponent a heart attack, etc. (Goldman : )
In much the same way, it follows from my view that the many speech acts that S performs in ut-
tering ‘Paul philosophizes’ are distinct actions because they exemplify distinct act types. What my 
account adds to this is the view that our dispositions to perform some of these actions in certain 
circumstances are grounded in our dispositions to perform certain others.
Moreover, I see no problem with saying that each of these speech acts is performed with cer-
tain intentions in virtue of which it counts as a token of a given act type. The opposing view, 
which has been a perennial worry about intention-based accounts of speaker meaning,17  seems to 
be based mainly in the fact that many speakers will deny having communicative dispositions at 
all, or in the fact that even theorists lack introspective access to this evidence. More generally, it 
may simply seem implausible that naïve language users have this much stuﬀ going on in their 
minds in speaking.
My response to this concern is that although it may be intuitively strange to say that speakers 
perform this many actions or have that many intentions in speaking, neither our intuitions, nor 
our folk theory of action, nor our introspective abilities should be taken as reliable guides to these 
matters.18 Although the early stages of a theory might get oﬀ the ground in part due to the plausi-
bility of its posits, those posits must ultimately be judged by the explanatory work that they do. 
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17 See, for example, Evans and McDowell (: xix–xxiii).
18  It’s also worth asking ourselves how intuitive the complex set-theoretic posits of truth-
conditional semantics are, by comparison.
The version of speech-act-theoretic semantics I’ve oﬀerd in this and the past few chapters is ulti-
mately justiﬁed on the theoretical grounds that it best accounts for the phenomena that a theory 
of linguistic meaning ought to explain.
5.3  Conclusion and Mile-Marking
My goal in this chapter has been to point the way toward a version of compositional semantics 
that is compatible with everything I’ve said in the previous chapters. Although there is much work 
left to do, I hope to have shown at least that the project is conceptually sound, and that there is 
reason to be optimistic about the possibility that speech-act-theoretic semantics stacks up well 
against its more orthodox competitors when it comes to their strengths as well as their weak-
nesses.
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